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iABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES
The following abbreviations, editions, and notations are used throughout the work. If not
specified, all references are to pages. The dates of composition and/or publication of
Hobbes’s works are indicated in the square brackets.
The Answer to Davenant: The Answer of Mr Hobbes to Sir William Davenant’s Preface before
‘Gondibert’ [1650], in EW, IV.
Appendix to Leviathan: Leviathan (with selected variants from the Latin Edition), ed. E.
Curley (Indianapolis: IN, 1994[1668]), 498-548.
Aquinas: I have used the following abbreviations: Summa Theologiae [ST], tr.
English Dominicans (New York, 1981), Summa Contra Gentiles
[SCG], tr.  by  James  F.  Anderson  (Notre  Dame,  1975),  and A
Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima [CDA],  tr.  by  Robert  Pasnau
(New Haven, 1999). References in the first follow the classification
of Aquinas, which consist of questions, answers, replies and is based
on the medieval practice, in the second references are given by parts,
chapters, and (when necessary) page numbers, and in the third by
page numbers.
Aristotle: The Complete Works of Aristotle,  2  volumes,  ed.  J.  Barnes
(Princeton: NJ 1984). Independent works are referred to by the
standard Latin name and follow the conventions of the Bekker
system.
Augustine: I have used The Fathers of the Church series (for further details,
consult bibliography). The exception are De Genesi ad Litteram and
Enchiridion from the Ancient Christian Writers series.
Behemoth: Behemoth; or the Long Parliament [1679], in EW, VI.
Bible: When referring to the Bible I use the normal conventions. For
example, Romans 13:7  refers  to  the  verse  7  in  the  book  13  of  St.
Paul’s letter to Romans in the New Testament.
Brief Lives: I have mainly used the text that appears in Elements. But as it is not
complete I have occasionally consulted John Aubrey, Brief Lives,
Chiefly on Contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey between the
years 1669-1696, ed. A. Clarke (Oxford, 1898) to which I refer to as
Brief Lives (Clarke).
Rhetorique: A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique, in Harwood (ed.) 1986[1637], 33-
128.
Chatsworth Catalogue: Catalogue of the Library at Chatsworth,  4  volumes,  ed.  Sir  J.  P.
Lacaita (London, 1879). Though the catalogue was printed by
Chiswick Press London, the publication was a private enterprise of
William 7th Duke of Devonshire, who published 200 small and 50
ii
large copies. I have used the large copy number 12, which was
presented to the Bodleian library.
Concerning Body: Elements of Philosophy. The First Section, Concerning Body [1656],
in EW, I. I have occasionally used the Latin edition, De Corpore
(Elementarum Philosophiae, sectio prima: De Corpore [1655], in
OL, I). References to both editions are given by Roman (chapter) and
Arabic (article) numerals, followed (when necessary) by page
numbers.
Correspondence: The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes, 2 volumes, ed. N. Malcolm
(Oxford, 1994). References are given by the number of the letter
followed by page numbers.
Critique du ‘De Mundo’: Critique du De Mundo de Thomas White, eds. J. Jacquot and H. W.
Jones (Paris, 1973 [1643]). When consulting the English translation
of the work I use the customary title Anti-White (Hobbes, 1976).
References to both works are given by Roman (chapter) and Arabic
(section) numerals, which are followed (when necessary) by page
numbers.
Decameron Physiologicum: Decameron Physiologicum, Or Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy
[1678], in EW, VII.
De Homine: Elementarum Philosophiae, sectio secunda: De Homine [1658], in
OL, II. References are given by Roman (chapter) and Arabic
(section) numerals, followed (when necessary) by page numbers.
Dialogue: Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws
of England, in Writings on Common Law and Hereditary Rights, eds.
A. Cromartie and Q. Skinner (Oxford 2005[1675/1681]).
Elements: Elements of Law: Human Nature and Concerning Body Politico with
Three Lives, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford, 1993[1640]). References
are given by Roman (chapter) and Arabic (article) numerals,
followed (when necessary) by page numbers.
EW: The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, 11 volumes, ed. Sir William
Molesworth (Aalen, 1962[1839-1845]). References are given by
volume and page numbers in a volume.
Leviathan: Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, 1998 [1651]). References
are given by Roman (chapter) numerals and page numbers, which
follow the pagination of the Head edition and are indicated in the
margins of the central editions of Leviathan.
Liberty and Chance: Questions concerning Necessity, Liberty, and Chance [1656], in EW,
V.
Liberty and Necessity: Of Liberty and Necessity [1654], in EW, IV.
OL: Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis opera philosophica quae latine
scripsit omnia, 5 volumes, ed. Sir William Molesworth (Aalen,
iii
1961[1839-1845]). References are given by volume and page
numbers in a volume.
On the Citizen: On the Citizen, ed. Richard Tuck and tr. M. Silverthorne
(Cambridge, 1998[1651]). I have occasionally used the Latin edition
De Cive, ed. H. Warrender (Oxford, 1983[1642]). References to both
works are given by Roman (chapter) and Arabic (article) numerals,
followed (when necessary) by page numbers.
Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington
Cairns (Princeton: NJ 1961). Independent dialogues are referred to
by the standard English name and references are given by the
Stephanus numbers.
Six Lessons: Six Lessons to the Professors of Mathematics [1656], in EW, VII.
Thucydides: ‘The Epistle Dedicatory’, ‘To the Readers’ , and ‘Of the Life and
History of Thucydides’[1629], in EW, VIII.
The Verse Life: The Verse Life [1679], tr. by anonymous contemporary, in Elements,
254-264.
The Virtues of an Heroic Poem: ‘Concerning the virtues of an heroic poem’[1673], in EW, X.
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I PROLOGUE
Thomas Hobbes was a scandal. This is strange because what he merely tried to explain
was what many of his contemporaries already believed. An example is Hobbes’s
Dialogue on common law where he disagrees not so much with what is taken to be just
and unjust, but on what the authority of laws is based on. On more general terms,
justification of knowledge not stating facts, is central in Hobbes’s thinking.
Samuel Mintz once described Hobbes’s character in an illuminating fashion: ‘a
fearful man with an adventurous and searching mind’.1 There is some evidence that
Hobbes was a fearful man,2 but this work will study ‘an adventurous and searching
mind’. It does this through two themes. First, by examining different aspects of Hobbes’s
notion of imagination, and, second, by inspecting the multifaceted nature or, as I call it,
the diversity of Hobbes’s philosophy.
The prologue in hand has three topics. After touching some methodological
issues, it draws a familiar picture of Hobbes’s philosophy and gives some critical remarks
on the standard reading of his philosophy. The last section of the prologue offers a
preliminary summary of the thesis.
RESTRICTIONS AND LIBERTIES
The recent renaissance in Hobbes studies has produced an industry3 that concentrates not
only on discussing various aspects of his thought, but also addresses the problem of how
to study past thinkers. In this respect, the work in hand tries to avoid two kinds of
errors. The first is the illusion that we can give a perfect reconstruction of past ideas, the
second is an idea that we can forget the facts. Below I will discuss in more detail the
principles of interpretation that guide my study of Hobbes’s philosophy, but as a general
outline, I have found Noel Malcolm’s short methodological reflection useful:
When A influences B, there may always be reasons (in principle, separately statable) why B
was apt to be influenced by A; and at the same time what B gets out of, or sees in, A may well
be different from what C, D, or E get out of him—again, because of factors in B’s intellectual
1 Mintz 1962, 1.
2 Above all in the opening lines of his verse autobiography, but see also Correspondence Letters 4 and 5,
where Hobbes reports on the problems of travelling in Europe of his day.
3 Goldsmith (1991) has provided an overview to the modern Hobbes scholarship. See also Lamprecht’s
(1940) essay on the reception of Hobbes.
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formation that are both more general, and more specific to B. The nexus of ‘influence’ is thus a
much more complex interaction than any mere transfer of ideas from one person to another.4
The passage has three noteworthy points. The first is that thinkers are more conscious of
the origins of their  ideas (they are ‘apt to be influenced’) than is thought by those who
interpret these ideas. For example, and as will be explained in more detail later, when
discussing what scientific knowledge is, Hobbes uses rather traditional vocabulary
(usually traced back to Aristotle’s distinction between apodeixis tou dioti and apodeixis
tou hoti in Analytica Posteriora).5 The second point is that people read texts with
different motivations and background information. Hobbes’s volatile relationship to the
tradition of ars rhetorica is an example of this. Depending upon which interpretation we
consider a plausible one, sometimes he seems to approve the use of eloquence in civil
philosophy, sometimes not. The last point that Malcolm’s formulation raises is the most
obvious: influence is a rather complicated issue which cannot be solved by pointing out
some textual similarities between thinkers, but which always requires a more holistic
account. Therefore, despite the fact that Hobbes uses Aristotle’s example of the sun6,
this does not imply that his conception of the imagination is an Aristotelian one, though
the two have some things in common. To say where conceptions, theories, and ideas
differ from and resemble each other calls for two kinds of methodological guidelines:
restrictions and liberties.
The first restriction in a study of the history of philosophy are facts, by which I
refer to two things: a text that is studied and other source material that is available, for
example, correspondence, library catalogues, and other documents, as well as
contemporary reactions and reports. When it comes to supplemental material, I have
used some, but in a particular way. I do not refer to Hobbes’s letters or the general
intellectual background of his philosophy primarily in order to demonstrate a historical
truth, but in order to exemplify his ideas and to give some factual evidence for a claim at
hand. Even though there are places in this work where I will indicate something about
the context of a specific question or a problem that is under discussion, my thesis should
be considered a philosophical rather than a historical exploration.
Texts are central to the work at hand. This requires analyses of passages in
Hobbes’s work, a necessary task in order to do justice to his careful and versatile
thinking. His discussions do not touch only upon one subject, but are written so that
they, quite often (but not always), set up a chain of ideas or a line of arguments that
relate to one another and make sense only if the different trails of thoughts are seen as a
whole. To give a familiar example, Chapter I of Leviathan is  a  summary  of  Hobbes’s
4 Malcolm 2002, 537 n. 294.
5 Analytica Posteriora 71b10-19.
6 Aristotle, De Anima 428b2-5. Used again in De Insomnis 460b18-20. For Hobbes’s adaptation, see
Elements II.5, 23-24; Decameron Physiologicum, 80-81; and Correspondence Letter 19, 33-34.
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theory of sense, but to this is added the first occasion of the critique of Schools. Even
though the critique is in the form of the scholastic theory of perception, it does not only
seek to rebut this doctrine but also to give an unfavourable view of the whole intellectual
movement. The critique, then, is at the same time philosophical and ideological.
A salient question under this topic is Hobbes’s texts and their mutual relationship.
My study will take Leviathan as its starting point, but hopefully avoids a fetishistic
approach to Hobbes’s magnum opus. Although I give some parallels between Elements,
De Cive, and Leviathan, when trying to locate and determine the status of Leviathan
among Hobbes’s works, I do not seek to trace the development of Hobbes’s political
ideas.  The  work  in  hand  seeks  to  give  a  more  comprehensive  account  of  Hobbes’s
thinking and this requires us to pay attention to both works that preceded and followed
Leviathan. Some of these have more direct connection to Leviathan. For example,
Critique du ‘De Mundo’ includes the basic ideas of Hobbes’s psychology and, moreover,
anticipates his philosophy of language. Equally, The Answer to Davenant, The Virtues of
an Heroic Poem and Thucydides are  instructive  when  trying  to  make  sense  of  the
economical summaries on poetry and history that appear in Chapter VIII of Leviathan.
What are of special interest here, are works that came after Leviathan. These are
important not only on the general level, but also because they have a link to some of the
ideas that arise from Leviathan. A central notion is Hobbes’s conception of knowledge.
Through  this  some  later  works,  such  as Six Lessons to the Professors of Mathematics
and De Homine which have been sometime depicted as failures, sometimes as
anachronisms, and sometimes as politics, become central.
The main point of this short discussion is the idea that though it is a masterpiece,
Leviathan is still part of Hobbes’s philosophical thought. The book has become a classic
of intellectual history and its richness is astonishing, but this should not diminish the
value of other, less-studied works, such as the commentary to White’s De Mundo, also a
book  full  of  new,  interesting  ideas,  often  in  a  form  that  makes  it  easier  to  trace  the
origins of Hobbes’s ideas.
The second restriction deals with Hobbes’s intellectual formation.7 The question
of influence is not an easy one with Hobbes, who was both secretive on the origins of his
ideas and always ready for a debate.8 In  general,  the  question  of  influence  will  not  be
studied as a separate issue. Instead, during the course of the thesis, I shall try to add
something new to what has already been said of the origins and genesis of the different
ideas in Hobbes’s philosophy. In addition, I wish to ask a basic question: what did
Hobbes read?9
7 On the intellectual origins of Hobbes, see Malcolm 2002, essay I; Skinner 1996, Chapter 6; 2002, Vol.
III, Chapters I and II.
8 A valuable study of Hobbes as troublemaker is Jesseph 1999.
9 For a recent view of the subject, see Thornton 2005, 11-12, notes 106 and 107 there.
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Hobbes,  notoriously,  boasts  how  little  he  read,  though  this  notion  should  be
immediately qualified. First, though he very seldom refers to other authors, it is plausible
to think that Hobbes is following the convention of his time. In a similar fashion, for
example, Descartes and Bacon rarely mention their sources. It was simply of little use to
give exact references, because education confirmed that every literate person was
familiar with the classical works. Second, the fact that Hobbes ‘had very few books
[...and  Aubrey]  never  saw (nor  Sir  William Petty)  above  half  a  dozen  about  him in  his
chamber’10 is not a substantial evidence that Hobbes did not read. Third, besides
individual pieces of evidence,11 one needs to take into account the fact that Hobbes was
in the service of a literary family of the Cavendishes, who had a wide and active interest
in the intellectual currents of the time.
An  important  source  of  what  Hobbes  read  is  then  the  Cavendish  library  and  in
particular the library in one of the Cavendish residences, Hardwick Hall. There is no
modern critical edition of the catalogue of the library at Hardwick Hall12, but a catalogue
of the books of Cavendish family does exist. The enterprise was organised by William
Cavendish (1808-1891) 7th Duke of Devonshire and carried out by Sir James Phillip
Lacaita (1813-1895). Hobbes is mentioned in the preface of the catalogue,13 but we are
unable to say much on that basis. However, from the preface we learn some things about
how the Chatsworth library was formed.
Firstly, though there were early acquisitions by the First and the Second earl,
according to Lacaita it was the Third earl (also William and the one in whose service
Hobbes spent most of his career) who started to build up the collection: ‘He was “bred
to book”, and many of the early editions of the classics, as well as of French and Italian
works bear his book-plate, showing that they were collected by him during his long
life’.14 Even so, it is often unclear when a certain edition exactly entered the collections.
Though the catalogue reports many early editions, many of these could have entered the
library collections only in the 18th century, when William-Spencer, the Sixth Duke
10 Brief Lives, 239.
11 For example, the story in Brief Lives according to which Hobbes started to buy pocket-size books in
order to restore his Latin to its former level. Another piece of evidence is how familiar Hobbes was with
natural philosophy and mathematics. For the former, see, for instance, the chapter discussing comets in
Critique du ‘De Mundo’ and although here the documentation of sources is partly due to the excellent
work of the editors, this would not have been possible without distinguishable sources. The interest of
comets traces back to Aristotle’s Meteorologica. For a documentation of some early Medieval views, see
the volume edited by Thorndike (1950).
12 It should be mentioned that Hobbes drew up two catalogues of the Cavendish books. The first is from
the 1630s and the second from the late 1650s. The latter was complied by James Wheldon but Hobbes
directed the work. See (respectively) MS E1 A and MS Hardwick, unnumbered. I have here relied on
Malcolm 2002 (96, 111, and 458). The study of MS Hobbes E1 A (started by the late Richard Talaska
and titled The Hardwick Library and Hobbes's Early Intellectual Development)  has  not  yet  been
published.
13 For entries, see Chatsworth Catalogue, I, vii, xii.
14 Chatsworth Catalogue, I, xiii.
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purchased the library of Thomas Dampier (1748-1812), Bishop of Ely, who ‘was one of
the most learned bibliophiles of his day [and] collected a large library of rare editions of
the Greek and Latin classics’.15 Additionally, the Cavendishes had many residences which
all contained some books and the various collections were not brought together before
1815.16 In the light of this, it seems reasonable to conclude that the library had already in
the beginning at least one edition of classical works, such as Aristotle and Cicero, and
though it  remains  in  many cases  unclear  exactly  what  edition  he  used,17 it is likely that
Hobbes had access, which he also utilised, to a diverse collection of works. As Aubrey
concludes: ‘He had read much, if one considers his long life; but his contemplation was
much more  than  his  reading.  He  was  wont  to  say  that  if  he  had  read  as  much as  other
men, he should have known no more than other men.’18
The third restriction concerns the way past ideas are explained and expressed. It
would be, if not a mistake, at least limiting to stay within a purely internal conceptual
framework, especially if by this is understood only those concepts, doctrines, and
theories that are explicitly mentioned by an author, or were available to him on the basis
of  what  we  know  generally  about  the  history  of  a  language,  say,  by  means  of
dictionaries. Therefore, terms such as ‘psychology’ and ‘epistemology’ will be used
when discussing Hobbes’s theories of human nature and knowledge, even though these
are, strictly speaking, later inventions. But then again it is crucial to make a difference
between adopting terms to elucidate past ideas from incorporating ideas to explain them.
An example may help to clarify the difference.
Watkins has described the shortcomings of Hobbes’s philosophy in the following
way:  ‘[i]n  Hobbes’s  day  two  distinctions  which  are  now  fairly  commonplace  were  not
drawn sharply: that between cosmology and epistemology, and that between a scientific
and a metaphysical cosmological theory about the external world, or some aspect or part
of it’.19 This may be true, but the question can be posed how much does this help us to
understand Hobbes’s thinking? Watkins’s analysis does not necessarily do justice to
Early Modern philosophy. Early Modern philosophy can be characterised as an
intellectual movement that was particularly aware of the latter distinction, but which also
maintained that natural science is always the best possible, as well as the most plausible
15 Chatsworth Catalogue, I, xvi.
16 Chatsworth Catalogue, vol I, xvii.
17 Some of the works are also listed in Hamilton 1978, but the list provided there is short. During the
course of my thesis, I will indicate possible works that Hobbes could have used.
18Brief Lives, 240. Compare this to what Aubrey writes a little earlier: ‘I heard him say, that at his
lord’s house in Derbyshire there was a good library, and books enough for him, and that his lordship
stored the library with what books he thought fit be bought; but he said, the want of learned conversation
was a very great inconvenience’ (Brief Lives, 236).
19 Watkins 1989, 19.
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hypothesis of what is ‘there anyway’20 – Leibniz, I believe, is the best spokesman of this
position. Therefore, at least the distinction between scientific and metaphysical theory
was present in Early Modern philosophy and in Hobbes, but not in the same sense as this
distinction was to be understood in the 20th century.
Moving to the terrain of explicit methodology, it has become customary to make
a distinction between two approaches in the history of philosophy: the contextualist and
the textualist approach.21 To simplify, the idea of putting a thinker within a context
requires that at least three factors are take into account: the historical factor, namely that
a concept, an idea, or a theory always has a pedigree; the contemporary factor by which
is meant here that ideas are always born in a certain intellectual context and as a result of
the exchange of ideas; and the socio-ideological factor, that is, the impact that historical
and political conditions have on intellectual activity. The second option, textualism, puts
the preference in the text and tries to understand it on its own terms and in a systematic
fashion without putting special emphasis to the historical context.
The distinction between the contextualist and the textualist approach also reflects
the difference between the historical and the philosophical approach.22 The historical
approach tries to give a precise and well-documented account of past thinkers and their
ideas. Here such things as influence, correspondence, and historical events are relevant.
Nevertheless, something that has been aptly called ‘the cult of fact’ should not distract
us.23 A perfect construction is never possible and therefore we need to interpret the
evidence, and here the philosophical approach enters to the picture. The idea of
coherence is slightly different in philosophical and historical examinations. Instead of the
demand for authenticity, the aim in philosophical interpretations is hermeneutic. The
different approaches answer different kinds of questions, and they are better understood
as supporting than competing with each other. Whether an interpretation is historical or
philosophical  is  not,  however,  a  matter  of  taste,  but  of  emphasis.  My own approach  is
closer to the philosophical than the historical; my aim is to clarify Hobbes’s ideas as
much as possible, but without distorting their original content.
An example will elucidate my point. In a letter to William Cavendish (1617-
1684), the Third Earl of Devonshire, Hobbes writes: ‘[i]n thinges that are demonstrable,
of wch kind is ye greatest  part  of Naturall  Philosophy, as depending vpon the motion of
bodies  so  subtile  as  they  are  inuisble’.24 It would be absurd to say that this is not a
genuine statement of Hobbes, because he speaks of invisible bodies and these kinds of
entities do not belong to his materialist and empiricist philosophy. Equally, it would be
20 The phrase comes from Bernard Williams’s Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry.
21 For a discussion, see Hoekstra 2004, 71-72.
22 Examples of the kind of historical approach I have in mind are Sommerville 1992 and Overhoff 2000.
Parallels in the field of philosophy are Gauthier 1969; Kavka 1986; and Lloyd 1992.
23 Skinner 2002, Vol. I , Chapter 2.
24 Correspondence Letter 19, 33.
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hasty to conclude that during the writing of the letter Hobbes was under the influence of
Aristotelian physics and considered some sort of incorporeal substances possible, for
there is no sign of a doctrine of intelligible forms in the writings of Hobbes from the
period in question or afterwards. Instead, the explanation could be very trivial. There are
some things that we are not able to perceive either with our eyes or with scientific
instruments, but this does not imply that we are unable in the future to perceive this
invisible motion. Natural philosophy is not demonstrable science, but develops gradually
as our means of studying the natural world develops.
The methodological reflection ends with another example. Religion and faith are
a subject of lasting debate in Hobbes studies.25 A separate question, raised during
Hobbes’s lifetime and every now and then since, concerns his atheism.26 My answer to
this question runs as follows. In 17th century Europe and Britain political vocabulary and
human life in general were essentially religious, and, consequently, religion was an
integral part of Hobbes’s thinking.27 As Jesseph writes, ‘Hobbes viewed religion as an
inescapable part of the human condition which must be rigorously controlled by the
sovereign’.28
The question whether Hobbes was an atheist or a Christian can be answered by a
statement Hobbes himself gives in an early work: ‘opinions [of Thucydides], being of a
strain  above  the  apprehension  of  the  vulgar,  procured  him the  estimation  of  an  atheist;
which name they bestowed upon all men that thought not as they did of their ridiculous
religion’, when in fact, as Hobbes argues, Thucydides was neither ‘superstitious’ nor ‘an
atheist’.29 The same line of argument applies in the case of Hobbes. In the eyes of many
of his contemporaries he was an atheist of the worst kind, but then again we need to take
into account that they used the term in a different sense than we do. From their
standpoint, Hobbes’s call for the subordination of ecclesiastical power to the secular, his
materialistic metaphysics, and his somewhat mundane conception of morality formed a
major threat, which they expressed in the familiar normative language and in this higly
qualified sense Hobbes was an atheist.
25 These should be distinguished from each other. My understanding is that to Hobbes, religion
represents public, faith private relationship of human beings to God.
26 In relation to Hobbes and religion, Malcolm (1982, 266-272) gives the list of thirteen different
positions that have been proposed to characterise Hobbes’s religious stance; these include pantheism.
Useful discussions on the subject are by Curley (1992); Martinich (1992); and Jesseph (1999, Chapter 7
(especially 325-327) and 2002). Also Mintz’s (1962) pioneering study is still useful.
27 Compare  to  Kateb  (1989,  368):  ‘Hobbes  is  no  more  Christian  than  he  is  an  atheist.  However,  his
world is Christian’.
28 Jesseph 2002, 142.
29 Thucydides, xv. The passage is a bit unclear. Hobbes seems to refer to the opinions of Anaxagoras, but
because the subject in general is Thucydides, whom Hobbes considers the student of Anaxagoras, I find
my attribution in square-brackets justified.
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One more caveat needs to be made,. In his article ‘Hobbes’s Atheism’, Jesseph
provides a plausible line of argument which shows how the idea of God is problematic in
the framework of Hobbes’s materialistic ontology and concludes that ‘there are strong
grounds for seeing Hobbes’s excursions into theology as exercises in irony’.30 Even
though I agree with Jesseph’s philosophical argument, the conclusion he draws is suspect
and I suggest that we should remain sceptical when it comes to Hobbes’s personal
religious conviction. The reason for this is simple, no indisputable evidence exists. All the
historical evidence provided indicates that at best Hobbes was ‘a closet atheist’.31
There are, then, convincing philosophical reasons to conclude that Hobbes’s
philosophy entails atheism and to claim that his views in matters of faith and devotion
were unorthodox,32 but not enough historical evidence to show Hobbes was an atheist. It
takes both historical knowledge and philosophical dexterity to show that this dual
account of Hobbes’s atheism is a plausible approach, but it reflects the balance between
restrictions and liberties that this study aims at.
A PORTRAIT OF HOBBES
Those who have studied Hobbes may have come across a detail: there are few widely
circulated portraits of him. There seem to be two or three pictures that a scholar finds
again and again on the covers of studies of his thought.33 A similar observation applies to
his philosophy.
Since  the  end  of  the  19th century there has been a growing interest in Hobbes’s
work, which has accelerated as we come closer to our own time. The amount of
scholarship is huge. From this it does not follow that there are as many interpretations of
Hobbes as there are interpreters. There are many disputes over specific issues, but there
appears to be a consensus about what the central tenets of Hobbes’s philosophy are. In
what follows, I wish to offer some critical remarks on the standard readings. What is
discussed below is however an outline, and the questions related to the standard picture
of Hobbes’s philosophy will be discussed in detail during the course of the thesis. These
30 Jesseph 2002, 158.
31 Jesseph 2002, 154 (the circumstantial socio-historical evidence for Hobbes’s atheism is discussed on
pages 152-156).
32 For Hobbes’s view of faith and devotion, see Glover 1965 and Johnston 1989.
33 The reality is, as usual, more complex, and exceptions do exists. See, for instance, the cover of Tuck
1993.  There  would  appear  to  be  twelve  portraits  of  Hobbes,  of  which  many  have  variants.  The  most
extensive study, and the one followed here, is Bredekamp 2003 (for different portraits see 215-233; note
that Bredekamp lists four more portraits that are not pictured in the appendix). Hobbes himself writes:
‘A portrait of him, painted from life when he was seventy, finely executed, is held in the private
collection of King Charles the Second. Other portraits of him are extant. These were painted at various
times, at the behest not least of his friends in England, but also at the behest of his friends in France’
(‘The Prose Life’, in Elements, 252).
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discussions  form  the  second  of  the  broad  themes  of  the  work,  namely  the  diversity  of
Hobbes’s philosophy.
Hobbes is a pleasantly systematic thinker. This is often taken to mean that he has
a system of ideas;34 that Hobbes, from the philosophical awakening of the 1630s
onwards, developed a set of doctrines that dovetail smoothly. I believe this to be a
mistake.  Hobbes  is  a  systematic  thinker,  but  from this  it  does  not  follow that  he  had  a
system of ideas.35 Instead, we have a set of principles that we are able to find in his
extensive oeuvre and that are normally expressed by a list of isms, which includes
materialism, mechanism, determinism, nominalism, and empiricism. Surely, these labels
characterise Hobbes’s philosophy, but they need to be explicated.
To begin with the most obvious, Hobbes was a materialist, but what kind of
materialist?36 In Leviathan, Hobbes expresses his materialism with the following words:
‘The World, (I mean not the Earth onely, that denominates the Lovers of it Worldly men,
but the Universe, that is, the whole masse of all things that are) is Corporeall, that is to
say, Body’.37 Consequently, materialism is a position that holds that reality is not
immaterial, nor does it have any immaterial components. This excludes such entities as
angels and immaterial spirits.
The problem with the material world is, however, that we do not have direct
access to it. Hobbes solves this by constructing the notions of real and imaginary space.
For example, in Critique du ‘De Mundo’, he explains that we conceive space by
imagining it in our mind, but from this it does not follow that this totality of bodies in
motion  will  cease  to  exist  when we stop  to  imagine  it,  merely  that  as  an  object  of  our
capacity to understand reality it exists as an imaginary space.38 This gives room for the
conclusion  that  Hobbes’s  idea  that  reality  is  nothing  but  matter  is  an  axiom  .  There  is
nothing alarming in this. As long as Hobbes is able to show that there is either some
evidence for the axiom or that there is some evidence against the rival views. I will return
to the details of the question in Chapter V, here it is suffice to point out the following.
Because Hobbes thinks that the knowledge of the causes of natural bodies will always
remain unsure, the latter option is more convincing. For instance, Hobbes’s argument of
the denial of incorporeal substances could be taken as evidence against a prominent rival,
namely Aristotelian metaphysics. This is not however a very satisfactory conclusion
because the same kind of reasoning could be used to defend, say, Aristotelian
metaphysics, but the following qualification may make Hobbes’s position more
convincing.
34 See, for example, Brandt 1928, 347-348 and Watkins 1989.
35 For a similar train of thoughts, see Oakeshott 1975, 16; Prokhovnik 1991, 214; and Malcolm 2002,
538.
36 For some ideas, see Brandt 1928, 355-372 and Leijenhorst 2002, Chapter 4.
37 Leviathan XLVI, 371.
38 See Anti-White III. For a valuable discussion, see Leijenhorst 2002, Chapter 3.
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A central tenet of Hobbes’s philosophy, materialism, is then better read as the
qualified claim which states that, in the light of the best available knowledge concerning
the natural world (including the human mind) and within the limits of human mental
capacities, the world is nothing but matter in motion and all phenomena should be
considered in the light of this. A similar line of thought applies to the other central thesis,
mechanism.39
Motion, which is to Hobbes local motion, is the principle which explains the basic
functioning of our world; it is ‘Hobbes’s conceptual key to the understanding of all
reality’.40 In Concerning Body, he writes about motion as follows: ‘But the causes of
universal things (of those, at least, that have any cause) are manifest of themselves; or (as
they say commonly) known to nature, so that they need no method at all; for they have
all but one universal cause, which is motion’.41
In Leviathan,  Hobbes  articulates  two  general  meanings  motion  has  in  his
metaphysics. First, it is a universal truth, and in the following passage the Galileian
origins of the principle of inertia can be seen: ‘That when a thing lies still, unlesse
somewhat else stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that
when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it,
though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change itselfe,) is not so easily
assented to.’42 Second, the principle of motion characterises life as a biological
phenomenon:’[f]or … life is but a motion of Limbs’.43 But again, it appears to be so that
motion is a regulative metaphysical principle. The world seems to work according to the
laws of motion, but it is perhaps impossible to demonstrate that these laws apply
universally and absolutely.
The third salient feature of Hobbes’s metaphysics is determinism. At its simplest,
determinism is an account according to which everything in the world has its cause. The
more specific claim has been that in Hobbes determinism means that there is a necessary
cause for every change. In order to have a correct understanding of the context of
Hobbes’s determinism, a brief note on the connotations of the term ‘cause’ is needed.44
39 My discussion here owns a great deal to Leijenhorst’s (2002, Chapter 5) study of Hobbes’s
mechanism.
40 Gauthier 1969, 2. See also Raphael (1977, 22) and, for a critical view, see Brandt (1928, 371). For the
background of Hobbes’s mechanism, see also Rogow (1988, 105-106) and for the broader background
and different theories of motion in 17th century philosophy, see Ariew & Gabbey (1998, 440-444) and
Gabbey (1998). For Hobbes’s arguments that there is only local motion, see Leijenhorst (2002, Chapter
5).
41Concerning Body I.6.5, 69. See also Critique du ‘De Mundo’ V, XIV, XXI, and XXVII (especially,
article 8).
42 Leviathan II, 4. Leijenhorst (2002, 173) calls this the principle of exteriority of motion.
43 Leviathan ‘Introduction’, 1.
44 My ideas here base on a distinction made which considers two types of explanation: causal and
rational. For classical discussions, see Plato, Phaedo 96-99 and Aristotle, Metaphysica 1013a24-
1014a25.
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By causes, Hobbes means material, efficient causes like a stone hitting a glass and
causing it to break, but to understand his determinism as a doctrine which gives
everything a material, efficient cause and therefore does not give any place for reflection
or choice is insufficient. Cause has another general meaning in his philosophy: to have a
cause is to give a reason why something happens as it happens, it is not merely a material
relationship between two bodies.When one is trying to explicate Hobbes’s layered view
of cause, passions and physical reactions related to them offer an example. Passions, as
material phenomena, determine our reactions. When embarrassed, we blush, and this
blushing is a result of the acceleration of bodily motion which causes heat, which is then
apparent in our cheeks and ears. This is the first aspect of cause, but we may ask again:
why do we blush? The very cause of blushing is not necessarily determined by physical
factors, but can arise because we realise that we have broken a convention of social
behaviour, for instance, burped at a banquet. Furthermore, when we understand the
mechanism how passions arise in us, we become aware of their causes and, finally, are
able to control our passions. This does not yet mean the denial of the idea that everything
in the world has a cause, or even the more radical claim that everything in the world has
a material, efficient cause. It may be that Hobbes is as reductionist as his text sometimes
suggests,  and  that  ultimately  there  is  nothing  but  a  matter  in  motion.  What  I  have
however  tried  to  point  out,  and  hope  to  explicate  in  the  coming  chapters  is,  first,  that
explaining the causal processes is itself beneficial and may help us to understand
ourselves and the world, and, second, that perhaps Hobbes’s conception of cause is more
complicated than simply an account of material, efficient cause.
Nominalism is the fourth doctrine which is often associated with Hobbes. Of the
epithets describing Hobbes’s philosophy, it is also perhaps the most unproblematic and
apt. Here the discussion of Hobbes’s nominalism is limited and some further aspects will
be offered in the chapter where Hobbes’s notion of language is studied. Hobbes’s
nominalism  has  two  central  aspects.  The  first  is  the  idea  that  the  world  consists  of
particular things and the second is the idea that only names are universal. In her article
‘Mr Brown’s note annotated’, Krook characterised Hobbes’s nominalism as follows:
Hobbes is a nominalist; and a nominalist as uncompromisingly radical and consistent and
audacious  as  any  that  has  been  known.  And  what  that  means  in  this  case  is  that  for  Hobbes
nothing in the world is 'given' but bare sense-particulars, wholly discrete, wholly
unconnected— 'a universe of disconnected singulars'. Everything else is created by the mind of
man; all distinction, all significance, all order, all intelligibility, are human artifacts, creations
of the human mind.45
45 Krook 1953, 226. Krook's quotation is Carré's definition of Ockham's world view in his Phases of
Thought in England.  As  Doctor  Aho  pointed  out  to  me,  a  more  adequate  characterisation  of  Ockham
should include qualities, that is, a universe of disconnected singulars that have certain qualities.
- 12 -
Krook’s statement bears a germ of truth in it. Hobbes indeed appears to depict the world
as consisting of particular beings and that order is imposed on it by reason and above all
by language.
The last epithet that needs to be mentioned is empiricism. McNeilly46 has
proposed that Hobbes’s empiricism is a combination of psychological (i.e., the origin of
conceptions is in experience) and logical (i.e., the analysis of language creates uniform
and precise notions) empiricism. In addition to this, he continues, there is a
methodological empiricism according to which science proceeds by collecting
observational data and making generalisations. Of these the first two are of some further
interest.
The first form of empiricism seems to be correct when applied to Hobbes. There
are no conceptions in a person’s mind, which are not produced by sense-experience.47
This should not be understood in a naive fashion as a thesis that all our conceptions must
have personal perceptual origin. For instance, as his account of history implies, Hobbes’s
concept of sensation allows such things as books to be the source of experience.
Secondly, like materialism and mechanism, empiricism is a background principle; it is
another plausible axiom which Hobbes takes as a starting point for his philosophical
reflection. In principle, our conceptions are reducible to our sensations, but as Hobbes’s
analysis of the deviations of the mind shows, sometimes there is a cul-de-sac and the
explanation of how a person came to hold a conception is pure fantasy. Contradiction in
terms (‘insignificant names’) is another familiar example.48 A person who holds, say, the
conception of an incorporeal body or a round quadrangle, is not only expressing an
obvious absurdity, but also, in the case of a round quadrangle, committing a category
mistake by combining two incompatible sensations.
The second way to understand empiricism is more complicated. It is possible to
agree with the idea that Hobbes’s philosophy aims at the clarification of the use of
words, but it is far-fetched to claim that this is an early form of logical empiricism. A
cogent reason to abandon the idea that Hobbes was a logical empiricist is, however, his
humanistic approach to the study of language. Hobbes’s interest toward language is also
that of a Renaissance man – philological, partly historical, classical, and, perhaps, best
exemplified in his analysis of the Scriptural terms.
Nevertheless, and as already indicated, all five labels that have been discussed are
appropriate ways to describe Hobbes’s philosophy. I wish, however, to cast some doubt
on the idea that these doctrines have always been correctly applied to Hobbes.
In general, my doubt concerns two ideas. The first is that though all the described
doctrines seem to fit Hobbes’s philosophy, it is another question whether they form a
46 McNeilly 1968, 77-82.
47 See, for example, Leviathan I.
48 Leviathan V, 30.
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system, and my objection here is that there is no system in Hobbes’s philosophy.
Throughout the thesis when discussing various aspects of Hobbes’s philosophy, I will
make the point that though the standard reading is not false, it fails to appreciate all the
nuances of Hobbes’s thinking. The second idea has been already introduced to some
degree, and it has more to do with the specific doctrines. Hobbes is far too easily placed
within various canons, which again has prevented us from seeing the richness of his
philosophy.  I  argue  that  the  idea  of  a  system  of  philosophy  in  Hobbes  gives  a
misleadingly smooth reading of his work and, if the assumption of a system is
maintained, elements of his philosophy (which I found more proper way to describe what
Hobbes  was  trying  to  do)  appear  in  a  strange  light.  To  summarise,  attempts  to
characterise Hobbes’s philosophical ideas and practice in some general terms or to put
them into a certain context, whether this be modernistic-Aristotelian or humanistic-
rhetorical (to mention the two prevailing lines of interpretation), will leave something out
of picture, and will not only fail to appreciate the richness of his thinking, but will also
prevent his shortcomings from being acknowledged.
IMAGINATION AND DIVERSITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HOBBES
Aside from diversity of Hobbes’s thinking, the other broad theme of the thesis is
imagination. Below I will try to explain why I believe that the concept of imagination
could be a promising candidate to provide a certain thematic unity to Hobbes’s thought,
but before doing this, a note on the more general use of the term. In this work, the term
‘imagination’ will be used in two major sense. The first could be called ‘internal’ and this
refers to the ways Hobbes uses the term in his works. Though imagination here may refer
to various things, the meaning of the term is restricted in the sense that it is not used in
other senses than those Hobbes gives to it. The second use could be called ‘external’.
This use refers to a broader conception of imagination and also has some points of
contact with how the term is used today. The work in hand, then, seeks to reflect more
broadly on what the term imagination could be taken to cover. During the course of my
thesis I wish to show that the latter use of the term is also justified, but here it needs to
be emphasised that the motive for using imagination as an umbrella notion comes from
Hobbes’s philosophy, where imagination and its many forms touch upon issues that may
appear strange to the eye of a modern reader. An issue that this work finds particularly
interesting is that imagination has something to do with knowledge.
Imagination plays a central role in many of the core areas of Hobbes’s
philosophy, but at the same time it is possible through the notion to analyse his ideas on
poetry and his view of political life. Imagination is not only a coupling and organising
notion,  but  also  a  notion  that  opens  a  new  perspective  on  Hobbes’s  philosophy.  In
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particular, this seems to hold true in his theories of human nature and of knowledge.
Imagination, moreover, is a historically enlightening concept because it helps one to
understand some of Hobbes’s background ideas in a way that creates a certain
uniformity,  and  also  because  it  shows  how  the  idea  of  creativity  changed  from  the
beginning of the 17th century to the age of Romanticism. Aside from these, imagination is
above all an explanatory concept, which helps us to understand a tension in Hobbes’s
philosophy. This tension is perhaps best summarised as follows: if we take Hobbes’s
empiricism in a strict and narrow sense, the problem is how to explain the rational
process which corrects inadequate perception in terms of his empiristic psychology. In
order to understand this tension, we need a preliminary account of different aspects of
imagination in Hobbes’s philosophy.
In Leviathan, Hobbes illustrates the peculiar ways of the human mind by the
following train of thought:
For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask
(as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest
enough. For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of delivering up the King to his
Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that
again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily
followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.49
The political connotation of the passage, Hobbes’s use of the Judas allusion, is not
extraordinary. Aside from being an image of treachery, the allusion was part and parcel
of the discourse of discussing the deliverance of Charles I. Marchamont Needham
(1620–1678), a known pamphleteer, wrote in the epitaph of James, the Duke of
Hamilton:
Rather than he his ends would miss
Betrayed his Master with a kiss. 50
Two other connotations, psychological and stylistic, come to mind. Seen from the first
perspective, the passage is a kind of proto-associationism.51 It is also easy to agree that
the passage is one more apt example in the texture of Leviathan. All these connotations
elucidate Hobbes’s philosophical practice, but say little about the claim that the
coherence of a train of thought is manifest.
49 Leviathan, III, 9. Hobbes discusses the execution of Charles I in many of his works. A particularly
illustrative discussion is in Dialogue, 71-78.
50 Needham 1649, 31. I am indebted to Dr. Clive Holmes (Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford) for bringing this
quotation to my attention.
51 See, for example, Peters 1967, 107-108; Robertson, 1993 [1886], 129; and above all Thorpe, 1940,
90-96.
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One may ask, how is a comparison that combines contemporary politics and the
history of Christianity compatible with Hobbes’s mechanism and materialism, and, in
particular, with his empiricism, according to which ‘there is no conception in a mans
mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of
Sense’?52 The question does not only relate to one particular occasion, but highlights the
tension which is created when Hobbes’s materialistic and empiricist starting points meet
his linguistic and logical philosophical method and which, I think, culminates in his
analysis of imagination.
No independent study of Hobbes’s notion of imagination is available, but the
notion is part of the standard discussions of Hobbes’s psychology.53 The standard view
says that sense is the central notion in Hobbes’s psychology and that imagination, like all
the other capacities of the mind, is a mode or a variant of sense. This is something that I
wish to reconsider in the chapter that discusses Hobbes’s theory of human nature.
The two specific areas where imagination has been studied in Hobbes are in his
ideas on art and in his civil philosophy.54 Sometimes these are linked and, for example,
Skinner in his study of the nature of Hobbes’s civil philosophy, writes that ‘if we wish to
understand Hobbes’s changing beliefs about the value and use of ornatus [and
consequently his mature account of civil philosophy], we need to begin by sketching his
theory of imagination, a theory first outlined in chapter ten of The Elements of Law and
definitively unfolded in the opening three chapters of Leviathan.’55 Both of the
mentioned readings bring out some aspects of Hobbes’s notion of imagination. The
reading that deals Hobbes’s civil philosophy tells a great deal about Hobbes’s way of
engaging in civil philosophy and its intellectual context, but at the same time eclipses the
fundamental level on which the developed use of imagination is based, whereas the
interpretation that concentrates on the psychology of creative process and imagination’s
role  in  it  misses  the  diversity  and  elegance  of  Hobbes’s  understanding  of  the  basic
processes of the mind.
In the previous section, two general objections to the prevailing understanding of
Hobbes’s philosophy were introduced. The more specific objections of this work can be
explained through the synopsis of the work. After the historical introduction of Chapter
52 Leviathan I, 3. A similar example of the coherence of conceptions can be found in Elements IV.2, 31
53 Studies of some interest include Thorpe 1940, 79-117; Peters 1967, Chapter 4; McNeilly 1968, 30-1;
Reik 1977, 141-143; Sorell 1986, 82-84; Sepper 1988; Herbert 1989, 69-70; Gert, 1996, 157-174;
Leijenhorst 2002, 89-97. For a general account of 17th-century theories of cognitive faculties which
includes Hobbes, see Hatfield 1998.
54 For the first, see Thorpe, 1940, especially Chapters I and III-V; Reik 1977; Cantalupo 1991; and
Prokhovnik 1991. When mapping the broader historical development, Engell (1981, 112-17) discusses
briefly also Hobbes’s view. For the latter, see Wolin 2004 [1960], 214-256 and 1970, 4-5; Johnston,
1986; and Prokhovnik 1991. Caygill’s (1990, 11-31) short and slightly cryptic discussion is also of some
interest. The most complete work that studies both is Skinner 1996. Valuable, but unfortunately often
overlooked, is Oakeshott’s (1975, 150-154) ‘Leviathan: a myth’.
55 Skinner 1996, 363-364.
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II, Chapter III will study how imagination, cognition, and motivation are intertwined,
along with this it will make some critical remarks about how Hobbes’s theory of sense
has been understood. The aim here is not to refute the standard view, which says that
sense is central in Hobbes’s theory of human nature, but to argue that there are at least
three levels in Hobbes’s psychology and if these are not carefully distinguished,
confusions will arise. In terms of imagination, the two main ideas in Chapter III are that
imagination is essential in building up the coherence of thinking, and that it has a
significant role in Hobbes’s theory of motivation.
The  subject  of  Chapter  IV  is  Hobbes’s  conception  of  language.  Imagination
relates to language in two ways. The first is the notion of understanding, which Hobbes
defines as a form of imagination that deals with ‘words, or other voluntary signs’.56 The
second way that imagination is relevant also has a connection with Hobbes’s philosophy
of mind. As already mentioned, imagination provides coherence to our thinking, but
through understanding it also explicates our thinking. The diversity of Hobbes’s
philosophy is not only present in the two accounts of language, but is already manifest in
his theory of signs. The chapter ends with a reflection that defends a less naturalistic
reading of Hobbes’s theory of human nature and with some remarks of how Hobbes’s
empiricism should be understood.
Chapter V, in which I wish to offer some fresh findings, concentrates on the
question of knowledge. The historical claim of the chapter is that in the 1650s, Hobbes
started to formulate a new approach to knowledge. The approach was motivated by
Leviathan, but better articulated in some post-Leviathan works. In order to understand
this new theory of knowledge, a re-reading of his theory of causality is needed.
Secondly, the emphasis will be on genuine sciences, that is, on geometry and civil
philosophy, though some aspects of natural philosophy will also be discussed. In terms of
Hobbes scholarship, my aim is again not to abandon what has been said about Hobbes’s
theory of knowledge, but to revise and complete what we already know – though I will
object to some of the recent readings of Hobbes on this question, in particular the
argument which claims that Hobbes’s account of knowledge was influenced by the
sceptical challenge to Early Modern philosophy. Aside from formulating Hobbes’s idea
of genuine demonstrative science, the role of imagination as a knowledge-productive or
even knowledge-creative capacity as well as forms of pre- and semi-scientific thinking
will be studied. The chapter ends with something I call Hobbes’s ‘epistemic
conservatism’ and by which I refer to the idea that the justification of knowledge and
making it sure, not the discovering of knowledge, are two central aims in his theory of
knowledge. That is to say, Hobbes’s account of knowledge is conservative in the sense
that our intuitions how things are in world is usually correct, and it is only the
explanations and theories we give to different phenomena where faults occur. A well-
56 Leviathan II, 8.
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known example is the dispute between Aristotelian and Galilean physics on the causes of
free fall.
The background of the Chapter VI are readings of Hobbes that emphasise the
role of rhetoric in his philosophy. Literary style and its relation to Hobbes’s philosophical
thinking have received increased attention from Hobbes scholars. Chapter starts with an
analysis of how Hobbes understood the notion of art (a notion that has not been
discussed much in Hobbes scholarship), and extends to Hobbes’s theory of poetry and
his  understanding  of  the  function  and  the  role  of  history.  The  major  topic  is  however
Hobbes’s conception of style. Recently arguments have been put forward that Hobbes’s
ideas on poetry are more or less directly related to his changing conception of civil
philosophy. Some authors, like Condren, claim that Hobbes is fully rhetorical, whereas
some, like Skinner, seek to explain the identifiable change in his conception of civil
philosophy in Leviathan using a more cogent historical argument, which links Hobbes to
the tradition of ars rhetorica.57 Perhaps the greatest tension between this work and the
preceding studies of Hobbes arises from this question. My claim is that though Hobbes’s
ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy, his theory of
poetry should be considered an independent part of his thinking with its own rules of
composition and own aims. A similar line of thought applies to history, the other art
Hobbes discusses extensively in his works. As poetry, so history and its subspecies, like
natural and ecclesiastical history have their independent disciplinary and stylistic devices,
which should not be confused with those of philosophy. Scientific, or philosophical
imagination is separate from the poetic and the historical imagination. From this it does
not follow, however, that style is not important. Quite the opposite, style is of extreme
importance, but the style adopted in poetry is very different from that adopted in
philosophy, which both differ from some other traditional genres, like history.
Concerning imagination, I argue that imagination is the basis of all harmonious style,
whether this be in poetry, rhetoric, history, or philosophy, but, first, that the adoption of
literary strategies are according to discipline, and, second, that though arts like poetry,
history, and rhetoric can be used to educate, they remain subordinate to philosophy. This
idea takes us to the last topic of the thesis.
Chapter VII extends the discussion on style into the complicated field of method
and argumentation. There are many answers to the question how we should understand
Hobbes’s way of philosophising. In general, most of these use the concept of method to
analyse the question, some arguing that there was one method in Hobbes, whereas others
distinguish  between  two  methods,  one  for  natural  and  one  for  civil  philosophy.  Again,
the aim of this work is not to say that there is something acutely mistaken in these
readings. It will instead seek to show, first, through a historical survey how the notion of
method has been understood in the tradition of philosophy, and, second, using Hobbes’s
57 Condren 1991 and Skinner 1996 and 2002, II, Chapter 4 [1991].
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own discussions of logic and art of reasoning, and adding to this what has been said
about different arts and of knowledge in the two previous chapters, it will suggest that
method is not perhaps the aptest way to conceptualise Hobbes’s philosophical practice,
which itself can be considered a manifestation of imagination in the aforesaid broad sense
of the term.
The  conclusion,  or  as  it  might  be  better  to  call  it,  epilogue,  brings  together  the
various themes and dimensions that have been discussed throughout the work, with
emphasis still being on the conception of imagination. Finally, the epilogue will suggest
what could be Hobbes’s role in the modern history of imagination.
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II A HISTORY OF IMAGINATION
A history of imagination is justified for three reasons. First, it clarifies the similarities and
the differences one is able to find between theories that preceded Hobbes. Second, the
chapter in hand is not only an introduction to Hobbes’s theory or conception of
imagination,  but  more  broadly  an  introduction  to  the  themes  of  the  thesis.  Third,  a
history is needed to set up the broader historical suggestion that will be discussed in the
epilogue of the thesis, namely that there may be reason to believe that the modern notion
of creative imagination started to develop, not in the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries
reflections on art, but in scientific and epistemological discussions in the 17th century.58
The historical survey offered here is not an all-embracing one.59 Instead, in what
follows I will concentrate on some prominent theories of imagination that can be taken
to have an influence on Hobbes or at least to have a point of contact with his conception
58 The emphasis here is in the word ‘modern’, by which I explicitly refer to the distinction made by
Immanuel Kant in his later writings (see the conclusion of this chapter). Of course the expressions
‘productive’ or ‘creative’ are attached to the notion of imagination before Hobbes or Kant. O’Daly
(1987, 106), for example, writes in his study of Augustine’s psychology: ‘Imagination can be merely
reproductive of the images in the memory, but Augustine can also talk of the creative exercise of the
imagination’, but here creativity refers to the compounding function of imagination, and as O’Daly
(1987, 108) later remarks, to Augustine even the most fantastical imaginations consist of various
reproductive imaginations and ‘cannot plausibly be held to occur without in some way originating in
images of perceived objects’.
59 In fact, there is no all-embracing and authoritative history of imagination or, even an inclusive
philosophical study of the imagination in 17th- and 18th-centuries philosophy – naturally numerous
smaller-scale works exist, and some of these are indicated in my footnotes. A work that comes closest to
an authoritative history is Bundy’s pioneering work The Theory of Imagination in Classical and
Medieval Thought (1927), but as the title indicates, it ends before the time of Hobbes and the sequel
Bundy promises in the preface never appeared. It is also somewhat dated. Two other works that study
imagination in classical thought are Watson (1988) and Barnouw (2002). Recently a collection of essays
has been published, which discusses some aspects of the Late Medieval and Early Modern notions of
imagination, but as the editors write: ‘Given the protean character of imagination it goes without saying
that we do not aim at a comprehensive account of its history, even of that part of history which this
volume covers’ (Nauta and Pätzold 2004, xi). Concerning the 17th and 18th centuries, the works I have
consulted are Engell (1981) and White (1990). White discusses few Early Modern thinkers (Hobbes,
Descartes, and Locke) as well as some prominent minds of the 18th century (Berkeley, Hume, and Kant),
but his emphasis is on psychology and 20th century conceptions of imagination. Engell’s work touches
on the main currents in 17th and 18th century philosophy, but it does this only insofar as it is taken to be
relevant to the later development, especially to the theory of imagination in Romanticism. Other general
studies that I have encountered consider the conception from various points of view. These include
Cocking’s (1991) posthumously published study, which concentrates on literature, and Kearney’s
synthetising work (1988 and 1991), which is an attempt to analyse imagination as a constituent of
Western culture. Lastly, I have benefited from Thorpe’s (1940, Chapter II) discussion, which is,
however, limited to the aesthetic-psychological aspects of the history of imagination and which builds
largely on the work of Bundy. Despite the “shortcomings” I have found all the works helpful while
writing this chapter. For purely encyclopaedic accounts that I have benefited from, see Historisches
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 4, 218-219 (imagination) and Vol. 7, 516-535 (phantasia).
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of imagination. The order is mainly chronological, but there are some complementary
distinctions, and though I do not follow them completely, they help to form a picture of
how the conception of imagination has been understood in different intellectual currents
and periods.
Chronologically I will follow the conventional path, which starts from Plato and
continues with Aristotle and the Stoics.60 After touching briefly on the Judaeo-Christian
concept of imagination and imagination in the classical ars rhetorica,  I  will  narrow the
discussion to Platonist and Aristotelian theories of imagination (that is, how these two
thinkers’ ideas on imagination were treated in the later intellectual discussions). The
body of the chapter ends with some aspectsof the Renaissance conception of
imagination.
Thematically one is able to draw a distinction between philosophical and literary
conceptions of imagination.61 By the philosophical conception of imagination I refer
mainly to the role of imagination in theories of human mind and knowledge, and by the
literary conception of imagination I refer to a classical idea of literature, which referred
mainly to poetry, but included not only the genres of literature, like tragedy, but more
broadly other forms of (literary) expression, such as rhetoric and history. This division, it
should be added, is heuristic. The two conceptions are intertwined, but, as for instance
Hobbes’s theory of imagination shows, it is misleading either to detach them, or to
consider them as conceptual Siamese twins. To be precise, the way Hobbes understands
imagination in his theory of human nature has consequences both for how he understands
knowledge and how he understands poetry, but from this it does not necessarily follow
that they have something in common.
The second division is between natural and artificial imagination, and below I will
introduce, in an appropriate context, one more distinction: passive and active
imagination. The distinction between natural and artificial imagination is more systematic
than historical, but it is helpful, for it reflects the two central meanings imagination has
had in Western thought and can be applied to psychology, to religion, and to knowledge.
In general, the difference can be expressed as follows. Imagination and images are taken
to be natural to our thinking (to have a conception is often taken to be equivalent to
having an imagination, or what is more, a sensory image of something), but then again,
imagination can bring into existence things that are unnatural, that is, fall beyond
experience. Here a salient dimension of imagination enters the picture, namely that
60 For the Epicurean view, see Watson 1988, 38-44 and Striker 1996, Chapter 3. For the role of the
Sceptics, see Barnouw 2002, Chapter 5, part I.
61 For a similar distinction, see Nauta and Pätzold 2004. For a view how these were historically
separated, see Watson 1988, Chapter 4 and Watson 1996. Watson emphasises the role of Philostratus
the Elder (born c. 190 AD) and his Eikones (‘Pictures’), a work where some sixty paintings are
discussed.
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imagination and language are taken to have something in common.62 The connection is
not universal, but it is substantial. The linkage between imagination and language can
have various forms. It can mean, as in Hobbes’s case, that imagination is the basis of
language, or, more customarily, that imagination is needed in literary work. An insightful
summary of natural and artificial imagination and their possible connection is given by
Italo Calvino (1923-1985). In the fourth of his Norton lectures, entitled ‘Visibility’,
Calvino writes:
We may distinguish between two types of imaginative process: the one that starts with the word
and arrives at the visual image, and the one that starts with the visual image and arrives at its
verbal expression. The first process is the one that normally occurs when we read.63
The first imaginative process Calvino is describing in the passage is what I have called
the artificial imagination, whereas the second, the one that starts from the visual image,
corresponds with the natural imagination. In addition, Calvino’s analysis introduces two
themes. The first is the distinction between two basic ways in which imagination can be
taken  to  work  in  Hobbes’s  thought.  The  second is  a  complex  history,  through which  I
hope to show that Calvino’s analysis is especially apt in the case of Hobbes. The second
forms the substance of the following pages, but the first can be briefly demonstrated by a
topic that has fascinated Hobbesians: the metaphorical layers of Leviathan.64
Using Calvino’s distinction, Leviathan consists of two imaginative processes.
The first ‘starts with the visual image’, which is the the known image in the title-page
‘and arrives at its verbal expression’, which refers to the verbal similitude of the
‘Introduction’ as well as the philosophical theory that takes some four hundred pages to
explain. The second imaginative process ‘starts with the word (Leviathan and Leviathan)
and ‘arrives at the visual image’ (the image of the title page). Part of the enigma of
Leviathan is the complexity of the processes and their interaction. A set of rather
revolutionary theoretical ideas is captured in a single image, which again reflects the
complexity of these ideas. Furthermore, when to this is added the intermediating layer of
the verbal simile of ‘Introduction’, the intellectually titillating reaction to the work opens
up on a general level.65 To understand some of the complexity and elegance of Leviathan
62 This is to claim that natural language is not a plausible idea, if by this we refer to the idea that we are
born with a capacity to use language. We do have a disposition to communicate, but language is always
something acquired, learned and in this sense artificial. I will return to this question and the way Hobbes
treats it in Chapter IV.
63 Calvino 1988, 83.
64 For an extensive account, see Skinner 1996, 381-390 and sources there.
65 Here I agree with Prokhovnik (1991, 142-147 and 217-219) but not with all her conclusions, e.g, that
‘[w]ithout the allegory the work may still be political thought of some kind, but it would not be political
philosophy’ (op.cit. 218). The role of comparisons in Hobbes’s philosophical thinking is discussed in
more detail in Chapters VI and VII.
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and  Hobbes’s  theory  of  imagination,  one  should  start  from  an  understanding  of  its
historical origins.
CLASSICAL ELEMENTS OF IMAGINATION
A philosophical account of imagination does not exists before Plato, but different
conceptions of it do.66 In ancient Greek there were two terms (eikasia and phantasia)
and many derivatives of these that referred to what was later to be understood as
imagination and imaginations. The first term eikasia was  used  before  Plato,  but
otherwise the use of the term was marginal.67 However some related terms, such as
eikôn (‘image’, ‘copy’), eidôlon (‘image, ‘idol’) and eidos ( ‘form’, ‘idea’) do reveal an
aspect of imagination. This family of terms refers to the idea that imagination is
comparable to sensations and something that bears a resemblance, not only or even
primarily to the objects in the outside world, but to our sense impressions of them. The
cardinal term was phantasia (‘appearance’) and the corresponding verb to phainesthai
(‘to appear’, ‘to come to light’).
Phantasia elicits two basic types of imagination: passive and active. As an
appearance of an external object, an imagination is passive, something that follows from
perception, or a replica of sensation, but as a mental state, an imagination refers to a
conception of mind that has already been processed in one way or another, or as Bundy
puts it, ‘a mental state as opposed to a reality’.68 Passivity and activity can also be stated
as capacities.
As a passive capacity imagination bears a close resemblance to memory, but is,
first,  primary  to  memory,  and,  second,  not  as  limited  as  memory.  When  we  sense
something, the organs of sense receive an experience of something. After the external
sensation, the object of sensation is perceived internally. This internal sensation is the
function of imagination as a passive capacity. Only after the internal sensation is the
experience of something stored in the mind by the memory. As an active capacity,
imagination differs from memory. Though both capacities evoke something from the
mind, memory is (at its best) evoked like the original sensation was and is unable to
change the original sensation, whereas imagination is not limited by the original sensation
and is able to change it.69
66 See Bundy 1927, Chapter I; Watson 1988, 1; White 1990, 3-6; Kearney 1991, 79-87; and Schofield
1992, note 11.
67 For instance, Plato uses the term when discussing the line-analogy in the fifth book of The Republic.
68 Bundy 1927, 12.
69 A memory can of course be distorted, but a distorted memory does not change the original sensation,
only reproduce it imperfectly.
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In the classical thought phantasia, from systematic point of view, had the
following features. It was more blurred or muzzy than sense perception, which was
considered to be veridical. As a combination of sensation and belief, phantasia was
untrue also in another sense, that is, in comparison to ideas which are the proper
constituents of reality.70 Third, the objects of phantasia were particular sense objects like
horse, man, or snub nose, whereas the objects of discursive reason were universal.
Fourth, a peculiar feature of phantasia was that it was able to represent sense objects
even when objects were no longer present. With these initial remarks it is possible to
enter into more detailed discussions about how imagination has been understood in the
tradition of Western philosophy.
GREEK CONCEPTIONS OF IMAGINATION
Though Aristotle is often hailed as the discoverer of imagination71, it was Plato who laid
the foundation for later development.72 Plato discusses extensively of aspects and forms
of imagination and in this way his reflections constitute the history of the concept.
Naturally he considers it from a psychological point of view, but his work contains also
aesthetic and epistemic reflections, of which the latter has a point of contact with the last
dimension, religious or mantic73 imagination.
Plato did not form a theory of imagination, but he seems to have a consistent
view of it: imagination is not a part of the intellectual (and the moral) perfection of
human beings. Plato’s negative view of imagination is partly based on the association of
phantasia and doxa (opinion),  or  as  he  defines  the  term  in The Sophist ‘a  blend  of
perception and judgement’,74 partly on the idea that imaginations are the shadows of
shadows (that is, replicas of impressions of material objects, which are, again, inferior to
ideas).75 If the material world is already in a state of constant change and sensations are
unable to offer any firm basis of knowledge, then imaginations are a double harm for they
are also relative to a person, and his or her individual conceptions of an object.
Consequently, as a mental capacity imagination is mimetic, distorting, subjective, and
includes  a  possibility  of  error  because  opinions  related  to  a phantasia interpret the
70 Of ideas, see The Republic 509e-510a and Phaedo 96a-101e
71 See, for example, Bundy 1927, 19 and White 1990.
72 For Plato’s view, see Bundy 1927, Chapter 2 and Barnouw 2002, Chapter 1. See also Historisches
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 7, 516-517.
73 From the Greek word mantikos, which means prophetic and oracular (see, for example, Plato’s
Phaedrus 265b).
74 The Sophist 264b. This is little misleading, for doxa can be verbal or non-verbal, and only when the
latter is it called phantasia by Plato. See The Sophist 264a and Watson 1988, 2.
75 What is said here is based mainly on The Republic 509d-510a, 511d-e, and 603a. See also Bundy
(1927, 23-24) and Sorabji (2004, I, 61).
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thought of which the phantasia is composed. For example, the perception that someone
is approaching moulds into the phantasia that the person approaching is Socrates.76
In The Republic, Plato equates the visible world with that of ‘images’, by which
he  means  here  ‘first,  shadows,  and  then  reflections  in  water  and  on  surfaces  of  dense,
smooth, and bright texture, and everything of that kind’.77 This seems to confirm the
general view of Plato introduced above, but the characterisation applies only to the
material world. The line analogy suggests that there is another stage of reality to which
another kind of imagination corresponds, ‘an imagination of ideas’.78 Plato uses
geometry to explain the difference between the two. Geometricians may draw different
figures, which are, firstly, material images, but secondly devices of science, which can
support opinion, not knowledge. The proper objects of geometricians, however, are
dianoetic  images,  that  is,  ‘images  [...]  of  those  realities  which  can  be  seen  only  by  the
mind’.79 Plato then seems accept the possibility that imagination plays a role in
intellectual life. This tentative conclusion finds two further responses in his works:
negative and positive.
The negative view is Plato’s theory of art.80 Though there is (with dianoetic
images) a corresponding possibility of higher art that deals with ideas, ultimately Plato
rejects this. The reason is theological: God is the only agent that can create in the highest
sense, that is, create ideas. Artists are able to make only appearances and their work is
mere imitation. In other words,  works of art  bear the character of likeness in them, for
example, a sculpture is alike to a human body, which again is material and inferior to the
rational soul. The difference between divine and artistic creation is that the latter is a
trick, a bluff to mislead people.81 In other words, the reason for the rejection of the
possibility that art could express something higher is familiar: it cannot because, first, it
deals with changing, material things, and, second, it is based on a subjective view, the
appearance (phantasia) of an individual. Towards the end of The Republic, Plato fuses
the psychological, epistemic, and aesthetic elements of his analysis of imagination:
76 Theaetetus 191b. The error, technically speaking, occurs because we wrongly combine our past ideas
with the present sensation.
77 The Republic 510a.
78 Bundy 1927, 25. Bundy’s characterisation is not the aptest possible. What Plato seems to say is that
certain objects of mathematics, say, a triangle are particular but our knowledge of them is based on the
assumption that demonstrations considering this particular triangle apply to other triangles as well. For
an insightful discussion, albeit relating to Aristotle, see Lear 1982.
79 The Republic 510e.
80 An explanatory note is needed here. Plato’s conception of art is undifferentiated. By art Plato refers
not only to plastic arts or what today is considered art, that is, music, literature, and so on, but his
conception of art has a special relation to the art of speaking. His critique is, then, partly the critique of
art as imitation of the shadows of the higher reality, and partly the critique of sophistry as opposed to
dialectics, that is, philosophy.
81 The Republic 598a-c
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And the same things appear bent and straight to those who view them in water and out, or
concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colours, and there is obviously
every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene painting in its exploitation of this
weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft, and so do jugglery and many other
such contrivances.82
This concludes Plato’s critique. Phantasia is not only material and subjective, but the
forms of human thinking that are based on it are misleading and many of its craftsmen,
e.g., dramatists and orators, are deceivers.83
Aside from this negative reaction, Plato developed another line of thought, which
was inspired by religion. In The Sophist,  Plato  distinguishes  between  two  kinds  of  art
(creative and acquisitive) and between two kinds of creation (human and divine). Divine
creation creates the universe, real things, but also phantasms. In the latter, a number of
ideas meet. Psychologically speaking phantasms sent by a divine being appear to human
beings in various ways, for instance, in reflections and in dreams,84 but in Plato this does
not lead only to a pondering of the possibility of poetic inspiration85, but above all to a
doctrine  of  divine  inspiration,  which  forms  the  last  aspect  of  Plato’s  account  of
imagination, namely mantic imagination.86
Plato’s stark distinction between material and immaterial planes of reality and his
implicit location of imagination in the corporeal part of the soul seems to exclude any
account of visions or similar phenomena. This is not, however, the case. In Timaeus, he
puts forward an account of corporeal inspiration.87 According  to  Plato,  the  liver  is  the
organ which mirrors the divine images. Though at times Plato seems to suggest that
prophecy, inspiration, and visioning are able to give an immediate knowledge of higher
reality in the form of images, he regards the idea as ultimately doubtful. Immediately
after describing the physiology of divination, he writes that:
[H]e who would understand what he remembers to have been said, whether in a dream or when
he was awake, by prophetic and inspired nature, or would determine by reason the meaning of
the apparitions which he has seen, and what indications they afford to this man or that, of past,
present, or future good and evil, must first recover his wits. But, while he continues demented,
he cannot judge of the visions which he sees or the words which he utters; the ancient saying is
82 The Republic 602c-d. Compare this to what Plato says of sensation and perception in Theaetetus
152a-c and 161d-e. The primus motor for the critique is the Protagorean doctrine of homo mensura. See
also Watson 1988, 2-6.
83 The last dimension is discussed extensively in Sophist 260-268. See also Bundy 1927, 33-41. For a
more nuanced view that also comments on Bundy, see Cocking 1991, 1-17.
84 The Sophist 260b-c.
85 See above all Phaedrus 265, where Plato distinguishes between four kinds of divine inspiration: that
of a prophet, of a mystic, of a poet, and of a lover.
86 For this, see above all Watson 1988, 11-13.
87 Timaeus 71.
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very true—that ‘only a man who has his wits can act or judge about himself and his own
affairs.’ 88
Bliss must at least subside, before any intellectual activity can take a place. Therefore it
remains safe to say that Plato maintained his intellectualism and a reserved attitude
towards imagination, in particular towards aesthetic imagination. Secondly, as his theory
of the soul does not distinguish systematically between different faculties of psuchê,
there is no descriptive psychological theory of imagination.89 From  all  this  it  does  not
follow that Plato is of secondary importance in the history of imagination and the
following vignette by Long indicates Plato’s profundity:
Plato uses phantasia to pick out the different ‘appearance’ or ‘perception’ that one and the
same entity may generate in a pair of observers. [...] Phantasiai are necessarily individual
experiences, appearances to individuals. [...] The point is simply that any post-Platonic
philosopher who wished to refer to individual experience of any kind – the way things appear to
the individual subject who experiences them – had phantasia available as the appropriate
term.90
Therefore, aside from demarcating the three principal forms of imagination
(psychological, aesthetic, and mantic), Plato gave a timeless characterisation of this
‘Reason in her most exalted mood’.91 The first of the post-Platonic philosophers to
develop this account of individual experience was Aristotle.
Aristotle’s discussion of imagination is mainly in De Anima,  though  he  also
examines it in other works92, and he is the first to provide a theory of imagination. On
the basis of pure textual analysis, Aristotle’s theory of imagination is psychological and it
may appear striking that in his De Rhetorica and De Poetica he hardly mentions the term
phantasia.93 This,  of  course,  does  not  mean that  his  views  of  rhetoric  and  poetry  were
not of significant influence for the discussion at hand. I will return to the topic when
discussing imagination in classical oratory. Here it is sufficient to say that Aristotle was
88 Timaeus 71e-72a.
89 This is not to claim that Plato does not speak of the major mental capacities of sensation, memory,
and so on, only that it is rather hard to find a single, taxonomic treatment of them in his works.
90 Long 1991, 104.
91 This is Wordsworth’s definition of imagination. See his The Prelude, Book XIV (Conclusion), line
191.
92 These include De Memoria et Reminiscentia, De Insomniis, De Motu Animalium, and Metaphysica.
For a general discussion, see Bundy 1927, Chapter III; Cocking 1991, Chapter I, White 1990, Chapter I;
and Watson 1988, Chapter 2. For more detailed reflections, see Lycos 1964; Nussbaum 1978; Frede
1992; Schofield 1992;and Barnouw 2002, Chapter 2.
93 Bundy (1927, 63, 65), who considers Aristotle’s decision to be deliberate, refers to two occasions in
De Poetica (1448a6 and 1460b9). Cf. Cocking 1991, 20-21. O’Gorman (2005, 18) says that ‘phantasia
appears only nine times in the Rhetoric’.
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not as hostile as Plato toward sub-celestial art, but took a pragmatic point of view. Art
was imitation or mimetic activity and a skill (technê), and best treated as such.94 His
treatises of poetry and rhetoric are more like manuals than conscious articulations of a
theory of art. In a similar vein, it can be noted that Aristotle was more tolerant when it
comes to the relationship between imagination and knowledge. When Plato, though
evaluating a possibility of this, ultimately thought that imagination does not play a role in
the acquisition of knowledge, Aristotle arrived at an opposite result: imagination is
necessary for having knowledge.
To Aristotle imagination is a particular kind of motion that is prompted by
sensation and has two central functions: it offers the raw data for thinking and initiates
action. It thus participates in the activity of both theoretical and practical reason as a
capacity which produces appearances. As a state of mind, imagination is not a (mental)
image, but any kind of appearance (phantasma) that results from sense perception, say,
an echo or the taste of olive oil. More precisely, appearance is something that represents
or stands for an object when it is no longer present or is somehow indirectly present.95
Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of phantasiai,  which  correspond  to  his
tripartite division of perception. There is the fantasy of sensory qualities, say, ‘white’ or
‘this is white’, the fantasy of what this something is, for example, ‘this white thing is a
horse’, and the fantasy of attributes common to different senses, e.g. magnitude.96 Of
these, the first is usually true when the other two can be false or erroneous. In addition,
appearances are the basis of more complex mental constructions.97 These constructions
correspond to what later philosophical tradition refers to as complex or compounded
ideas, say, a centaur.
As a capacity, ‘imagination [phantasia] is different from either perceiving
[aísthesis] or discursive thinking [nous], though it is not found without sensation, or
judgement without it’98. As a passive capacity, imagination conveys within the mind
something that is not necessarily present to a perceiver anymore or is present in an
indirect way.99 Consequently, acquisition of knowledge, though related to sensation and
imagination, is ultimately an activity of the intellectual soul that abstracts essences of
things from imaginations that are caused by sensations. Nevertheless, it is important to
94 For the mimetic conception of art, see De Poetica 1449b24-28.
95 De Anima 425b25 and 428a15-16.
96 De Anima 428b15-25 and 429a4-5. Cf. Bundy 1927, 69; Cocking 1991, 19-20; and White 1990, 11-
12.
97 De Anima 431b2 and 431b29.
98 De Anima 427b14-17; 432a6-9 and 431a15-17. Cf. De Memoria et Reminiscentia 449b31-450a14 and
De Motu Animalium 702a19-20. Frede’s discussion (1992) clarifies some aspects of this troublesome
matter.
99 De Anima 428a1-2 and 429a2-3. Cf. 429b5-8.
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understand that nous thinks in images.100 Finally, Aristotle uses imagination to bring
together a set of mental phenomena, which Schofield has called ‘non-paradigmatic
sensory experiences’.101 These include dream, memory, fantasy, after image,
hallucination, ghost image, reflection, and similar. Aristotle’s two examples illustrate the
perplexing character of imagination. In De Anima, he writes: ‘But what we imagine is
sometimes false though our contemporaneous judgement about it is true: e.g. we imagine
the sun to be a foot in diameter though we are convinced that it is larger than the
inhabited part of the earth’.102 The second example is more constructive. In De Memoria,
Aristotle seeks to demonstrate his basic tenet that thinking is not possible without a
phantasma, by referring to the way problems are solved in geometry.103 We can draw a
figure, say, a triangle, but it is not the physical qualities which we are mainly interested
in, but instead, we focus on the properties (say, the number of sides and angles) of a
figure that remain the same no matter how big or small the picture is. The point, as
Watson puts it,  is  that  ‘we still  have to use a physical model at any given time.’104 The
lesson of the first example is that there is a distinction between appearance and
judgement, whereas the second can be taken as a more sober account of what was called
dianoetic images.
As mentioned earlier, it is in Aristotle’s theory where the distinction between
passive and active imagination makes its first appearance, to be exact, it is in Book III,
Chapter XI of De Anima:
To sum up, then, and repeat what I have said, inasmuch as an animal is capable of appetite it is
capable of self-movement; it is not capable of appetite without possessing imagination; and all
imagination is either calculative or sensitive. In the latter all animals partake.105
When operating in the lower part of the soul, imagination is passive and bears a close
resemblance to the working of memory,106 but in the higher part of the soul it acts as an
active principle and as something distinct from the mnemonic or mediating functions of
the mind. From this not too far-reaching conclusion can be made. What Aristotle
suggests is that imagination has some cognitive functions, like that of synthetising the
100 De Anima 431b2. Among Aristotle scholarship this is of course debatable, but the question need not
be addressed here. For one account, see Schofield 1992, note 20.
101 Schofield 1992, 252 and note 20 there.
102 De Anima 428b2-5. Used again in De Insomniis 460b18-20.
103 De Memoria et Reminiscentia 449b30-450a13.
104 Watson 1988, 29.
105 De Anima 433b27-30.
106 Imagination is, however, primary in relation to memory. Though Aristotle does not fully reject that
there could be ‘intellectual memories’, that is, memories which do not base on sense experience’, he says
that these kind of memories are incidental. See De Memoria et Reminiscentia 450a.
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experience, but this kind of capacity to make comparisons is relatively modest.107 He is
even more resolute (and in accordance with Plato), when discussing the religious
dimension of imagination.
Prima facie, Aristotle seems to dismiss the discussion of mantic imagination. In
De Anima, there are hardly any references to the realm of divine, and the theme only
appears in the short treatise that closes the psychological part of Parva Naturalia, that is,
in De Divinatione per Somnum.  Even  here,  Aristotle’s  treatment  is  reserved.  He
carefully avoids giving an impression that some sort of supernatural prophecy is a
significant part of mental life. Though he admits that dreams ‘have a mysterious aspect’,
this is only because ‘Nature [their cause] is mysterious, though not divine’.108 Moreover,
Aristotle is positive that gods do not send any divine prophecies or visions, but that these
are man-made. In brief, phenomena like foresight and vision happen because violent
movements of the soul are not harnessed by critical self-reflection.109
Though Aristotle was the first to give a systematic approach to phantasia, it was
the Stoics who brought the conception to the centre of philosophy.110 Some general
features of Stoic psychology are worth mentioning before introducing their account of
phantasia. The Stoics treated sensation as one of the modes of representation. For them
it  did  not  have  any  privileged  status  in  relation  to  other  modes  of  the  mind,  say,
memories. The Stoics also held a doctrine of the primacy of self-awareness according to
which a sentient being is always aware of itself, or in other words, has a representation of
itself before it has any other representations. For instance, a worm is aware of itself
before becoming aware that it is on a fishhook. What is relevant to add is that the Stoics
had a unified concept of mind. There were no lower or higher parts of the soul, but
instead the soul is a single unit led by hêgemonikon (the commanding faculty or,
sometimes, intellect). Lastly, as Aristotle, the Stoics understand the functioning of soul in
terms of motion, which consists of two components, phantasia and hormê, which
correspond (respectively) with cognition and motivation.
The first advantage of the Stoic analyses of phantasia is the emphasis on the
conformity of our experiences: ‘my sensing something white, my awareness that what is
hurting is my leg, my recollection of someone’s birthday, my current thoughts of
Socrates, and my reflection on the square root of 2 are all alike in being representations,
appearances of something to me’.111 From this it does not, however, follow that all our
107 For a detailed discussion, see Frede 1992.
108 De Divinatione per somnum 463b14-15.
109 De Divinatione per somnum 464a25-26.
110 For Stoic theory, see Bundy 1927, 87-96; Cocking 1991, 22-24; Watson 1988, 44-58; Long 1991;
and  Barnouw  2002.  I  follow  here  Long,  which  is  not  only  a  study  of  the  concept  of phantasia in the
Stoics, but offers a valuable comparison between them and Aristotle (see pages 104-106). For a thorough
study of the Stoic theory of phantasia, consult however Barnouw (2002).
111 Long 1991, 107-108.
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representations are of equal value, for some representations (phantasiai) can naturally be
false. Secondly, though the Stoics did not give any clear view of how we can make
qualitative distinctions between different representations, say, between the
representations of white, painful, and ecstatic, they made some distinctions about
representations. A central distinction concerns cataleptic and non-cataleptic fantasies.
The  first  are  impressions  of  real  objects  that  we  have  assented  (sunkatathesis) to be in
correspondence with our mental content of them, and the latter are the ones we have
dissented.112
The second main interest of the Stoic theory of imagination is the linking of
language, thinking, and phantasia. A genuine cogitation is the cogitation of a sane,
rational adult, and requires language. Rational understanding of things requires
conceptions, and rational representations that contain the propositional structure, are
expressible (lekton).113 Lekton was understood as an incorporeal entity. When combined
with the Stoic tenet that corporeal and incorporeal cannot have an impact on each other,
it becomes problematic how it is possible that every rational representation contains a
lekton. There is no satisfactory answer to this question among the known Stoic texts,114
but it is worth pointing out that the problem how imagination as a natural capacity of
mind and as a constituent of language originates from the Stoic view.
ORATORY AND CHRISTIANITY
Cicero was an eclectic, though of the Stoic orientation, and an orator, but above all a
Roman. Through him, it is possible to enter the next phase in the history of the concept
of imagination. The Stoics were the first to link language and imagination, but it was the
Roman theorists of rhetoric who analysed in detail the relationship between imagination
and language.115
Oratory, eloquence, or rhetoric was the invention of Greeks. Among the Greeks,
Aristotle was not perhaps the most gifted in the art of speaking, but his notes on the
subject have been influential. De Rhetorica contains  two  ideas  that  need  to  be
introduced. First, Aristotle was more cautious than his Roman successors when he
evaluated the power of eloquence: ‘the way in which a thing is said does affect its
intelligibility. Not, however, so much as people think.’116 Second, Aristotle introduces
112 Diogenes Laertius 1925, II, 155-157. For sunkatathesis, see Long 1991, 110-111. The Stoics also
made a distinction between sensory (aisthêtikê) and non-sensory, rational and non-rational, and expert
and non-expert phantasia. See Laertius, II, 159-161.
113 For the notion of lekton, see Barnouw 2002, 157.
114 Long (1991, 119) refers to Sextus Empiricus’s idea that lekta do not influence the mind directly, but
from a distance, which is, however, a vague explanation.
115 Watson 1988, 94.
116 De Rhetorica 1404a10-12.
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the familiar idea of giving a lively picture of something with the help of the right
expression. This conjuring before the eyes with apt wording bears a resemblance to our
mnemonic capacity and is used both in poetry and oratory.117 It  is  the  latter  idea  that
became of particular interest in the later development of rhetorical theory.
If Aristotle acknowledged that imagination can move and please, the classical
Roman orators added that it can also inform. In Cicero, this is sometimes referred to as
the hybrid theory of ideal imitation.118 The idea is that imagination enables the apt use of
language  and  in  this  way is  able  to  represent  things  not  only  in  a  lively  and  motivating
manner, but also in a crystallised form that transcends all the objects of imitation, that is,
all the real-life models. In Orator, Cicero writes:
But I am firmly of the opinion that nothing of any kind is so beautiful as not to be excelled in
beauty by that of which it is a copy, as a mask is a copy of a face. This ideal cannot be perceived
by the  eye  or  ear,  nor  by  any of  the  senses,  but  we can  nevertheless  grasp  it  by  the  mind and
imagination. For example, in the case of statues of Phidias, the most perfect of their kind we
have ever seen, and in the case of the paintings I have mentioned, we can, in spite of their
beauty, imagine something more beautiful. Surely that great sculptor, while making the image
of Jupiter or Minerva, did not look at any person whom he was using as a model, but in his own
mind dwelt surpassing vision of beauty.119
Though Cicero is the ex officio master  of  Roman  oratory,  it  is  the  work  of  Marcus
Fabius Quintilian (ca. 35-95) that is usually taken as most representative of the
tradition.120 In his Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian discusses virtually every aspect of
laudable speech, but the main concern is what makes a person eloquent. To this
Quintilian answers that ‘it is the heart and the power of the mind [vis mentis] that make
us eloquent’121 and that ‘[t]he person who will show the greatest power over the
emotions [... is called by some] euphantasi?tos’.122 Quintilian’s reflection moves along
117 See De Memoria et Reminiscentia 450a and 452a14-16; Poetica 1455a23-25; and De Rhetorica
1411b23-1413b1.
118 Here I follow Thorpe (1940, 34-35). Thorpe calls Cicero’s account ‘hybrid’ because he sees in it
Platonic as well as Aristotelian elements.
119 Cicero 1962, 311. The sculpture Cicero is referring to is Athena Parthenos of Phidias, a famous
Greek sculptor and architect who lived in the 5th century BC.
120 See, for instance, Vickers 1988, 34-38. See also Bundy (1927, 105-112), Watson (1988, 66-71), and
Cocking (1991, 27-31), who all discuss in some length the third standard name, ‘Longinus’, but he was
re-discovered only at the end 17th century (Thorpe 1940, 55-56) and is therefore not discussed here in
detail. Aside from Quinitilian’s Institutio Oratoria, the canon of classical oratory includes Cicero’s De
Inventione and De Oratore and  an  anonymous  work Ad C. Herennium Libri Quattuor De Arte
Rhetorica (commonly called: Rhetorica ad Herennium, composed ca. 92-86 B.C.), which was thought to
be also a work of Cicero, for it bears a close resemblance to his works, though it was later shown to be
written by someone else. See Howell 1952, 66.
121 Institutio Oratoria, IV, 381.
122 Institutio Oratoria, III, 59 and 61.
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the lines of Aristotle’s descriptive psychology, but it is articulated curiously differently in
one respect : ‘the Greeks call phantasiai (let us call them “visions”), by which the images
of absent thing are presented to the mind in such a way that we seem actually to see them
with  our  eyes  and  have  them  physically  present  to  us.’123 The emphasis here is that
though the object of the senses is absent, the apt use of language conjures it back. It is in
this sense that classical oratory falls to the category of reproductive imagination.124
Before proceeding, it is useful to provide a short note on how imagination was
treated in the Christian tradition. Classical Roman society was a pagan world and
Christian faith became the acknowledged religion of Rome only by the time of the
emperor Constantine, but the Judaeo-Christian (with the emphasis on ‘Judaeo’)
conception of imagination is older than any of those we have discussed so far.
The Judaeo-Christian conception of imagination is based on the Old Testament
and on the exegetical work by early Jewish intellectuals. Kearney, whom I follow here,
has distinguished four aspects of Judaeo-Christian (or as he calls it, Hebraic)
imagination: mimetic, ethical, historical, and anthropological.125 The concept is first and
foremost a reproductive and normative one. Imagination (jetser in Hebrew) has a similar
root as the word ‘creation’ (yetshirah), and imagination is associated with imitation of
God and his works. The normative element can be introduced through the story of Fall.
Imagination presents the capacity to create, and because God is the only creature that
can create, imagination as a pretended creation is a sign of human sinfulness.
Additionally, it makes the human being an impermanent creature. From this arises the
historical aspect of imagination, the finite character of human beings constitutes the sense
of history and, consequently, imagination, which is ‘an activity proper to man which
differentiates him from both a higher divine order and a lower animal order and which
opens  up  a  freedom  of  becoming  beyond  the  necessity  of  cosmic  being’.126 Kearney  is
somewhat unclear, but one way to explain the last aspect of imagination is through the
concept of narrative, that is to say, the essential identity of human beings is constituted
by narratives, which again are based on the use of imagination.127
Two discussions that would normally follow will be merged. The first is the
conception of imagination as it appeared in early Christian thinking. The second is the
123 Institutio Oratoria, II, 61.
124 Bundy  1927,  110.  Note  that  here  we  also  face  a  similar  problem  as  with  the  Stoics:  how  can
something immaterial affect the material? Classical orators, whose principal interest was not the body-
mind interaction, naturally do not reflect on the problem, but the tension between natural and artificial
imagination (though in a different form than in the Stoics) is present here as well.
125 Kearney 1991, 53. For a detailed discussion and further sources see the Chapter I of Kearney’s book.
126 Kearney 1991, 53.
127 Two articulations of this kind of conception of identity in contemporary thought are MacIntyre 1981
and Taylor 1989.
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Neoplatonic theory of imagination. The two are connected128 but since it was one of the
Church Fathers, Augustine, whose view had a prominent influence on later thinkers, and
in who Christianity and Neoplatonism meet in interesting ways, the chronological order
is broken.
THE MEDIEVAL MIND
It is customary to distinguish two great syntheses in Medieval thought: a Platonic and an
Aristotelian one. Both are more or less attempts to reconcile Christianity and philosophy.
The first to face the challenge of integrating the classical heritage with Christianity was
Augustine of Hippo. The second synthesis appeared almost a thousand years after
Augustine, but was by no means less influential than Augustine’s.129 Usually this second
synthesis is connected with the Dominican scholar, Thomas Aquinas, who was canonised
by the Pope John XXII in 1323. Before discussing Platonist and Aristotelian theories of
imagination, I will first introduce an account that influenced Medieval theories of mind,
namely that of the Arab philosopher, Ibn Sina (980-1037), or as he is known in the Latin
West, Avicenna.130
Following Aristotle, Avicenna, like many of his Medieval successors,
distinguished between external and internal senses. Of these the latter are focal here.
According to Black,131 Avicenna has three principles that explain how internal senses
process the data provided by the five external senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell, and
touch). First, there must be a correspondence between an object and a faculty which
receives it. The objects divide into two categories: ‘the forms or images of the common
and proper sensibles (suwar al-mahs???t) and the “intentions” of those sensibles (ma’???
al-mahs???t)’. Second, active and passive faculties must be distinguished. By active
faculties Avicenna understands those internal senses that are able to manipulate their
objects, whereas the objects of passive faculties ‘are merely imprinted on them’. Third, it
is not possible for the same faculty to ‘both receive and retain a sensible object’ because
128 On the relationship between Early Christian and Neoplatonism in general, see The Cambridge
History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, 137-192. For more detailed accounts, see Bundy
1927, Chapter VIII; Cocking 1991, Chapter 4.
129 To make such a leap is to do violence to many important developments in Western thought between
Augustine and Aquinas. These include such thinkers Boethius (see, for instance, Bundy 1927, 172-176)
and above all Arab commentators (see Cocking 1991, 104-140). I believe that the transition is justified,
for the developments discussed here are the ones which form the central point of comparison with
Hobbes.
130 Two sources that I rather directly follow here are Black 2000 and Kenny 2005. Avicenna’s principal
discussion is in Al-Shif?’: Al-Nafs 1.5 and 4.1-3 (pages 43-45, 58-61 and 163-169 in the 1959 English
translation). I am grateful to Doctor Taneli Kukkonen and MA Jari Kaukua for helping me understand
Avicenna’s position.
131 All quotations in this paragraph are from Black 2000, 59.
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the substrates these operations require are different. From these principles arises
Avicenna’s classification of internal senses, which consists of ‘two receptive-retentive
pairs conjoined by the active power of compositive imagination’. It should be noticed
that though Avicenna establishes a division between internal senses, in practice they
work together and his distinctions are better understood as analytical clarifications.
The first pair, which deals with common and proper sensibles, consist of ‘[t]he
common sense (al-hiss al-mushtarak), [which] receives sensible forms of the external
senses and the formative or retentive imagination (al-musawwirach/al-khay?l), [which]
retains their images’.132 The second pair deals with intentions, which are received and
retained by the estimative power (wahm)  and  the  memorative  faculty  (al-dh?kirah).133
From the point of view of Hobbes what is however perhaps most interesting is the
compositive imagination (al-mutakhayyilah).
The compositive imagination can be ‘random and undirected’, but also
‘consciously harnessed and controlled by either the estimative faculty or reason’.134 The
activity of the compositive imagination is propositional by its nature and the interaction
between imagination and intellect can be understood as a case of syllogistic reasoning:
‘[a] human intellect wishes to know whether all As are Bs. His cogitative power
rummages among images and produces an image of C, which is an appropriate middle
term to prove the desired conclusion. Stimulated by this image, the human intellect
contacts the agent intellect and acquires the thought of C’.135 Imagination  seems to  be
here in a similar role as it is in the standard Aristotelian theory, that is, acting as a
mediating faculty between sensitive and intellectual parts of soul, but so that it
participates to the working of both parts. In sum, Avicenna elegantly re-articulates two
ideas: that of passive and active imagination (from Aristotle) and that of the
propositional nature of the active imagination (which was present in distinguishable form
in the Stoics). Of particular interest is Avicenna’s conception of the compositive
imagination, which can be, first, either unregulated or regulated, and, second, when
regulated has a connection with our rationality.
PLATONISM AND IMAGINATION IN EARLY CENTURIES
Augustine is said to be the first who used the Latin word imaginatio as the equivalent of
phantasia.136 The constituents of Augustine’s philosophy are twofold: Christianity and
132 Black 2000, 59-60. See also Kenny 2005, 226-227.
133 Avicenna’s account of the estimative power is skipped here. For further discussion of wahm, or
aestimatio, see Black 1993 and 2000.
134 Black 2000, 60.
135 Kenny 2005, 227.
136 For an alternative view, see Watson (1988, 134-135).
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Neoplatonism. Christianity was touched upon briefly above; below, some aspects of how
imagination was understood in Neoplatonism will be discussed. The central document for
the Neoplatonists was Timaeus,  and  Plato’s  works  in  general,  but  Aristotle’s  impact  is
also of some importance. Aristotle provides the general framework, but the novelties that
Neoplatonism introduces to the history of imagination are based on Plato’s speculations
on the images of the higher world.
The spherical cosmology of Neoplatonism was created by Plotinus (204-270) and
in the theology of emanation related to this cosmology, phantasia had a role as a means
to get in touch with the One. Cocking suggests that in Neoplatonism the Aristotelian
conception of imagination is reversed.137 If in the Aristotelian theory, imagination was an
intermediator between sense and intellect, in Neoplatonism it is a vehicle between the
divine and the human mind, a way to reach the mystical union with the One. This is not,
however, a fully precise account. If the idea of soul as potentiality is left aside,
Neoplatonists accepted Aristotle’s conception of phantasia, but they developed it in two
ways: by studying the relationship between geometry and phantasia, and by introducing
the possibility of communicating with the divine through phantasia. Their contribution
concerns then the mantic and epistemic dimensions of imagination.
Proclus (411-485), who is known for his commentaries, especially on Euclid’s
Elements, is important in two respects. Firstly, because of his explicit distinction between
phantasia and eikasia, or the fantastic and the imaginative.138 When the imagination is
operating with phantasiai it is purely entertaining and imitative, but when it is working
with images, it ‘looks to the correctness of the imitation’,139 that is to say, imagination
acts as a reflective capacity, or what Proclus calls passive Nous, the functioning of which
he describes as follows:
We invoke the imagination and the intervals that it furnishes, since the form itself is without
motion or genesis, indivisible and free of all underlying matter, though the elements latent in
the form are produced distinctly and individually on the screen of imagination. What projects
the images is the understanding; the source of what is projected is the form in the
understanding; and what they are projected in is this “passive nous” that unfolds in revolution
about the partlessness of genuine Nous, setting a distance between itself and that indivisible
source of pure thought, shaping itself after the unshaped forms, and becoming all the things
that constitute the understanding and the unitary ideas in us.140
137 Cocking 1991, 53. For the Neoplatonist theory of imagination in general see Bundy 1927, Chapters
V and VI: Cocking, Chapter 3; and Watson 1988, Chapter 5. A useful source of original views is Sorabji
2004, 1, section 2 (Phantasia) and 3, subsection 12b (Philosophy of Mathematics).
138 Bundy (1927, 140) attributes the distinction to Proclus. For a short account of how the distinction
was treated by some later thinkers, see Thorpe 1940, 36-39.
139 Commentary of Plato’s Republic I, 191.
140 Proclus 1970, 45.
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The second, and remotely consequent, point of Proclus concerns mathematicals.141
Proclus opposes Aristotle’s idea of mathematical objects142 (of any kind) as abstractions
from matter and understands them in the fashion of Plato as something between the true
realm of ideas and the apparent realm of sensations (what was earlier referred to as
dianoetic images). Further on, imagination is the capacity by which we understand
mathematical objects, which are projected onto our imagination like, to use the favourite
metaphor, films onto a screen.143 Mathematical objects are at the same time independent
of the human mind and also corporeal. Proclus explains this mental double vision as
follows:
[I]magination, occupying the central position in the scale of knowing, is moved by itself to put
forth what it knows, but because it is not outside the body, when it draws its objects out of the
undivided centre of its life, it expresses them in the medium of division, extension, and figure.
For this reason everything that it thinks is a picture or a shape of its thought. It thinks the circle
as extended, and although this circle is free of external matter, it possess an intelligible matter
provided by the imagination itself. This is why there is more than one circle in the sense world;
for with extension there appear also difference in size and number among circles and
triangles.144
Mathematical knowledge is then a hybrid of discursive reason and imagination; some of
its brands, like geometry, deal more closely with corporeal entities, some, like arithmetic,
do not have anything to do with the imagination. In educational terms, mathematics is a
discipline which stands between the study of nature, preparing the mind for the more
serious study of dialectics and ‘the pure realities’.145
Though Neoplatonism could be characterised as mystic, this holds true perhaps
only  from the  modern  secular  point  of  view –  ‘demonic’  would  be  the  proper  word.146
The ecstatic plane of existence and intuitive conception of knowledge were relevant, but
by its essence Neoplatonism was a rationalistic system.147 This emphasis changes in
Augustine.
141 Already discussed by Plotinus in his Enneads (IV.3.30), but Proclus’s discussion is more developed
and systematic.
142 Aristotle reflects the subject in Metaphysica Books XIII and XIV. For a discussion, see Lear 1982.
143 Proclus 1970, 41-45.
144 Proclus 1970, 42.
145 Siorvanes, 1998 (the subsection: ‘Philosophy of science’).
146 For this element of daimôn in Neoplatonism, see Watson 1988, 112.
147 There were, however, truly mantic movements in the period of Early Christianity of which the most
known is perhaps Gnosticism. As Cocking (1991, 81) writes, ‘[g]nosticism is less a matter of doctrines
than of rites. In and outside Christianity it is closely associated with alchemy and magic, and especially
with the religious use of magic in theurgy’. These tendencies did not by any means fade away later. For
mysticisim and imagination in the Middle Ages, see Bundy 1927, 199-210.
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Augustine is known for two things: his subjective psychology in general, and his
conception of will in particular. As the author of Confessions, he is sometimes even
considered to be the first of the moderns. For the discussion here in hand, his significance
however rests on a careful analysis of imagination.148
Augustine’s discussion of imagination is based on a central distinction in his
theory of human nature between the outer and the inner man. The outer man is the one
who is, through the five senses, in contact with the material world, whereas the inner
man is the one who reflects what is happening in the soul of a person. On a general level,
Augustine sees imagination in the customary way as a mediator between senses and
intellectual knowledge, but he also analyses the process from the other end, as a
movement from intellect to the body. Imagination deals with incorporeal images, but it is
not completely clear how Augustine exactly understands the relationship between
corporeal memory images and intellectual images of inner vision.149 Nevertheless, De
Trinitate suggests something like the following.
The soul acquires knowledge through a specific kind of vision, which is the result
of the activities of the senses, imagination, and intellect, each of which has three
components. In this process the sensory, or the corporeal vision, consists of the object,
the intention to look at it, and the act of seeing, whereas imagination, that is, an inner
(sometimes a spiritual) vision, is a combination of the memory image, the will to recall it,
and  the  act  of  holding  it  firmly  in  one’s  mind.  The  components  of  the  last  part  of  the
process, intellectual vision, are the intelligible form, the will to attend to it, and the
rational reflection of this. This type of vision focuses on intelligible reality. In the
process, however, the two capacities of the soul that determine the epistemic status of an
image are imagination and will.150 Lastly, in Augustine imagination is discussed in
relation to sin. Having false imaginations, above all of one’s own status, expresses the
original arrogance of human beings, but certain sorts of imaginations, that is, dreams, are
not sin because in dream an agent does not act on purpose.
Augustine’s treatment of different kinds of imaginations is rich.151 They can be
images that follow from a sensation, say, the impression of a tree, images that are in the
memory  but  whose  object  is  no  longer  (these  he  calls phantasma or imago)  –  for
example, an image of the father who died in one’s early childhood – and fictive or
mythical images, like Manichean world pictures. Yet another set of imaginations is
148 Augustine’s discussion can be found in De Trinitate (especially Book 11) and De Genesi ad Litteram
(Book 12), some of his letters, and other treatises (like De Musica, Book  VI).  For  commentary  see
Bundy 1927, 153-172; Cocking 1991, 70-76; Watson 1988, Chapter 6; Markus, 1967, 362-373 and 374-
389; Breyfogle 1999, 442-443; and especially O’Daly 1987, 106-129.
149 Letter 162.
150 De Genesi ad Litteram 12.11.
151 This paragraph, if not mentioned otherwise, is largely based on Letter 7 and O’Daly 1987, 107-111
and 120-127.
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distinguished on the basis of intentio. It is likely that imaginations recalled from the
memory belong to this class, but Augustine also mentions intentionally formed or
anticipated imaginations like that of the city of Alexandria, a place where the person
imagining has never been, but the image of which he or she is able to raise to the mind on
the basis of the image of a city and, say, what he or she has heard of Alexandria. The last
two types of phantasia include images of representational objects, and visions. The first
Augustine understands, following Plato, to be theoretical by nature, for example, the
objects of geometry. These are, to borrow O’Daly’s characterisation, ‘real but
necessarily imagined natural objects’ like ‘a representation of the entire universe as well
as objects of certain sciences or branches of theoretical knowledge (disciplinae), such as
geometrical figures, musical rhythms, and metrical patterns’. Visions and prophecy,
Augustine explains, require imagination, but need to be separated depending on their
physical accompaniments, like the burning bush that appeared to Moses, or an
imagination like Peter’s vision at Joppa.152 Here Augustine is also following Plato, for he
insists that though visions require imagination they are not yet visions for they need to be
interpreted by reason. It is not a prophet who is able to receive visions, but the one who
is able to interpret them according to the will of God.
It is not completely sure whether Augustine did understand, first, imagination to
have a propositional structure, as the Stoics did, and, second, whether words and signs
are imaginations. De Trinitate suggests that both ideas are possible. In his treatise
Augustine writes that words and signs are required for the rational formulation of
things.153 In general, imagination then has two roles in Augustine’s psychology: it
‘transmits sense perception to the intellect and represents ideas received from the
illuminated intellect’.154 It has, moreover, some further aspects.
Firstly, there are dreams, which to Augustine are involuntary instances of
imagination. Dreams can be true or false. They can be true in two ways: literally and
symbolically.155 The symbolism of dreams and the interpretation of them as signs of
God’s will offer a bridge to the next dimension of Augustine’s analysis of imagination,
namely supernatural communication, which operates via the imagination. Through the
body, a person is in contact with demons, whereas angels can communicate directly to
one’s mind.156 Augustine, however thinks that prophecy can be corporeal and that with
imagination we are able to have non-verbal communication with dead and living souls.157
152 See Exodus 3:1-15 and Acts 11:5-6.
153 De Trinitate 255-260, 285-286, and 483-486 (references of this work are to pages).
154 Breyfogle 1999, 442.
155 De Genesi ad Litteram 12.18-30
156 For demons, see Letter 9, De Civitate Dei Book 18 (106-109); and De Divinatione Daemonum, 426-
428. For angels, see Enchiridion, 419 and Letter 162.
157 Letter 9.
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Thirdly, like many before him, Augustine considers it possible that imagination
has material consequences.158 Augustine considers the consequences of these intensive
and effective imaginations by giving some examples. Firstly, to ejaculate, the act of sex is
not required. Another example of the mind-body interaction is the relationship between a
mother and an embryo. Augustine believed that an unborn child can be affected by the
imaginations of the mother. A further twist is to raise the question of the moral nature of
imaginations. In the case of “nocturnal emissions” Augustine thinks that we are not
responsible for our imaginings, but it makes sense to conclude that if a person
deliberately and passionately re-enacts a sexually oriented imagination and this leads to
an orgasm, this is sin. A similar line of thought could be applied to controlling our
passions. It is possible that imaginations may excite movements of the soul, for example,
to amplify our anger, but as good Christians we need to control the flight of our fancy.
Lastly,  Augustine,  who  taught  rhetoric  in  Carthage  and  later  hold  a  chair  in
subject in Milan, was aware of the link between imagination and language. His analysis
of the relationship is positive. Imagination and various techniques of expression are able
to provide images of which the intellect is able to grasp the truth via their similarity.159
This aesthetic imagination, however, has a religious colour. Imagination can reveal parts
of supernatural reality, but Augustine’s reply is negative when it comes to the question
whether the human imagination could create something totally new and original, for only
God can create in the true sense of the word.
To summarise, Augustine discusses all the principal forms of imagination at
length, in detail, and with subtlety. Secondly, though there is no room for a more detailed
study it is safe to state that Augustine’s explorations into imagination, influenced many
generations of thinkers, including our next subject, Aquinas.
THE ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF IMAGINATION AND ITS CRITICS
Generally, it can be said that Aquinas, whom I do not claim here to be the only voice of
scholastics, much less, of Medieval philosophy, sharpens the distinction between reason
(or intellect) and imagination that was already present in Aristotle.160 Imagination
(imaginatio) is ‘a movement caused by actual sensation’161 and one of the internal senses
158 De Trinitate 110-111 and 321-356. O’Daly (1987, 111) suggests that this was an old and popular
belief developed not only by Augustine but also, for example, by Porphyry.
159 The idea can be found from Aristotle, see De Poetica 1451b.
160 For Aquinas’s theory of the soul and imagination see, above all, ST I.q77 and 78; SCG 2.67 and 73;
and CDA, 327-340. For a discussion, see Bundy 1927, 216-224; Cocking 1991, 151-155; Kenny 1993,
36-40; and Stump 2003, Part II, especially, 256-60. For the early and the mature scholastic views, see
(respectively), [Anon.], ‘Soul and its Powers’, ca. 1225 (in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval
Philosophical texts, III, 26-27) and Reisch 1503, 10.2.21. For a discussion, see Bundy 1927, Chapter IX;
Mahoney 1982; Marenbon 1991, Chapter 5; and Pluta 2004, 21-24.
161 SCG 2.67, 203. Cf. SCG 2.73; ST I.q.77.a.7; and CDA, 337-338.
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(sensus interiores). It is a prerequisite for understanding, but only when the soul is united
with the body.162 Secondly, though imaginations can arise without external stimulus, as
in dreams, Aquinas holds that imagination is limited to experience; ‘for we cannot
imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man
born blind cannot imagine color.’163 Thirdly, Aquinas describes imagination as a special
kind  of  ‘the  storehouse  of  forms  (thesaurus formarum), that is, phantasms, of sensible
things when the latter are no longer present to the external senses’.164 Imagination
however differs from memory ‘by its power to decontextualize images’.165 When
memory always recalls things in the context they were perceived, imagination does not
has no such constraint.166 Lastly, Aquinas shares with Aristotle the idea that ‘our intellect
understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material
things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the
contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.’167 It is, then, intellect
alone that understands the essences of things168 and by understanding (intelligere)
Aquinas means here that intellect understands ‘the quiddity of a material thing’, that is,
the real nature or essence of a thing.169As he writes:
for by the intellect’s command there is formed in the imagination a phantasm corresponding to
such and such an intelligible species, the latter being mirrored in this phantasm as an exemplar
in the thing exemplified or in the image.170
Aquinas’s formulation calls for a further comment. When he writes that in imagination a
phantasm is formed that is ‘an exemplar in the thing exemplified or in the image’, this
sounds like the Neoplatonic idea of geometrical objects, the only difference being that he
appears to make a general statement. That is, in a similar vein to the way we abstract
from the phantasm of a particular triangle certain general qualities, like magnitude or
angles, so do we with the other sorts of objects. For instance, from a phantasm of a man,
say Socrates, we abstract the qualities ‘rational’ and ‘animal’. This sort of
straightforward rationalism, however, raised objections. Though the reaction to Aquinas,
162 ST I.q.78.a.4 and CDA, 337.
163 ST I.q111.a3. r1 and CDA, 337.
164 Mahoney 1982, 606 and note 18.
165 ST I.q.78.a.4. Cf. SCG 2.74; ST I.q78.a4 (editor’s note c on page 141); and CDA, 415..
166 Aquinas is confident on the strength of memory here, but it is reasonable to think that we quite often
forget the context in which we perceived a thing.
167 ST I.q.85.a1. Cf. De Anima 429a10-430a26.
168 ST I.q57.a1.r2.
169 ST I.q85.a5.r3. It was a commonplace, held for instance by Siger of Brabant (c. 1240-1280), to think
that sense and imagination conceive things as material, that is, as particular. See Mahoney 1982, 613.
170 SCG 2.73, 226. Cf. ST I.q90.a1.
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and intellectualist scholastism in general, was diverse and took place in many areas of
philosophy, in what follows I will narrow down my discussion to a particular reaction,
namely to William Ockham’s view of imagination.171
Ockham’s discussion of imagination can be approached from two perspectives:
that of sensory cognition and that of intellectual cognition.172 This seems to correspond
with the basic Aristotelian idea of imagination as acting in relation to both external
sensation and intellect. Ockham also followed the paradigm of faculty psychology and
considered imagination to be an internal sense which processes the data of external
sensations. However, what is more interesting is where Ockham diverged from the
standard view. As is well known, Ockham denied the existence of species. As Hirvonen
explains, in sensory or intellectual cognition, there is no ‘need to postulate any species of
things as intermediates between the things and the abstractive cognitions of them’.173 In
this abstractive cognition, imagination plays a role.
 Imagination, unlike sensation, does not refer to an image of a thing in the mind,
but  to  an  act  of  the  mind.  For  instance,  a  complex  imagination,  say,  that  of  a  golden
mountain consists of ‘simultaneously an act with respect to a mountain and with respect
to gold’.174 Imaginations are not, then, mind pictures, but ‘abstractive cognitions of a
thing [...] caused by the intuitive cognitions of the thing or the habits generated by the
abstractive cognitions [that] exist in the interior senses (fantasy)’.175
Up to a point, the intellectual cognition follows the same pattern as sensory
cognition. In intellectual cognition, intuitive cognition is ‘a kind of notification of the
thing which is apprehended, but it is not a proper judgement of the existence of the
thing’.176 For  such  judgement  it  needs  the  help  of  other  acts  of  mind  and  in  particular
those acts that are in the intellect. The first difference arises concerning how the internal
process of cognition is understood in the intellectual soul. In the operation of intuitive
intellectual cognition, when the objects are the intellect’s own functions, no ‘sensory
cognitions are involved’.177 Instead intellect can have intuitive acts as its interior objects,
which include its own acts (reflection), the passions of will, and complex objects. The
171 For the differences between the two, see Pluta 2004, 24-26.
172 For a discussion, see Stump 1999 and Hirvonen 2004, Chapters 3 and 4. I follow the latter, which
also offers extensive documentation of the original sources.
173 Hirvonen 2004, 113.
174 Hirvonen 2004, 80.
175 Hirvonen 2004, 78. Note also that objects of imagination cannot be the external objects themselves.
For the notion of habit, see Hirvonen 2004, 56-59.
176 Hirvonen 2004, 76-77. The necessity of sensory intuitive cognition is not completely clear, for
‘Ockham seems to think that sensible exterior objects immediately and effectively cause intuitive
cognitions of themselves in the intellect, but they cannot do so unless they cause cognitions of
themselves in the sensory cognitive potency’, but then again he also held that ‘[b]y God’s power,
however, human intellects could perceive the external world without senses’ (Hirvonen 2004, 109).
177 Hirvonen 2004, 110.
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last are possible only in intellectual cognition and should be distinguished from complex
imaginations, which belong to sensory cognition. To conclude, Ockham offered a radical
alternative to the standard reading of imagination, his originality being the idea of the
imagination as an act of mind and not as a more or less cognitive second-order sensation.
Ockham’s influence was great and his radical philosophical theology changed the
course of philosophy in many ways. It would, however, be misleading to think that the
less radical philosophical psychology, that is, the standard Aristotelian theory (or faculty
psychology as the conventional name goes), faded away. This theory is relevant for the
present study, because the Aristotelian theory of the soul and its functioning is the theory
which Hobbes objected to. Therefore, a more detailed look at some of its developments
needs to be introduced here.
The Aristotelian theory of the soul that dominated philosophical psychology from
the Arab commentators to the time of Hobbes was rather uniform. Here this theory will
be introduced – with some clarifying departures – through its developed form, that is, as
it is articulated in Gregory Reisch’s (ca. 1467-1525) influential Margarita Philosophica
(1503).178
 The starting point of faculty psychology is the division into vegetative, sensitive,
and intellectual souls.179 Each soul then has various faculties which have different
functions. For instance, one of the nutritive faculties of the vegetative soul is digestion.
What is of special interest here is how the soul understands the external world and how it
is  possible  to  have  intellectual  (universal,  abstract)  knowledge.  Let  us  look  at  these  in
turn.
Following  Aristotle,  it  was  thought  that  sensation  is  the  foundation  of
knowledge. To be more precise, the perceptive faculties of the sensitive soul was divided
into the external and internal senses. The first include the five external senses (vision,
hearing, smell, taste, and touch),180 which operated with sensible objects when these
objects are present. The internal perceptual senses operate with the same objects but
when these objects are not necessarily present anymore. Imagination was one of the
internal senses, the others being cogitation, memory, fantasy, and common sense.181
178 Here I follow mainly Park 1988 and Mahoney 1982, but I have also utilised the short discussion by
Leijenhorst (2002, Chapter 2). References to Reisch’s work are given by Books (L), Tracts (T), and
Sections (C), all in Roman numerals. For example LVII.TII.SXXV refers to section 25 in the second
tract of the eighth book of Margarita Philosophica.
179 In Margarita Philosophica, the vegetative soul is discussed in LX.TI, the external capacities of the
sensitive soul in LX.TII.CV-XX, the internal capacities of the sensitive soul in LX.TII.CXXI-XXXI,
and the intellectual soul in LXI.
180 Margarita Philosophica LX.TI.CV.
181 Margarita Philosophica LX.TII.CXXI. Two clarificatory remarks are needed here. First, though the
standard number of inner senses was five, there was no agreement on this question. Some Scholastic
thinkers, like Phillip Melanchton (1497-1560) considered that there were three internal senses and
Aquinas lists four of them. See Leijenhorst 2002, 91-92. A historically and systematically fruitful
discussion of various faculties can be found in the eight disputation on the commentary to Aristotle’s De
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Especially in the later forms of faculty psychology it became customary to understand the
inner senses as separate faculties located in different parts of the brain.182 This tendency,
which I will briefly return to below, was developed in the empiristic, physiological
theories of the soul in Renaissance.
The role of the sensitive soul was to provide material to the intellectual soul.
Knowledge of external objects that the sensitive soul provided was particular and more
general and universal knowledge was obtained only by the operation of the rational
faculties (will, [intellective] memory, and intellect) of the intellectual soul. This idea of
the gradual acquisition of intellectual knowledge was clearly expressed by Albert the
Great (ca. 1200-1280), Aquinas’s teacher, and it is called the principle of the grades of
abstraction.
The principle of the grades of abstraction, put very simply, says that different
faculties of the soul play different roles in the acquisition of intellectual knowledge. The
first stage is sensation. In the sensation of an external object there is ‘an intention
(intentio) or species of the material thing which enables us to have sense knowledge of
that thing’.183 Leijenhorst explains this in more detail:
species are immaterial qualities, such as colour, which are impressed by the medium, i.e. air or
water [...and they] are received by the sense organs: colour and light by the eye olfactory species
by the nose, audible species by the ear, etc. [...] The species emitted by the external object are
transported by sensory, vaporous spirits to the brain, the seat of the faculties of inner sense’.184
Further on, when species arrive to the brains they are a type of raw data, and external
sensory faculties are unable to quantify them. The initial organisation of raw data is done
by common sense (sensus communis). The second grade of abstraction takes place in the
imagination, where an image of a thing is apprehended when its sensible origin is no
longer present. In Albert’s account the role of the imagination appears to be rather
instrumental. As Mahoney puts it, imagination ‘enables us to form an image before our
interior eyes (prae oculis interiribus facere imaginem) and to prepare images for the use
of  phantasy  and  intellect,  which  represent  the  third  and  fourth  grade  of  abstraction
respectively’.185 In sum, despite the empiristic grounding, in faculty psychology the
Anima by the Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco Suarez (1548-1617). Second, there was no
one answer to the question what is the relationship between imaginatio and phantasia. Normally these
were separated and it was common to think that imaginatio and phantasia were, to use the terminology
adopted, passive and active forms of imagination.
182 For an example of where the different inner senses were located, see the picture in Margarita
Philosophica LX.TII.CXXI.
183 Mahoney 1982, 602.
184 Leijenhorst 2002, 59-60.
185 Mahoney 1982, 603.
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acquisition of knowledge is conducted by the intellectual, rational part of the soul and by
the immaterial faculties of mind.
TWO NOTES ON IMAGINATION IN THE RENAISSANCE
When we move to the next phase in the history of imagination, a rather different
approach arises. The distinctive feature of the Renaissance discussion of imagination is
its linkage to poetry, civil life, and education.186 For instance, in his Lectorium
antiquarum, Lodovico Ricchieri (1453-1525), a central Renaissance theorist, writes:
But with respect to these [fables for the young] we must note carefully that the poets are not
condemned outright by Plato; since to the degree in which he holds that they should be rejected
when they disturb the state and invent shameful things, to that same degree he embraces them
and kisses them tenderly when they exhort to moral improvement, celebrating elegantly and
eloquently in their praises of heroes or their hymns to the gods.187
Here poetry has a clear political function and imagination is considered as a risky
capacity. A more nuanced view is introduced some fifty years after Ricchieri by Bernardo
Tasso (1493-1569), who defined the task of the poet to be:
by imitating the human action through the delightfulness of plots, through sweetness of the
words  arranged in  a  most  beautiful  order,  through the  harmony of  the  verse,  to  adorn  human
souls with good and gentle characters, and with various virtues.188
Poetry (and literature in general) is to be harnessed to the service of the higher end of
civilising the public, educating them, and giving examples of the moral way of life.
The technical discussion concentrated on the notion of idolo. When talking of the
difference between bad and good poetry, another Italian literary theorist, Jacobo
Mazzoni (1548-1598) discusses the Renaissance conception of poetic imagination. A
poetic image ‘has its origin in our artifice and is born of our fancy [phantasia] and of our
intellect through our choice and our will’.189 This view is complemented by Bernardo
Segni (1504-1558), who says that poetic imagination consists of two stages, where
‘words imitate concepts just as its [idolo’s] concepts imitate things’.190 Segni is utilising
the  known  formula  of  Aristotle  from De Interpretatione,  which  states  that  ‘spoken
186 There is a mountain of works that discuss the field. Some starting points can be found in Cocking
1991, Chapters 9 and 10. For a thorough study, see Weinberg (1961), whom I have followed here.
187 Ricchieri 1516/7?, 158. Quoted in Weinberg 1961, 57.
188 Tasso 1562, 12. Quoted in Weinberg 1961, 282-283.
189Mazzoni 1587, Part I, section 10. Quoted in Weinberg 1961, 324. See also Cocking 1991, 207.
190 Segni 1573, fol. 86v. Quoted in Weinberg 1961, 301 (square brackets mine).
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sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken
sounds’.191 Poetic language must directly affect the soul by imitating the order of things.
This articulates the idea of poetic imagination as lively images reproduced by right
expression. This has often been discussed on the level of literary theory, but the
underlying psychological current is equally important.
In his recent study of the constituents of Hobbes’s philosophy, Leijenhorst has
emphasised the influence of Italian natural philosophy on Hobbes. A similar observation
was earlier made by Thorpe.192 Aside from the main similarity, the tendency to naturalise
aesthetics, Thorpe distinguishes two ideas from the Continental Renaissance that are
relevant to Hobbes. The first was the empiristic, physiological psychology and
naturalistic epistemology of Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588), whereas the second was
the consequence of this for aesthetics, put forward by Tommaso Campanella (1568-
1639) and made known in Europe by the Spaniard Juan Huarte de San Juan (1529-
1588).
Telesio held that all knowledge is based on observation, but by observation he
did not refer only to the sensation of the objects of external reality. Instead, to observe
was to become conscious of the effects of these objects on us. These observations may
be understood as imaginations or phantasms. The second major idea concerns the nature
of reasoning. To Telesio, making a judgement, which was the basis of reasoning was the
second-level observation of similarities in various sensations, and for this language was
not required. He even claimed that general concepts were formed on the basis of this
analogical reasoning. Telesio then thought that reasoning was in accordance with the
natural processes of the mind and even perhaps reducible to certain physiological
processes.
Like Telesio, Campanella understood memory and imagination to be extensions
of sensation, but he also differed from his teacher. Campanella emphasised the subjective
element in sensation and distinguished between reproductive and creative imagination.
Reproductive imagination is a reenacting and repeating faculty, creative imagination is
responsible  for  the  succession  of  different  contents  of  the  mind.  This  proto-
associationism shows that Campanella did not understand creative imagination in a
modern fashion, but as creating a unity between different ideas in the mind.
To determine the exact role Huarte played in European thought and especially in
17thcentury English philosophy and criticism would deserve a book of its own. Here it is,
first, sufficient to say that his Examen de ingenios para las sciencias193 spread rapidly
191 De Interpretatione 16 a4-5.
192 Leijenhorst 2002, 11 and Thorpe 1940, 39-48. Two works of Schuhmann (1988 and 1990) also
discuss the topic. I follow Thorpe’s presentation.
193 Originally written in 1575, the book was translated into English in 1594 by Richard Carew, a
Cornish scholar. Though Carew knew Spanish, as s well as other major European languages, his
translation was based on the Italian version of Examen by poet Camillo Camilli. See Rogers 1959, ix-xi.
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among the European intelligentsia during the latter half of the 16th century and was likely
to be known by a learned person. Aside of a random similarity, we have some evidence
that Hobbes had read Huarte.194 Secondly, to the discussion in hand, Huarte has an
instrumental role. His view of imagination is introduced as a point of contrast.
Huarte’s ‘essay in scientific vocational guidance’195 is  based  on  a  distinction
introduced by a mathematician and philosopher Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576).
Cardano divided human faculties into three classes: memory, reason, and imagination,
which turned in Huarte’s treatment into the tripartite: memory, understanding, and
imagination.196 From this, Huarte develops a theory how every person has his or her own
special wit or mental aptitude.197 For example, persons with a good memory are able in
languages and law, whereas those with a developed understanding can do well in logic
and theology. In his pedagogical physionomy, Huarte creates a strong association
between imagination and poetry (and arts in general). This would be a rather
conventional solution, if Huarte had not added that imagination is the mental faculty
needed in many practical arts. He writes:
From a good imagination, spring all the Arts and Sciences, which consist in figure,
correspondence, harmonie, and proportion: such are Poetrie, Eloquence, Musicke, and the skill
of preaching: the practice of Phisicke, the Mathematicals, Astrologie, and the gouerning of a
Common-wealth, the art of Warfare, Paynting, drawing, writing, reading, to be a man gratious,
pleasant, neat, wittie in managing, && all the engins & deuices which artificiers make: besides
a certain speciall gift, whereat the vulgar maruelleth, and that is, to endite diuers matters, vnto
foure, who write togither, and yet all to be penned in good sort.198
On Huarte and his treatise, see Rogers 1959, v-xii. The Cavendish library holds three copies of the work:
Camillo Camilli’s Italian translations from 1590, Salustio Grati’s translation (‘pura italiana’) from
1603, and the English translation by Carew from 1640. See Chatsworth Catalogue , II, 316.
194 Both works, Carew’s translation and Hobbes’s Leviathan, are dedicated to Sir Francis Godolphin,
but these are two different persons. The first Francis was a landowner and a politician and the personal
friend of Carew, when the latter was a brother of Hobbes’s acquitance from the1630s, a poet Sidney
Godolphin who belonged to the Great Tew, a circle of intellectuals peopled by Viscount Falkland who
discussed on the questions of religion. See J. P. D. Cooper, ‘Godolphin, Sir William (b. in or before
1518, d. 1570)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/67867, accessed 9 May 2005] and Anne Duffin, ‘Godolphin,
Sidney (bap. 1610, d. 1643)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10881, accessed 9 May 2005]. Among Hobbes studies, Thorpe
(1940, 42-48) discusses Huarte’s work, and Malcolm (2002, 458) points out that Hobbes had read
Huarte. On the basis of the latter and what the Cavendish library catalogue tells, it can be concluded that
Hobbes read the Italian translations.
195 Thorpe 1940, 42.
196 Spingarn (1957, x) attaches the division straightly to Huarte.
197 Huarte 1959, Chapter VIII.
198 Huarte 1959, 103.
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Huarte’s all-embracing account of the wonders of imagination is not perhaps precise or
coherent in every respect, but it stands as an illuminating contrast with preceding views.
When in the previous accounts, imagination was something specific, in Huarte it has
become a capacity that is used to signify all sorts of intellectual activities of human
beings.
Huarte’s view in particular, and, the Renaissance ideas in general, are echoed
among Hobbes’s predecessors.199 One of the early Elisabethan literary critics, George
Puttenham (1529?-1590), using the old wording of Quintilian, distinguished between
persons with a disordered phantasm (‘phantastici’) and ‘euphantasiote’, a person whose
imagination combined with ‘sound & true judgement’.200 The latter was essential for all
civilised life. Non-paradigmatic sensory experience had become the Daedalus of the
mind.
The relevance of the selective history of imagination given above lies not so much
in an attempt to show that Hobbes’s ideas on imagination were current in earlier thinkers
or  in  his  time.  It  was  introduced  in  order  to  show that  imagination  has  occupied  many
minds before him and that the concept has a rich history. The remainder of the chapter
discusses Hobbes’s vocabulary or lexicon of imagination and it seeks to point out
possible similarities with some of the views discussed above. In brief, in Hobbes’s
conception of imagination, the matter of imagination is limited to the experience and in
this sense imagination is reproductive, but because its results are not, it is also
productive. From this starting point, Hobbes builds up a new account of how the world,
mind, and language relate; an account that we find later in a refined form in Hume and
Kant.201
CONCLUSION: HOBBES AND THE LEXICON OF IMAGINATION
Hobbes is not always clear in his use of concepts.202 The difficulty is not only that his
vocabulary  changes  from  text  to  text,  but  also  that  the  content  of  a  single  concept
199 In the latter transition, Spingarn’s (1957) essay is still useful.
200 Puttenham 1970 [1589], 19-20.
201 For Hume’s conception of imagination, see Raynor 1982/3 and Hakkarainen 2005.
202 Hobbes’s reflections can be found in Leviathan II, 4-5 and Concerning Body IV.25.7, 396. For
eikasia, phantasia, and imaginatio, see Concerning Body IV.25.10, 404 and IV.25.7, 396. See also
Leviathan XLV, 358. For an attempt to clarify Hobbes’s terminology, see Cantalupo (1991, 43-44 and
49-50), which is, however, somewhat strained. More plausible analyses are Thorpe (1940, 79-82) and
Sacksteder (1978, 33-45).
An acknowledged reason for vagueness is that no developed philosophical vocabulary in
English existed in Hobbes’s time. Tuck (1989, viii) has summarised the issue: ‘Hobbes created English-
language philosophy. Before his work, there was little written in English on the more technical areas of
philosophy – on metaphysics, physics, and even ethics […] But after Hobbes, there was no area of
human enquiry deemed inappropriate for the English language’. For a misapprehension of Hobbes in
these terms, see Peters 1967, 94. I share the view that Hobbes’s contribution to the philosophical
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changes when it is discussed in relation to other concepts. This is particularly true in the
case of imagination.
A look at Hobbes’s terminological reflections on imagination shows that he was
aware of the Greek and Latin origins of the concept. This is present on the level of
etymological references, but above all in Hobbes’s insistence that imaginations should
not be understood unequivocally as visual, but more broadly as something appearing to
the mind as a result of or originating from sense-perception; ‘And this is it, the Latines
call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly,
to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy, which signifies apparence, and is as
proper to one sense as to another’.203
The vague nature of Hobbes’s view of imagination may be due to the fact that we
have lost the language and conceptual framework in which Hobbes thought and it is
difficult to reconstruct them. Certainly, a perfect reconstruction is not possible, but I
believe that a plausible one is. Hobbes’s ideas on imagination were developed at a time
when many traditional ideas existed (though not necessarily in the same form as they
were originally formulated) side by side with some novel ones. This hypothesis needs to
be studied in more detail.
Hobbes’s theory of imagination does not seem to demonstrate a great deviation
from, or break with, the preceding ones. His account is strikingly similar to the prevailing
idea of imagination as a sort of second-order perception. What is particularly worth
noticing is that on some fundamental issues Hobbes seems to share a common ground
with Aristotle and Aquinas, thinkers who are often seen as antithetical to him.
Firstly, all three hold that incorporeal things cannot be imagined.204 Secondly,
Hobbes holds, like Aristotle and Aquinas, that imaginations proceed from sensation.205
Again, all three think that imaginations are states of mind where the object of sense
perception is not present or is otherwise obscure.206 Hobbes also unites some abnormal
experiences under imagination.207 Lastly, to Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hobbes imagination,
vocabulary in English is remarkable, but at the same time the complexity of the development should be
acknowledged. That is to say, earlier attempts to provide a vernacular philosophical lexicon exists. See,
for instance, Lever 1573. For a discussion, see Howell 1952, 61-62 and Gilbert 1960, 199-200.
203 Leviathan II, 5.
204 See De Anima 427b14-17; ST I.q17 and CDA, 325; Leviathan III, 11.
205 See De Anima 425b25 and 428b10-13; SCG 2.67 and CDA,305; Leviathan I,  4.  See  also ST
I.q33.a3.r.3: ‘The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive
powers, which are exercised through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use
of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers.’
206 Leviathan I.II, 5. Cf. De Anima 428a33-35; ST I.q78.a4.
207 For Hobbes’s list, see Leviathan II, 4-8 and Concerning Body IV.25.7-9, 396-402. Cf. the Latin
Leviathan, in OL, III, 537. This similarity holds true at least in the case of Aristotle. See also the above
discussion of non-paradigmatic sensory experience.
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so it seems, stands somewhere between sense and reflexive thinking.208 It is, however, on
this last point that Hobbes seems to differ from Aristotle, Aquinas and the like. To
phrase the difference by means of a heuristic exaggeration, in Hobbes imagination is a
form of reflexive thinking.
The first substantial difference between Hobbes and Aristotle and Aquinas is that
the latter two had a hylomorphic model of the world and the mind, whereas Hobbes was
a strict materialist. To him the world and the mind are matter in motion and scientific
explanations  should  be  in  accordance  with  this  tenet.  The  second  difference  is  that
Aristotle and Aquinas, as well as Plato and his followers, thought that understanding
reality is essentially an intellectual activity, a view that was also popular among some
contemporaries of Hobbes.209 According to these, there is a special capacity in the human
soul that apprehends the world that is intelligible in itself and this capacity does not have
direct connection to the material reality. As Aquinas writes:
It must furthermore be observed that the intellect informed by the species of the object, by
understanding produces in itself a kind of intention of the object understood, which intention
reflects the nature of that object and is expressed in the definition thereof. This indeed is
necessary: since the intellect understands indifferently a thing absent or present, and in this
point agrees with the imagination: yet the intellect has this besides, that it understands a thing
as separate from material conditions, without which it does not exist in reality; and this is
impossible unless the intellect forms for itself the aforesaid intention.210
What Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hobbes share is the idea that imagination is something
apparent, and as such perhaps unreliable, but whereas Aristotle and Aquinas think that it
is the intellect that is able to overcome this when with the help of imagination(s) it grasps
the essence of things from their particular occurrences, Hobbes does not see any ground
to go beyond the use of five senses and what follows from this. Instead of a qualitative
alteration (from sensational to intellectual, or material to immaterial) there is motion of
bodies upon which order is established by correct scientific language that arises from a
208 See De Anima 427b14-17and 431a1-432a; De Memoria et Reminiscentia 449b31-450a14 and De
Motu Animalium 702a19-20. In Aquinas, see ST I.q.78.a.4 and CDA, 383.
209 See De Anima 429a10-431b19 and ST I.q79, especially a3-4 and CDA, Chapters 9-13. For
contemporaries, see Descartes 1984, II, 50 (AT VII:72). For a discussion see Jesseph 1999, 210-215.
The case of Ockham, and perhaps, other nominalists is more complicated. It has been customary to
relate Hobbes with this school of thought and some similarities indeed exists (for these, see Malcolm
1983, Part I. Hobbes himself does not always speak in positive terms of his alleged intellectual
predecessors. See Historia Ecclesiastica, in OL, V, 399). One similarity is the denial of intelligible
species, but then again, as the discussion of Ockham above shows, the Medieval nominalists made a
distinction between sensory and intellectual soul, which is not present in Hobbes. Concerning
imagination, Ockham’s account of imagination as an act could in general also fit to Hobbes’s view
(especially, if the activities of the mind are understood as variation of the motion of bodies), but then
again the link Hobbes makes between sensation and imagination appears to speak against this, and
therefore it is concluded that the matter needs further study.
210 SCG 1.52.
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form of imagination, that is, understanding.211 In other words, the material nature of
substances is a presupposition of all understanding, because without it there would be no
sensation of external objects and all knowledge is based on experience. The idea that a
thing could be understood as separate from its material conditions is absurd. In short,
where Hobbes breaks with a tradition is in displacing intellect with imagination and
adding a verbal emphasis to the imagination.
The displacement of intellect is not just a psychological and epistemological
transition, but equally a metaphysical one. Hobbes considers implausible the cornerstones
of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s philosophical systems, namely immaterial reality and
intellect. The first one, because the whole universe, not only the earth, as Hobbes points
out, is corporeal, that is, consists of bodies.212 The  second  one,  because  to  explain
intellect, that is, the process of understanding as a process where ‘the thing Understood
sendeth forth intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen; which comming into
the Understanding, makes us Understand’, is nothing but ‘insignificant Speech’, for the
use of the five senses and some common sense is enough.213
When  moving  from  the  specific  point  of  reference  to  the  broader  comparisons,
things become more complicated. It is tempting to say that Hobbes more or less
consciously absorbed some of the ideas introduced in the body of this chapter, but this
does not sound convincing. Nevertheless, I believe that a short summative comparison
between Hobbes and the views that preceded him is meaningful – though it needs to be
taken as tentative and heuristic, not factual. It makes sense not only in that it provides
tools to piece together Hobbes’s at times scattered analysis and his lexicon of
imagination, but above all because it shows how wide his philosophical enterprise is: he
tries to establish a mechanistic-materialistic philosophical system which can explain the
wide variety of human thought.
In his enterprise, Hobbes adopts as a general framework the division of types of
imagination into psychological, epistemic, aesthetic, and mantic aspects that is derived
from Plato. His understanding of imagination as the capacity of mind is from Aristotle on
two particular points: as a capacity of mind, imagination is a mediator, and as a mental
state, it has a number of different perverted manifestations, which have in common the
absence or obscurity of an object of sensation. Christianity, along with Plato, brings to
Hobbes’s analysis a sense of doubt toward imagination; Augustine introduces a
distinctively subjective element, whereas the theory of eloquence and Renaissance
literary criticism can be seen to bring in the dimension of language, the important vehicle
of imagination, as well as a peculiar civic pedagogy of poetry. Another important
211 For a similar reading of Hobbes, see Leijenhorst 2002, 93-5.
212 Leviathan XLVI, 371 and XXXIV, 207.
213 Leviathan I, 4 and III, 11. Cf. Leviathan II, 8. It has been suggested that Hobbes shares this doctrine
with the Renaissance thinker Pomponazzi. See Schuhmann 1988, 345. It must be added that Hobbes is
here rejecting just one of the explanations of intellect.
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constituent is the physiological theory of mind, which was a starting point already in
some scholastic views, but which was developed especially by the 16th century Italian
natural philosophers like Telesio. The two views that appear to have interesting, if also
historically speaking loose, similarities with Hobbes are the Stoic theory and its
conception of lekton, that is, the propositional nature of imagination, and the
Neoplatonist reflection of imagination and geometry. In brief, the tradition of philosophy
offers a pedigree to most of aspects of Hobbes’s theory of imagination, but it is the task
of a more historically orientated study to prove, whether such points of connection really
exist. With this conclusion, we may proceed to Hobbes’s lexicon of imagination.
Hobbes uses a range of terms when discussing imagination. The core term,
‘imagination’, is misleading in the sense that it refers to the states of mind generated by
visual sensations,214 whereas imagination, properly speaking, is any kind of sensory
appearance. The term imagination can still be used if we remember that ‘all phantasms
are not images’.215 The Greek-based term ‘fancy’ has the more extensive and correct
meaning that covers all five senses and emphasises the appearing nature of imaginations.
The terms appearance and seeming are synonyms of fancy. This conception of
imagination bears a resemblance to the Stoic notion of phantasia,  but  it  needs  to  be
complemented with an argument that shows that Hobbes also considered sensation to be
a mode of phantasia.216 An argument can be built upon Hobbes’s definitions of sense and
imagination.
In physical terms, sense ‘is some internal motion in the sentient, generated by
some internal motion of the parts of the object, and propagated through all the media to
the innermost part of the organ’.217 Imagination is a continuation of this motion in a
sentient’s body. Hobbes adopts the language of the new physics to describe the decaying
or hindered nature of imagination and explains the whole process of becoming aware as a
214 Leviathan II, 5; Concerning Body IV.25.7, 397. The Latin rootwords are imaginari and imago, the
latter having several telling meanings like image, appearance, statue, idea, echo, ghost, and phantom.
That Hobbes consistently made this claim is puzzling if we remember his interest in optics and vision. In
De Homine, for example, the analysis of vision takes up a substantial part of the book. Hobbes’s keen
interest in optics should not mislead us, however. Firstly, optics was one of the most vital sciences of the
times, something in which every progressive mind should be interested. Secondly, the physiology of
vision and the optical studies related to it can be seen to be a part of Hobbes’s theory of perception.
215 Concerning Body IV.25.7, 396. Scholars tend to forget this and discuss Hobbes’s account of sense in
terms of images and pictures. See, for example, Peters, 1967, 77; Herbert, 1989, 48 and 73; and Skinner
1996, 364. A particularly mistaken view is given by White 1990, Chapter 2 (especially pages 17 and
27). Martinich (1995, 141) comments on the pictorial reading as follows: ‘Although ideas are usually
thought of by Hobbes as iconic or pictorial, in fact for him each sense has its own kind of idea’. Of the
passages Martinich refers to (Concerning Body I.7.3, 95 and IV.25.2, 389-391 and Leviathan IV, 16),
only the latter two discuss the subject, strictly taken, and only the last one along the lines that Martinich
speaks of. What Hobbes, however, says in the passage in Leviathan,  is that sight, sound and so on are
‘names of fancies’. Therefore even this view is imprecise, because all the conceptions of the mind are
similar (i.e., matter in motion); we merely call them by different names.
216 Leijenhorst’s (2002, 93-94) discussion is useful here.
217 Concerning Body IV.25.2, 390.
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chain of motions that enter a body through the sense organs, but meet there the friction
of the internal parts of the human body and this friction hinders motion and causes the
original sensation to weaken. That sensations decay is not necessarily the same thing as
their hindering. By decaying, Hobbes refers to the idea that our sense organs, which are
perpetually ‘moved by other present objects’, cause new sensations and thereby make the
recent imaginations ‘less predominant’.218 What is somewhat problematic is the
distinction between sense and imagination that arises from the physical, mechanistic
description of them, namely: when does exactly the motion change so that we are able to
call it imagination? How much hindrance and by what does it take to mould sensation to
imagination? How decayed does it need to be? In Chapter III I will offer some insights to
these questions.
Hobbes’s philosophical definitions express the connection between sense and
imagination more clearly. ‘Sense in all cases,’ Hobbes writes, ‘is nothing els but originall
fancy’ and imagination ‘nothing but decaying sense’.219 The criterion to distinguish sense
from imagination is that in sensing and sense perception the object is present,220 but that
sense is ‘but an originall fancy’ seems to point to the reading of sensation as something
appearing, not something that is immediately and directly present to a person who
perceives, but more like the person’s subjective impression of something.
Hobbes’s classification of different contents of mind gives support for the above
claim that sense is not as central in Hobbes’s philosophical psychology as has been
thought  of  or  at  least  that  if  we  are  to  give  a  more  coherent  view  of  the  mind,
imagination is a more powerful explanatory concept. At its broadest, imagination as a
mental state refers to the conceptions of the mind (or simply: thoughts)221, which Hobbes
divides into three major classes: the original fancies (sensations properly speaking), the
decaying fancies (memories, simple imaginations, some compounded imaginations, and
dreams), and the fictive fancies (some compounded imaginations, visions, and after-, and
ghost images)222. Hobbes also uses the term ‘idea’ when he discusses conceptions of the
mind in general, but this is marginal.223 Thus, Hobbes uses a family of terms to describe
218 Concerning Body IV.25.7, 396. It is, however, worth mentioning that the clarity, distinctness, and
stableness of a sensation are directly proportional to the duration of the sensation. See Correspondence
Letter 12, 22-23.
219 Leviathan I, 4 and II, 5. Cf. Concerning Body, IV.25.7, 396 and Critique du ‘De Mundo’ XXVII.19,
326-328 and XXX.4-7, 350-351. The discussion in Chapter I of Decameron Physiologicum (EW, VII,
71-81) is also helpful.
221 ‘Mental’ is used here in general, non-philosophic sense as something referring to the activities of
mind. In Hobbes, of course, all mental states are material states.
222 Elements III.1-5, 27-29. Cf. Leviathan I-II and Concerning Body IV.25.2-9.
223 It has been proposed that Hobbes advises using fancy instead of phantasm, and abandoning the term
‘idea’. See Sacksteder 1978, 42-44. The argument seems to rest on the assumption that Hobbes seeks to
restore the meanings of original Greek philosophical vocabulary so that they correspond with the
English of his own age. This is rather odd argument in view the above short survey of the two major
Greek terms and their derivatives. In the light of this, the link between fancy and idea is quite clear, for
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the motions of the mind, but so that this family has a common core: the motions of mind
are phantasiai, that is, appearances or representations of external objects.
The faculty of imagination is to Hobbes what Kant later called imagination as a
reproductive capacity, that is, ‘a power of exhibiting it [i.e. imagination] in a derivative
way, but bringing back to mind an empirical intuition we have previously had’.224 This is
also the conception of imagination that we find, on one hand, from Aristotle and
Aquinas, and on other hand, from Hume and his account that ideas are copies of our
impressions (the ‘Copy Principle’).225 Imagination, however is also, in Kant’s
terminology, a productive capacity, which refers to the combining capacity of
imagination.  Lastly,  in  this  thesis  I  hope  to  succeed  in  putting  forward  a  view  that
imagination in Hobbes has also, in Kant’s terminology, a creative aspect. That is to say,
imagination is ‘a power of exhibiting an object originally and so prior to experience’.226
Naturally, the argument begins from Hobbes’s complex view of the human mind.
both refer to something appearing and, secondly, to the likeness between the object of the perception and
the conception of it in the mind.
224 Kant 1974, 44-45. Cf. 1911, 77-79.
225 Hume 1978, Part I. The expression ‘Copy Principle’ is from Garret (1997, Chapter 2). To Hobbes,
however, all our impressions and, consequently, all ideas are caused by bodies. They are (local) motion
within the inner organs of our body. On the possible relationship between Hobbes and Hume, see Russell
1985, 52 and 61 note 30. Hampton (1986, 19-22) also discusses some similarities and dissimilarities
between Hobbes’s and Hume’s theories of human nature.
226 Kant, 1974, 44-5. Cf. Kant 1911, 85-86.
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III HOBBES’S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The body of De Cive starts with the following classification: ‘NATURÆ humanæ
facultates ad quatuor genera reduci possunt, Vim corpoream, Experientiam, Rationem,
Affectum.’227 These (powers of body, experience, reason, and passions) will form the
principal topic of this and the following chapter. The central idea of these chapters is
simple. Imagination has three principal roles in Hobbes’s theory of human nature: it
consolidates, motivates, and explicates the mind and its various workings.
The chapter in hand and the one following it form a unity. The organising
principle comes from the distinction between mental and verbal imagination. As is well
known,  Hobbes  put  great  emphasis  on  our  ability  to  use  language.  It  is  not  even  far-
fetched to suggest that language is a part of human nature, for this is what Hobbes in
many places of his oeuvre claims.228 Language does not merely enable sophisticated
forms of human thinking, such as the arts and sciences, but also serves as a tool for
introspection.229 In the next chapter I will put forward the idea that Hobbes himself
employs this view in his writings on human nature. It is not, however, a matter of course
that this capacity is either natural or artificial. In order to clarify the distinction, we need
to study in detail what Hobbes says about basic operations of the mind.
The chapter in hand follows a further distinction: a common one, but articulated
by Hobbes as the cognitive and motive powers of the mind. The cognitive refers to
functions of the mind related to the processing of (sense-)data, whereas motivation is
related to deliberation and action. Sense, for example, is the source of knowledge,
memory a storage (or as Hobbes says ‘a register’) of empirical knowledge, and dreams
and visions represent distortions in the cognitive process. The distinction between
thinking and acting is not of course clear-cut, quite the opposite. Passions, which are the
basis of our motivation, also have an impact on cognitive processes. What remains sure
is that imagination plays a role in both cognition and motivation.
227 De Cive I.I, 89.
228 See, for instance, Elements V.1-2, 34-35; Leviathan II, 8 and IV, 13; and De Homine X.1.
229 For a view that misses not only this dimension in Hobbes’s thought, but his theory of sensation as
sensation of our inner states, see McCracken 1998 (the section on Hobbes and especially page 821). That
Hobbes does not make a distinction between an inner and an outer man, like, say, Augustine, or name a
specific capacity for introspection, like Locke (1975, 105-106) does, is not, in my opinion, sufficient to
support McCracken’s conclusion. On introspection, see Leviathan ‘Introduction’, 2.
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COGNITION
As the end of Chapter II showed, the basic distinction Hobbes draws when discussing
imagination is between imagination as a state of mind and as a capacity of mind. This
division is also present in his theory of human nature, though here it is articulated a little
differently: there are, on the one hand, the basic constituents of mental discourse, that is,
phantasms, and, on the other hand, the various ways (what I will call, conceivability)
how the mind becomes aware of reality.230
In general, Hobbes calls the natural activity of the mind ‘mental discourse’ and
gives two principal descriptions of it: physical and philosophical.231 The physical
explanation says that mental discourse is internal motion in a sentient caused by an
external object. It has a certain course, that is, it enters a sentient, travels to the brain and
continues to the heart where it meets a counterpressure. The core idea is simple: there is
nothing but matter in motion. Hobbes, however, speaks of the activity of the mind also in
other terms, for example, that sense is original fancy, not, say, that sense is the motion in
the internal parts of body.232 And it is this kind of vocabulary that seems to prevail. For
instance, in Concerning Body Hobbes writes: ‘[t]he object is the thing received; and it is
more accurately said, that we see the sun, than that we see the light’.233
When we come to Hobbes’s philosophical (or, psychological) description of
mental discourse, it can be called a common sense view, but only if two things are kept
in mind. No matter that Hobbes speaks in terms of everyday language, the fundamental
nature of reality is matter in motion. Secondly, though this is a common sense view, it is
not a naive one. Hobbes’s definition of what is the object of sense (it is the appearance of
an external object, not the external object) excludes this possibility.
There are two critical aims in the two sections that follow. The first is to show
that a certain adoption of the two-level theory of mind leads to a misunderstanding of
Hobbes’s philosophical psychology. Though Hobbes maintains that there is nothing but
matter in motion, the way in which he analyses various phenomena of mind does not
necessarily have a direct point of contact with the material basis of the mind. Similarly,
attempts to reduce his theory of human nature to materialistic processes are not
necessarily wrong, but still miss a fascinating layer of his philosophical psychology. The
second critical aim is to show how Hobbes’s theory of sense has dominated the
understanding of his theory of human nature. Although it is important, sense is a
230 On term ‘conceivability’, see the section ‘Conceivability and Hobbes’s theory of signs’) below.
231 This distinction is present in both the cognitive and the motive part of Hobbes’s theory of human
nature. Secondly, as becomes evident later, there is a third layer in Hobbes’s analysis of mind, namely
physiological, but this is relevant mainly in his theory of sensation. Thirdly, in what follows I shall use
the two terms, sensation and perception, interchangeably.
232 Leviathan I, 4 and III, 8. Cf. Concerning Body IV.25.2, 391 and IV.25.8, 399.
233 Concerning Body IV.25.3, 391.
- 56 -
prerequisite of thinking and is insufficient when we try to understand how human mind
and human nature work.234 This is not to belittle how Hobbes himself considered his
scientific project,235 but more an attempt to understand the correct meaning and aim of
his project.
The structural reason for studying forms of conceivability and the nature of sense
is to show the foundations of my argument in the following chapter. It is through a
certain form of imagination, namely understanding, that we are able to explain how pre-
linguistic thinking is possible. By this is not meant the obvious, that is, that we need to
write down or speak out our ideas, but that verbal discourse imposes an order on our
mental discourse and in this sense the capability to use language is inseparable from
human nature. If my reading of Hobbes is plausible, thinking without language is
possible, but sophisticated forms of thinking always require language.
The other side of the coin, motivation, also calls for some preliminary remarks.
Firstly, when we employ the distinction between the cognitive and motive, the latter
qualification can have at least two meanings. The first refers to the idea that our basic
mental motions are instinctual (natural motivation). The other meaning of motivation
refers to the idea that we are able to control our thinking by controlling our passions
(artificial motivation). Secondly, to specify the notion of natural motivation, the basic
mechanism of sense appears to contain some kind of a primitive, emotive judgement.
This idea is, however, developed by Hobbes into a full-fledged form of emotive
judgement, which he calls deliberation. It then seems that Hobbes considers desires or
passions not only irrational or uncontrollable, but equally a constituents of reflection.
Thirdly, passions form a class of sensations that go well with Hobbes’s idea that
perception is primarily perception of inner states of the sentient.236 Lastly,  and  most
importantly, Hobbes suggests that the basic dynamics of the mind are both initiated and
guided by passions. Though it may appear factitious to treat the motive and cognitive
aspects of human nature separately, I have chosen to follow the original order set down
by Hobbes.
Before entering into a more detailed discussion, three central principles of
Hobbes’s theory of the human mind need to be introduced. According to the first, all the
activity of the mind is the motion caused by bodies (the mechanism principle).237 The
second says that all the contents of the mind are corporeal states within a sentient being,
234 Though the extension of the latter is more broad than the extension of the former, in what follows
the terms ‘mind’ and ‘nature’ are used interchangeably. Mind refers primarily to the psychological
contents and operations, whereas nature may include a view of what is man’s essence.
235 In  ‘The  Prose  Life’  (Elements, 252-253), Hobbes writes that his intellectual awakening was
prompted by the question: ‘what might a sense be ?’ to which none of his contemporaries could give a
satisfactory answer. Recently it has been claimed (Jesseph 2004) that Hobbes’s ideas on this question
bear a close resemblance to those of Galileo.
236 This is put most clearly in Concerning Body IV.25.12, 406 (‘But there is another kind of sense...’)
237 Leviathan II, 5;III, 10-11;IV, 17;V, 18;and VIII, 32-34.
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which itself is a composition of bodies (the materialism principle).238 The third principle
articulates Hobbes’s empiricism: all the contents of the mind are based on sense-
experience (the empiricism principle).239 In  the  pages  that  follow,  I  shall  seek  to  show
two things: that of the principles the first and the second bear a metaphysical nuance,
while the third is the most controversial of the three. The second claim is that each of the
three principles relates to a specific part of Hobbes’s theory of sense.
NATURAL COGNITION
To Hobbes, cognition is a two-stage process: we sense something and then process this
information. Hobbes’s idea of cognition seems to be an input-output-model, but in this
section I shall try to show that the opposite is the case. Hobbes’s conception of how we
become aware of reality is not as simple as one would think on the basis of his hailed
empiricism and materialism. Though the developed forms of human thinking require the
acquisition of language, it does not follow that the pre-linguistic forms of conceivability
are simple.
Hobbes’s conception of sense has been criticised at least from three points of
view. First, it is generally acknowledged that sense (or ‘apparition’) is central to
Hobbes’s philosophy in many ways, but then again it has been claimed that his theory is
not sophisticated enough.240 It is true that Hobbes’s analyses, say in Leviathan and
Elements of Law, are short and cursory, but these are better taken as a part of Hobbes’s
theory of sense, which can be divided into three layers: physical, physiological, and
psychological.241 Second, there is scope for a more plausible critique of Hobbes’s theory
of sense, namely that his conception of sense is not powerful enough to explain the
variety of the functions of the mind. But then again, this is not necessarily what Hobbes
claims. The third critique of Hobbes’s conception of sense is perhaps the most serious,
238 Leviathan I, 3; Elements II, especially articles 2-5, 22-3; and Concerning Body II.7.1, 92 and
IV.25.1-2, 388-391. On Hobbes’s theory of sensation, see Thorpe 1940, 80-82; Peters 1967, 97-104;
Sorell 1986, Chapters VI and VII; Leshen 1985, 429-437; Herbert 1989, 63-72; Tuck 1988, 11-42; Gert
1996, 157-159; and Hatfield 1998, 972-975.
239 Elements II.1-2, 22-23; Leviathan I, 3. Hobbes is positive that even embryos can sense something
and that the mind starts to form in the womb (see, for example, Concerning Body IV.25.12, 407;
compare, however, Decameron Physiologicum, 83). In modern terms, Hobbes is a concept-empiricist.
See The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 262-263.
240 Peters 1967, Chapter IV (especially pages 96 and 102); Sorell 1986, 82-87; Robertson 1993, 124-
126; and Hatfield 1998, 973. McNeilly (1968, 31) goes so far as to claim that the Chapters I-III of
Leviathan have only an instrumental value
241 This kind of solution is not extraordinary. Quite a number of studies have suggested that Hobbes had
various ways to explain the processes of nature. For two illuminating interpretations, see Brandt 1928,
Chapter X, especially 346, and Leijenhorst 2002, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, section 1. On how the
physical and the physiological were understood in the 17th century, see Ariew and Gabbey 1998, 427-
428.
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namely that he does not explicate his basic claim: sensation is motion.242 All three of the
critiques are discussed during the course of this thesis.
All the explanations of sense follow a pattern where sense is explained to be a
two-phase  process,  which  consists  of  the  part  in  which  our  sense  organs  receive  a
material impulse or pressure produced by an external object and of the part in which the
material impulse moves in a sentient being, where it meets two kinds of resistance, that
of the brain and that of the heart.243 The end-product of the process, say, a conception of
a piece of wood in the mind, is called a sensation, which appears as an external object,
but not understood simply as a replica of an external object in the mind, but more like
something which arises from the interaction of an external object and the mind.
In terms of physics, sensation is motion consisting of the smallest possible units,
endeavours (Lat. conatus).244 Endeavour, the basic unit of motion, Hobbes defines as
follows: ‘motion made in less space and time than can be given ; that is, less than can
be determined or assigned by exposition or number ; that is, motion made through the
length of a point, and in an instant or point of time.’245 It has been proposed that
endeavour is both a purely theoretical and a relative notion.246 We  proceed  from  the
latter because the analysis of the relativity of endeavour gives one reason to doubt its
theoretical nature.
The relativity of endeavour may mean two things. First, it may mean that
endeavour is determined by the capabilities of an observer. The latter is a platitude: a
person with good eyesight sees things more clearly than a person with poor eyesight.
The variations in perceptive capabilities should not however be confused with what
subjective qualities mean in Hobbes’s theory of sensation. Though our sensation is tied
to the conditions of sensation, say, in dim light objects appear different than in bright
light, from this it does not follow that an object is really different, only that our
perceptions of it are. Another example could be colour blindness. But the case of
endeavour is different, and the reason is simple. Endeavour is not like colour, but
concerns  the  primary  quality  of  motion.  There  is  then  a  plausible  reason  to  doubt  that
this is the sense in which endeavour is relative.
242 James 1997, 131. Cf. Tuck 1993, 299 and 302.
243 To Hobbes, the sentient consists of not only the sense organs, but also the nerves, brain, arteries and
heart. See Concerning Body IV.25.4, 392-393 and Correspondence Letter 21, 37-8.
244 The origins of the concept are twofold, physico-mathematical and psychological. As a notion of
physics, endeavour bears close a resemblance to the mathematical notion of the infinitesimal or
indivisible. The method of indivisibles was a topic of vivid discussion during the first half of the 17th
century, pioneering work being Bonaventura Cavalieri’s Geometria indivisibilibus continuorum nova
quadam ratione promota (1635). See also the note 440.
245Concerning Body III.15.2, 206.
246 See (respectively) Gert (1996, 159-160) and Martinich (1995, 105-106). For an opposing view
concerning the first claim, see Barnouw 1992, 399-400.
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Another reading of the relativity of endeavour seems more convincing. Here
endeavour is relative in the sense that the unit of endeavour is determined by what is
taken to be the smallest unit of measuring (for instance, a millimetre). Because we do not
have certain knowledge of natural objects, our ways of measuring always remain
indefinite. But, again, it does not follow that we are able to change the criterion
arbitrarily. The criterion of endeavour is always tied to the best possible knowledge of
the natural world, not to the system of measurement. The unit of endeavour changes
whenever our knowledge, not the conceptual system, changes. Therefore this is not the
question of yards or feets, but more like the question of atoms and quarks. One
implication of the argument is that our unit of endeavour changes when our empirical
knowledge changes. To summarise, whether or not endeavour is a purely theoretical and
relative  notion,  seems to  depend on  how we read  the  word  ‘can’  which  appears  in  the
above cited definition of endeavour. The reading that defends the theory-nature and
relativity of endeavour is based on the idea of ‘can’ as a convention, that is, we agree
what will define endeavour in each case; in some cases it is the ability of a half-blind
person to see, but at times it is the visual acuity attained by the latest electron
microscope. This line of thinking may apply to Hobbes’s idea of what is good and evil in
the state of nature, or to ‘points of the Small Moralls’,247 but is unconvincing when it
comes to the basic structure of reality. A realistic reading of ‘can’ refers to endeavour as
something that can be measured or observed in the best possible conditions and that has
gone through critical and rational reflection, and that endeavour is relative in this
qualified sense.
The physical description of sense which complies with both the mechanism and
the materialism principles and describes what happens on the level of bodies and motion,
has a specific role for Hobbes. Put in terms of his metaphysical doctrine, it gives an
objective explanation of what perception is. It is objective in the sense that it explains the
phenomenon in proper terms, namely in terms of bodies and motion. It has however a
twist that needs to be further explored.
As suggested in the introductory section, the physical level of Hobbes’s theory of
human nature is not necessarily of primary importance. This is clear in the case in hand
here. Hobbes explains sense in terms of bodies and motion, because he has reasons,
coming from his metaphysics, to believe that these explanatory factors are plausible.
Hobbes’s line of thought seems to be the following: since the rivalling theories on what
reality consists of and what principles govern it are not plausible in the light of the latest
scientific discoveries, his explanation is better than rivalling explanations. In many places,
he transposes this line of argument to his psychological discussion. This happens, for
instance, when he is criticising the scholastic theory of sense at the end of Chapter I of
Leviathan. Hobbes’s treatment of magnetism is also valuable here. He says that the
247 Leviathan XI, 47.
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causes of magnetism are yet unknown, but ‘whensoever it shall be known, it will be
found to be a motion of body’.248 The physical explanation of sense is based on the same
conviction that all the phenomena of the world are fundamentally matter in motion. Its
purpose is to give an objective foundation for Hobbes’s theory of sense, but it is not a
comprehensive explanation of what sense is and how it works. For this two other layers
of Hobbes’s analysis of sense need to be discussed.
The physiological account, which appears in Chapter XXV of Concerning
Body249 is more detailed than the physical account. The physiological account is not only
interesting as such; it also tells us something about Hobbes’s relationship to anatomy.
A crude picture of Hobbes emphasises the “nakedness” of his view of human
nature and with certain provisos, this interpretation makes sense. Hobbes’s anti-
essentialist view of man is based on naturalistic psychology, but a further question can be
articulated as follows: is the physiological explanation of sense a theory of the animal or
human psyche?
A common view suggests that Hobbes’s ideas in psychology are based on the
human anatomy. Furthermore – though Hobbes at one point momentarily indicated the
opposite250 – we have reason to believe that he was familiar with the medicine of the 16th
and 17th centuries. He was an acquaintance of William Harvey, who developed the
modern theory of blood-circulation, had studied some of the central works of medicine,
and had even acquired some practical experience.251 This standard view requires revising.
248 Concerning Body IV.25.4, 430.
249 This should not be mixed with the physical analysis of sound, colour and other such qualities that
appear later in Concerning Body.
250 Aubrey (Brief Lives, 240) reports that when Hobbes was sick ca. 1668 ‘he had rather have the advice,
or take physic from an experienced old woman, that had been at many sick people’s bedsides, than from
the learnedest but unexperienced physician’.
251 Hobbes himself mentions Harvey in Concerning Body (“Epistle Dedicatory”, vii and IV.25.12, 407).
Aubrey (Brief Lives, 236) reports that Hobbes performed dissections in Paris with William Petty (1623-
1687), natural philosopher and administrator in Ireland, during the 1640s and Malcolm proposes (2002,
320, he leans on Keynes 1978) that Hobbes and Harvey dissected a deer. Our knowledge of how much
Hobbes really knew about modern medicine is slightly restricted. It is safe to say that he was familiar
with Harvey’s principal works, Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus (1628,
but Hobbes could have used Exercitatio anatomica de circulatione sanguinis from 1649) and
Exercitationes de generatione animalium (1651), and at least some of the studies of Andreas Vesalius
(1514-1564), the Belgian anatomist, who – together with Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) – contributed
to the development of modern anatomy. Vesalius’s De humani corporis fabrica (1543) was widely
known in 16th century Europe (Of this, see Karasszon, 1988 , 238-239 and 249-251). Chatsworth
Catalogue (respectively II, 280 and IV, 82) gives one work of Harvey, De Motu cordis et sanguis in
animalibus anatomica exercitatio, cum refutationibus Ænguli Parisani et Jacobi Primirosi (1639) and
one by Vesalius: Anatomes totius, ære insculpta delineatio, cui addita est epitome de corporis humani
fabrica (1565)  and two general  works  on  veterinary  medicine.  Both  are  by  Johannes  Ruellio  and both
titled Veteneriae Medicine (1530 and 1537). Aubrey  (Brief Lives, 236) confirms that Hobbes studied
Vesalius while staying in Paris.
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I agree with Brandt that the physiological explanation concerns animal psyche252
and that another account of sense is needed to explain the peculiarities of human mind.
There is however a shortcoming in Brandt’s analysis. It does not address the question
what could be the sources of Hobbes’s physiological account of sense.
The sources that could indicate the origins of Hobbes’s zoological ideas are
scarce, even the indirect sources seem to be limited to one and the analysis on the
general level hardly leads anywhere. The single indirect source is, as in many other cases,
provided by Aubrey, who writes that ‘I have heard him say that Aristotle was the worst
teacher that ever was, the worst politician and ethic - a country fellow that could live in
the world as good; but his Rhetorique and Discourse of Animals was rare.’253 From this
it can be concluded that Hobbes was familiar with Aristotle’s works on animals, though
it is not clear exactly which work or works he knew.254 Luckily  this  does  not  make  a
significant difference, because both of the major works, Historiae Animalium and De
Partibus Animalium, contain the same basic anatomy of animals. There seems to be
some similarities between Aristotle’s and Hobbes’s accounts of animal sensation, for
example, that the central organ of sense is the heart,255 but this is does not prove
much,256 and we need to consult more general evidence.
The rationality of animals and their similarity to human beings was a lively
dispute in the 16th century. An extreme case was Hierome Rorarius (1485-1556), who in
his Quod animalia bruta ratione utantur melius homine (1547) made the claim that
animals do not only have reason and language but that they reason better than humans.
Rorarius’s work was widely known,257 but we do not have any evidence that Hobbes had
252 The argument rests, to some extent, in the division of Hobbes’s work on the elements of philosophy
(De Corpore, De Homine, and De Cive). Brandt (1928, 347-355) ponders this when trying to determine
the status of part IV of De Corpore and, more broadly, the consistency of Hobbes’s philosophical system.
His argument is a structural one. Locating the physiological analysis of sense to the beginning of part IV
of De Corpore makes  sense  only  if  we  read  this  account  as  a  general  explanation  of  sense  in  living
creatures, and that specific human psychology, which contains the acquisition of language, use of
reason, and developed emotions appears in De Homine. Secondly, in Hobbes’s political treatises,
emphasis is naturally on human psychology, but Hobbes maintains the distinction between animal and
human psychology. In Leviathan the distinction is present, for example, in the notions of understanding
(II, 8) and regulated thought (III, 9, see also V, 20).
253 Brief Lives (Clarke), I, 357.
254 Aristotle's works in this area include: Historiae Animalium, De Generatione et Corruptione, De
Generatione Animalium, and De Partibus Animalium.
255 Aristotle speaks of the ‘seat of sense’ (for example, De Partibus Animalium 647a25-35), Hobbes of
‘the fountain of all sense’ (Concerning Body IV.25.4, 392).
256 Probably Aristotle adopted the pneuma doctrine common in Ancient Greece and especially in
Hippocrates, but it was Aristotle who applied this systematically to the study of animals. See Karasszon
1988, 67 and 74.
257 A useful introduction to the discussion of animal psychology and the epistemic capacities of animals
is the article on Rorarius in Bayle's Dictionary (see especially the footnote K). I have consulted the
English edition of 1737. The entry on Rorarius is in volume 4: M-R, 900-916. An interesting early
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read him. Another contemporary source could be two works by Marin Cureau de la
Chambre (1594-1669): Quelle est la Connoissance des Bestes and Traité de la
Connoissance des Animaux.258 Hobbes could have been aware of Cureau’s work through
his contacts and stay in Paris 1640s,259 but more evidence is needed. The conclusion then
is that the evidence does not directly support the line of argument introduced, but what I
think remains relevant is that the physiological account of sense is an account of
sensation in animals, including man, that is, in living creatures, and though Hobbes’s
medical reflections probably come from sources like Vesalius and Harvey, they might
also have been influenced by Aristotle and contemporary writings on animal psychology.
Whether based on human or on living creatures in general or on modern or on
ancient sources, Hobbes’s physiological account of sense explains primarily the latter
part of the sensation process, that is, what happens after the pressure caused by an
external object enters into the sentient. Secondly, Hobbes’s view could be termed a
holistic one; it is not only the organ of the specific sense, say, the eye, that constitutes
sensation, but the whole organic network in a sentient. This network includes the organs
of sense, the brain, nerves, arteries, and, most importantly, the heart.260 That the view is
holistic becomes clear in the cases where no perception arises. This can happen if a part
of a sentient’s perceptive network is destroyed or if the motion is ‘intercepted between
the brain and the heart by the defect of the organ by which the action is propagated’.261
Two things are salient. The first is that perception requires the operation of the whole
network, but especially of the heart. The second is plenism integrated into the view: a
break in the relevant sensory network means that no perception arises. The physiological
account is then in line with two ideas, Hobbes’s refutation of the existence of the vacuum
and the materialism principle.
Further on, Hobbes considers the physiology of sensation from two viewpoints.
The general analysis describes how the organs of sense consist of ‘certain spirits and
membranes’ and explains in more detail how motion moves in a sentient: ‘proceeding
from the pia mater, involve the brain and all the nerves; also the brain itself, and the
modern reaction to Bayle and, consequently, to Rorarius are the comments by Leibniz (1998, Part 2,
Chapters 10, 11, 14, and 15). For recent studies of the subject, see Harrison 1998 and Serjeantson 2001.
258 Cureau de la Chambre, 1645 and 1648. The latter was originally written in French and published in
Paris in 1647, but there is an early translation into English (Cureau de la Chambre 1657). Traité de la
connaisance des Animaux. was a reply to Pierre Chanet (1603-166?), who had criticised Cureau de la
Chambre in his ‘Infinity and Knowledge of Beasts’. The work of Chanet that the English translation (8
and 13) refers to could be De l’instinct et la connoisance des animaux. Avec l’examen de ce que
Monsieur Chambre a escrit sur cette matier. Chanet’s strategy was to use the notion of infinity, which
he took to be impossible for brutes to have, to show that animals cannot reason and acquire knowledge.
On Cureau de la Chambre, see Darmon 1985.
259 The book is not included in the Chatsworth Catalogue (I, 448), which lists only one work by Cureau
de la Chambre (1665), a treatise on the flooding of the Nile.
260 Concerning Body IV.25.4
261 Concerning Body IV.25.4, 393.
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arteries which are in the brain; and such other parts, as being stirred, the heart also,
which is the fountain of all sense, is stirred together with them’.262 Here Hobbes
rearticulates the view of sensation as stimuli propagated by motion or pressure caused by
an external body.
In his major works, Hobbes offers only one complete physiological analysis of
sense, and this deals with sight.263 It  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  in  detail  Hobbes’s
description of the functioning of sight here, and it is sufficient to consider just two ideas
that he mentions in the middle of the analysis. The first says that ‘sense is nothing else
but the action of objects propagated to the furthest part of the organ’, that is sense is
nothing but motion. The second idea is more complicated. Hobbes takes it as evident
‘that animal spirits are nothing but vital spirits purified by the heart’.264 This is a central
point, because with this idea Hobbes gives an explicit account of the relationship of the
two principal bodily motions.
The tenth article of Chapter 25 of Concerning Body illustrates the turning point
in Hobbes’s analyses of sense. The article opens with physiological reflections, but
changes to a more familiar account of sense and to what is usually considered Hobbes’s
theory of sensation.265 This analysis is noteworthy for a number of reasons. It introduces
the distinctively human psychology with a reflective element. Secondly, it reintroduces266
Hobbes’s attempt to apply his own theory of sense to the process of sensation. Thirdly,
262 Concerning Body IV.25.4, 392.
263 The most complete is Concerning Body IV.25.10. Cf. Elements II.7, 25
264 For both ideas, see Concerning Body IV.25.10, 403. The notion of ‘spirit’ was central in 16th century
theories of the soul which emphasised the physiological explanation of the functioning of the soul. Of
these, see Park 1982, 468-469. Hobbes can be considered as continuing this development, especially if
we take seriously the possible connection between him and some 16th century Italian natural
philosophers, like Telesio. Of this, see Leijenhorst 2002, 11; 63-71; and 97-100. The notion was central
also among Hobbes’s contemporary. Descartes (1984, Vol. III, 224-226) gives a detailed analysis of
spirits in a letter to Vorstius.
265 That is to say, though the physical and the physiological accounts are, occasionally, mentioned, the
psychological (or philosophical) account is the principal subject in the secondary literature. This is
particularly well presented in Gert (1996, 157, cf. 158 (‘Hobbes has no great interest ...’)) who writes:
‘In what follows I shall discuss only Hobbes’s philosophical view concerning psychological topics, not
his empirical speculations. With regard to the matter of sense, this is explicitly in accordance with
Hobbes’s view of philosophy’. For some variations of this thesis, see Robertson (1993, 123); Peters
(1967, Chapter 3); and Tuck (1989, 40-41). It is true, first, that various interpretations do not totally
reject the physical and physiological accounts, but they do concentrate on the philosophical account. For
example, Peters (1967, 76) considers Hobbes the great advocate of mechanistic philosophy, whereas
Tuck reads Hobbes’s theory of sense as belonging to the tradition of scepticism. Second, there are plenty
of alternative views. Though the foundation of his understanding of Hobbes’s early views on sensation
(that is, the authenticity of Short Tract) is a matter of further discussion, Leijenhorst (2002, Chapter 2)
probably offers the most balanced view. Herbert (1989, Chapter 2) also offers some insights, but his
work suffers from a tendency to read Hobbes’s philosophy as a kind of proto-phenomenology.
266 ‘Reintroduces’ because the analysis of sense is the subject of the opening articles of Chapter 25 of
Concerning Body.
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the article discusses the central and controversial notion of phantasm. However, the
analysis is only introduced here, and Hobbes in the next article concludes:
[T]his may suffice to be said in general concerning sense made by the reaction of the organ.
For, as for the place of the image, the deceptions of sight, and other things of which we have
experience in ourselves by sense, seeing they depend for the most part upon the fabric of the eye
of man, I shall speak of them then when I come to speak of man.267
The passage is an example of Hobbes’s multilayered strategy and calls for some
comment. First of all, it confirms Brandt’s268 view that there is animal and human
psychology in Hobbes – or, if you like, the psychology of natural man and the
psychology of artificial man. Secondly, it also closes the naturalistic analysis of sensation,
which explains sensation as a reaction of a sense organ and, at the same time, introduces
an introspective element of sensation lacking in animals. A way to articulate the shift is
to say that here the empiricism principle replaces the mechanism and materialism
principles.
In the empirical account, the central notion of conatus or endeavour, which was
discussed  earlier  as  a  notion  of  (theoretical)  physics,  re-appears,  but  this  time  as  a
psychological notion.269 This layer of Hobbes’s theory is central. As Barnouw writes,
‘The use of conatus in mechanics already suggests a metaphorical projection that likens
physical motion to voluntary’.270 That is to say, endeavour also stands for intentional
activity of the mind in Hobbes. The metaphorical projection of Hobbes refers to the ‘the
subtlety and complexity of mental motions’.271 Barnouw’s idea is simple: love,
deliberation, sagacitas, and other such a operations of the mind are motion, but much
more complex than, say, that of a billiard ball. In Chapter I of Leviathan Hobbes writes:
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each
Sense, either immediately, as in the Tast and Touch, or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and
Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the
body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-
pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver itself: which endeavour because Outward,
seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call
Sense.272
267 Concerning Body IV.25.11, 406.
268 Brandt 1928, 350.
269 Elements VII.2; Leviathan I, 3 and VI, 23.
270 Barnouw 1992, 400.
271 Barnouw 1992, 400.
272 Leviathan I, 3.
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This summarises some of the issues which have been discussed in detail, but an issue that
needs further attention remains, namely how Hobbes explains the development of the
cohesion or the unity of the mind. The problem of cohesion brings together many of the
themes discussed above: firstly, it gives an account of sense itself; secondly, it explains
what happens in the heart; and thirdly, it clarifies the notion of phantasm.
In general, Hobbes’s idea of how mental discourse is structured can be explained
on the basis of the empiricism principle: through the course of time the number of our
sensations grows and is organised into a more or less coherent whole in the mind.273 The
idea is expressed in Chapter III of Leviathan: ‘But as wee have no Imagination, whereof
we have  not  formerly  had  Sense,  in  whole,  or  in  parts;  so  we have  no  Transition  from
one Imagination to another, whereof we have never had the like before in our Senses.’274
This activity of the mind is based on an axiom of Hobbes’s natural philosophy, which he
formulates in Decameron Physiologicum as follows:
B. My first axiom then shall be this: Two bodies, at the same time, cannot be in one place.
A. That is true: for we number bodies as we fancy them distinct, and distinguish them by their
places.275
This ontological principle is then applied to Hobbes’s theory of cogitation. For example,
in Concerning Body he writes that ‘such is the nature of sense, that it does not permit a
man to discern many things at once’.276 The impression that we do have many ideas in
the mind at the same time is partly because thoughts, or phantasms follow each other so
quickly, and partly because we have formed composite ideas. Hobbes’s philosophical
theory of how the mind orders the flow of phantasms is something like the following.
At its most elementary level, an external body does not merely press its image
into a sentient, but its conception is also due to the activity of the sentient. The sentient
is directed towards objects on the basis of what it finds pleasurable and painful.277 In
more precise terms, the basic function of the rudimentary emotive judgement is to
273 Elements III.6, 29; Leviathan II,  5,  III,  9-10.  For  an  attempt  to  describe  this  in  more  detail  see
Concerning Body IV.25.5-6, 393-394. See also what Hobbes says about pleasure and pain in article 12.
274 Leviathan III, 8.
275 Decameron Physiologicum, 85. Cf. Concerning Body IV.25.6, 394-395.
276 Concerning Body IV.25.6, 394.
277 Concerning Body IV.25.12, 406; Cf. Elements I.4 and 7, 21-22 and Leviathan VI, 23. Peters (1967,
98-99) seems to miss this emotive component of sense, whereas Herbert (1989, 66-69 and 71-72), who
recognises the component, discusses it predominantly in relation to volition and to action. For a similar
view as expressed here, see Barnouw (1992, 401-404), though I do not share his idea that Hobbes’s
conception of imagination ‘lays the foundation for a conception (more Herbartian than Freudian) of a
dynamic unconscious’ (402). Instead of referring to the unconscious, whether Herbartian or Freudian,
the more plausible explanation lies in deficiencies, like in not understanding the basic operations of the
mind and in inattentiveness to the quick motions of the mind. Compare to the example of the Roman
penny in Leviathan (III, 9).
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regulate motion within the body. Hobbes depicts pleasure and pain, which proceed ‘from
continual action from the outermost part of the organ towards the heart’, as two
regulative operations of motion in a sentient; ‘by quickening or slackening, helping or
hindering’278 this motion causes changes in the vital motion. In brief, impressions of
objects have concrete consequences in our body. Hobbes characterises this ‘another kind
of sense’ [that is, sense of pleasure and pain, not sight, hearing and so on] in the
following fashion: ‘as phantasms seem to be without, by the reason of the endeavour
outwards, so pleasure and pain, by reason of the endeavour of the organ inwards, seem
to be within’.279 Hobbes’s notion of sensation, then, has proved to be a complicated
construct.  Sensation  is  not  simply  a  pressure  in  our  cortex,  but  requires  the  activity  of
mind. In addition, the concept of sensation does not refer only to the appearance of an
external object in the mind, but also to the introspective sensation, that is, the sensation
of various bodily states. Though we are able to distinguish between the two components
of sensation, sensation properly speaking consists of both.
To Hobbes, the simple, direct, and correct connection to external objects is not
axiomatic,280 and sense (or, sensation, or perception) is better characterised as an
appearance (‘original fancy’), which has a certain likeness to that of which it is a copy.
This position has a consequence that carries some weight. In Concerning Body Hobbes
writes: ‘The proper phantasm of sight is light; and [...] colour also [...] But the object of
sight, properly so called, is neither light or colour, but the body itself which is lucid, or
enlightened, or coloured’.281 To remind, the criterion that distinguished sensation from
imagination  was  that  in  the  former  the  object  is  present,  whereas  in  the  latter  it  is  not.
The  problem  now  is:  how  are  we  able  to  say  that  an  object  is  present,  and  not  only  a
fiction of our mind, ‘such as is the appearance of your face in a looking glass; such as is a
dream; such as is a ghost; such as is a spot before the eye that hath stared upon the sun
or fire’?282
One  way  out  of  this  is  the  plea  to  our  common  sense  that  is  embedded  in
Hobbes’s objection to Descartes’s dream argument. The objection runs as follows:
‘because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the
absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I
dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake’.283 What Hobbes then
278 Concerning Body IV.25.12, 406.
279 Concerning Body IV.25.12, 406.
280 Elements II.5, 23-4; Concerning Body I.I.3, 4.5 and IV.25.11, 405-406. See also the example of the
firebrand that appears in a letter to Sir Charles Cavendish (Correspondence Letter 31, 83). The
phantasmatic nature of sensations has given room for an interpretation that emphasises the role of
scepticism in Hobbes. This interpretation will be discussed in relation to Hobbes’s theory of knowledge.
281 Concerning Body IV.25.10, 404.
282 Seven Philosophical Problems and Two Propositions of Geometry, in EW, VII, 27.
283 Leviathan II, 6.
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suggests, is that we learn by experience to make the distinction between real and fictive
sensation. As such the argument is not fully convincing, but there is further support for it
in Hobbes.
In Concerning Body Hobbes gives the following characterisation of sensation:
‘the most admirable [‘of all the phenomena or appearances which are near us’] is
apparition itself, ?? ?????????; namely, that some natural bodies have in themselves the
patterns almost of all things, and others of none at all.’284 There are a variety of ways to
read the passage, but it is safe to say that Hobbes’s admiration focuses on the mechanism
not on the variety of sensation.
Ambiguity in the passage rests on the phrase ‘the patterns of almost of all things’.
A way to read this is that bodies carry with them extra-information, which tells a subject
how this particular object relates to other objects and what are its essential qualities.
Because only sophisticated bodies can sense285 and more sophisticated bodies
communicate, this certainly cannot be true. Taking into account the fact that Hobbes
denies explanations that transcend sense experience, for example, the doctrine of
intelligible species, as well as teleology in nature (or at least that there can be certain
knowledge of this), his referring to patterns must mean something else. In my reading,
the argument goes as follows: the mind contains numerous states created by previous
experiences that are activated by the appropriate external stimulus.286 What Hobbes
needs to explain is the nature of this activation, and what turns out to be unexpected is
that the mechanism of sense, which is the primary candidate for the explanation of
activation, is not of much use.
When pondering on the nature of sense, Hobbes makes the following question:
‘by what sense shall we take notice of sense?’287 The  answer  is  memory,  or
remembrance.288 Though sensations are temporally prior to memories,289 Hobbes sees
284 Concerning Body IV.25.1, 389. For analyses of the passage, see Brandt 1928, 359-360; Peters 1967,
78-80; and Sorell 1986, 82-87.
285 Concerning Body IV.25.5, 393. For discussion of the problems of this position, see Sorell 1986, 74
and Leijenhorst 2002, 97-100.
286 Concerning Body IV.25.5, 393-394.
287 Concerning Body IV.25.1, 389.
288 Hobbes’s terminology varies from text to text. The general mnemonic capacity is called ‘memory’ in
Leviathan and ‘remembrance’ in Elements,  whereas  in Leviathan the  latter  is  a  developed  form  of
memorising with a conscious aim of bringing something into the mind, which in Elements is called
‘reminiscence’, deriving from the Latin reminiscentia. See Elements III.6, 29 and IV.5, 32 and
Leviathan II, 5-6 and III, 10. In Concerning Body (IV.25.1, 389) memory is tied to sensing and there is
no explicit analysis of its different modes. See, however, also the discussion on good judgement below.
Secondly, in Elements Hobbes calls the capacity of remembrance a sixth, internal sense. Though it was
not uncommon to name something as a sixth sense, Burton (1927, 137), for instance, mentions that
Scaliger considered titillation and Lullius speech to be the sixth sense, this issue needs further
commentary.
The reference to the sixth sense seems to be a minor, even insignificant claim and it could be
easy to skip it as a mere slip of the pen, but a few similar remarks show that the case might well be the
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memories as a part of sensation. A memory, if we follow Hobbes’s materialistic
psychology, is the specific composition of matter in our body caused by a previous
sensation. When I see something and memorise it, the same composition arises in my
body as when I first saw it.
A memory, however, has two components: the memory of a thing and the
memory of its similarities and dissimilarities with all other things I have experience of,290
and to memorise is not merely to re-enact the past sensation, but also to compare it with
something. Hobbes explains this in more detail in Concerning Body:
For he that thinketh, compareth phantasms that pass, that is, taketh notice of their likeness or
unlikeness to one another. And as he that observes readily the likenesses of things of different
natures, or that are very remote from one another, is said to have a good fancy; so he is said to
have a good judgement, that finds out the unlikenesses or differences of things that are like one
another. Now this observation of differences is not perception made by a common organ of
sense, distinct from sense or perception properly so called, but is memory of the differences of
particular phantasms remaining for some time; as the distinction between hot and lucid, is
nothing else but the memory of both of a heating, and of an enlightening object.291
opposite. In the light of his well-known antipathy towards the scholastic philosophy, Hobbes’s
characterisation sounds unconvincing. The passage however does not hint in this direction, but appears
as a genuine statement. A short answer could be the original status of Elements.  It  was  a  manuscript
meant to be circulated among and commented on by contemporary colleagues of Hobbes and then
possibly revised and published. This never happened – at least under the same title. However, I believe
that there is a more interesting twist related to the issue of Hobbes’s intellectual development and to the
status  of  a  piece  of  work  that  has  by  some  scholars  been  attributed  to  Hobbes  and  which  is  generally
referred to as the ‘Short Tract’ or ‘Little Treatise’. The work contains some clearly Aristotelian features.
Assuming that the treatise is by Hobbes and taking into account his later psychology in Leviathan and
Concerning Body, the claim that remembrance is an internal sense could be seen as an indication of
Hobbes’s gradual distancing himself from the Aristotelian theory of human nature. The weak part of the
argument is however the authenticity of ‘Short Tract’. It is very likely that it was not written by Hobbes,
but by his friend Robert Payne. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that in the 1630s, when
Hobbes started to develop his theory of the human mind he started from the Aristotelian theory, which
he then rejected and replaced with his own doctrine. Though this is also questionable in the light of
some autobiographical evidence, namely that Hobbes despised Aristotelianism as a student in Oxford.
See The Verse Life, 255.
‘Short Tract’ was originally identified as the work of Hobbes by Ferdinand Tönnies (1889, xii-
xii). Its authenticity was questioned by Richard Tuck (1988, 16-18 and 1993, 295). Recent commentary
on the ‘Short Tract’ includes: Schuhmann, 1995; Raylor, 2001; Leijenhorst 2002, ‘Introduction’; and
Malcolm, 2002, Chapter 4.
289 Elements III.6, 29. Cf. Leviathan III, 10. However see also the counter-example that François Peleau
gives and Hobbes’s ‘reply’ to it. Both in Correspondence Letter 95, 330 and 332 (Peleau) and Letter
202, 767 (Hobbes).
290 Concerning Body IV.25.1, 389 and IV.25.5, 393.
291 Concerning Body IV.25.8, 399. Cf. ElementsV, 34-35.
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This is the second form of pre-linguistic conceivability, which consists of two operations
that Hobbes calls fancy and judgement.292 It  is  important  to  note  that  this  kind  of
comparison is materialistic. That is to say, a memory is the rise of a specific material
composition, which is at the same time distinguished from or connected with something
in the mind. For example, two experiences of sunrise, one from yesterday and one in 12th
of June 2004.
It is not, then, so much the paucity, but the narrowness that is the problem of
Hobbes’s account of sense. Though he gives a passable explanation of sense experience
and its variety, the foregoing discussion shows293 that  this model is  not fully successful
when  applied  to  other  kinds  of  conceptions  of  the  mind.  It  is  this  range  of  ‘non-
paradigmatic sensory experiences’,294 as Schofeld shrewdly puts it, that Hobbes seeks to
grasp with the notion of imagination. The notion is also important to Hobbes because it
seeks to overcome the problems that his account of sense generates.
IMAGINATION
Imagination as a state of the mind, Hobbes writes in Concerning Body,  is  ‘sense
decaying, or weakened, by the absence of the object’.295 Systematically speaking,
imaginations can be divided into simple and compound imaginations,296 and range from
uncomplicated imaginings, like an imagination of a piece of wood, to more complex
ones, like a chiliagon (a plane figure with a thousand angles) or the figure that appears
on the title page of Leviathan.297 When the concept of an object, for instance a horse or a
man, is in the mind at once and wholly, an imagination is called simple. When two simple
imaginations are combined, we call the result compounded imagination, say, a centaur
and a golden mountain,298 or to continue the train of examples, from the imaginations of
two pieces of wood and string it is possible to form the compound imagination of a
292 Leviathan VIII, 33. Outside Hobbes’s ideas of style (see, above all, Skinner 1996, 365-372), these
operations have not received much attention in the secondary literature. Thorpe (1940, especially 94-96)
discusses them at some length and Sorell (1986, 82) briefly analyses judgement, which he sees as a part
of sense, which is not a fully correct view. What Hobbes might mean in the passage in question is that
the operation of judgement should not be understood as the sensus communis as  it  was  in  the
Aristotelian theory of the mind. Secondly, Hobbes clearly says that the ‘observation of differences […] is
memory of the differences’ and because sense cannot create memory, but is merely its raw material, the
difference must be made by memory.
293 My discussion is indebted to Sorell (see especially 1986, 84).
294 Schofield 1992, 253.
295 Concerning Body IV.25.7, 396.
296 Leviathan II, 5.
297 On the chiliagon, see Descartes, II, 50. For a discussion of the title-page of Leviathan see Malcolm,
2002, essay 7 and Prokhovnik 1991, 141-5.
298 The example of the centaur appears, for example, in Leviathan II, 5 and that of the golden mountain
in Elements 3.4, 28 and Concerning Body IV.25.9, 399.
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cross. Lastly, both as a capacity of the mind and as a mental state, imagination divides
into four subspecies, which are memory, dream, vision or apparition, and
understanding.299
The first issue to deal with is the distinction between simple and compound
imaginations. The distinction is a traditional one.300 There is  hardly a thinker who does
not make this distinction in one form or another. Differences between Hobbes and, for
example, Aquinas, seem to be of minor importance. Nevertheless, there are a number of
things that are worth reflecting on.
The first is how we should understand simple imagination. Hobbes’s examples
refer to the empiricist interpretation, for example, the imagination of a horse is a re-
enacted appearance of a sensation of a horse that one has. It can be big or small, black or
white, and so on. Simple imaginations are then, mainly, concrete, but since such entities
as a chiliagon or the figure on the titlepage of Leviathan appear to qualify as simple
imaginations, the notion is more complex. Let us look at the mentioned examples in turn.
Aside from concreteness, that is, aside from having a concrete sensation of
something, imaginations can also be non-pictorial.301 Even depicting a chiliagon is
possible, though imagining it refers to a slightly different thing than in the case of, say, a
cube. The possibility of having an imagination of a chiliagon is based on the fact that we
have some similar concrete imagining, by whose help we are able to acquire the
imagination of a non-concrete entity. There is nothing mystical in this, as the example of
the imagination of Alexandria from Augustine shows. In De Trinitate, Augustine
explains how it is possible to give a description of Alexandria without ever having
actually visited the city. The description is possible on the basis of the experience we
have from indirect sources like books, from what other cities are like, and, say, from
what kind of a light there is just before sunset, to mention a few possible sources.302 He
goes on to explain that it is even the case that the description can convince people who
have actually visited the city. Something similar takes place in the case of a chiliagon.
For if we have experience of different figures, like a triangle and an octagon, we can go
on to imagine a figure with a thousand angles. The difference between Descartes and
Hobbes is, however, that Hobbes takes the imagination to be concrete, not in the sense
that we have had a concrete experience of a chiliagon, but in the sense that it is a
concrete figure and not an idea of reason.
299 Leviathan II.  This claim is based on the fact that Hobbes discusses all  these under the heading ‘Of
Imagination’ in Leviathan. As is evident his discussion here bears a resemblance with faculty
psychology. For a valuable comparison, see Leijenhorst 2002, Chapter 2.
300 See, for example, ST I.q12.a2.r.2 and I.q78.a4. Compare with Aquinas, 1952, I.q8.a5.
301 See Descartes 1984, II, 62 and Malcolm 2002, 177. This is also what Calvino (1988, 83) refers to in
his distinction between two kinds of imaginations discussed earlier.
302 De Trinitate 250-251. See also Letter 7, when Augustine speaks of phantasms of supposed things.
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The anamorphic picture appearing on the title page of Leviathan is a different sort
of simple imagination. Firstly, it appears as a compounded imagination, but this is to mix
compound in the technical sense in which Hobbes uses it when discussing imaginations,
to compound in some more general and loose sense as referring to composition. It is true
that the figure consists of a large number of smaller figures composed in a certain
manner, but as an anamorphic figure it is a single whole. The figure on the title page is
not perhaps the best possible example,303 but the whole idea of anamorphic pictures is
that if one of its constituents is missing, the picture is no longer a whole, that is to say,
we do not have a simple imagination anymore.
The point of the two examples above is to show that simple imaginations are not
only about goats and cabbages, but may refer to rather complex contents of the mind.
The immediate objection to this is that the mentioned kinds of imagination are anything
but simple. Quite the opposite, a chiliagon and the figure on the title page of Leviathan
are complex compounded imaginations. From a particular point of view this appears to
be  the  case,  but  still  the  conclusion  is  wrong.  It  is  true  that  after  the  analysis  the
mentioned entities appear complex, but as real contents of the mind they are undivided.
One  of  Hume’s  distinctions  may  help  us  to  see  the  difference.  When  analysing
perception, Hume defends the unity of the different constituents: ‘Put a spot of ink upon
paper,  fix  your  eye  upon  that  spot,  and  retire  to  such  a  distance,  that  at  last  you  lose
sight of it; ‘tis plain, that the moment before it vanish’d the image or impression was
perfectly indivisible’.304 It is of course possible to distinguish philosophically between the
roundness and redness of a figure, but in practice this is impossible, for it is impossible to
sense roundness or redness per se.
The second and more obvious issue is the nature of compound imaginations.
Hobbes’s discussion of these has a special tone. In general, compound imaginations are
combinations of a number of simultaneously existent simple imaginations and in this
sense they are empirical; they are more or less complicated combinations of sensations
and memories. Aside from the standard examples of a golden mountain and a centaur,
Hobbes gives the example of the fictive compounded imagination: a person may imagine
that  he  or  she  is  ‘a Hercules, or an Alexander’, but adds that this ‘happeneth often to
them that are much taken with reading of Romants’.305 Though this distinctively human
imagination is not that easily resolved with past experiences, what remains evident is that
Hobbes considers these kinds of imaginations nonsense. Nevertheless, they have their
303 The example of the anamorph of Louis XIII is, perhaps, more illuminating. For the picture of the
anamorph, see Malcolm 2002, 233.
304 Hume 1978, 27.
305 Leviathan II,  5. This was a common fear. Robert Boyle, for example, is reported as being afraid to
open a romance. For a discussion of the physiology of reading in early modern England, see Johns 1996
(for Boyle, see 145).
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role in Hobbes’s philosophical psychology, for they are the basis of delusional
imagination.
Moving to the specific forms of imagination, Hobbes begins with memory, which
he now combines with imagination. Memory operates on things that were perceived or
happened in the past and are ‘worn out with time’.306 Memory and memories are then
limited not only because they are reproduction(s) of past sensation(s), but also because
they have faded.307 Imagination, though it must have its origin in previous experience,
can overcome the bounds of sense and memory and is not in this sense replicating the
external world. For example, I can change my original sensation of a piece of wood by
imagining that this piece of wood floats in the air. Yet, these phantasms are also
decaying, because of the continuous flow of stimuli and corresponding phantasms, which
obscure the present imagination ‘as the light of the Sun [sense] obscureth the light of the
Starres [other conceptions of the mind].’308
After analysing imagination and memory, Hobbes moves to dreams and visions, or
apparitions.309 As a capacity, dreaming is the imagination of a sleeper and
correspondingly dreams are the imaginings of those who sleep. Though external
conditions can affect the quality of dreams, in general dreams are caused by ‘the
agitation  of  the  inward  parts  of  mans  body’,  that  is  to  say,  ‘[t]he  motion  when we are
awake, beginning at one end, and when we Dream, at another'.310 Dreams differ from our
waking imaginations in that they are, firstly, more distinct than waking imaginations,
because in them there are no external stimuli.311 Secondly, dreams are the reverse of our
waking imaginations in two respects: in how imaginations arise and how the causal
relations may occur. When awake, imaginations cause bodily reactions, but when in
dreaming, bodily changes cause imaginations. Therefore, sleeping against a pillow may
cause an imagination of suffocating or that in a dream a pile of ashes is transformed into
a piece of wood.
Being subjective (in the sense of belonging to purely inner experience of an
individual subject) and incoherent, dreams resemble visions, which demonstrate the most
delusive aspect of our non-paradigmatic life of the mind.312 These can be of various
306 Concerning Body IV.25.8, 398. Cf. Elements III.7-8, 29-30.
307 For an example that illuminates this see Elements (III.7, 29-30). Hobbes was willing to compromise
his principles, as the letter to Sir Gervase Clifton shows: ‘the image of yor noblenes decayes not in my
memory’(Correspondence Letter 15, 27).
308 Leviathan II, 5.
309 I have chosen to use the former term ‘vision’, because the meaning of ‘apparition’ is equivocal. In
Leviathan (II, 6-7) Hobbes puts it into the same category as visions, but, as already mentioned, later in
Concerning Body (IV.25.1, 389 ) ‘apparition’ is used in a different context.
310 Leviathan II, 6.
311 Leviathan II, 6. Cf. Elements III.2, 27 and Concerning Body IV.XXV.9, 401.
312 Again this is not a novelty. The connection between vision and imagination goes back to Plato, who
discusses visions, especially in Timaeus. See Sophist 235a-236d, 977-9 and Timaeus 71a-72b, 1194-
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kinds, but the unifying factor is that they refer to something that is clearly unreal. Ghosts
and fairies are the obvious examples, but a golden cross appearing in the sky in the
middle of the day is also a vision.313
Visions and dreams are close to each other in another way: they are often
confused. Hobbes refers to the historical example of Brutus, who on the eve of the Battle
of Phillippi is reported by historians to have had a vision, but who in fact had a
nightmare.314 Though Hobbes admits that ‘there is no doubt, but God can make
unnaturall Apparitions’,315 in general vision is a distorted capacity of the mind.
Delusive imaginations are based on the incorrect compounding of single
imaginations, and there is clearly a political aspect in Hobbes’s discussion of visions.
Vision is not only description of a perversity of the mind, but also serves as an aetiology
of fanaticism. Related to visions are the doctrine of private judgement, pretence of
inspiration, and (true and false) prophecy. In brief, certain imaginations, that is,
religiously motivated imaginations, which amplify private judgement and strengthen
alleged prophecies, are politically dangerous for they provoke fanaticism, sectarianism,
and, ultimately, civil unrest.316 However Hobbes’s attitude to these phenomena is not
clear cut. On the one hand, he clearly abhors them as irrational, but on the other hand he
takes them as proper objects of philosophy, something that needs to be dealt with.
The above reflection reveals two things. Firstly, it gives some reason to doubt that
sensation  is  the  only  notion  relevant  in  Hobbes’s  philosophical  psychology,  or  that
explaining the variety of mental phenomena solely on the basis of sensation is sufficient.
Secondly, though Hobbes’s analysis moves further into the various parts of his
philosophy, the discussed forms of imagination stay within Hobbes’s mechanistic,
materialistic, and empiricist framework: they can be explained by the materialistic
constitution  of  the  mind,  that  they  are  ultimately  motion,  and,  because  no  matter  how
1195. Later the idea is found, for example, in Aquinas who writes that ‘in his De Genesi ad Litteram
Augustine describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the sense; spiritual,
which is an action of the imagination or fantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect’ (ST
I.q78.a4.o6). Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram book XII, especially sections 6-7, 11, 24.
313 The example, which is not from Hobbes, refers to Constantine’s vision on the eve of the battle of
Milvian Bridge. See Eusebius, Life of Constantine Book I, Chapters 28-32. A real case that might have
influenced Hobbes’s view on visions was the possession of the nuns of the Ursuline convent at Loudoun,
France, in 1632. On this, see a copy of Digby’s letter to the Prince de Guémene (Correspondence Letter
25, 43-45 and editor’s notes 1 and 13). On visions in general, see also Correspondence Letter 201, 761.
Hobbes maintained his interest toward supernatural, religious phenomena and their naturalistic
explanation. A discussion worth mentioning is Schaffer 1998 (see especially, the section ‘Martha
Taylor, “Wonder of Wonders”‘).
314 Leviathan II, 7.
315 Leviathan II, 7. His view here seems to resemble his account of miracles. See Leviathan XXXVII.
316 See (respectively) Leviathan XXIX, 168 and XLVI, 376; XXXVI and especially, XLII, 303-304.
Note that the idea is touched earlier in Leviathan. For some instances, see Leviathan II, 7-8 and the
analysis of madness in Chapter VIII. For a short but extensive account of sectarianism in the 17th
century, see Charles Blount’s letter to Hobbes (Correspondence Letter 201, 759-763 and editor’s notes
to the letter). The account of chronograms in Correspondence (Letter 84) is also illustrative.
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wild a phantasm is, it is possible to resolve it with the previous sensations. In this
respect, Hobbes’s analysis of imagination changes when he moves to the last form of
imagination, understanding.317
Hobbes’s analysis of understanding is divided into two parts and the division is
based on his definition of understanding. In Leviathan, understanding is defined as an
imagination ‘raysed in man (or any other creature with the faculty of imagining) by
words or other voluntary signes’.318 Understanding of words will  be dealt  with later;  in
what follows I will concentrate on other voluntary signs.
CONCEIVABILITY AND HOBBES’S THEORY OF SIGNS
Analysis of different forms of conceivability319 is embedded in Hobbes’s theory of signs
and, further on, his theory of names. Scholarship has discussed Hobbes’s theory of
names, but not so much of his theory of signs. A consequence of this is the already
mentioned over-simplification of Hobbes’s theory of sensation. Tom Sorell, for instance,
concludes that for Hobbes human thinking is simply ‘a by-product of sense’.320 In part,
this is a plausible conclusion: the mind and its functioning are a by-product of sense; but
in what follows I shall try to show that it is not a very simple by-product, but has various
layers. Another commonplace is to take Hobbes’s subjectivism seriously, that is, to claim
that he thinks that our perceptions are subjective appearances. A way to clarify both
shortcomings is to appreciate Hobbes’s analysis of different kinds of signs.
An initial clarification is needed. Hobbes uses the term ‘sign’ with various
meanings. Firstly, there is the distinction between marks and signs. Roughly speaking,
marks are the units of mental discourse, whereas signs are the units of verbal discourse.
317 Here my view differs from the standard view, according to which ‘Hobbes differs from the standard
empiricism in that he appreciates that language is included in that which was at first begotten upon the
organs of sense’ (Gert 1996, 158). This analysis runs into a number of problems that are discussed in the
following sections.
318 Leviathan II, 8. For discussion of Hobbes’s claim, see McNeilly (1968, 41). For the broader context,
see Serjeantson 2001.
319 My choice of the term calls for two explanatory notes. First, conceivability is not perhaps the most
frequent term Hobbes uses to describe the phenomenon, but he indeed uses it (for instance, Elements I.8,
22). By conceivability I mean ways in which we become aware of reality through different kinds of
phantasms, like sensations, memories, “understandings” and so forth. Second, when referring to
conceivability, I will also sometimes use the word understanding in the ordinary, not the Hobbesian,
sense. My use of the term is then both broader than Hobbes’s and systematic with no special historical
connotations.
Recently, Duncan (2005, 439) has argued that Hobbes, at least in the early 1640s, used the term
‘conceivability’ in a broader sense. In general, I am sympathetic with Duncan’s analysis, but it has two
problems. First, as Duncan himself writes. ‘Hobbes does not, however, use this terminology consistently’
(ibid.). Second, Duncan’s reading is based on an imagist or pictorial reading of Hobbes, which, as will
be argued, is not a plausible one.
320 He makes this claim in both of the major areas (cogitation and motivation) of Hobbes’s theory of
human nature. See respectively Sorell 1986, 85-86 and 91-92.
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It  is  not  fully  clear  whether  marks  and  signs  are  the  two sides  of  the  same coin  but  in
many places Hobbes seems to think so. For instance in Leviathan he writes that ‘the first
use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many
use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they
conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other
passion for’.321 Even so, Hobbes did not deny that thinking without language is not
possible (this issue will be touched upon below and also in the next chapter), only that
some developed forms of reasoning require language. This is articulated clearly in
Concerning Body,  when  Hobbes  distinguishes  between  two  kinds  of  methods,  that  of
invention and that of demonstration. He writes: ‘Nevertheless, as I said above, they serve
as marks for the help of our memory, whereby we register to ourselves our own
inventions; but not as signs by which we declare the same to others; so that a man may
be a philosopher alone by himself, without any master; Adam had this capacity. But to
teach, that is, to demonstrate, supposes two at the least, and syllogistical speech.’322
Secondly, Hobbes uses the term ‘sign’ in two different senses, general and specific. The
specific meaning will be discussed later, but the general meaning is as follows: a sign is
‘the Event Antecedent of the Consequent; and contrarily, the Consequent of the
Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before: And the oftener
they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe’.323 Aside from the technical
definition, Hobbes uses the term sign in the way it was (and is) used in everyday
language, that is, something which indicates or stands for something. Lastly, signs in
Hobbes can be divided into pre-linguistic and linguistic signs and they can be natural,
voluntary or artificial. Because he nowhere makes any clarifying and systematic
statements about how the different distinctions in his theory of signs relate to each other,
it is at times hard to say, for instance, whether a mark is a natural or a voluntary sign.
What, however, seems to be true in general is that all artificial signs are signs in verbal
(that is, inter-personal) discourse. Even though there is a lack of clarity in the
terminology, it is meaningful to analyse the forms of conceivability in terms of signs.
Hobbes’s general definition of a sign appears to be in line with his conception of
sensation as something which always contains some memory in it. We may redefine sense
as a conjunction between something that is in the mind at the moment and something that
has been perceived earlier.324 This, however, leaves out sensations of new things and, in
321 Leviathan IV, 13. Cf. Concerning Body I.2.2-3, 15-16.
322 Concerning Body I.6.11, 80.
323Leviathan III, 10.
324 For  an  early  view of  sense  and memory,  see Elements III.9, 29. Consequently, memory creates the
intra-personal continuity of the mind, and Hobbes seems to hold a proto-Lockean theory of personal
identity, namely that the identity of a person is based on diachronic continuity. This reading finds
further evidence from the annihilation argument (Concerning Body I.VII.1, 92). On the origins of this
‘method of annihilation’, see Funkenstein 1986, 172-174 and 186.
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fact, it is not possible to give a definition of sense in terms of Hobbes’s theory signs. The
reason for this is that in a sensation of something new, there is not this kind of relation,
and Hobbes’s concept of sign is relational. One is able to interpret this conclusion at least
in two ways. Either sensation is an elementary concept, which does not need any further
explanation (similar to the axioms of geometry) or if there is no proper definition of
sensation, the question arises why this is so. I prefer the latter interpretation for the
following reason.
It is true that sensation is a basic concept in Hobbes’s philosophy and it can be
understood as an axiom which does not call for further justification, only a definition,
which Hobbes gives. This is not, however, exactly the issue I wish to raise here. Even if
we are able to give sensation a proper definition, the problem is, still, its poor force in
explaining various phenomena and functions of the mind. In brief, sensation is one of the
basic axioms (concepts) of Hobbes’s philosophical psychology, but it is not all-
embracing.
The first capacity that can be defined in terms of Hobbes’s theory of signs is
memory, which operates with marks. A mark, Hobbes defines in Elements, is ‘a sensible
object which a man erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the end to remember’,325 that is, it
is a prop to memory. It is possible to make two conclusions from this: marks signify the
conceptions of the mind and marks are strictly inner means of communication. Both
conclusions have their problems.
Hobbes’s discussion of a mark appears to be related to his conception of a name,
but  the  two notions  easily  become entangled.  This  is  most  clear,  perhaps,  in Elements,
where Hobbes after defining the notion of mark goes on to explain that:
In the number of these marks, are those human voices (which we call the names or appellations
of things) sensible to the ear, by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to
which we give those names or appellations. As the appellation white bringeth to remembrance
the  quality  of  such objects  as  produce  that  colour  or  conception  in  us.  A NAME or APPELLATION
therefore is the voice of a man, arbitrarily imposed, for a mark to bring to his mind some
conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.326
On the basis of this, it may be asked: which, marks or names, signify the conceptions of
the mind? What Hobbes seems to suggest here is that it is a name, not a mark that brings
to mind a conception, but then again, the passage may be read so that conceptions can be
raised either by marks or by names. There is a terminological confusion, which, I believe,
can be explained.
The beginning of the article states that names are a class of marks. This suggests
that there is a specific class of names: strictly private names, that is, words that have
meaning only in an individual, solipsistic vocabulary. In my opinion, this is a far-fetched
325 Elements V.1, 35. Cf. Leviathan IV, 13; Concerning Body I.2.1-2, 13-14
326 Elements V.2, 35.
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solution. Names are for Hobbes interpersonal conceptions, and no private names exist.
What remains confusing is that Hobbes’s definition of a mark seems to speak against this
conclusion. There is a further aspect that may help us out of a solipsistic conclusion.
In the passage quoted Hobbes does not explicate one of his central distinctions,
namely the distinction between mental and verbal, or a train of thoughts and a train of
words, or discourse and discursion.327 Leviathan is more clearer on this question. Marks
and signs are understood as two sides of the general use of speech, which is ‘to
transferre our Mentall discourse into Verbal; or Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne
of Words’.328 In this transformation, marks are the mnemonic and signs the
communicative aspect.
Marks should, however, be distinguished from natural non-voluntary signs, like
clouds  as  the  sign  of  rain  or  ashes  as  the  sign  of  fire.329 Understanding natural signs is
based on memory,330 which originally creates the relationship between certain events.
Because of this, the relationship is still conjunctive, not causal by nature. These kinds of
signs differ from memories in that they are generalisations, and the more signs a person
has, the more experienced he or she is said to be. Sometimes experience and wisdom are
taken to be the same thing, but Hobbes thinks this is incorrect, for experience
‘concludeth nothing universally’ and a person with more experience, that is, with a larger
collection of ‘what antecedents have been followed with what consequents’ is a good
guesser, rather than being prudent, for prudence requires a quick imagination.331
The next forms of conceivability (that of natural, voluntary signs and that of
artificial, voluntary signs) seem to differ only a little from each other. For example, the
hiss of a cat (a sign of animosity) and its purring (a sign of friendliness and contentment)
are natural voluntary signs. These differ from natural non-voluntary signs, because to a
sign, or perhaps what is more appropriate to say, to its producer an intention is attached.
From this it follows that natural voluntary signs include an element of communication.
They are addressed to somebody outside of an agent.
 Stones that mark a field are an example of artificial voluntary signs.332 It  is  true
that stones are natural bodies, but here they are used in an artificial manner. In the same
way as there is an intention in, say, smiling, there is an intention in encircling a field. It
then turns out that marks, which are the basic units of intra-mind communication, are
rather developed devices.
327 Leviathan IV, 12 and Elements IV.1, 31.
328 Leviathan IV, 13. Note that Hobbes has here dropped the technical distinction between discursion
and discourse that appears in Elements.
329 Elements IV.8-9, 33; Concerning Body I.II.2, 14. Jesseph (1999, 213) has a rather straightforward
view of Hobbes’s conception of natural signs.
330 See also what Hobbes says on signs of science in Leviathan III, 22.
331 See Elements IV.10 and 6, 32-33.
332 Concerning Body I.II.2, 14-15.
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Hobbes’s  analysis  of  the  forms  of  conceivability  is  not  without  its  problems.  The
first obscurity involves the distinction between sense and memory, on the one hand, and
other forms of conceivability, on the other. The difference between understanding raised
by voluntary signs and one raised by other signs embedded in sense arises due to the fact
of the nature of the former. Voluntary signs are a sub-class of artificial signs, which can
be of two kinds, verbal and non-verbal. Furthermore, non-verbal voluntary signs are
contrasted with natural signs. Therefore conceivability that takes place in sense and
memory is natural and materialistic, whereas other forms of conceivability are more or
less artificial in the sense that to them an intention is attached by an agent.
The second obscurity relates to the nature of thinking (and even reasoning) that
takes place in these processes. It is a little unclear whether reasoning with natural signs is
the same thing as understanding. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to think that it is,
because the process started by natural signs fulfils the criterion mentioned in the
definition of understanding: it raises a thought in an individual. On the other hand, it does
not fulfil the criterion, because natural signs are not voluntary.
To Hobbes, voluntary is something related to deliberation, which is the name of a
chain of appetites concerning good and evil consequences that leads to action.333
Additionally, it is a description of the structure of emotive judgement that is present
already in the sense (remembering that there are two reactions to external pressure in a
subject, that of the brain and that of the heart). The key feature of a voluntary sign is
then that it is, in one way or another, intended by an agent. What clouds and stones lack,
is exactly this, and therefore they are not voluntary signs, while, for example, the hiss of
a cat (a sign of animosity) and its purring (a sign of friendliness and contentment) are.334
A  further  elucidation  of  the  difference  is  to  say  that  what  clouds  and  stones  lack,  and
men and other living creatures have, is signs in the specific meaning that Hobbes gives to
the term in Chapter IV of Leviathan, namely something used to express one’s thought to
others.335
Despite the relatively elaborate classification of different levels of conceiving
reality, there appears to be a gap between the material structure of reality and its
333 Leviathan VI, 44.
334 It has been proposed that Hobbes is committed to ‘pan-sensism’ (see, Leijenhorst 2002, 98). The line
of argument provided here objects to this reading. Additionally, Hobbes explicitly denies this kind of
reading: ‘But though all sense, as I have said, be made by reaction, nevertheless it is not necessary that
every thing that reacteth should have sense. I know there have been philosophers, and those learned
men, who have maintained that all bodies are endued with sense. Nor do I see how they can be refuted,
if  the  nature  of  sense  be  placed  in  reaction  only.  And,  though  by  the  reaction  of  bodies  inanimate  a
phantasm might be made, it would nevertheless cease, as soon as ever the object were removed. For
unless those bodies had organs, as living creatures have, fit for the retaining of such motion as is made
in them, their sense would be such, as that they should never remember the same. And therefore this
hath nothing to do with that sense which is the subject of my discourse’ (Concerning Body IV.25.5,
393). More specifically, this is a reference to Adrian May’s theory of perception. See Correspondence
Letter 49 and the editor’s notes to the letter.
335 Leviathan IV, 25.
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intelligibility. One possible way to amend this problem is to give an argument that
consists of three parts. The first studies the process of conceiving from the point of view
of mental discourse, whereas the second does the same from the point of view of verbal
discourse. The final part is to show that these two have something in common. The other
two  parts  will  be  discussed  after  the  analysis  of  the  second  principal  part  of  Hobbes’s
psychology,  his  theory  of  motivation.  The  first  part  of  the  argument  has  already  been
discussed above and it is sufficient to provide a summary with some additional remarks.
I take the passage on apparition in Concerning Body to  refer  simply  to  the
normal evolution of the mind. Our knowledge of the world grows gradually as our
experience of its various phenomena grows. During this growth we become also more
and more capable of classifying it. This development follows a pattern: from different
perceptions arises ‘[m]uch memory, or memory of many things, [which] is called
Experience’  out  of  which  grows  ‘Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and
sometimes Wisdome’.336 The  basis  of  this  is  the  described  material  organisation  of  our
memory, which contains numerous states (created by previous experience) that arise to
the mind when appropriate external stimulus is present.337 This I think is the correct
understanding of Hobbes’s naturalistic analysis of perception, and this is what was
referred to earlier in the discussion of imagination as a capacity which consolidates the
human mind. The consolidating function of imagination is well articulated in Chapter III
of Leviathan.338 The chapter is entitled ‘Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations’.
Hobbes’s ideas will be discussed in detail at the beginning of the chapter on imagination
and knowledge, but now two things need to be introduced.
In Chapter III of Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes between two kinds of mental
discourse, unregulated or unguided and regulated or guided. The former is called
unguided because there is no desire or design and therefore it appears muzzy. Though
Hobbes does not spend much effort in analysing the unregulated succession of
phantasms, it is important to notice that already this kind of train of thought is solid.
Unregulated mental discourse can be clarified, the consequence of thoughts explained. In
principle we are always able to point out the origins of even the most delirious chain of
ideas for, in this case, not only the parts, but also the links of the chain have their basis
on previous experience. What is unregulated can then be equated with what is
unspecified as the cited example of a Roman penny clearly shows.339
Another noteworthy idea embedded in Hobbes’s analysis of mental discourse is
the non-randomness of the succession of phantasms; ‘[n]ot every Thought to every
336 Leviathan II, 5 and III, 10. Cf. Elements III.6-7, 29-30 and IV.5-9, 32-33.
337 See Concerning Body IV.25.5, 393-394.
338 Hobbes’s earlier accounts are equally useful. See Elements IV  and Critique du ‘De Mundo’
XXVII.XIX. In Concerning Body (IV.25.8), Hobbes’s view remains the same.
339 Leviathan III, 8-9.
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Thought succeeds indifferently’.340 ‘Indifferently’ does not mean that thoughts follow
each other always in the same order, sometimes from one thought follows one idea,
sometimes another. To use Hobbes’s analogy, the relationship between two ideas is
determined just as the finger determines the course of water on a table.341 Certainly, the
course of water is determined, but we are able to change the route. Thus we are, to some
degree, able to regulate (that is, to regulate and to understand) the wandering of our
mind. In this process of regulation of imagination, desire, and motivation have a role.
MOTIVATION
In Chapter VI of Leviathan, Hobbes while introducing motivation, reformulates his view
of cognition in the following manner:
As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (as I have sayd before) onely Motion, caused by
the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the Sight, Light, Colour; to the Eare, Sound;
to the Nostrill, Odour &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes,
Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the reall effect is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour;
which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or
sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.342
What motivates us according to Hobbes are emotions, or, passions.343 From this it does
not follow that human life is whimsical, merely that the dynamics of mental life is
prompted by passions. Secondly, though passions, ultimately, are nothing but matter in
motion, Hobbes reflects upon them from a special point of view.
340 Leviathan III, 8.
341 Leviathan III, 8. See also Elements III.3, 28.
342 Leviathan VI, 25. In the passage, the meaning of the word 'motion' is ambiguous. It refers to motion
as cause, which is really motion of a body and something completely materialistic, but, also, to motion
as effect. What the latter exactly means is, again, obscure. We may understand it as concrete movement,
say, when I pull my hand out of water that starts to boil, or, as a thought that causes some further action,
for example, my thought 'I want that last piece of cheese' may cause me to pick up the piece from a
plate.
343 Two terminological note is needed here. First, passion is a standard term used already in the Latin
and especially in Medieval philosophy. The general metaphysical meaning of the term refers to the idea
that something is under the influence of something else. Hobbes’s concepts of patient and agent mirror
this metaphysical conception of passion. See Concerning Body II.9.1-2, 120-121.The psychological
meaning refers to those motions of mind or soul, which are caused by some external agents. For
example, fear is caused by a sensation of a snake. Second, the modern term ‘emotion’ does not fully
correspond with the 17th century term ‘passion’. Though passions were often used to refer to what is now
understood as emotions, there were also other kinds of emotions called ‘actions’. The difference between
the two was, roughly speaking, that passions were caused by something outside an agent, whereas
actions were more conscious emotions initiated by the agent. In this respect, ‘emotion’ is still an apt
term in the case of Hobbes, who does not make this sort of distinction explicitly, as did, for instance,
Descartes and Spinoza. On emotions in the 17th century philosophy, see James (1997), who, in some
places, I follow here.
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Hobbes did touch on the questions of motivation and passions before
Elements,344 but the manuscript offers a compact introduction to his view of motivation:
The power of the mind which we call motive, differeth from the power motive of the body; for
the power motive of the body is that by which it moveth other bodies, which we call strength:
but the power motive of the mind, is that by which the mind giveth animal motion to that body
wherein it existeth; the acts hereof are our affections and passions[.]345
When turning to Hobbes’s theory of passions, two familiar ideas arise: his theory of
passions appears mechanistic and materialistic, and there is a similar distinction between
animal and human psychology as was present in his reflections on cogitation.346 The
physiological side of Hobbes’s theory of passions will be discussed in the following
pages, but if we are to follow Hobbes, this is an element in the theory. The other element
is the philosophical theory of passions, which includes definitions of what passions are,
what kind of passions there are, and the role of passions in action and decision-making.
This introductory section deals mainly with some details about the intellectual
milieu and background in which Hobbes’s theory of passions developed, but will close
with some general points of view that are helpful when trying to understand Hobbes’s
account of human motivation. My aim is not to show that this or that work clearly
influenced Hobbes, and I shall restrict myself to a few comments on the issue, rather than
giving a thorough historical analysis.
Considering the classical background, there are two major candidates: Aristotle
and Cicero. The basic difference between Aristotle and Cicero was that the former
introduces a variety of passions, which are listed in De Rhetorica, whereas the latter
claimed, following the Stoics, that there are four basic passions.347 The standard view
defends the influence of Aristotle and, in particular, that of his De Rhetorica.348 The
following reflection can be summarised. Firstly, as James notes, Hobbes’s classification
of passions is ultimately based on two basic motions, appetite (or desire) and aversion,
which was the common Aristotelian distinction.349 The second is Hobbes’s personal
intellectual history. We know that Hobbes both translated (partly) and valued Aristotle’s
344 Instances include a letter to young Cavendish about his conduct while in Paris in 1638
(Correspondence Letter 28, 52-53) and the translation of Aristotle’s De Rhetorica.
345 Elements VI.9, 43.
346 Some scholars tend to repeat the overt layer of Hobbes’s theory of passions. For example, McNeilly
(1968, 95 and 100-104), though he notes that the theory of passions in Leviathan is not as materialistic
and egoistic as is usually thought, still reads Hobbes’s theory of passions and motivation in
physiological, mechanistic terms.
347 James 1997, 5.
348 Among scholars, Strauss (1952, Chapter III, especially 37-41) has made the strongest case here.
349 James 1997, 5. For the original discussion, see Ethica Nicomachea 1104b4-1105a17.
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De Rhetorica.350 In my opinion, the argument should be complemented by an
observation: it may be that the translation of De Rhetorica was  made  for  Hobbes’s
private educational uses and did not have as much influence on Hobbes as has been
claimed.
Some evidence for the influence of Cicero can also be shown. To James’s claim
one may reply that there are resemblances between Hobbes’s account and the Stoic
theory of passions. He makes, for instance, the distinction between basic and derivative
passions.351 And to Strauss’s argument it  can be answered that Stoicism in 17th century
was understood through Cicero. That is, if a thinker was familiar with Stoicism this was
probably because he or she was familiar with Cicero. Secondly, as James352 suggests,
when  the  17th century authors consider passions, Stoicism (and, at least indirectly,
Epicureanism) were favoured instead of Aristotelianism. Therefore it is far from
axiomatic  that  Hobbes’s  ‘theory  of  the  passions  was  influenced  by  Aristotle’s
Rhetoric’.353 His pedagogical assignments here may have some impact, but the whole
basis of the theory of passions is different from that of Aristotle, and the formal
similarities are not enough to prove the influence of Aristotle.
Moving on to the contemporary influences, a crystallisation of the 17th-century
discussion of passions is taken to be Descartes’s The Passions of Soul (1647), and after
him passions had two principal meanings.354 The first, a broad one, refers to the motions
of the mind that are caused by external agents and which are opposed to actions caused
by will, for example, fantasy is a passion in this sense. The second and a narrow meaning
refers to passions as feelings. In this sense, joy, for example, is a passion. Lastly, it
should be added that though passions were considered irrational or at least harmful to
rational thinking, this is far from being the whole truth on the matter. Quite the opposite,
many 17th century thinkers, Hobbes included, understood certain passions, especially
curiosity, to be crucial to thinking and knowledge.355
Though Hobbes conversed with the leading minds of his time, it would be a
mistake to think that philosophical reflections on passions are the only background
sources of his view. The literature on passions was widely popular in England and
Continental Europe, France in particular. Therefore the general readers of the first half of
17th century was also influenced by a wide selection of popular books on passions,  like
350 Brief Lives (Clarke), I, 357. The translation of Aristotle’s De Rhetorica is published in EW, VI and
in Harwood (ed.)1986. The catalogue of the Cavendish library lists 6 editions that Hobbes might have
used. See Chatsworth Catalogue, I, 78-79. For a discussion, see Strauss (1952, Chapter III); Harwood
(1986); and Howell (1952, 384-385).
351 See, for example, Leviathan VI, 25 (‘These simple passions ...’).
352 James 1997, 5-7 and 23-4.
353 Strauss 1952, 42.
354 Descartes 1984, I, 335-339.
355 James 1997, 189 and 196.
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François Senault’s De l’usage des passions (1643), Thomas Wright’s The Passions of
the Mind in General (1604), Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), and
Timothie Bright’s A Treatise on Melancholie (1586).356 In what follows, not all the
works mentioned are discussed in detail,357 but two remarks are worth of making. Firstly,
similarities exist on the general level. For instance, Wright takes self-love (Gr. philautía,
Lat. amor proprius) to be the mother of passions that God has implanted to every one of
his (living) creations and, following Aquinas, he says that there are eleven passions in
all.358 Senault considers passions to be the most difficult of things to learn about, not
only learn to master.359 Burton makes a similar distinction between vital and animal
spirits as Hobbes, though he also speaks of natural spirits.360 There is also some
correspondence in details; Wright, for example, talks of the insatiable nature of
passions.361
A case apart is the analysis of imagination. Here Senault and Wright offer curious
statements. Wright speaks of children, who ‘lacke the vse of reason and are guided by an
internall imagination’,362 or of God who has given to his creations different means of
aggression: ‘to the Bull he hath imported hornes ... to men their hand and witte’.363 Both,
Senault and Wright also establish an intimate connection between passions and
imagination as a pair which seeks to mislead reason. Senault writes that ‘[t]he
imagination never represents them [passions that have a voluntary element] to the mind
without speaking in their favour’, which Wright echoes: ‘ the imagination representeth to
the  understanding,  not  only  the  reasons  that  may  favour  the  passion,  but  also  sheweth
them very intensively, with more shew and appearance than they are indeed’, or in a
more hilarious way about ‘how the imagination putteth greene spectacles before the eyes
of our wit, to make it see nothing but greene, that is, serving for the consideration of the
Passion’.364 Lastly, and curiously enough, Senault points out that ‘[i]t is not even
necessary that the good and evil represented by the Imagination should be real’.365
356 For the editions used here, see the bibliography.
357 There are many probable connections. For instance, there is some evidence (Malcolm 2002, 95-96
and references there) that Hobbes and Burton knew each other through a common friend, Robert Payne,
but whether or not Hobbes ever read Burton's book is not sure.
358 Wright 1620, 11 and 22. See also Burton (1927, 141). Wright is following the Medieval practice of
using amor proprius instead of the classical amor sui.
359 Senault 1772, 157. The idea seems to be that we are not only the slaves of passions but also that this
is painful to understand and admit. Here Senault also refers to Horatius’s sentence: Vino tortus et ira,
which appears in Epistola 18 and which can taken to refer to moderation according to one’s status.
360 Burton 1927, 129.
361 Wright 1620, 71-72.
362 Wright 1620, 7. Cf, Leviathan V, 21.
363 Wright 1620, 21-22. Cf. Leviathan IV, 13.
364 See (respectively) Senault 1772, 16 and Wright 1620, 51.
365 Senault 1772, 19. Cf. Leviathan VI, 24.
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What the above discussion shows is that again and again the question of what
influenced Hobbes turns out to be rather difficult. The axiomatic views that Hobbes’s
theory of motivation was influenced by some contemporary reflections of motion or by
Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric are far too narrow. Surely both had an impact, but what
exactly that was, is a subject for meticulous study. As is the whole setting.
My own conclusion is that the speculation on the historical origins of Hobbes’s
theory of passions and motivation has demonstrated a thing: there are probably no
compulsory reasons to believe that many of the mentioned works had an influence on
Hobbes. For instance, both Senault and Wright are more attached to the Scholastic
tradition and Christian moral mentality than Hobbes would ever be.366 Also the influence
of Descartes is hard to show. The Passions of the Soul was relatively late, that is, it
appeared after the time Hobbes had formulated his view of passions. In sum, two things
remain plausible. There was an intense discussion of passions during the time of Hobbes,
and the nature of this discussion was anti-traditional; a sign of which was, above all, the
strong emphasis on physiological accounts of passions. Secondly, many ideas, like that of
amor proprius, that are at times taken to be peculiar to Hobbes were part and parcel of
the general discussion.
Before entering into a more detailed discussion, some basic ideas need to be
listed. As the analysis of sense and the forms of conceivability have suggested, the basic
passions of desire and aversion regulate all mental activity, and therefore passions always
have a place in our thinking and action.367 Secondly, imagination plays a role in the
theory of passions for it is ‘the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion.’368
Thirdly, imagination and passions affect each other. A vivid example is vainglory. A vain-
glorious person is one who takes him- or herself to be something special on a false basis,
for example, the person believes flattery or has false imaginations of him- or herself, for
example, likening himself to Napoleon.369 A peculiarity of Hobbes’s reflection on
passions is that the pleasure that a vain-glorious person gets from a false imagination of
his or her own person, seems to be as efficient as the one that a person gets from a real
source, say, disinterested love. Lastly, though grounded on a physiological account of
passions, language seems to be a factor that has a decisive role in Hobbes’s theory of
motivation. After these lengthy preliminary remarks, it is possible to move onward.
366 Perhaps  we  would  be  much  more  informed  on  the  influences  and  details  of  Hobbes’s  theory  of
passions, if only he had been be as detailed and conscientious in reporting his sources as Wright, or had
spent more time in pragmatics (‘good and ill use of passions’), as Senault did.
367 This claim is made explicitly in Chapter three of Leviathan.
368 Leviathan VI, 23.
369 Leviathan VI, 27. Cf. Elements IX.1,  51  and  X.8,  63.  Hobbes’s  discussion  in  the  early  treatise  is
more lively. See also Kahn 2001, 14 and Frost 2001, especially 35.
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MOTION AND THE PHYSICAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION
Hobbes’s theory of motivation leans on two kinds of motions. First is the vital motion,
which once started, will continue its movement until a human being dies. Circulation of
blood  and  breathing  are  this  kind  of  motion,  which  does  not  need  the  ‘help  of
imagination’.370 In the second kind of motion, animal or voluntary motion is included as
one of the components of imagination. That is to say, human beings first imagine an
action in their mind and then give an order to the body, for example, ‘speak’ or ‘walk’.
Hobbes seems to think that we do not usually recognise these motions because we are so
accustomed to certain actions. Nevertheless, in philosophy we do need an exact account
of motivation, and in particular, an account of what is the relationship between vital and
voluntary motion.
Earlier it was pointed out that in his physiological theory of the mind, Hobbes
defines the relationship between vital and voluntary motion as follows: ‘that animal
spirits are nothing but vital spirits purified by the heart’.371 This is echoed in Hobbes’s
discussion of passions, where he re-establishes the link between physical and
psychological notions of endeavour: ‘small beginnings of Motion, within the body of
Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are
commonly called ENDEAVOUR’.372 After describing endeavour, Hobbes moves on to
explain  the  two basic  forms  that  it  can  take.  These  are  appetite  (or  desire  which  is  the
general name for appetite) and aversion. When an endeavour turns toward something,
which causes it, we speak of appetite and the appearance or phantasm of this is called
pleasure. The contrary endeavour, that is, something that makes us turn away from
something is called aversion, and its appearance is pain.
With appetites some are natural, such as the appetite for food, but mainly
appetites and aversion focus on particular things and ‘proceed from Experience’.373 We
can have a specific appetite only for things that we know by experience (our desire to
unknown things is ‘tast and try’), whereas aversions can relate to unknown things
because we do not know whether they will hurt us or not374. The three basic passions are
love, hate and contempt, although the last is not properly speaking a passion, but ‘an
370 Leviathan VI, 23.
371 For both ideas, see Concerning Body IV.25.10, 403.
372 Leviathan VI, 23.
373 Leviathan VI, 23. The Latin origins of the terms are appeto and averto. The similar Greek
expressions are hormê and aphormê. It has been recognised (see Airaksinen 1993, 85-86, who I follow,
to some degree, here) that this part of Hobbes’s theory of passions has a weakness. The problem is that
Hobbes understands appetite and aversion to be separate things, not different perspectives as his
contemporary Descartes (1984, I, 359) thought.
374 Hobbes appears to think that fear or other negative emotion toward unknown is typical to human
beings, but does not give any explicit clarification for this. One could add that this corresponds neatly
with his analysis of the natural causes of religion. For this, see Leviathan XII and my discussion below.
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immobility, or contumacy of the Heart’, that is, indecisiveness.375 Love and hate are the
concrete counterparts of desire and aversion, and the difference between the two pairs is
that in the former an object of endeavour is physically present. From these starting points
Hobbes builds up a list of passions that include hope and laughter as well as good and
evil.
The trouble with passions is their dynamics, which is ‘continuall mutation: it is
impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in [a human being] the same
Appetites, and Aversions’.376 This seems to suggest two things. First, that our motivation
is ultimately nothing but bodily motion and, second, that passions are, as Hobbes
occasionally calls them, perturbations and as such harmful to us. The latter is a platitude,
which is not, as suggested earlier, even completely true. The first claim is, however,
interesting.
What seems prima facie persuasive is that Hobbes at least adopts the language of
mechanism. An example of this fashion is Hobbes’s description of inward motion.
Motion caused by an external object travels from the eyes, ears and other organs of sense
to the brains and further on, to the heart, and the result, we learn from Hobbes, is
nothing but motion (‘for motion produceth nothing but motion’).377 Another
consideration, however is how successful the explanation is.
Let us adopt, for a moment, a strictly mechanistic and materialistic model of
explanation. Now, if a person A is to have an appetite towards an object O, we say that
he receives a perception of the object and, physiologically speaking, that the perception
causes the enlargement of the heart and moves the person towards an object. The object
O is said to have a motivational force upon the person A. An important thing to
understand is that in mechanical terms the enlargement of the heart (in purely physical
terms, increase of motion within the body of A) indicates the amount of capacity to act.
The pattern seems to work well in the case of appetite. Appetites increase our capacity
to act by accelerating the vital motion in our body. The trouble arises when we move to
aversion.
According to a general explanation, aversion is something that moves a person A
away from the object O. If we follow Hobbes, this is not the precise interpretation. The
correct reading is that aversion will reduce the heart and decrease the motion within the
body of A. Therefore aversion may be said to paralyse the person A and make him or her
incapable  of  action  of  any  kind.  The  case  of  fear  is  illuminating.  According  to  the
mechanical explanation, as an aversion, fear reduces the heart and decreases the motion
within the body of a person
375 Leviathan VI, 24.
376 Leviathan VI, 24.
377 Leviathan I, 3.
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An obvious contradiction arises, for the above is not what Hobbes says. We may
easily pick up from his works passages that show that fear can cause motion in man.378
He then says quite the opposite of what the mechanical reading of his theory of
motivation suggests. Fear and other negative emotions can have a significant
motivational power in a man. The action based on the ‘negative’ motivation may, and
often is chaotic but the salient point here is that it contains a lot of motion. How are we,
then, to understand the contradiction? The solution is threefold. Firstly, the proposed
reading is not indeed what Hobbes says. Instead of being material-mechanistic, his theory
of motivation can be better described as a dynamic model, where the totality of desires
and aversions related to an object form a solid motive after a process of deliberation.
Secondly, the paralysis argument can be interpreted in a different way. Lastly, that
aversion is genuinely motivating makes sense only if two things are taken into account:
the analysis of motivation through the capacity to imagine and to make decisions, and the
semantics of passions.
The standard view faces yet another problem when the relationship between
motivation and the unknown is looked at in detail. If everything in our mind is supposed
to originate in sensation, it appears somehow strange that we can have aversions that do
not have any point of reference in our experience. Hobbes could answer to this that here
exactly lies his point. Reasonable and sane people do not believe that these kinds of
things exist, they are obvious nonsense, fairy tales mainly created and spread by old
wives and power-hungry priests. Nevertheless, he takes the time and trouble to discuss
them in detail, and he does this because he sees them as real motives. The explanation
must lie elsewhere.
Hobbes’s vocabulary of human nature changes along the way from the physical to
the philosophical, or to the psychological theory of motivation. A way to demonstrate
this shift is the notion of endeavour. As explained, endeavour is the smallest possible unit
of motion and in the light of this, all the processes of mind consist of endeavours. But the
endeavour peculiar to motivation is not just motion, but voluntary motion or, as has been
duly noticed, ‘the thoughts which precede action are “commonly called endeavour”’.379
Here the physical and psychological notions of endeavour, and more broadly physics and
psychology, overlap.
The case is not, however, so that Hobbes only gives different names to motion
which travels through a sentient. When he calls certain forms of endeavour (pleasure and
pain) the appearances of motion, he makes a qualitative, if rather familiar distinction. On
the one hand there is the physical world of bodies and motion (that is, primary qualities),
but on the other hand there is the phenomenal world of desire, hope, giddiness and other
378 One argument is found in Leviathan (XIII, 63) where Hobbes introduces the remedy for the natural
condition of humankind.
379 James 1998, 928. The inset quotation is to Leviathan VI, 23.
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passions (that is, secondary qualities). What is perplexing is that Hobbes seems to put
forward a theory of mental causation.
Again the problem is aversion and its motivational force. In Concerning Body,
Hobbes states in a firm voice that ‘animal spirits are nothing but vital spirits purified by
the heart’, and more specifically in Leviathan, Hobbes clarifies the purification of vital
spirits by explaining that pleasure is ‘a corroboration of Vitall motion’ and pain is
‘hindering and troubling the motion vitall’.380 These,  however,  sketch  a  physiology  of
action,  not  a  theory  of  motivation.  It  tells  how  our  body  functions,  when  we  act,  but
nothing much about reasons we give to our actions. Secondly, because Hobbes limits
desire and pleasure to the things of which a person has already had an appropriate
experience of, say, a taste of a particular ice-cream, no problem of mental causation
occurs. The motive to have, say, a chocolate ice-cream is explained by a pleasant
previous experience of it. The cause of any given action is the re-activation of a memory,
that is, a certain physical composition in our brains that has been stored in the memory
before. In the case of desires Hobbes then manages to avoid the idea of mental causation,
but the same line of reasoning does not work in the case of aversions.
The problem with aversions is that ‘wee have [them] for things, not onely which
we  know  have  hurt  us;  but  also  that  we  do  not  know  whether  they  will  hurt  us,  or
not’,381 that is, a physical composition in our brain does not necessarily exist
corresponding to a particular aversion. A lively formulation of this is Hobbes’s idea on
the natural causes of religion. Man’s curiosity about the causes of his good and evil
fortune and his worries about the origin of the world produce a certain kind of anxiety:
For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive
hereafter; it is impossible for a man; who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against
the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the
time to come [...]
This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in
the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore where there is nothing to be
seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some Power, or Agent
Invisible.382
In other words, we can fear or hate something without having any experience of it. It is
however unclear how these can have an impact on our decisions and actions?
An obvious answer is that unknown things do not have a real impact and that
people with artificial or unknown aversions have misunderstood something. This also
appears to be Hobbes’s answer in certain cases. For instance, the fear of the unknown in
380Concerning Body IV25.10, 403 and Leviathan VI, 25.
381 Leviathan VI, 24.
382 Leviathan XII, 52.
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its endless forms – listed quite extensively in Chapter XII of Leviathan –  is  indeed  a
praise of folly.
A philosophical way to formulate the answer is to refer to the disruptive nature of
passions. This line of explanation states that people with aversions towards the unknown
have a surge of emotions or a similar dysfunction of the mind, and they do not
understand that their aversions ‘are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be
reall, and externall Substances’.383 In short, aversion to something that has not been
experienced, is to misunderstand the consequences of inward motion.
The  appeal  to  some  kind  of  disorder  does  not,  however,  solve  the  problem
entirely. Surely in some cases, say, when someone has suffered a serious loss, the person
can be delusional, but to generalise this conclusion only leads to the already mentioned
contradiction with Hobbes’s general tenets that passions are the constituents of
cogitation and the source of motivation. Additionally, the above analysis shows that
mechanical materialism, at least in its rigorous form, is contrary to Hobbes’s own text
and especially what he says about the motivating force of aversions. Therefore it seems
to be a fair conclusion that a robust mechanistic-material reading of Hobbes’s theory of
human nature is not convincing. Instead, we may consider our emotional life as a mode
of thinking.
DELIBERATION AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF
MOTIVATION
Along with his alleged atheism and prominent materialism, the subject that raised
resentment among his contemporaries was Hobbes’s denial of free will. Instead of being
free  –  or  in  Latin, liber – Hobbes claimed, the will is determined by which, it will be
claimed here, he meant that our decisions are considered or thought of (in Latin
deliberare). Hobbes did not deny our freedom to do what we chose, merely that there is
no such thing as free will. The theoretical basis of this question is contained into the
exchange between Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall (ca. 1594-1663), which is above all
about God.384 When one looks more carefully the debate between Hobbes and Bramhall,
it turns out that the emphasis is on the word ‘will’, not on the word ‘free’.
383 Leviathan XII, 53.
384 This aspect of the discussion is omitted here, but briefly put it is as follows. First, Hobbes seeks to
refute Bramhall’s Scriptural arguments of free will giving his own rival interpretations of certain
passages from the Bible based partly on the authority of St Paul (see Liberty and Necessity, 241-251).
Second, and here is where they seem to differ most, Bramhall claims that God made man free to choose
between good and evil and it is man’s task to find out what is good and evil, whereas Hobbes thinks that
man is never able to know the mind of God. Finally, Hobbes criticises Bramhall’s petit bourgeois ideas
of what it is to sin, or what it is to be just and unjust. The core idea is, still, the same as that in the
philosophical debate: liberty and necessity are not exclusive and, according to Hobbes, to understand the
true nature of God, that is, that He is the omnipotent creator of the world supports his view.
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Hobbes’s central argument against Bramhall, in particular, and freedom of will, in
general, appear to be quite simple. Bramhall has not understood the relationship between
liberty and necessity. Instead of being mutually exclusive, they are in a perfect harmony.
As he writes in the earlier version of the debate:
The  question  therefore  is  not,  whether  a  man  be  a free agent,  that  is  to  say,  whether  he  can
write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will; but, whether the will to write, and the
will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or according to anything else in his own
power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say, I can will if I will, I take to
be an absurd speech.385
Behind the familiar mockery of School-men, Hobbes’s view is based on the following
arguments. The first deals with deliberation and will and is reiterated in Leviathan:
When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Feares, concerning one and
the same thing, arise alternately; and gives divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or
omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have
an Appetite to it; sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes
Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes, and Fears,
continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.
[…]
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the
omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing.386
Deliberation is the name of the chain of appetites, which themselves are motion initiated
by fancies, which are caused by external objects, whose activity we are not able to
manipulate,387 and the will is the last link of deliberation. This is what Hobbes means
when he claims that deliberation and will always have necessary causes. Freedom,
however, comes from the fact that we are able, more or less, to regulate our passions
and above all, to choose to do something or not. Inclinations and intentions, that is, ‘[a]ll
other appetites to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations’, might
change during the process of deliberation and human beings are free in that they ‘hath
not  made  an  end  of deliberating’.388 In brief, we are free when it comes to our
inclinations and intentions, but not in relation to will, and once we have acted our action
is determined by certain appetites.
385 Liberty and Necessity, 240.
386 Leviathan VI, 28. Cf. Liberty and Necessity, 245, 247, 254-5, 268-9, 273, and 275; and Concerning
Body IV.25.13, 408-410.
387 This is well-articulated in Liberty and Necessity, 274 (‘Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh
beginning from itself ... ’).
388 Liberty and Necessity, 273.
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The second argument says that ‘also voluntary actions are necessitated’.389 This is
so because a voluntary action is the action that follows from the will, that is, from the
last appetite, which, as was shown, is always caused by appetites, and ultimately, by
external objects. It is a matter of further debate whether, or to be precise, in what sense,
we are free according to Hobbes. In general, there are two possibilities.
Freedom, says Hobbes, in Liberty and Necessity,  ‘is the absence of all the
impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the
agent.’390 This statement has been taken as evidence that Hobbes’s conception of
freedom is negative, that is, that freedom is always freedom from external obstacles.391
Hobbes’s statement on freedom may appear contradictory in relation to what he
says about our knowledge. For if we do not have certain knowledge of external objects,
does  this  not  mean  that  we  are  not  free  at  all?  This  is  the  traditional  way  to  read
arguments that deny freewill, and in the light of this we are not metaphysically free. We
may be free in a sense, that we are free as long as we are ignorant of the real causes of
our thoughts and actions and as long as we are ignorant of the metaphysical doctrine
according to which everything in the world has its absolute cause. In what follows,
however, I shall argue that Hobbes defends a conception freedom which leaves space for
both reflection and chance.
Deliberation, as has been explained, depicts more correctly how Hobbes
understands human motivation. We do have various urges, needs, desires and so on, but
we also reflect upon them. It is not the case then that our bodily constitution determines
what we do and what we think, for we are able to control ourselves. Here Hobbes’s view
moves toward what is some times called positive freedom, that is, freedom to act
according to some self-imposed principles. These principles can be taken to refer to
various things. For example, they can be universal and rational or general and emotive.
The first option appears plausible. Hobbes can be taken to put forward a view that
freedom lies in our understanding of our own intrinsic qualities and our acting according
to this knowledge. In other words, by rational reflection we control the irrational traits in
our character and live a secure and commodious life. This view, however, is somewhat
problematic. If Hobbes is considered as a mechanical materialist and a determinist,
freedom would now be reduced to the maxim that to be free is to choose one’s own
chains – a kind of pseudo-Stoic fatalism. This conclusion does not hold.
Hobbes indeed employs a desire-based model of the mind. Passions are what
moves  us,  but  then  again  it  is  not  passions  as  such,  or  that  we  would  be,  to  refer  to
Hume’s famous and misquoted idea, slaves of our passions.392 Like Hume later, Hobbes
389 Liberty and Necessity, 275.
390 Liberty and Necessity, 273.
391 Skinner (2002, Vol. III, Chapter 7) offers a perceptive discussion on the subject. For the original
discussion of negative and positive freedom, see Berlin (1969 [1958]) and Constant (1988 [1820]).
392 See Hume 1978, 415.
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does not believe that we are doomed to search endlessly for the fulfilment of every fancy.
The point of Hobbes’s conception of deliberation is a general view shared by many of his
contemporaries: that passions are not contrary to, but an integral part of the harmonious
human flourishing and freedom.393
One more aspect of motivation needs to be discussed. Hobbes’s analysis of
irrationality is not restricted to his discussion of passions, but also covers his view of
imaginations as harmful and as a capacity of the mind that needs to be harnessed by
reason. This characterisation is not fully correct for three reasons. Firstly, to Hobbes
imagination is not only or even predominantly a negative capacity of the mind. It plays a
significant part in our rational life of the mind. Secondly, to claim that imagination as
such is harmful is simply wrong. If we read Hobbes, it turns out that a peculiar form of
imagination, namely vision or apparition, is harmful. As I shall try to explain below, this
is not a philosophically interesting account. There is a more general feature that makes
visions particularly harmful. Thirdly, and perhaps the central remark here, Hobbes’s
theory of motivation requires the conception of imaginary motivation. His explanation of
action is tied to the idea that we are able to imagine things, and moreover, this bringing
of things before the mind’s eye is central in deliberation. The first one of these reasons
will become clear as the discussion proceeds to understanding and language, but the
latter two will be discussed here.
Visions, Hobbes explains with certitude, are typical of timid persons who spend
too much time reading romances. Visionaries, we learn, are either already in a state of
mental disturbance or at the edge of such a state. As an example of the latter, Hobbes
refers  to  the  story  of  Brutus  who,  just  in  the  night  before  the  battle  of  Philippi,  is
reported by historians to have had a vision.394 Hobbes, however, does not swallow the
standard interpretation. According to him, Brutus was anxious and the assassination of
Caesar caused him great distress. In the middle of his turmoil he must suddenly have
fallen asleep and then comprehended the dream he saw as a vision. Instead of shrouding
Brutus’s case in mystery, Hobbes gives a naturalistic explanation.395 Beside  this
explanation, which sees Brutus’s behaviour as a cognitive error, Hobbes studies visions
from a different point of view, namely in respect to the question what causes them.
The first cause of visions is fear and anxiety, as is obvious in the case of Brutus.
Another way in which visions arise is out of ignorance, which can mean two things. The
first is that a person simply either has no grounds for his or her beliefs or that these
393 On the substantive role of desires, see Leviathan III, 9 (‘Where in there is no Passionate Thought ...’)
and VIII, 32-33 (quickness and slowness of imagination) and 35 (‘For the Thoughts, are to the Desires
...’).
394 The story is told by many ancient historians. See, for example, Plutarch’s ‘Life of Brutus’in Parallel
Lives, Vol. VI, 206-209.
395 Hobbes’s reasoning needs a clarifying remark. Hobbes actually reduces vision to dreams, which ‘are
caused by the distemper of some inward parts of the body’, that is, by some motions of matter
(Leviathan, II, 6). See also self-reflections in The Verse Life, 251.
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grounds are somehow unsound. Superstitious persons, for instance, can be easily made
to believe in ghosts, or fairies, or other non-bodily creatures. A similar kinds of
phenomena to visions, prophecy and inspiration, for example, are clearly dangerous in
political life. As a type of imagination, visions are, then, the most negative side of the
phenomenon and, but even more importantly, vision and compounded imagination are
rudimentary expressions of what Hobbes will later in the book label as private
judgement. When seen from the point of view of the general line of thought of
Leviathan, Hobbes’s analysis of imagination is also an investigation of the philosophical
origin of sedition.396 The philosophical relevance of decaying sense is not trivial, but,
quite the opposite, is essential.397 The  analysis  of  perversities  of  the  mind  helps  us  to
understand how Hobbes understood the roots of political disorder.
The second meaning of ignorance is even more fascinating. Ignorance here refers
to lack of knowledge of the functioning of our mind. A person is not able to explain his
or her action because he or she does not understand the causes of it. When put into the
context of the present theme, this means that a person is not aware of the efficient causes
of passions and motivation. This knowledge, so Hobbes seems to think, is necessary for
rational life and it consists of two general parts.
The rational self-understanding is based on the naturalistic or mechanistic theory
of passions, but as was suggested above, the mechanistic reading of Hobbes’s theory of
motivation is insufficient. The theory stems formally from Hobbes’s idea of life as
motion, but when more complicated patterns of decision making and action enter into the
picture, the mechanistic model shows its limits. A supporting reading was introduced.
The psychological theory of motivation based on imagination does not only emphasise
that motivation can be articulated in non-material terms, but opens a new viewpoint to
Hobbes’s theory of human nature. The imaginary nature of motivation brings forward the
way in which we reflect upon our choices and actions.
The physiology and psychology of passions are the traditional parts of Hobbes’s
theory of passions. Other components are the self-understanding of passions and the
semantics of passions.398 Self-understanding simply means to understand the causes of
one’s actions and in this the semantics of passions is of some relevance.
Semantics of passions refers to the idea that language illustrates our attitudes, not
the  world  as  it  is.  This  is  especially  true  with  passions.  The  meaning  that  a  person  can
give to his or her passion may emerge from three sources. It can be purely subjective,
396 See Leviathan XXXII and XXXVI and, in particular, 196. Cf. Cantalupo 1991, 145 and Johnston
1986, especially 103. However, it must be emphasised that imagination is always double-edged. It can
direct or mislead us. See especially the analysis of imagination as curiosity (Leviathan III, 9-10).
397 Of an opposite allusion, see Gert (1996, 158).
398 Hobbes actually adopts a method of generalisation on the basis of introspection, and states that this is
the way to understand human nature. See Leviathan, ‘Introduction’, 2 (‘that for the similitude of the
thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another ...’).
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purely social, or a combination of these. The next issue is to understand how the
interpretation of passions as given by an individual and that given by others meet.
Hobbes adopts a dry and technical grammatical approach to talk about the forms
of speech by which we express our passions. All passions ‘may be expressed
Indicatively; as I love, I  feare’, but some passions have particular forms.399 Passions
hardly ever make an affirmation, but when an expression contains a passion from which it
proceeds, we may talk of affirmations. The particular languages of passions are
subjunctive, imperative, optative and interrogative.
Subjunctive language expresses deliberation, usually with a supposition and one
or more consequences. For example, ‘If I take this apple, my friend will become angry’
or ‘If I take this apple, my friend will become angry, calls to police, and I will be in
trouble’.  Hobbes  says  that  subjunctive  language  does  not  formally  differ  from  the
language of reasoning, but the difference is that the subjunctive language in reasoning
deals with general names, whereas in passions it focuses on particular things and in this
sense it is misleading to talk about reasoning, which, properly speaking, deals with
general names.
The language of imperatives like ‘Do love me!’ or ‘Do not pity me!’ has three
specific forms: a command, a prayer, and a counsel. Imperative language expresses a
general desire and aversion. Optative language aims to catch such passions as vainglory
and indignation, whereas the interrogative language considers the desire to know, for
example ‘Why so?’. Hobbes’s discussion appears unconnected, but further scrutiny
shows otherwise. There is a clear line of thought in his short account of language of
passions. Firstly, it underlines the subjective character of passions. As known, though
passions are the same for everyone, their objects are not, and this causes the subjectivity
of passions. Hobbes’s analysis of different ways of expressing passions is a way to
systematise the matter. Secondly and more importantly, the short reflection may be seen
as part of Hobbes’s account of introspection and deliberation. By verbalising emotions,
an  agent  is  able  to  get  a  more  precise  picture  of  his  or  her  inner  motions  and  express
them to others.
Languages of passions are forms of speech and as such they can be classified as
reasoning, but only in the remote sense referring to deliberation on the basis of particular
emotional states. Hobbes denies this because of the volatile character of passions, but
adds that the best signs of passion are more natural, that is, ‘the countenance, motions of
the body, actions, and ends, or aimes, which we other know the man to have’.400
To conclude, like, say, with dreams, Hobbes adopts a naturalistic explanation of
passions, but as elsewhere in his theory of human nature, this is only one element of his
account. A way to show that this is the case is to give counter-examples that show that
399 Leviathan VI, 29.
400 Leviathan VI, 29.
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the naturalistic explanation of passions is just a part of the explanation even by Hobbes
himself. In what follows, I will concentrate on two such examples: religion and good and
evil.
In  a  long  list  of  passions  in  Chapter  IV  of Leviathan Hobbes summarises the
religious feelings of human beings as follows: ‘Feare of power invisible, feigned by the
mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION, not allowed,
SUPERSTITION.’401 If this would be all Hobbes says about the subject, the popular image
of  Hobbes  as  an  ironic  intellectual  on  the  questions  of  faith  and  devotion  would  be
correct.
First of all, it should be pointed out that Hobbes is following a long tradition of
religious criticism, though to originate the Greek poet Xenophanes (ca. 6th century BC).
Hobbes repeats the tradition’s central idea of religion as an (irrational) projection of
human feelings, especially fears. Secondly, Hobbes seems to propose that religion is
something fictive. The crucial part of the passage, however, comes immediately
afterwards, namely that these fictions are sometimes publicly permissible and allowed by
authorities. This implies that no matter how critical and reflective some members of a
community might be, there will be always those who follow these tales. Hobbes is not
here necessarily anticipating the modern materialistic and historical critique of religion,
but is simply pointing out the obvious: religion is a part of organised communities and
that, on the basis of historical knowledge, religion necessarily exists in all societies. Even
the definition of superstition is a descriptive one and should be detached from any
normative interpretations about the general nature of man’s belief in supernatural things.
Another flaw in the image of Hobbes as an ironic atheist is his proposal that there
might well be some ground to religious beliefs. This is what he calls true religion, in
which ‘the [invisible] power imagined, is truly such as we imagine’.402 This should be
read in the light of Hobbes’s voluntaristic view of God as ‘Incomprehensible, and his
greatness, and power [...] unconceivable’.403 This voice of reason, which says that human
beings are never able to understand the omnipotent nature of God, does of course in a
way restrain them from trying to do this. I believe, moreover, that Hobbes saw nothing
particularly strange in this. Religion may well be a fiction, but a useful and, above all,
successful one.
The internal relevance of the example (that is, its relevance for Hobbes’s
philosophy and, in particular, in this theory of passions) is, hopefully, more significant.
Such passions as religion, vainglory, and shame as well as Hobbes’s analysis of them
demonstrate that he did not see motivation only in mechanistic, physiological terms, but
instead as a more reflective and above all social and linguistic construction. Human
401 Leviathan VI, 26.
402 Leviathan VI, 26.
403 Leviathan III, 11.
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beings are able to become convinced of most fantastical things, but then again are also
able to overcome these fantasies by the use of their cognitive capacities.
The second example is Hobbes’s conception of good and evil. In Leviathan,
Hobbes gives the following definition: ‘But whatsoever is the object of any mans
Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good;  And the object of his
Hate, and Aversion, Evill […] For these words of Good, [and] Evill […] are ever used
with relation to the person that useth them.’404
There is the standard interpretation of this definition and it is sometimes used as
evidence that Hobbes is a moral subjectivist.405 If  this  were  all  that  Hobbes  says  about
the matter, then the conclusion might be right, but there are three counter-arguments.
The first counter-argument is based on what Hobbes says about Greek
philosophy (or rather about their ethics, to be precise) at the end of Leviathan:
Their Morall Philosophy is but a description of their own Passions. For the rule of Manners,
without Civill Government, is the Law of Nature; and in it, the Law Civill; that determineth
what is Honest, and Dishonest; what is Just, and Unjust; and generally what is Good, and Evill:
whereas they make the Rules of Good, and Bad, by their own Liking, and Disliking: By which
means, in so great diversity of tastes, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth
(as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his owne eyes, to the subversion of Common-
wealth.406
This statement puts, to say the least, the subjectivist reading in a strange light.
The  subjectivist  reading,  then,  is  based  on  Hobbes’s  claim  that  given  that  what
comes to good and evil there is ‘nothing simply and absolutely so’ and therefore it is not
possible to deduce good and evil ‘from the nature of objects themselves’.407 But as
already mentioned, by this Hobbes means that we are not able to find any objective
normative order from the (physical) world. Instead, values (what is considered good and
evil) are determined by individuals (in the natural state) or by a sovereign (in the civil
state).408 There might well be some widely applicable moral truths, but only some of
them are universal. For example, a sharp knife is good for cutting meat, except the meat
in question is my finger. A moral subjectivist would have to admit that hurting oneself is
a good thing. This takes us to the second objection.
The second objection is based on a distinction of some importance, which
Hobbes draws, namely the one between real and apparent good. According to Hobbes,
we have two kinds of desires, rational and non-rational, and these are divided by the help
404 Leviathan VI, 24.
405 The claim is problematic. Assuming that people take their personal judgements as values, it would
not follow that values are reducible to such judgements.
406 Leviathan XLVI, 369-370.
407 Leviathan VI, 24.
408 See also Malcolm (2002, 30-33).
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of the principle of self-preservation. This distinction makes it possible for Hobbes to
claim that there are some universal claims in moral and political philosophy. In Hobbes’s
vocabulary, the conceptions of rational and non-rational desires correspond to the
notions of real and apparent good. Further on, the idea of rational desires applies with
grown-up, sane adults, and includes education and the conditions in which a person has
grown up. These have, according to Hobbes, a crucial impact on what kind of person
one is.409
Hobbes’s definition of good and evil is revealing. It is not so much concerned
with morality as with (moral) psychology. He sees passions as essential to motivation,
but at the same time emphasises their whimsical nature. Good and evil vary from person
to person and within a person, and do not, necessarily, form any consistent order. I may
love a glass of port tonight, but hate a glass of port tomorrow morning. Respectively, it
is easy to point out how our appetites, desires and aversions, concerning food, drink,
music, people and so on differ from time to time and person to person. It is important to
note that subjectivism is tactical by nature. Hobbes’s lively words on the unavoidable
subjectivism of human beings come close to the trope of hyperbole, whereas the salient
point to notice is that it is not the object of desire and aversion, but a person's or persons'
valuations of something which is, if we are to believe Hobbes, the prime mover, and,
above all that human beings are able to overcome their subjectivism.
Conclusions to this chapter are postponed for the following reason. Though the
psychological level of Hobbes’s theory of human nature is fascinating, the distinctive
feature is the role that language plays in this theory. Aspects of this role will be discussed
in detail in the chapter to come, but as an introductory remark it is worth remembering
the third role imagination plays in Hobbes’s theory of human nature is that it explicates
the workings of the mind. In Hobbes’s text, this role is referred as the capacity of
understanding peculiar to human beings. Here, if anywhere, the difference between
brutes and humans becomes clear: we do have the capacity for introspection, but only
because we have language.
409 De Cive ‘Præfatio ad lectores’, 81. The original Latin expression is ‘disciplinâ atque damnorum
experientiâ’. In On the Citizen (‘Preface to the Readers, 11) this is translated ‘discipline and experience
of harm’, whereas the 1650 translation by poet Charles Cotton (1630-1687) speaks of ‘good education
and experience’ (EW, II, ‘Preface to the Readers’, xvii. On translation, see Malcolm, 2002, Chapter 8).
The former is more exact, but the 17th-century translation is not totally wrong, especially if we see it in
the light of Hobbes’s own life. His early education under the tutelage of Robert Latimer had a strong
impact on young Hobbes. Secondly, a matter that scholarship seems to forget is that Hobbes himself was
a tutor. This can be seen as support for his trust in the power of education. For a short but concise view
on the role of education in the early modern England, see Malcolm 2002, 1.
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IV UNDERSTANDING AND TWO THEORIES OF
LANGUAGE
The natural analysis of the mind is insufficient when trying to understand Hobbes’s view
of the mind. A complementary discussion on the role of language is necessary for
without language the coherence of our thinking stays at a modest level. In Critique du
‘De Mundo’ Hobbes makes the following claim: ‘intellectio ergo non ipsarum rerum, sed
orationis et vocum est, quibus sententiam nostram circa res significamus’.410 On the basis
of this, to perceive is to understand words and their proper definitions and how these link
to those thoughts that we take to correspond with the things in the world. There then
seems to be a link between the world, the mind, and language, but it is indirect. Various
questions and problems related to this link are the topic of the chapter in hand.
 A closer look at the relevant chapters of Part I of Leviathan and corresponding
parts in other works form a network of ideas of Hobbes’s view of verbal discourse, or,
simply put, language.411 Hobbes analyses verbal discourse principally from two points of
view: uses and names. This corresponds roughly with the two conceptions of language
he held.412 One describes our everyday use of language, while the other is an attempt to
give a philosophically plausible account of different elements of language. The latter
clarifies the former. In brief, Hobbes had a coherence-based theory of meaning that deals
with scientific language and a communication-based theory of meaning that deals with
ordinary language.413 He studies not only the static, but also the dynamic dimension of
language.
In my discussion I shall follow the pattern of Hobbes, that is, after introducing
the notion of understanding, I will move on his analysis of the pragmatics of language, or
simply, speech, and only after this to his more theoretical reflections, such as his theory
of names and propositions. Last, I will ponder the much vexed issue of meaning in
Hobbes’s philosophy of language.
410 Critique du ‘De Mundo’, 126.
411 I follow here Chapter IV of Leviathan. Parallel discussions can be found in Elements Chapter V and
Concerning Body I.II, but equally important is his Critique du ‘De Mundo’ (see especially IV.2, V.2 and
XXX.16).
412 As Ross (1987) duly notes, confusing the two leads not only to a fantastical, but also to a misleading
interpretation of Hobbes’s conception of language. For this kind of reading, see Hungerland and Vick
(1981).
413 Compare to Ross (1987, especially 46-47). Scientific language is articulated in Concerning Body,
whereas Leviathan gives an account of ordinary language.
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SPEECH
Chapter IV of Leviathan opens with a reference to the invention that had shaken Europe
some 200 years before: ‘The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the
invention of Letters, is no great matter [...] But the most noble and profittable invention
of all other, was that of SPEECH’.414 This statement mirrors Hobbes’s priorities. To him,
language is primarily spoken language, that is, language as it is used.
This is not a new preference, but one usually addressed to Plato’s dialogue
Phaedrus, which among other things discusses the invention of letters and how the
written word affects intellectual capacities.415 In the story told by Socrates writing was
invented by Theuth (that is, Ibis), the Egyptian god who also invented numbers and
calculation.  Theuth  offered  the  secret  art  to  the  King  of  Egypt  who  refused  it  on  the
basis that it will only ‘implant forgetfulness to their [people’s] souls’. The king Thamus
(that is, Ammon) also pointed out that Theuth’s invention was ‘a recipe not for memory,
but for reminder [...] for by telling them of many things without teaching them you will
make them seem to know much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men
filled, not with wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to their
fellows.’ Socrates’s more theoretical point is that the written word is inferior to ‘living
speech’ and ‘the written discourse may fairly be called a kind of image’ of it.
Additionally, written works are not self-explanatory in the same sense as actual dialogue
and therefore they are susceptible to incorrect interpretations.
It is instructive to compare Hobbes’s views of language to the ideas Plato
discusses in Phaedrus.  This  is  not  so  much in  terms  of  the  historical  influence  (though
we may assume that Hobbes was familiar with the text) but thematically. First, Hobbes
was a good conversant and preferred the oral exchange of ideas. Aubrey, for instance,
writes: ‘The Lord Chancellor Bacon loved to converse with him’ and that when Hobbes
spent time in the Cavendish London residence in the 1650s, he had the ‘convenience not
only of books, but of learned conversation’ and when in Derbyshire though there was a
great library, ‘the want of learned conversation was a very great inconvenience’.416
Second, also in his theoretical stance Hobbes’s views are not dissimilar from
Socrates’s idea that a written work is useless in its ability to teach and liable to
misinterpretation. His mockery of the dead language of School-men is an example of
this.
414 Leviathan IV, 12.
415 What follows can be found from Phaedrus 275a-276a.
416 Elements, 234 and 236. Bacon’s fondness for Hobbes as a conversant may be based on Hobbes’s
ability to register the thoughts of the Lord Chancellor.
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Though Hobbes appears to prefer spoken to written language, his theory of
language is more complicated. The first issue that calls for attention is the relationship
between thought and word. This is found in Hobbes’s analysis of understanding.
UNDERSTANDING
By understanding Hobbes primarily means the understanding of words.417 For example,
the words ‘in hoc signo vinces’ raised the idea of victory in Constantine. The definition
of understanding as imagination raised in a living creature by words or other voluntary
signs is complemented by the following specification: ‘[u]nderstanding not onely [of the
speaker’s] will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the
names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech’.418 There is,
then, understanding which is typical of creatures with the capacity of speech, that is, with
the capacity to form complex expressions. In the terminology adopted in the previous
chapter, understanding may also be defined as linguistic conceivability.
In Chapter IV of Leviathan Hobbes redefines the concept of understanding not
only in a way that supports the primacy of language, but also so that we are able to see
how the pre-linguistic and linguistic intertwine in his philosophy:
When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that
Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie; Then he is said to
understand it; Understanding being nothing else, but conception caused by Speech.419
The definition has two aspects, material and semantic. In a certain sense Hobbes thinks
that speech is material, namely that speech is sound waves that cause certain effects on
us.420 The procedure is similar to that of perceiving a piece of wood. As the colour,
shape  and  other  qualities  of  the  piece  of  wood  raise  a  certain  imagination,  the  same
happens when hearing a certain sound. Furthermore, repetition creates the connection
between certain sounds with certain phantasms. For example, saying the word ‘cross’
brings  to  the  mind  the  imagination  of  two  pieces  of  wood  tied  together  with  string  or
some other phantasm of a cross. This is, however, the explanation given to hearing, one
of our natural capacities. Again, naturalistic analysis does not carry us very far, but
equally it is not the materialistic account of speech that is problematic when explaining
417 Again the counter-example by Peleau and Hobbes’s ‘reply’ are illuminating. See (respectively)
Correspondence (Letter 95, 330 and 332, and Letter 202, 767).
418 Leviathan II,  8. This  can  of  course  merely  mean  that,  as  in  the  case  of  the  cause  of  sense,  an
understanding of  voluntary  signs  ‘is  not  very  necessary  to  the  business  now in  hand’  (Leviathan I, 3).
See, however, Ross 1987, 45-6.
419 Leviathan IV, 17. Cf. Elements V.8, 37 and De Homine X.1, 88-89.
420 Elements V.1-2, 34-35.
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how sounds can raise conceptions in us, but two related issues: how do words get their
meanings and in what way is Hobbes’s materialistic account compatible with the other
things he says about language and meaning. The central issue is to explain how
understanding synthesises experience and how it changes it.
It is not the case that understanding links things on the basis of their similarity
and dissimilarity to each other, because this is done by sensation and memory. However,
there is another, more sophisticated form of comparison that is possible through
understanding.421 The difference is in how we comprehend a thing with and without
language. Put simply, the difference is that when we have language we can make
universal claims about things, but when there is no language we can only make more or
less reliable generalisations about things.
The second, and consequent, problem is that when Hobbes says that nothing but
imagination is needed to use universal names, what does he mean by this? The claim
needs to be put into its context. It should be seen as the refutation of intellect or other
similar higher capacity that was common place in the earlier philosophy of mind.
Secondly, the claim about the use of universal names means understanding finds and
conveys from the memory things to which a name refers, for example, all dogs which I
have sensed, but this is not the only thing it does, because if were the case, then the set
of things would be limited, because memories relate to always something in the past.
Therefore understanding also links new occurrences to the appropriate set of past
phantasms, which sets are again infinitely open and in this sense imagination is more
active and diverse than memory. What needs to be explained next is how understanding
links new occurrences. My suggestion is that this is done by a regulated train of thought.
To be more exact, understanding utilises the second type of train of thoughts
Hobbes discusses in Leviathan, namely that in which we imagine ‘any thing whatsoever’,
or as this is also called, ‘curiosity’.422 The idea is that we study the meaning of words in
relation to our experience and if a certain occurrence of word is in accordance with our
experience, we store the word in our vocabulary. Though this rudimentary form of
invention serves as a model of how understanding operates and it is also possible to
apply  it  in  the  case  of  words,  it  does  not  explain  how we learn  language  or  how mere
voices are transformed into meaningful expressions – these will be discussed in detail
later. Nevertheless, it is worth keeping in mind that though a regulated train of thought
plays a role in the acquisition of language, Hobbes is unclear how this exactly happens.
In Elements, he clarifies the matter little:
we cannot from experience conclude, that any thing is to be called just or unjust, true or false,
nor any proposition universal whatsoever, except it be from remembrance of the use of names
imposed arbitrarily. For example: to have heard a sentence given (in the like case the like
421 Hobbes talks about division and addition in Critique du ‘De Mundo’ II.2, 109.
422 Leviathan III, 9.
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sentence a thousand times) is not enough to conclude that the sentence is just (though most men
have no other means to conclude by); but it is necessary, for the drawing of such conclusion, to
trace and find out, by many experiences, what men do mean by calling things just and unjust,
and the like.423
Hobbes is alluding here to the fact that although experience can help us to understand
word, the conclusion is problematic, because he also holds that ‘experience concludeth
nothing universally’ and ‘there is nothing universal but names’.424 One conclusion could
be that he took language as something that by definition transcends experience, but I
shall return to this in the following sections.
THE USES AND ABUSES OF SPEECH
In Leviathan, after sketching the two main phases in the history of language, Hobbes
takes a more analytical point of view and turns to explain the uses of speech. This
classification is important for his philosophy. The general use of speech is to transfer our
mental discourse into verbal discourse. This translation has two advantages.425 The first
is the ability to memorise, and these inner voices Hobbes calls ‘Marks, or Notes of
remembrance’. The second advantage is when we use the same combination of marks to
express to each other different things such as matters of fact, opinions and desires, when
we speak of signs.426
More specifically, speech has four special uses and four corresponding abuses:
the registering of causes and effect, or the acquisition of knowledge (arts), and the
emulation of arts or deceiving oneself; counselling or teaching and using words
equivocally, or misleading others; declaring one’s will to others and declaring something
that  is  not  our  will;  delighting  oneself  and  others  with  the  innocent  use  of  words  and
hurting others with words or insults.
Some of Hobbes’s remarks can be supported. The first use and abuse of speech
belongs, at least partly, to mental discourse, whereas the rest are related to interaction
for they need both a speaker and a listener. Secondly, the discrepancy between mental
and verbal discourse appears to be central, but what is the decisive criterion that makes
speech proper or improper? First of all, the misuse of speech is secondary to its abuse.
423 Elements IV.11, 34. Though the word ‘sentence’ refers to the specific legal meaning of the term, the
principle applies generally (see, editor’s note in Elements, 267).
424 Elements IV.10, 33 and V.6, 36. Cf Leviathan IV, 14 and Concerning Body I.2.9, 20..
425 Elsewhere Hobbes used a different division, though in relation to history. Critique du ‘De Mundo’,
106-107. See also Schuhman (2000, especially page 6.)
426 See also the preliminary definition in Leviathan (II, 22). With respect to a mark and a sign, we may
ask: is the distinction analytical or of some other kind? I tend think that it is analytical. For we do
develop our vocabulary in interaction with the outside world and other people. Nevertheless, at least in
scientific language, marks appear to be prior to signs.
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That a person may use language incorrectly because of incompetence, say, because the
person is not familiar with the finesses of the punctuation of English, should be
distinguished from the political agitation. This implies that to Hobbes speaking is
conscious and voluntary. Consequently, the abuse of speech is deliberate and the matter
can be analysed in relation to truth.
In the first use and abuse of speech, truth appears to be something different from
that found in the rest of the uses. Truth here is based on conceptual analysis, to some
method of imposing names and, further, to creating a language in order to communicate
with oneself. That is to say, the first use of speech is to produce a coherent and
understandable system of concepts for oneself. And the opposite, abuse is to create an
order which for some reason or another is not coherent or understandable even to the
person himself. Here lies a dilemma. It is assumed that the initial creating of a conceptual
system is purely internal and is based on the functioning of the mind as I analysed earlier.
However, the system in which a person describes the functioning of his own mind to
himself,  so  Hobbes  seems  to  think,  cannot  be  based  on  purely  internal  criteria.  To
conclude, the first use and abuse of speech that appears to represent private language
formation is dependent upon (in one way or another) how we understand the other uses
and abuses. The analysis of truth with respect to them is therefore necessary.
The second and the third use imply a certain correspondence between thought
and its expression. The second use and abuse form the basis of the analysis of truth. To
counsel and to teach is to explain things as truthfully and clearly as possible.427 The
equivalent abuse is the opposite, to mislead with words. Eloquence and scholasticism,
with their confusing languages are examples of this. To mislead with words is for Hobbes
(at least in this particular class of language use) reprehensible. But the question remains:
what makes an expression misleading or not?
From the opposite point of view, it may be proposed that an unambiguous
expression is a true expression. Unambiguous expressions can be generated in two
respects: like in the first use of speech, they can be created internally and externally. Here
the hierarchy between mental discourse and verbal discourse becomes evident. The
verbal dominates the mental and here some common vocabulary based on shared
meanings is assumed. Consider the example, two persons disagreeing on something, say,
what  is  the  best  form of  government.  Presume also  that  we  know that  person  A has  a
more elaborate view than person B. To be able to convince B, A has to use notions and
conceptions that B will understand, no matter how subtle A’s own vocabulary is.
427 The  analysis  of  the  second use  and abuse  will  continue  later.  In  Chapter  XXV of Leviathan, titled
‘Of Counsell’, Hobbes says that the difference between a counsel and a command lies in the fact that the
former is always given in order to benefit one who is counselled, whereas the latter is pronounced to
one’s own advantage. The similarity here is that persons who use words equivocally, rhetorically seek
their own advantage. The point is also salient in relation to the fourth abuse and the notion of command
it contains. The solution is that the sovereign always looks for the advantage of whole commonwealth
and, from Hobbes’s point of view, this overrides other factors.
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However, what has been explained here is a truism: if we use words
inconsistently, we do not understand each other or even ourselves. But the point lies
elsewhere. It is not only the case that we must be coherent when using words, but that
even if we think that we are coherent when using words, we do not decide this fully by
ourselves. From this follows a problem: external coherence can clash with internal
coherence. The use and abuse of speech can operate on both levels, individual and
communal, and the latter is more powerful. Therefore, it is not some kind of naturalistic
criteria how the world is or some perennial, eternal truths of reason that direct the
formation of language according to Hobbes, but a linguistic community.
The third use and abuse bears a resemblance to the second, although, the
situation is more complicated. In the second instance use and abuse was relevant to the
relationship between thought and word. In the third instance this correspondence is
secondary, albeit, necessary, and the primary relationship is between word and intention.
Although these two relationships have similarities, for example, the idea of misleading,
the difference lies in interpretation. A person might be convinced that he declared
something to be his will when the other person interpreted the will to be something else,
and, ultimately, the latter decides whether or not the person declared his or her sincere
will. Of course, one person can start to argue whether the interpretation of others is
correct, but here we are already moving toward the case of the second use and abuse.
The difference in the third use and abuse case, then, is the growth of social control.
To conclude, the second use and abuse of language are the essence of Hobbes’s
theory of pragmatics of language, for there two salient points are introduced. The first is
the principle of constancy, which simply says that in order to have communication people
must use words in a coherent and consistent way. The second is the idea that communal
or social coherence is more powerful than individual. An individual does not decide
whether or not he is right, for it is the linguistic community which makes the final
decision. The individual can, however, try to convince others. From this it does not
follow that language is totally socially determined according to Hobbes, but, as becomes
evident, his theory of names offers an instrument for rational and critical reflection.
LANGUAGE
In the above discussion the word ‘language’ has been used in a general sense. The word,
however, has a more specific, technical meaning, which refers to the view that language
is an object of intellectual activity. Though already Plato showed an interest in this (see
especially Cratylus), the scientific study of language and especially of old texts started to
flourish in Renaissance thought when the philological and historical study of language
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became central.428 Hobbes’s practice, above all his Biblical criticism, demonstrates that
he could have been influenced or at least aware of this sort of study of language, but
predominantly his theoretical ambitions here are more that of a philosopher and are based
at least equally on the Medieval logical study of language as on a Renaissance way of
studying language.
Another commonplace in the topic Hobbes and language has been that scholars
have concentrated on the theoretical questions in his account of language. Hobbes has
also been used to support fashions of modern-day philosophy of language. In the 1950s,
his theory of language was considered to be an attempt to provide a physiology of
speech, and it was claimed that ‘Hobbes anticipated modern techniques of logical
analysis by supplementing the demand for clarity and concreteness of speech by a theory
of absurdity’.429 The 1960s introduced Hobbes as the inventor of performatives, a trend
that found its climax in the introductory essay to the new translation of the Part I of De
Corpore, where Hobbes is put into a dialogue with such modern philosophers of
language as Grice and Carnap. The exact nature of these interpretations is the matter of
the coming pages, but here a general remark will suffice. As fashionable interpretations
show,  Hobbes’s  account  of  language  is  indeed  versatile,  but  then  again  in  the  midst  of
theoretical subtlety a simple thing tends to be forgotten. Namely that the practical and
theoretical sides of language are in a certain specific relationship in Hobbes. His view is
summarised in the following passage, where speech is understood as:
Names or Appellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them
when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation;
without which there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor
Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves.430
The relationship is then simple: we need a scientific, philosophical analysis of our
language to maintain both, political and intellectual order. Theoretical reflections on the
nature of language relate more to the latter than to the former.
NAMES
To Hobbes, a name is an elementary unit of speech that signifies our conceptions, not
things of the outside world, and is mainly used to express these conceptions to others,
428 This is of course a generalisation for Renaissance scholars had their models, for example, the Greek
and Latin commentators. On Renaissance linguistic scholars and their predecessors see Gilbert (1960)
and the standard work by Reynolds and Wilson (1991).
429 Peters (1967, 128, for the physiology claim see page 112).
430 Leviathan IV,  12.  The  primacy  of  the  spoken  word  or  of  speech  is  also  evident  later  in  the  same
chapter (page 16) where Hobbes considers the Greek term logos. What I discuss from hereon is based on
Chapter IV of Leviathan, but only exact quotations will be indicated.
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when it is called sign. Secondly, as already mentioned, when used in our inner discourse
as a mnemonic device, names are called marks.431
Names can be of various kinds and Hobbes goes through a long list of them,
which though they not be repeated here.432 The central idea, among the ‘[t]he writers of
logic’,433 is that we categorise or predicate things under different labels starting from the
most common kinds of names, like body, and proceeding to individuals, like Socrates.
Any system of names is, Hobbes claims, a heuristic list. The reason why Peter belongs to
the genus of body is that bodies are divided, first, into animated and unanimated bodies,
then, living and not living, and, thirdly, into man and not-man, and, finally, into Peter and
not Peter.434 But to claim ‘that as names, so the diversities of things themselves may be
searched out and determined by such distinctions’ is not correct.435 Hobbes agrees with
Aristotle that to take nomenclatures as such to reflect an absolute order of reality is not
convincing.436 What Hobbes has in mind is that the same word can have different
meanings in different contexts. For example, if person A takes light to be the movement
of a particle and puts it under the category of body, and the person B considers it to be a
wave and puts it under some other category, we cannot on this basis say, which of these
is the correct one.437 The decision which of the competing conceptual systems is the
correct one is ‘to be done only by arguments and ratiocination, and not by disposing of
words into classes’, for, Hobbes adds, he has ‘not yet seen any great use of the
predicaments in philosophy.’438
Hobbes’s theory of names is systematic and follows conventions of later
scholastic philosophy of language. Names can be proper and singular, like ‘Peter’, or
common, universal, like ‘man’. Proper names are as single imaginations, intuitively clear
and unproblematic, but universal names need further characterisation. A universal name
refers to a set of particular things and ‘is imposed on many things’ because of ‘their
431 Concerning Body I.2.1-4. Cf. Leviathan IV,  13.  The  point  on  the  arbitrary  nature  of  marks  is
repeated in Concerning Body I.2.5.
432 These include positive and negative (7), contradictory (8), common (9), names of the first and second
intention (10), universal, particular, individual, and indifferent (11), equivocal and unequivocal (12),
absolute and relative (13), and simple and compound (14) names. Numbers in the brackets refer to the
articles in Concerning Body I.2.
433 Concerning Body I.2.15,  25.  The  idea  comes  from  Aristotle  and  his Categoriae. This practice is
sometimes referred to as the Porphyrian tree. See, for example, Stump (2003, 224-5).
434 Concerning Body I.2.15, 25.
435 Concerning Body I.2.16, 27.
436 Concerning Body I.2.16, 28
437 Cf. Concerning Body I.2.16, 28 (‘Fourthly, I would not have […]’).
438 Concerning Body I.2.16, 28.
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similitude in some quality’.439 Whereas a proper name brings to mind only one thing, a
universal  name  brings  up  any  number  of  things  that  fall  under  it.  It  is  also  so  that
universal names vary in degree. That is to say, some names are more universal than
others. Hobbes’s examples are the term ‘body’ whose extension is wider than the term
‘man’, and ‘man’ and ‘rational’ which have equal extension, but different intension.
The set of scientifically appropriate names is determined by something I call the
restriction principle. The principle says that ‘[w]hatsoever we imagine is Finite’ therefore
‘[w]hen we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to conceive
the ends, and bounds of the thing named’.440 The things that can serve as names must
then be accountable, that is, finite. These positive names can be accountable in four
respects. In respect to matter or body, for example ‘living’ and ‘hot’ and they refer to
what there is, to reality. The next type of names is abstract names and they are abstract
because they are ‘severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter’.441
Abstract names are qualities or accidents, such as ‘being living’. According to Hobbes, it
is possible to construct a name that stands for an accident, for example, from ‘being
living’ we can interfere the name ‘life’. Accident or property have one special use, with
the help of them we are able to distinguish one body from another.
The final two classes of positive names have different characteristics. The third
class deals with ‘the Properties of our own body’442 and these are called fancies (that is,
conceptions). The last class contains names of names and names of speech. These include
such names as ‘general’, ‘universal’, ‘interrogation’, ‘syllogism’, and ‘sermon’.
The essential feature of positive names seems to be that they have some relation
to reality. However, this idea is misleading for Hobbes was a nominalist and to him
names do not signify things, but conceptions of the mind. Therefore reality understood as
the world outside a sentient has little to do with our view of reality. The ‘real’ should be
understood here somewhat loosely. Hobbes merely refers to the idea that it is supposed
439 Leviathan IV, 13. It is likely that Hobbes’s ideas here borrow from some classical sources like Euclid
and Aristotle and their ideas of common notions. For an interesting reflection on the former, see
Serjeantson (2001).
440 Leviathan III, 11. See also what Hobbes says of infinite and finite things in Critique du ‘De Mundo’
II.2-8, which contains clear-cut definitions of both. It is also relevant to note that though we think
something is infinite, this does not necessarily correspond with how things are in the world. Thirdly, the
question of infinity or eternity cannot be resolved by referring to God’s will. Infinity does not mean that
the world does not have boundaries, but that the boundaries of the world are infinitely remote from us.
Chapter XXVII, article 1 is also useful. Here Hobbes suggests that there is another conception of the
infinite, namely the potentially infinite, which means that we can imagine a space that is infinite;
however, to claim that this is real is similar to an astronomer’s invention of a sphere which again is
similar to a poet’s invention of what came before the world and, article 6 in the same chapter, where
Hobbes refers to the association between infinity and eternity and religion. He concludes that things
would be much easier if it could be agreed that infinity is uncountable.
441 Leviathan IV, 16.
442 Leviathan IV, 16.
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that  a  kind  of  thing  that  the  name  signifies  stands  for  something,  namely  to  fancies  or
conceptions caused by external bodies.
Negative names also signify something, namely absence. The fundamental
negative name is no thing, but also such a name as infinite is negative. Negative names
cannot serve as the basis of reckoning (that is, as axioms), but they have a special
function  in  the  process  of  definition  for  they  correct  it.  But  they  are  not,  properly
speaking, names for they do not stand for something.
Besides positive and negative names, there are two classes of names: insignificant
and inconstant names. The first class divides into two subclasses. The first subclass of
insignificant names is typical to ‘Schoolemen, and pusled Philosophers’, and names like
‘hypostatical’ or ‘eternal now’ belong to this category.443 The  second  type  of
insignificant names are a combination of names in which the combining makes a name
contradictory or inconsistent. Examples of such names are ‘incorporeal body’ or ‘living
dead’.
Inconstant names cannot be the basis for reasoning because they differ from
person  to  person,  time  to  time,  and  place  to  place;  in  short,  they  are  context-sensitive
expressions. For example, I may call my friend today wise and clever, but tomorrow
cruel and stupid, depending on my humour or on his behaviour. Inconstant names are too
closely determined by particular affections and prejudices that they could be used in the
reckoning and definition process. Metaphors and tropes are also excluded.
When  the  division  of  names  is  given  it  could  be  easy  to  conclude  that  here  we
encounter the limitations of scientific language. If a name does not qualify, it is not to be
included in our syllogisms. Although, as has been pointed out, Hobbes explicitly rejects
this solution, obscurities still remain. The restriction principle tries to explicate Hobbes’s
idea of meaning, but only on a general level. Equally tentative was my idea that the
linguistic community has a role in the formation of meanings. Both views, it turns out,
have some truth in them.
MEANING
Beside the use of speech and names Hobbes also touches upon a few other elements of
language. One is the mechanism of language by which many names are brought under
one word (stipulation). As an example of this determining of meanings he mentions that
all  the  words  ‘Hee that in his actions observeth the Lawes of his Country’  are  the
443 Leviathan IV, 17 and V, 21. See also Chapter VIII (39-40), where insignificant speech is taken to be
a sort of madness. Immediately after this Hobbes discusses‘questions of abtruse Philosophy’ and
Suarez’s De Concursu Motione et Auxilio Dei. Note that throughout the work examples of these empty
names are given. The examples here are random choice. For a more detailed account how insignificant
names are built, see Hobbes’s list of causes of absurdities in Leviathan V, 20-21.
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equivalent  of  one  word,  ‘Just’.444 Another element is a distinction between reckoning
with  numbers  and  words.  The  latter  is  not  so  evident  as  the  former  and  more
importantly: ‘without words, there is no possibility of reckoning Numbers’ or any
subsequent reckoning.445 The point is consolidated later when Hobbes says that
reasoning without speech is not possible, but speech without reason is.
Theoretical problems in Hobbes’s notion of language consider the relationship
between a name and a thing and the relationship between mental and verbal discourse.446
Mental and verbal discourses appear to be one and the same thing, which just serve
different functions.447 On the other hand, a practical problem here is how to distinguish
between hallucinatory and clear discourse.
Hobbes seems to believe that names come out of nothing. Though he repeats the
story of the Biblical origins of language, he adds that this perfect language was lost and,
after all, we can’t ‘find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by
consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers,
Measures […and] much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall […]
and least of all [such words as] Entity, Intentionality, Quiditty, and other insignificant
words of the School’.448 Therefore,  the  better  answer  would  be  that  names  come from
the community.449 This is not a fully correct view and in order to show why this is so,
some rival arguments of Hobbes’s theory of meaning need to be reconsidered.
Hobbes’s notion of language has, because of the implicit idea of convention, a
collective element. Names are conventions and Hobbes’s theory of meaning is based on
the idea that it does not matter what combination of signs we attach to things as long as
everyone knows what properties and consequences a name has.450 An example is the
notion of God. According to Hobbes ‘God’ is a name that refers to the first and eternal
444 Leviathan IV, 14. Losonsky (2001, 50-51) offers a short but insightful discussion of these ‘silent
geometricians’.
445 Leviathan IV, 14.
446 Herbert (1989, 74-83). See also Funkentein (1986, 52ff), who refers to the distinction between
meaning and signification. The Aristotelian doctrine says that words refer to or name objects, but
acquire their meaning through the mediation of concepts (see De Interpretatione 163a3-9 and ST
I.q.13.a.1). Additionally, a concept represents an object which it is the concept of by virtue of its
resemblance (similitudo) to the object.
447 For the idea that language is an external manifestation of memory, see Concerning Body I.II.1, 13-
14.
448 Leviathan IV, 12.
449 The direct evidence here is scarce. For some evidence, however, see Elements XII.8, 76.
450 Leviathan XXXI, 192. Cf. Leviathan V, 18-19. Compare this to what Martinich (1999, 113) writes:
‘Declaratives are true in virtue of the institutional facts they create, not natural ones’.
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cause of all beings. It is not important whether or not this kind of thing exists, what is
essential is that people use the name ‘God’ in the mentioned sense.451
There are three ways in which Hobbes’s theory of meaning and more broadly his
account of language have been interpreted: causally, conventionally, and through the idea
of communication.452 The causal theory says that the meanings of the words ‘are caused
by external things through the intermediary of phantasms, the word being [thus] a sign of
private phantasm’.453 The more popular view is the conventionalist, or, as Watkins once
put it, ‘Humpty-Dumpty’454 theory of meaning, which sees language as a system or a set
of agreements. The third interpretation emphasises the idea that language is primarily a
social phenomenon. The last two interpretations overlap, but differ so that the second
concentrates on some theoretical aspects of language, whereas the third emphasises
pragmatic aspects of language.
For the reasons explicated below, none of the candidates is a sufficient or even a
correct way to describe Hobbes’s ideas of language and meaning. The paradox of
Hobbes’s position is the following: to Hobbes language is at the same time the most
natural and the most artificial entity. Consequently, what Hobbes says about the use of
speech is an explanation, or perhaps an explication, of how we use language, but the
language of explanation is not the same language that is explained.455 From the point of
view of everyday use, language is natural, not in the same sense as the natural bodies are
natural, but in the sense that we are familiar with most of the words we use. But there
again, to the normal speaker of a language words appear to have a life of their own in the
same way as external objects appear independent of our perception of them. The
artificiality of language unveils itself only through philosophical reflection, which shows
that words do not have a transcendental or non-natural basis but are man-made.
Hobbes’s early view, the article on understanding in Elements, is a good basis for
further clarification:
451Hobbes suggests that our words that try to describe God, for example ‘infinitely good’ or ‘almighty’,
are attempts to honour Him. See Leviathan III, 11. The irony is that Hobbes’s notion of God was not the
one that was shared by his linguistic community.
452 For different views, see Krook 1956, 3-22; McNeilly 1968, 36-37 and 55; Watkins 1989, 104-109;
Hungerland and Vick 1981. For a discussion, see Herbert 1989, 74-75. For an early, sober articulation
see Robertson 1993, 83. The conventionalist view has the best textual evidence. See Elements V.7, 37;
Leviathan IV, 12; Concerning Body I.II.4, 16; and De Homine X.1-3, 88-92. In the last text Hobbes
articulates the idea of convention perhaps most starkly when he claims that understanding is not
possible without the arbitration of men. In my opinion this should, however, be read in the light of what
Hobbes says about right reason in Leviathan (V, 18): ‘Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right
Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reason, not the Reason
of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up,
because a great many men have unanimously approved it’.
453 Peters 1967, 126.
454 Watkins 1989, 104.
455 This is an alternative formulation of Ross’s (1987) idea that Hobbes had two theories of meaning.
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It is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of
language, to deliver himself from equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is
said: and this is it we call UNDERSTANDING.456
The key word in the passage is ‘true’, which needs to be analysed in the two contexts.457
The first is the ordinary use of language. The criterion of meaning in everyday language
is fluency, that is to say, words that are understood in a normal communication situation
are taken to be true. We usually understand what other people say to us and are able to
use names. Here ‘true’ is the equivalent of ‘valid’ or ‘correct’ in the sense that the word,
say, ‘justice’, is used in one of its common meanings in the language spoken.
From the point of view of the philosophical analysis of language this can be
explained through the idea of convention. The English can for example agree that the
word ‘justice’ means the same thing as ‘to allocate each his own’ and the Finns that
‘oikeudenmukaisuus’ equates to ‘jokaiselle se, mikä hänelle kuuluu’. Furthermore, they
can both agree that these definitions are in line with the classical definition, which says
that ‘Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens'.458
Communication, then, is possible because of (shared) convention. If this were all Hobbes
says about language, his theory of meaning would be conventional and arbitrary, but
there are further aspects that question this conclusion.
A convention theory of meaning may lead to meaning-anarchism. This is, first of
all, to mix two things, the arbitrary and the conventional. An arbitrary imposing of names
is not the same thing as the idea that meanings are a result of convention. Secondly, as I
have argued, Hobbes says that people learn language from other people.459 Nevertheless,
there is a problem with the conventionality thesis. It can lead to a language that does not
describe the world as it is, as is the case with ‘Schoolemen, and pusled Philosophers’. It
is true that the combination of signs is arbitrary, but from this it does not follow that the
meaning is arbitrary.460 To express Pythagoras’s theorem with the equation c2=a2+b2 is a
matter of convention, even arbitrariness, but it does not change the fact that ‘in a right-
angled triangle the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the
other two sides’ which is independent of conventions.
At the other end, causality is equally misleading and it is important to notice that,
though the acquisition of language has a point of contact with Hobbes’s materialism,
significant differences exist. On the one hand, Hobbes’s materialistic psychology
456 Elements V.8, 37.
457 See also Ross 1987, 51-52.
458 See Justianus Institutes I.I, 2. Cf. Plato Republic 331e; and Romans 13:7.
459 This is based on the claim that the second use of speech (communication, teaching) is after all the
most important to Hobbes, which again is based on Hobbes’s rejection of the Adamite origins of
language. See Leviathan IV, 12 and De Homine X.2.
460 Hobbes’s note on different languages in Leviathan (IV, 17) may be helpful here.
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guarantees that the same stimulus produces the same response.461 Therefore his theory of
meaning has a causal element in the qualified sense that sounds are caused by matter in
motion  and  that  they  activate  certain  conceptions  in  our  minds,  but  then  again  the
problem is that sometimes sound raises one, sometimes another conception, depending
on ‘contexture and other circumstances’. Punning, Hobbes’s fourth use of speech, is a
good example of this.
The problem can be rephrased in terms of how we learn language. Hobbes has
been criticised for how little he says of the learning of language.462 Again the criticism is
not so well founded. Hobbes says few explicit things about the learning of language,
except in relation to the language that God gave to Adam.463 The extent of the
applicability of this ‘language gotten’ is a matter for further study and in what follows I
shall concentrate on what Hobbes says about the language of Babel, which takes us back
to the question of the nature of understanding.
The difference between ‘understandings’ and other conceptions of the mind is that
there is always an explanation linked to a certain sound or, what is more, to
combinations of signs. This, if we read Hobbes carefully, requires that there is someone
who explains, or as he says, teaches us,464 what  words  mean.  The  argument  is  open-
ended, for the person who is teaching the meaning of something has acquired in one way
or another this meaning, when there is again the possibility that someone else has taught
this  to  the  person  and  so  forth.  There  are  two  ways  to  treat  this  problem.  The  first  is
simply  to  assume  that  Hobbes  thought  that  we  learn  language  by  growing  up  in  a
community.465 The second way is to look at Hobbes’s scientific reflection on language,
that is, his theory of definition and his theory of proposition.466
As Jesseph has pointed out, according to Hobbes there are better and worse
definitions.467 For example, to define a human being as featherless and two-legged is not
as a good definition as the one which says that humans are rational, living beings. This is
a better definition not because it catches the essence of humanity, or because the majority
of people equate these two, or because we have agreed that this is so, or because this
combination of sounds has been causally pressed into our cortex, but because it gives the
461 See especially Elements IV.2, 31. Cf. Robertson 1993, 94. What is easy to ignore is that a perception
of something is hardly ever the same.
462 See Hungerland and Vick (1981, 92) and Robertson (1993, 131).
463 Leviathan IV, 12 and Concerning Body I.2.4, 16, which are, I believe, instructive to read in relation
to what Hobbes says on the same matter in De Homine X.2, 89-90.
464 This is the second use of speech. See Leviathan IV, 13. The account of how the right to teach and
preach is acquired may also be useful. See Leviathan XLII, 296.
465 See, however, Ross 1987, 45.
466 Bunce (2003, 88) gives reasons why the two may coincide.
467 Jesseph (1999, 141-142). For the original claim see Concerning Body I.I.3, 4-5.
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relevant qualities by which we are able to distinguish humans from other beings.468 This,
again, is possible because we have reason. Understanding of this line of thought requires
the understanding of Hobbes’s theory of proposition.
As for many others, to Hobbes a proposition consists of a subject, a predicate and
a copula, and ‘ [a] true proposition is that, whose predicate contains, or comprehends its
subject, or whose predicate is the name of every thing, of which the subject is the
name’.469 The definition includes two criteria. The first says that the predicate of a
proposition must one way or another explain or at least shed light on the subject of the
proposition, whereas the second is well caught in Leviathan,  where Hobbes writes that
‘[o]ne Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or
other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely;
Universals recall any one of those many’.470 This summarises well the third form of
coherence that can be found in Hobbes. Names are the things that bring the proper glue
to our thinking. The case of universal names is illuminating. A universal name refers to
that set of conceptions, caused by sensations of external bodies, that a person presently
holds and to which the person refers by using a certain combination of symbols.
Taken simply, the formation of propositions is a mere combining of names and
organising of sense-data into certain classes, but the word ‘is’ (or any other connector)
does not merely connect, but also, if we believe Hobbes,471 makes us think why certain
names are connected.472 Hobbes’s theory of propositions brings to light one more
criterion of meaning: correspondence with the correct understanding of reality, but this
time ‘correct’ means not only that we know what something is, that is, are familiar by
custom with its definition, but also that we know why something is defined as it is.
CONCLUSION: TRANSCENDING THE (NATURAL) MIND
The conclusions of this chapter are not solely related to themes and arguments that have
been introduced in the chapter at hand, but need to be read in relation to the ideas
discussed in the previous chapter on human nature.
In the chapter on human nature, I introduced the idea that there are different layers
in Hobbes’s theory of human nature and that it is important to distinguish between them,
say, to distinguish animal from human psychology. I have suggested that historically
468 Concerning Body I.I.3, 4-5.
469 Concerning Body I.3.7, 35. Cf. Elements V.10, 37-38 and Leviathan IV, 15
470 Leviathan IV, 13.
471 Concerning Body I.3.3, 31. Cf. Robertson 1993, 85-86.
472 There is a supporting argument in Hobbes’s theory of passions. Curiosity is the specific passion
related to man’s epistemic endeavours. This passion Hobbes defines as the ‘desire to know why, and
how’ (Leviathan VI, 26).
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Hobbes was influenced, at least indirectly, by the ongoing debates on the rationality of
animals. Though his analysis of animal psuche is not as subtle as, say, Gassendi’s, he is
clearly not as rigid as Descartes. Instead, the naturalistic tendency in his philosophy calls
for an account of similarities between man and brutes, though there is a special human
psychology as well. The second major point has been that Hobbes’s empiricism is not as
a simple and evident as it is usually considered. It is simply not the case that the mind is a
white paper473 to be filled by experience. Though he maintains a view that the activity of
the mind is based on the use of the five senses, it may well be that what follows from this
is more important.
Hobbes is often at pains to show how the more complex psychological functions
arise from his minimal starting points. The conservative reading proposes that memory
must be accepted as an integral part of his theory of cogitation and that it is the
mnemonic function of the mind that constitutes coherence and solidity of thinking. My
own interpretation seeks to show that the basis of Hobbes’s theory of human nature is
wider in two respects. First, it contains a theory of signs, which explains the gradual
formation of more complex forms of conceivability and that it is through this explanatory
model that we are able to fill the gap that materialistic, mechanistic, and empiristic (in a
word, naturalistic) interpretation leaves. Second, especially his theory of motivation
shows that a straightforward materialistic and mechanistic reading of his theory of human
nature will lead to contradictions and misunderstandings. Human beings are able to
evaluate and control their passions.
Moving on to my concluding remarks on this chapter, language is an integral part
of Hobbes’s psychology, but language does not refer here to the fully developed human
language, say, German, but to propositionality. Though it may be that the natural way
our mind operates does not include even proto-linguistic structures, a philosophical
explanation and introspection do require this. Secondly, Hobbes’s view of human nature
includes the elements of sociability. The first issue has been discussed during the course
of the text, but the last topic needs further attention.
The end of Chapter VI of Leviathan establishes a preliminary account of how
language and sociability are linked. Though the discussion seems to be merely some
further remarks on the language of passions, two things suggest that it is not only this.
Firstly, the distinction between real and apparent good and, moreover, the notion of
felicity, establishes the idea of the rational balance for desires necessary for human
flourishing.474 The notion of apparent good can be equated with the unlimited urge for
the fulfilment of desires and may be contrary to good life. As indicated, the reading of
Hobbes as a value subjectivist relies on reading his value theory on the basis of the
apparent good alone. And also as explained, the alternative way of reading Hobbes’s
473 As a detail it can be mentioned that Hobbes uses the metaphor of white paper in two places:
Elements X.8, 62 and XXVIII.8, 176.
474 Leviathan VI, 29-30.
- 115 -
theory of value is based on the notion of the real good, that is, things we have desires for
after careful deliberation and where not only our momentary urges, but the broader
course of life and other people are take into account. That the real good also includes
our evaluations of what others might think is explained by Hobbes in Chapter X where
he discusses the worth or value of a man.
The value of man, Hobbes writes in apparently cynical vein, is his price.475 He goes
on to explain that our qualities as such are not always worth something. For example, to
be an able commander during the time of war makes one valuable, but, equally during the
time of peace, these skills are not needed. We are, moreover, subject to estimations of
others;‘let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves at the highest Value they can; yet
their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.’476 Earlier, in Chapter VI,
Hobbes has discusses the same matter in different terms:
The forme of Speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of any thing, is
PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and greatnesse of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. And
that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of mans Felicity, is by the Greeks called
?????????? [makarismos], for which wee have no name in our tongue.477
In brief, the language of passions also includes the mechanism by which we influence and
are influenced by each other. Second, the language of passions is inconstant and this
causes conflicts as well as concordance. Though Hobbes is normally introduced as a
conflict theorist, this is not a fully convincing view.478 The salient point is the idea of
social comparison that is embedded in Hobbes’s theory of human nature and which is
demonstrated at its best in his theory of passions and the analysis of power. Two notes
(of  which  one  was  promised  earlier)  may  help  to  see  how  the  idea  is  manifested  in
Hobbes’s philosophy.
In the light of the above analysis, freedom is also shown in a different light in
Hobbes.  It  is  not  to  Hobbes  a  boundless  fulfilment  of  vain  desires,  nor  a  rigorous
following of the eternal rules of reason. Neither is it negative or positive. Instead it is
partly both. A stable mental life requires the feeling of fulfilment and gratification which
is not possible if there is a never-ending circle of slavish demands or the continuous self-
control of reason. Additionally, life is neither predictable nor uniform. Our likings and
dislikings do vary and we are able to learn new things and alter our view of world
accordingly. But above all, we do take into account other people and are willing to
475 Leviathan X, 42.
476 Leviathan X, 42.
477 Leviathan VI, 30. The Greek term Hobbes is referring to here means something between happy and
blessed.
478McNeilly (1968, 205) goes as far as to claim that Hobbes is mainly interested in man as a social
creature. Hoekstra (1998) provides a sober analysis of sociability in the thought of Hobbes.
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compromise our so-called natural freedom in order to have a more secure and
commodious life with them. This is the proper signification of Hobbes’s idea of freedom
as well as a correct reading of his subjectivism.
Moving to the second concluding note, there is a clear naturalist tendency in
Hobbes’s philosophical psychology, but this tendency should not be understood in a
narrow way, that is, by only referring to the materialistic basis of the mind’s various
activities. Though this is one of Hobbes’s primary aims and is especially clear with
respect to the theories that present the minds’ activity as immaterial, the other aspect of
his naturalism is at least as important as the material aspect. Hobbes, I believe, did not
only seek to demystify human nature in the described sense, but also appreciated the
social dimension of our development.
The further connotation of natural is present in Hobbes’s two different pictures of
man (as natural man and as citizen). ‘Natural man’ refers to an agent who exists in the
state of nature with all his alleged strive for power, insatiable needs, his unlimited right to
everything, and the permanent fear of violent, sudden death. The second view, the citizen
or subject, is more complicated for it is built on the idea of natural man, and therefore
bears a likeness to this pre-political self. The notion of natural man has been seen as
primary in Hobbes’s theory of human nature. It is central to Hobbes for many reasons,
but above all to show that there are some internal structures in human psyche which may
need external co-ordination, and if we are interested in a more comprehensive view of his
idea of human nature, the social and political dimensions of humanity are equally
important.
Hobbes’s theory of human nature, at least in Leviathan, stretches the conventional
limits of the discipline in a number of ways. The major one I have put forward here is the
social dimension of human nature. However, as I have explained, his philosophical
psychology is not only an analysis of the mind, but also a portrait of a fanatic.
Nevertheless, a number of questions can still be asked. Why is Zedekiah a false prophet
and Moses and other righteousness men in the Old Testament are not? Why should we
abandon the philosophy of Aristotle and especially its later medieval forms? A simplified
answer is because they pose a major political threat, that can be summarised as the
doctrine of private judgement. Vain philosophers, false prophets, even false Christs are
considered ‘Pernicuous to the Publique State’ and they create ‘Factions for Government
of Religion, as of Papists, Protestans, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and Plebeinas of old
time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and Demoraticalls of old time in Greece [which] are
unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword
out of the hand of the Soveraign’.479 Compared  to  them  a  person  who  claims  to  be  a
479 Leviathan XLVI, 376 and XXII, 122. On the doctrine of private judgement, see Leviathan XXIX,
169-169 and LXVI, 376; on other political diseases, see Chapter XXIX; on the word of God and
prophets, see Chapter XXXVI. Hobbes discusses false prophets and false Christs, i.e., Anti-Christ, when
investigating Cardinal Bellarmines De Summo Pontifice (see especially Leviathan LXII, 303); on Moses
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poodle with wings is as convincing as the famous fly ‘sitting on the axletree, and saying
to himself, What a dust do I raise!’480
The chapter in hand and the one that preceded ithave tried to establish that
Hobbes’s philosophy transcends the mind in three ways: by stretching the disciplinary
limits of the study of human nature, by giving privilege to language in this analysis, and
by making a man depend not only on his material, but also his social surrounding. There
is, nevertheless, an important aspect of Hobbes’s naturalism: scientific thinking is based
on the natural operations of mind. The analysis of this provides the opening section of
the following chapter.
and other legitimate prophets, that is, sovereigns, see Leviathan XXXVI, 231-232 and ‘A Review and
Conclusion’, 393-394; and on vain philosophy, see Leviathan Chapter XLVI. Zedekiah appears in I
Kings 22.24 (Hobbes’s remark, see Leviathan XXXIV, 209). In the Scripture the issue is touched upon
in Deuteronomy 13:2-4; Matthew 24:24; 2 Thessalonians 2:9-1; and Revelation 13:13-14.
480 Elements IX.1, 51.
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V CAUSES AND KNOWLEDGE
To Hobbes all thinking is the succession of phantasms (‘mental discourse’, ‘trayne of
imaginations’) and his ideas of rationality, reasoning, and knowledge are based on this
basic view. When unregulated, mental discourse is not of much use,481 but the opposite,
a kind of lunacy. The rational thinking however is in one way or another ordered. In
Leviathan, Hobbes describes the coherent succession of thoughts in the following
manner:
The Trayne of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect imagined, wee seek the
causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when
imagining any thing whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that
is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time
seen any signe, but in man onely;482
In this chapter I will analyse the described kinds of succession of thoughts. The guiding
thread  of  the  chapter  is  to  show  how  Hobbes’s  theory  of  knowledge  and  his  idea  of
reason is built up from simple constituents. Along with this general scheme, Hobbes’s
architectonics of epistemic forms is also introduced. Here the aim is to emphasise that
though prima facie a  strict  rationalist  and  an  enemy  of  nonsense,  Hobbes  still  had  an
interest in other forms of thinking. However Hobbes’s concern with such things as belief,
faith, and opinion has a strict agenda: to demarcate the philosophical thinking from the
non-philosophical thinking.
In the first part of this chapter the pre- and semi-scientific forms of thinking will be
analysed, and then the examination is gradually enlarged towards the more developed
forms. This transition could be characterised as one from opinion to reason.483 The
broader  argument  here  is  that  Hobbes’s  notion  of  reason  is  partly   based  on  his
conception of imagination.
There is a general question that needs to be discussed before entering into a
detailed study. Is thinking without language possible? In a letter to Hobbes, composed
already in 1637, Kenelm Digby (1603–1665) seems to propose that Hobbes did not
consider thinking possible without language. Digby writes:
481 See Hobbes’s letter to young Cavendish, where he explains that vanity is action without design
(Correspondence Letter 27)
482 Leviathan III, 9.In Elements (IV.3, 31) the nearest equivalent is ‘ranging’.
483 Vaughan (2002, ‘Introduction’) considers this transition as central when trying to understand
Hobbes’s conception of political education.
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In  your  Logike,  before  you  can  manage  men’s  conceptions,  you  must  shew  a  way  how  to
apprehend them rightly: and herein j would gladly know whither you work vpon the generall
notions and apprehensions that all men (the vulgar as well as learned) frame of all things that
occurre unto them; or whither you make your ground to be definitions collected out of a deep
insight into the things themselues. Methought you bent this way when we talked hereof; & still j
am of opinion it is too learned a one for that which ought to be the instrument of other
sciences.484
Digby’s short comment is relevant in a number of ways. On the basis of an earlier
personal conversation, Digby suggests that in his logical work485 Hobbes  adopts  a
specific and technical way of analysing language and, in particular, universal names,
which are the basis of all philosophy and science. He is, however, hesitant on two things:
first, is this really so and, second, is it possible to hold such a view? Digby’s rejection of
the latter as ‘too learned’ is curious. Though the obvious solution, that by ‘too learned’
he means too learned for the vulgar is possible, it is difficult to say whether this is really
the case. The opening of the letter suggests the opposite context, it speaks of the
acquisition of concepts and on what bases this happens, but the excerpt ends with the
reference to the idea of language as the general instrument of other sciences. Digby
would  surely  have  benefited  from  the  two-level  analysis  of  Hobbes’s  conception  of
language introduced in the previous chapter. In the light of this analysis, it can be
answered that it is possible on the basis of everyday language that we do have general
notions, but to have universal, clear, and distinct conceptions that are the basis of
philosophy requires more complicated forms of human thinking. In brief, everyday
language is the raw data of more developed and also correct language.
The primacy of language is not, however, a subterfuge to ignore Hobbes’s
reflections of the less developed functioning of the mind. Pre- and semi-rational forms of
human thinking do not only explain how the more developed forms emerge, but also
enrich Hobbes’s view of human nature.
IRRATIONALITY AND RATIONALITY
There are two dogmas that may hinder an appreciation of the richness of Hobbes’s
account of pre- and semi-rational thinking. The first is a picture of him as a proto-
associationist. His language comes, at times, close to that of associationism, but it should
be kept in mind that Hobbes is here better described as a mechanist and a materialist. The
second is the pictorial account of mental discourse. To consider thoughts as mental
images is to deny not only the variety of sensation and to reduce it to visual sensation,
484 Correspondence Letter 25, 42-43.
485 The work Digby is talking about, probably, refers to an early draft of the first part of De Corpore.
See editor’s note 2 on Correpondence Letter 25, 49.
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but also to impoverish the life of the mind. Aside from these general objections, there are
a number of reasons why these two questions need to be revised here.
Hobbes never used the term association or defined his ideas as associationism, but
many of his ideas seem to be close to what is in general attached to this doctrine. He says
that thoughts relate to each other on the basis of the original sensations and explains the
variety of our thoughts by the variety of experiences from a thought follows sometimes
one, sometimes another idea. The word ‘sense’ brings to mind sometimes the faculty of
perceiving (say, according to Aquinas, ‘sensing is the reception of phantasm’,)
sometimes the idea that there is a connection between things (say, the clause,‘Your
accusation makes sense, thought you should consider if he is that bad.’). There is not,
however, much point in building a strawman called associationism and then concluding
that the described ideas are not found in Hobbes, for the validity of this kind of argument
lies on external criteria, namely a formulation of associationism and the formulation
could easily be stretched so that it also applies to Hobbes. The first proper objection is
then that associationism was a later invention. The second and the salient objection is
that Hobbes’s view of the functioning of the mind, even though it can be sometimes
described in terms of the concept of association, is explained by the notion of appetite.
A chain of quick imaginations can be seen as a chain of associations (again the example
of the Roman penny is enlightening), but what directs the ideas is appetites and aversions
in their various forms486 and these are causal powers.
When it comes to the second question, the idea of a mental image is not so much
pictorial, but arises from a platitude in the tradition of rhetoric, which is more likely the
origin of Hobbes’s conception of a mental image. An example will illustrate the
difference. In rhetoric, the aim of the speaker is to raise an image in the minds of an
audience. For instance, when speaking of how horses run wild, the rhythm of the speech
should imitate the rhythm of a canter or a gallop, depending on kind of run in question.
This conception of a mental image is, firstly, specific by its nature, and secondly, by its
functions. An important aspect of this kind of a conception of a mental image is that it
allows more variety and gives a certain freedom to the audience. The view is not
however individual or subjective, because the idea should not be taken literally, that is,
every hearer forms his own mental image. If this does not take place, the speaker has
failed, because he has not produced speech which is good and strong enough to catch the
essence of a subject, say, the panting of the horses. Additionally, it could be pointed out
that the pictorial (in the sense of referring to a content of mind caused by sight) reading
of mental content makes it hard to appreciate the influence that rhetoric had on Hobbes’s
philosophy. With these remarks it is possible to proceed.
486 See also Thorpe (1940, 90-97).
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If  one is looking for a general  title under which to put the forms of pre- or semi-
scientific thinking in Hobbes, the term is prudence.487 The prudence, or the reflected
experience that is used for a certain purpose, of a man depends on two things: his age
and, in some degree, on the variety of his experiences .488 As a capacity, prudence is
giving a learned guess about the likely state of affairs on the basis of experience (that is,
sensations and memories) and it is not genuine knowledge. An old man that has travelled
and met many people is likely to be more prudent than a young man who has once visited
the neighbouring village. In what follows, the three constituents of prudence (opinion,
belief, and sagacitas) will be discussed.
PRE- AND SEMI-SCIENTIFIC THINKING
An opinion, generally, is a resolute interruption in a chain of thoughts and when having
opinions we try to decide whether a matter has or has not been, or will or will not be. If
the whole chain of thought is unsteady, we talk of doubt. When a decision is taken and
we reach a conclusion upon the matter, we call this a judgement.
The second meaning of opinion is related to science. If science is a coherent system
of knowledge of consequences that also includes the proper first definitions, opinion is a
part of a similar system or discourse but in which the first definitions are not laid down
properly or in which definitions are not connected together correctly. The result is that
the  consequences  of  opinions  (which  are  opinions  in  the  sense  discussed  here)  may  or
may not be correct. In relation to this line of thought the notion of belief is also relevant.
Like opinion, belief is a discourse that begins not with definition but ‘either at some other
contemplation of his own’ or ‘some saying of another’ to which the person can trust and
rely.489 Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between belief and faith. Belief refers to
both: to the person who we believe, and to what this person says. Faith refers only to the
person.
Opinion and belief deal with probability, testimony, and trust, but unlike today
these  three  should  be  seen  not  in  isolation,  but  in  interaction.  In Elements, Hobbes
defines them in the following manner:
And all such propositions as are admitted by trust or error, we are not said to know, but think
them to be true: and the admittance of them is called OPINION.
7. And particularly, when the opinion is admitted out of trust to other men, they are said to
believe it; and their admittance of it is called BELIEF, and sometimes faith.490
487 The notion is discussed in various works of Hobbes. For central articulations on which I base my
discussion, see Leviathan III, 9-12; VII; and VIII, 32-35; and Elements IV.6-11, 32-34.
488 Leviathan VIII, 35-36. Cf. Elements IV.10, 33
489 Leviathan VII, 31.
490 Elements VI.6-7, 42.
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In Leviathan, Hobbes’s tone is clearer and more analytical. He writes:
But if the first ground of such Discourse [of syllogisms], be not Definitions, or if the Definitions
be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion, is again OPINION,
namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senselesse words, without
possibility of being understood.
[...] When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other
contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of
another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubeth
not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing as the Person, and the
Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH; Faith, in the man; Beleefe, both of the man, and of the
truth what he sayes.491
The concepts have three aspects that need to be discussed here. The first is the
epistemological aspect. Obviously, opinion and belief are not knowledge, but then again,
they seem to characterise something that is quite common, namely, that in everyday life
we often lean on poorly argued ideas which in a closer look often turn out to be false.
Instead of discarding this, Hobbes tries to give a philosophical account that explains
what is wrong with common beliefs and everyday justification. Such beliefs may well be
true, but they are not certain, and there is no plausible justification that makes them true.
As such, the notions are part of his critical revision of epistemology. The second aspect
is theological. To articulate belief and especially faith in a mundane and ordinary fashion
is to allude to the fact that certain parts of religious life are political rather than spiritual.
That is, faith in man, not in God. Lastly, a social aspect is present in the discussion: much
of what is taken to be knowledge is based on personal qualities. People adopt ideas, not
so much because of the plausibility of what is said to them, but because the person who
expresses them is reliable. Let us look at all three aspects in turn.
By the notions of opinion and belief, Hobbes seeks to gather together the whole
range of ideas that people can be taken to hold in their everyday life, but which they do
hardly ever justify. This may be because there really is no justification or simply because
people  do  not  care  to  give  one,  but  follow  blindly  what  they  have  been  told.  Most  of
these opinions and beliefs are harmless. It does not pose a great threat to anyone, if a
person believes that waking up at 6 o’clock is necessary for his well-being or if one
believes, on the basis of what one has read, that a certain well-known philosopher has
married.492 Though this kind of “streetwiseness” does not meet the philosophical
standards also Hobbes is setting, it is noteworthy to point out that Hobbes considers this
sort of everyday epistemology. Again the idea is the one articulated in the introduction of
the thesis: many common beliefs are right, but not true in the philosophical sense of the
word, namely, that there is now sound and indisputable explanation of them.
491 Leviathan VII, 31.
492 For the latter, see Correspondence Letters 67 and 68.
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The theological aspect of belief is also a part of Hobbes’s rational project. To
believe something said, Hobbes claims, is the way of divines and not found in other
discourses, where belief is always a belief in a person. Understood like this, belief is the
blind resignation to authority and ‘but Confession and acknowledgment of the
Doctrine’.493 In political terms, if the church is under secular control, then its teachings
are acceptable and should be followed by everyone, at least in their external action.
Belief in what is said is, however, the secondary meaning of the notion when the primary
meaning is the belief in someone.
Belief in someone is present in Hobbes’s conception of history. When we assent or
dissent with history, we agree or disagree with its writer. The same, so Hobbes seems to
suggest,494 applies with Scriptures, it is not the word of God that we doubt, but its
interpretation. This kind of belief in someone is up to an individual and may well change
accordingly. Here Hobbes emphasises integrity and calls this kind of belief faith, which
depends on our judgement of the integrity and competence of that individual not
primarily of the validity of his or her thoughts. It is through this characterisation that the
third, social, aspect of opinion and belief enters into the discussion.
Since our faith in a man depends on his virtue it depends on certain qualities that
are largely determined by valuations of community. In some communities, frankness and
sincerity are appreciated, but in others, wealth and beauty. The central idea of Hobbes’s
account of pre-rational epistemic forms is the following: a significant part of our
everyday knowledge is based on mutual trust. That is to say, our epistemic framework
and sociability are intimately tied together. But then again, though this may have some
point  of  contact  with  the  political  argument  on  covenanting  Hobbes  makes  later  in
Leviathan, and though this kind of ‘inarticulate’(or as it has become fashionable to say,
tacit) knowledge is enough most of the time in everyday life, it is of course insufficient
for philosophical purposes and genuine knowledge, which need to be articulated and
justified. The philosophical analysis of knowledge begins with the conception of
sagacitas.
Thinking is to Hobbes productive and creative. It is productive in the sense that by
the means-end calculation it aims at action, and it is creative by the free-play of ideas,
which is more relevant to his conception of knowledge. This free-play does not have
much to do with, say, the idea of creativity that developed in Romanticism and which has
shaped the modern conception of imagination.495 Instead creativity arises from the basic
mechanisms of the human mind and is first and foremost epistemic in nature:
493 Leviathan VII,  31.  Here  the  word  refers  more  to  ‘dogma’  than  other  meaning of  the  term,  that  is,
‘teaching’.
494 Leviathan VII, 32.
495 See Engell 1981.
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In summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by designe, is nothing but Seeking, or
the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting out of the
causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause.496
Though, as Hobbes’s example confirm,497 sagacitas has more to do with prudence than
genuine philosophy, its theoretical and structural relevance is significant. The point is
that sagacitas is part in a continuum that shows how Hobbes’s theory of the human mind
and his concept of science are related. Sagacitas refers not only to pre-scientific, but also
to semi-scientific thinking; sagacitas formulates Hobbes’s general idea of science as an
inquiry  proceeding  either  from  effects  to  cause  (analysis)  or  from  causes  to  effects
(synthesis), but not because, as it is restricted to sensations, it is unable to produce
genuine scientific knowledge.498
Natural capacities (senses, train of thoughts) and their derivatives such as
sagacitas do not however take us far. We may have what Hobbes calls natural wit,
which is a combination of two things ‘Celerity of Imagining (that is, swift succession
from  one  thought  to  another;)  and steddy direction to some approved end’.499 Natural
wit, in other words, is the observing of similarities (good wit, or fancy) and differences
(judgement) between things and from it arises experience, prudence and craft.500
Naturally acquired knowledge is useful, but not infallible. To this we need to add reason,
the only acquired wit,501 which is based on language.
VARIATIONS OF REASON
Though Hobbes holds that reason is always one and the same and that there is not, for
instance, judical reason,502 the notion itself has various meanings in Hobbes. He speaks
of natural reason, artificial reason (which is reason in the proper sense), and right
496 Leviathan III, 9-10. Cf. Elements IV.4, 32. For a discussion, see James 1997, Chapter 8, especially
189-191. Hobbes’s selection of terms is of some interest. Sagacitas means keenness of senses in general
and in particular keenness of scent, whereas solertia is cleverness, resourcefulness, or skill. It is also
worth remembering that curiosity is an integral part of Hobbes’s account of knowledge. On curiosity, see
Bunce 2003, Chapter 2.
497 Elements IV.3, 30 and Leviathan III,10. See also what Hobbes says about rhyming in The Virtues of
an Heroic Poem, iv-v.
498 Hobbes defines science or philosophy in numerous places in his works. For some articulations, see
Leviathan.V,  21  and Leviathan IV, 16; Concerning Body I.VI.1, 65-6.; I.I.2-3, 3-5 and I.I.8, 10; and
Critique du ‘De Mundo’ XXX.10, 352-353.
499 Leviathan VIII, 32.
500 Leviathan VIII, 34-35. For a discussion, see Hinnant 1976 and Cantalupo 1991, 240 and 219.
501 Leviathan VIII.13, 35.
502 Dialogue, 8-9.
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reason.503 A wide-spread view is that Hobbes’s notion of reasoning is computational.504
This is not fully satisfying label. The reason is that the view does not give full justice to
the role of language in Hobbes’s thinking.
To speak in general and more modern terms, Hobbes’s notion of rationality is
instrumental. However, exactly what is meant by instrumental is a complex issue. On the
one hand it refers to the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Reason is a device, not so
much a faculty, and reasoning, properly speaking, is something that is acquired by
rehearsal and education. As a practical notion, instrumental rationality refers to the view
that  reason  is  unable  to  tell  an  agent  what  ends  he  or  she  should  try  to  aim at,  merely
what means he or she may use to attain these ends. The direct evidence in Hobbes
supports at least the last conception of instrumental rationality; ‘For the Thoughts, are to
the  Desires,  as  Scouts,  and  Spies,  to  range  abroad,  and  find  the  way  to  the  things
Desired’.505
Natural reason seems to play a minor role in Hobbes. It should be understood as a
condition for the further development of reason and reasoning. That is to say, Hobbes
assumes that we have certain natural dispositions that, if practised, will be realised. It is
also safe to say that the pre- and semi-rational forms of thinking discussed represent
natural reason. One example is the reasoning that clouds are a sign of rain. More
precisely, based on previous experience, an agent makes a conjecture that the coming
course of events will follow ones that occurred in the past. Here the agent is said to
reason because he or she makes a deduction from causes to effects. These two concepts,
it will turn out, are central in Hobbes’s analysis of reasoning, if not always in his analysis
of the concept of reason.
According to Hobbes, when we reason, we do
nothing else but conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder,
from Substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of
the consequence from the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of
the whole and one part, to the name of the other part.506
First of all, there is the condition ‘if it done by Words’, which, as Hobbes points out
repeatedly, implies that the proper use of reason requires language. But as also should be
clear, Hobbes does distinguish between reasoning with words and without them. A
503 For some aspects of this distinction, see Nauta 2002, 48-51.
504 This idea has a long history starting at least from Leibniz, who in his Dissertatio de arte
combinatoria praised Hobbes’s idea that ‘every operation of mind is a computation’ (see also Malcolm
2002, 528). The computational model is, however, a little bit misleading, especially if understood as
algebraic calculus. For Hobbes’s suspiciousness of algebra, see Martinich (1999, 283-4) and the passages
there.
505 Leviathan VIII, 35.
506 Leviathan V, 18.
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person can reason without words upon particular things and here if a consequence one
expected on the basis of prudence does not appear, we speak of error. To reason in
general terms and make a mistake here is called ‘an ABSURDITY, or senselesse
Speech’.507 Reasoning is, then, the proper connecting and disconnecting of names.
Further on, by connecting and disconnecting (excluding) one may produce systems of
knowledge. The stages of these systems are name, affirmation, syllogism, demonstration
and sum. From sum one may subtract a proposition and start a new chain of reasoning.
To re-articulate Hobbes’s notion of reason in computational terms, we could say
that reason is nothing but reckoning with words and it is important to recognise all the
stages of reasoning, not only the result. Reason also aims at general conclusions. The
first definitions are included in the chain of deduction for they are ‘the first Items in every
Reckoning (which are the significations of names settled by definitions)’.508
The salient point of Hobbes’s concept of reason is its protean nature. Hobbes gives
certain general qualifications what reason is, but how precisely reason functions in
different disciplines is a further question. His discussion in Dialogue may shed some light
on the issue:
La.  ‘Tis is true, if you mean Recta Ratio, but Recta Ratio,  which I grant to be law, as Sir Edw.
Coke says, I Inst. Sect. 138. Is an Artificial perfection of Reason gotten by long Study,
Observation, and Experience, and not every Mans natural reason; for Nemo nascitur Artifex. This
Legal Reason is summa Ratio; and therefore, if all the Reason that is dispersed in so many several
Heads were united into one, yet could he not make such a Law as the law of England is, because
by many Successions of Ages it hath been fined and refined, by an infinite number of Grave and
Learned men.509
Hobbes, of course, cannot accept this kind of characterisation for a number of reasons.
Firstly, reason is the same for all and has its origin in our natural capacities. Secondly,
reason is not the same thing as prudence (‘observation, and experience’), but requires
study and industry.510 As the philosopher in the Dialogue replies: ‘though it be true, that
no  Man  is  born  with  use  of  Reason,  yet  all  Men  may  grow  up  to  it  as  well  as
Lawyers’.511 Thirdly, the perfection of reason is not a gradual process in the sense
described by the student. It is not accumulation of knowledge. Instead of collecting the
registers  of  facts  and  knowing  what  kind  of  things  there  are  in  the  world,  knowledge
requires us to know why something is what it is.
507 Leviathan V, 19.
508 Leviathan V, 19 (italics mine).
509 Dialogue, 18.
510 Leviathan III, 11 and V, 21.
511 Dialogue, 18.
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It is the artificial nature of reason, which gives Hobbes the possibility of making a
claim that appears contradictory, but is not, namely that reason is based on our natural
capacities, but is itself artificial. If his account is analysed as a leap from sense to
conceptual thinking, the idea is not clear, but when the mediating steps (namely forms of
conceivability, his theory of signs, his idea of regulated train of thoughts, and sagacitas)
are taken into account, the following makes sense:
These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added
together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in
numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficial,) angles,
proportions, times, degrees of swiftnesse, force, power, and the like; The Logicians teach the
same in Consequences of Words; adding together two Names,  to  make an Affirmation; and two
Affirmations to  make  a Syllogisme; and many Syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from
the summe, or Conclusion of a Syllogisme,  they  substract  one Proposition, to finde the other.
Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions, to find men's duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and facts,
to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there
is place for addition and substraction,  there  also  is  place  for Reason; and where these have no
place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.512
In this sense, reason is then nothing but reckoning the consequences of general names,
either to oneself, when we speak of marking, or to others, when we speak of signifying,
but it is obvious that people do not always agree about the consequences. Some reasons
for this were found in the list of uses and abuses of speech; a person may deceive himself
or others or make a mistake in deduction. In order to avoid conflicts, a procedure of
settling is required. This procedure Hobbes calls right reason.
Reason itself is always right reason, but by this is not meant the reason of an
individual or something agreed upon a number of men. Firstly, right reason refers to the
idea that certain truths, such as those of arithmetic, are infallible. The problem is that
even though a person holds right reason, ‘no one mans Reason, nor the Reason any one
number of men, makes the certaintie’.513 Right reason, properly speaking, is ‘the Reason
of some Arbitrator, or Judge’,514 a definition which has a number of dimensions. The first
and the most obvious is related to the neutrality of reason. An outsider (that is, an
objective view) is needed, because when nature does not give an answer, men are too
keen to impose their points of view, which are based on private interests and passions.
The second dimension of right reason is social. Right reason is reasoning, that is,
giving reasons, and in the particular way that this reason giving is received, which does
not here mean the majority rule, but a reason that can be understood by anyone. A
possible interpretation of this is a kind of public use of reason. That is to say, knowledge
512 Leviathan V, 18.
513 Leviathan V, 18.
514 Leviathan V, 19.
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should be contested openly, critically, and publicly. Hobbes’s objections to Boyle and his
experimentalist programme, for instance, point in this direction.515 What Hobbes
continuously objects to is the procedure in which matters of fact are produced in the
community of experimentalists. He even seems to suggest that this is a kind of elitist
model for scientific knowledge.
What is left before moving on to the next subject, is to connect reason to the major
theme of this study, imagination. The second principal role imagination plays in Hobbes’s
thought is to overcome the problem of empirical limitation, that is, how we are able to
have universal scientific knowledge. It does this in the first place by imposing the
described artificial order upon reality with words, but this is actually the starting point
for a more elegant coherence of thinking, which is embedded in the familiar idea of
reason as a calculus, or adding and substracting.
The operations of addition and subtraction are then one more manifestation of
Hobbes’s idea of the coherence of thinking and instead of reading them in computational
terms, they should be understood as something that is in harmony with the basic
operations of the mind, on the one hand, and, the clear and distinct understanding of
words on the other.
CAUSALITY AND FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE
Aside from coherence, rational thinking is constituted by knowing the causes of things.
Hobbes believed that ‘all events and actions have their necessary cause’516 and it  is  the
role of science, the inquiry of causes and effects, to find these out.517
In general terms, cause is to Hobbes those accidents in the agent that produce
certain changes in the patient and its accidents, which are effects, and causation
‘consist[s] in a certain continual progress; so that as there is a continual mutation in the
agent or agents, by the working of other agents upon them, so also the patient, upon
which they work, is continually altered and changed.’518 Causality  in  Hobbes  could  be
understood only as a material cause, but, properly speaking, the material cause is one of
the two major types of cause Hobbes discusses. It is true that he maintains that the
universal cause of all things is matter in motion, but as such the doctrine applies only to
natural bodies. An example of this kind of cause is gravity. The cause of gravity is not
some ‘internal appetite’ in a body, but its attraction to earth, understood so that this
515 This is documented by Shapin and Schaffer (1985). For some critical accounts, see Sorell 2001, 134-
141 and Malcolm 2002, 187-196.
516 Liberty and Chance, ‘To the reader’, vii.
517 For  a  discussion  of  Hobbes’s  theory  of  causality  and its  relation  to  his  idea  of  science,  see  Jesseph
1999, 198-205 and Malcolm 2002, 154-155.
518 Concerning Body II.9.6, 123. See also II.9.3, 121-122. An agent is the active, or productive, a patient
the passive, or receiving component of a causal process. See Concerning Body I.9.1, 120.
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attraction is a result from other bodies.519 With artificial bodies the conception of cause
need to be rephrased.
In politics and in geometry, which deal with artificial bodies, the notion of cause is
constituted by the knowing subject. In this sense we make knowledge. We know what
something is and especially why it is, because we start a causal process. In general,
Hobbes has two conceptions of causality: the effective causality and the causality that
applies to objects of geometry and civil philosophy. The first can already be found in his
early works, but he seems to start developing the latter only in and after writing
Leviathan.520
The other primary meaning of the cause will be referred to as the generated cause.
A generated cause can also have concrete effects, but instead of just causing a course of
events, it causes certain events on the basis of the knowledge created by a knowing
subject.
The distinction between the material and the generated cause is by no means clear
and various aspects of the distinction will be discussed during the course of the text, but
one clarification is needed here.521 Hobbes  says  that  to  know something  is  to  know its
effects from causes or causes from effects. This refers, among other things, to the
distinction between two kinds of bodies and two kinds of philosophical inquiries. On the
one hand, philosophy studies natural bodies and in this sort of inquiry knowledge is
acquired by proceeding from effects to causes, that is, from sensations to generalisations
and  to  the  hypothetical  laws  that  are  supposed  to  regulate  natural  phenomena.  On  the
other hand, philosophy studies artificial bodies like laws and commonwealths, which are
solely man-made entities. This kind of inquiry proceeds, normally, from causes to effects.
According to Hobbes, all the causes are efficient or integral causes. By integral
cause, Hobbes means that a cause always has two components: accidents in the agent
and accidents in the patient. Together these produce certain phenomena.522 By efficient
he means that a cause always has a certain effect. If there is no effect, one of the
components  of  a  cause  is  missing.  When we move  to  the  more  technical  discussion  on
causality, the analysis becomes more complicated.
In Chapters VIII, IX, and X of Concerning Body, Hobbes defines cause and makes
some basic distinctions, for example, between action and passion. The unifying notion of
519 Concerning Body IV.30.2, 509-510.
520 Especially in De Homine,  X  and  later  in  works  like Six Lessons, Decameron Physiologicum, and
Principia et problemata aliquot Geometricae (in OL,  V), though see also Critique du ‘De Mundo’ I.4.
For a general pattern of how Hobbes’s idea of science changed from the science of definitions toward a
more causal idea of science, see Malcolm (2002, 151-154).
521 I follow here mainly what Hobbes says in Concerning Body I.1.9.
522 A brief comparison might help us to understand Hobbes’s line of thoughts. The discussion of the
concepts of the first and the second cause in Liberty and Chance (261) proposes that Hobbes’s model of
causality is a synchronic vector model, where the partial causes form a full cause and Bramhall’s model
is a diachronic point-model based on chains of causes.
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Hobbes’s  conception  of  causality  is  that  of  the  entire  cause,  which  is  a  combination  of
two partial causes: the efficient and the material cause, which he defines (respectively)
as, ‘[t]he aggregate of accidents in the agent or agents, requisite for the production of
the effect’ and ‘the aggregate of accidents in the patient, the effect being produced’.523 In
other words:
a CAUSE simply, or an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how
many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be
present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant; and if any
one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not produced.524
From this definition it follows that all entire causes are always necessary causes. It would
make no sense to think that a cause is entire if both an efficient and a material cause are
not present, that is, if the accidents in an agent and those in a patient are not produced.525
Hobbes then denies the possibility of contingent causes. However, there can be
something that he calls contingent accidents, which are accidents that are not needed in
order to produce an effect,526 but which may change the outcome.
There are a number of distinctions and contexts that need to be explicated when
discussing causality in Hobbes. Hobbes’s theory of cause is of a peculiar nature. It seems
to be a rather straightforward development of a theory of causality as this was articulated
in the physics of the time, namely, on one the hand, in Aristotelian, and, on the other
hand, Galilean physics, though the emphasis is on the latter. However, it is true that
Hobbes drops some parts of Aristotelian theory of four causes, but equally true that his
discussion of causality has links with this theory.
Instead of examining influences, the framework I shall introduce here is Aristotle’s
original theory of four causes (formal, material, efficient, and final), and, in particular,
how he understood the notion of cause.527 There is a common belief that Hobbes denied
final cause, but this is not exactly true. In Decameron Physiologicum, his late dialogue
on natural philosophy, Hobbes explains the relationship between the four Aristotelian
causes:
523 Concerning Body II.9.4, 122.
524 Concerning Body I. 9.3, 121-2. The notions of agents and patient are technical and they can refer to
both inanimate bodies, say, a stone, and animate bodies, like a man. See Concerning Body I.9.1, 120.
525 Concerning Body II.9.5, 122-3. See also Concerning Body II.9.10, 126-7.
526 Concerning Body II.9.10, 126-127. This is not a novel idea. Epicurus, for example, proposed that
atoms may deviate from their regular course.
527 Aristotle discusses the four causes in various places in his works. The familiar example of a statue
appears in Physica 194b17-195b30. See also Analytica Posteriora 94a24-b37. Note, however, that
Hobbes  was  aware  of  some  other  theories.  For  instance  in Liberty and Chance (260) he criticises the
Stoic and Christian notions of necessity.
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B.  Your  desire,  you  say,  is  to  know  the  causes  of  the  effects  or  phenomena  of  nature;  and  you
confess they are fancies, and, consequently, that they are in yourself; so that the causes you seek
for only are without you, and now you would know how those external bodies work upon you to
produce those phenomena. The beginning therefore of your enquiry ought to be at; What it is you
call a cause? I mean an efficient cause: for the philosophers make four kinds of causes, whereof
the efficient is one. Another they call the formal cause, or simply the form or essence of the thing
caused; as when they say, four equal angles and four equal sides are the cause of a square figure;
or that heaviness is the cause that makes heavy bodies to descend; but that is not the cause you
seek for, nor any thing but this: It descends because it descends. The third is the material cause,
as when they say, the walls and roof, &c. of a house are the cause of a house. The fourth is the
final cause, and hath place only in moral philosophy.528
All four Aristotelian causes, then, have their role in Hobbes’s thinking, but we need to be
precise what kind of a cause to apply to what kind of phenomenon. Hobbes uses the
efficient and material causes to explain all kind of phenomena, natural, moral, and civil.
They are part and parcel of his theory of causality. It is equally clear that final and formal
causes do not play a role in the analysis of causality in the natural world. The reason for
the false conclusion that they do not play any role in Hobbes’s philosophy, I believe, is
the following.
Firstly, Hobbes’s general definition of causality as the process of an appropriate
interaction of accidents in the agent and the patient gives an impression that he refers
only to bodies understood as material objects. In fact, this is a justified interpretation
because of Hobbes’s metaphysical position, materialism. The mistake is, however, to
think that though Hobbes takes the world to be nothing but matter in motion it does not
follow from this that we are not able to analyse the world from another point of view.
The physico-metaphysical explanation is not exhaustive. The strictly materialist reading
seems to ignore a distinction that Hobbes makes throughout his works, namely the
distinction between natural and artificial bodies. On the metaphysical level there is
nothing but matter and its motion, but the same does not apply on the epistemological
level. Here we operate with the effects of external bodies in us, or appearances, which
can be, as long as they are acquired directly or indirectly from sense-experience,529
anything from stones to democracies. The agent and the patient are not necessarily
natural bodies, but can also be artificial bodies. It would be as inappropriate to explain
democracy purely in terms of physics as to explain rainbows in terms of theology.530
528 Decameron Physiologicum , 82. Cf. Concerning Body II.10.7, 131-132 and Critique du ‘De Mundo’
XXVII.
529 Leviathan I, 3. Here Hobbes writes: ‘The Originall of them all [that is, thoughts of man], is that
which we call SENSE; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by
parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall.’ (italics mine).
530 See Leviathan XXXVII, 233 (a theological explanation of the rainbow) and Concerning Body
IV.27.14, 463. Hobbes’s reference to Descartes is probably to a discussion in Optics (Descartes 1984, vol
I, 168).
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Secondly, the necessary elements of an entire cause, the efficient and the material
cause, could mean different things when applied to stones, birds, and to men. In the case
of stones, the efficient and the material cause are, so to speak, of the same quality, a
piece of matter that is in motion. In the case of birds, they differ a little because it is
reasonable to think (and we can point to textual evidence from Hobbes531) that animals
have certain rudimentary intentions532, for example,  birds make nests in order to have a
shelter. Nevertheless, in animals the material cause is the principal explanatory cause. In
the case of men, the material cause plays a secondary role. It is true that our body works
under the same laws of physics as all other natural creatures (think, for example, of the
circulation of the blood). This is a material cause but what Hobbes seems to consider
more relevant in the case of human beings is the efficient cause; the cause in an agent,
that is, in a sentient and rational being. The difference between the two can be found
from  Chapter  VI  of Leviathan, which makes the distinction between vital and animal
motion. The efficient cause of our action is the latter. It is significant that we are able to
imagine our action in our minds before committing them. We would be like animals if the
case was closed to the intentionality embedded in the notion of animal motion. Animals
can also have imagination, though not as developed as the human imagination. What,
however, they are not able to have are intentions formed by rational thinking. Only
humans can reflect on their action. This kind of intentionality plays a significant role in
Hobbes’s analysis of causality.
Thirdly, Hobbes’s materialism should not mislead as. It is true that there is no
teleology or finality in nature. The final cause, as Hobbes himself points, is only
applicable in moral philosophy. But again some hasty conclusions have been made.
Hobbes writes that there is no summum bonum, or ultimate end (finis ultimus), but this is
true only when taken to mean what he meant by it, namely the idea of the greatest good
as formulated by some philosophers, such as, Aristotle and Aquinas.533
Hobbes has in fact have two ideas that may well be in accordance with the final
cause. The first is the subjective goal of an individual. We all have our ends and likings in
life. These do not coincide with those of others, but they are the final causes of each
individual.534 This kind of finis ultimus is, however, something that Hobbes rejects. It is
significant in order to understand his argument about absolute sovereignty, but it should
be localised to this argument. Hobbes builds, if not a strawman, a caricature, which he
531 For  example,  see  what  he  says  about  sense  and  prudence  in Leviathan (respectively, VIII, 32 and
LXVI,  367).  For  some examples  of  how brutes  think,  see Leviathan III, 10 and Elements V.1, 3,4-35.
An important discussion on deliberation appears in Liberty and Necessity, 243-244.
532 Intention in the modern-day sense of the term, not in the technical one that Hobbes uses, for
example, in Liberty and Necessity page 273.
533 Leviathan XI, 47.
534 On  the  apparent  good  discussed  above,  see Leviathan VI,  24  and  29.  See  also  what  Hobbes  says
about deliberation and the difference between voluntary and spontaneous action in Liberty and Necessity
(272-273), and his analysis of rash actions, in where Liberty and Chance, 80-81.
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then utilises in the broader argument. Secondly, Hobbes himself denies the relevance of
the subjective ultimate end, seeing it as destructive to the political order, and secondary
in his theory of human nature.
More relevant is the second conception of final cause, which is objective,535 and
appears in Hobbes’s civil philosophy, namely security and commodious living, or, in
short, peace. Furthermore, security overcomes commodious living and it can be
concluded that the summum bonum is  life,  which  to  Hobbes  is  the  ultimate  value.  The
difference between him and his predecessors is that Hobbes is pluralistic in the sense that
he does not give a detailed list of what falls under summum bonum, and, secondly,
though in theory, life is the ultimate value of any rational agent, Hobbes does not deny
the obvious, namely that there are situations where some other thing overcomes value.
Therefore, as many held before Hobbes, security is the objective end of every
commonwealth and in this highly contextualised sense there is a or even the final cause.
In brief, because human beings have different ideas of what is good in life, Hobbes
deliberately leaves open what could be the final cause in moral philosophy, but not the
conception of the final cause per se.
Fourthly, Hobbes appears to have little interest in formal cause,536 though  it  has
been suggested that it also has a role in Hobbes’s civil philosophy.537 This is perhaps best
explained by the distinction that appears already in the subtitle of Leviathan. In civil
philosophy, some natural features of humans like passions are the material cause of a
commonwealth, whereas, the intentions of these same human beings are the formal cause
of a commonwealth. To conclude, all the traditional concepts of cause do play a role in
Hobbes’s theory of causality, but these roles are not clear cut and obvious.
A brief comment on Hobbes’s own vocabulary of causality is needed. He used
three different pairs of terms to describe causality. These are cause and effect, power and
act, and generation and consequence (or at times, property).538 The  first  pair  is  the
principal object of Hobbes’s analysis. Power and cause differ from each other in that
‘cause respects the past, power the future time’.539 In a similar way, effect is used to
describe things which have already happened and act things that will happen. The last
pair of terms Hobbes uses to describe causality is generation and properties.540 This can
be found, for example, from Leviathan:
535 Or the real good discussed earlier.
536 In Concerning Body II.10.7, 131-132, Hobbes says that both the formal and the final cause are
efficient causes and that the use of these terms in Scholastic theory is empty.
537 Malcolm 2002 , 151.
538 The principal sources (respectively) are Concerning Body II.11 and Concerning Body II.10.
539 Concerning Body II.10.1, 128.
540 The latter is sometimes replaced by ‘appearance’, sometimes by ‘consequences’.
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By  PHILOSOPHY, is understood the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of the
Generation of anything, to the Properties; or from the Properties, to some possible Way of
Generation of the same; to the end to bee able to produce, as far as matter and humane force
permit, such Effects as human life requireth.541
This is obviously something that diverges from the more traditional conception of
causality discussed above. The difference is that the terminology of generation is more
active than the traditional vocabulary of cause. With these initial remarks it is possible to
analyse in detail Hobbes’s theory of causality, which falls under two headings: material
and generated cause.
MATERIAL AND GENERATED CAUSE
Material causality could be characterised as a smooth interaction between the accidents
of an agent and those of a patient. The first and the most obvious place to reflect on
Hobbes’s notion of material causality is in his natural philosophy.
Causality in the natural world is always hypothetical.542 Since  we are  not  able  to
know external bodies, but only the effects of motions they cause within us, we are only
able to make the best possible explanations of them. As Hobbes writes:
The first beginnings, therefore, of knowledge, are the phantasms of sense and imagination; and
that there be such phantasms we know well enough by nature; but to know why they be, or from
what causes they proceed, is the work of ratiocination; which consists (as is said above, in the 1st
Chapter, Art. 2) in composition, and division or resolution.543
The second principal area where material causality appears in Hobbes, is in his kinematic
geometry.544
The common view of geometry, held for example by Euclides, Proclus, Clavius,
and Descartes, understood the objects of geometry as immaterial, separated from matter
541 Leviathan XLVI, 367.
542 This should not be confused with what Hobbes says about the idea of hypothetical necessity, or
necessity upon supposition in Liberty and Necessity page 262. In the latter, Hobbes criticises Bramhall’s
terminology, which he considers absurd. To say that something is at the same time necessary and
hypothetical is nonsense. In the former context, hypothetical means that we are not able to say with
absolute certainty how exactly natural bodies interact – or as it reads in the margin of Concerning Body
(II.9.8, 125): ‘The same agents and patients, if alike disposed, produce like effects, though at different
times’. However we do know that they are necessarily matter in motion, which is the universal cause of
all natural phenomena. See Concerning Body, II.9.7-9, 124-126.
543 Concerning Body, I.6.1, 66.
544 Kinematic geometry uses the motion of bodies to explain geometry. For example, a line is explained
as the motion of a point. For a short but illustrative discussion, see Child 1953, 276-279.
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by abstraction. Hobbes’s view was quite the opposite.545 Geometrical objects, like a
point, line, and surface, are bodies or motions of bodies.546 To say that a point is  ‘that
which has no parts’, or define a line as ‘breadthless length’547 is nonsense according to
Hobbes; it is the same thing as to say that ‘a Point is nothing’.548 Instead, ‘[y]et if, when
a body is moved, the magnitude of it be not at all considered, the way it makes is called a
line, or one single dimension, and the space, through which it passeth, is called length;
and the body itself is called a point.549
The idea of kinematic geometry could be taken to be a connecting element
between Hobbes’s general idea of science, which takes its model from geometry, and his
natural philosophy. If reality is nothing but matter in motion and if geometry is a science
which operates within the general laws of motion, physics seems to rest on a firm basis.
Additionally, for example the articles on method in the first part of Concerning Body and
the table of sciences in Leviathan seem to support this reading.550 The  reading  is  not
totally convincing. Geometry, even in its kinematic form, is epistemologically different
from physics or other sciences of natural bodies, because the notion of causality is
different. The similarity between kinematic geometry and physics turns out to be slight. It
is still strange why Hobbes puts forward a programme of materialistic geometry. One
could try to give two answers to this question. The first relates to his metaphysical
position, while the second tries to analyse causality in the contexts of metaphysics and
logic.
The first discussion is, perhaps, more obvious. If Hobbes indeed was a materialist
and maintained that there is nothing in the world except bodies, rest, and motion, it is not
so strange that he seeks to integrate geometry into this more general doctrine. I believe
however that the idea of materialistic geometry should not be taken too literally.
It is true that Hobbes sometimes uses concrete language when describing the
peculiarity of geometrical objects.551 It is also true that Hobbes sometimes explains an
abstract idea, say, how reasoning is adding and subtracting, by constructing figures.552
But these are illustrations. The more pressing reason why a concrete, or materialistic,
545 For a critique of algebraists, see OL, V, 41 and Hobbes 1682, 93.
546 From this follows, as has been noted by Jesseph (2004, 207), that there is no distinction between pure
and applied mathematics in Hobbes.
547 These are the definitions of Euclid in his Elements, book 1, definitions 1 and 2, which were widely
accepted. For a discussion, see (Jesseph 1999, p.78ff).
548 Six Lessons, 201.
549 Concerning Body II.7.12, 111.
550 See Concerning Body I.6.6, 71-72. The table of sciences appears in the Chapter IX of Leviathan.
551 See Six Lessons, lessons 4 and 5 (especially, 289 (‘Let us therefore pass to the demonstration ...’)).
552 See, for example, Concerning Body II.7.10, 98. This is peculiar to Hobbes’s argumentation in
Critique du ‘De Mundo’.
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reading of geometry is misleading is that this is not what the idea of constructing or
making the objects of knowledge means to Hobbes.
It was mentioned earlier that Hobbes’s terminology of causality has a different
flavour in Leviathan and in the works after Leviathan. Chapter V of Leviathan reads:
Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which,
out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like,
another time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what
manner;  when  the  like  causes  come  into  our  power,  wee  see  how  to  make  it  produce  the  like
effects.553
The passage includes two analyses of causality. The first sentence speaks of the
dependence of one fact (that is, state of the world, not of the mind) upon another, while
the rest of the passage introduces another idea of causality. The first kind of causality
refers to Hobbes’s idea that science is about the efficient causes of things, which causes
are all ultimately matter in motion, but whose generation is never completely known by
us. This was discussed in the previous section.
In the case of artificial bodies, generation does not refer to the natural causes of
phenomena, but, instead to constructions that are best exemplified in geometry and civil
philosophy. It should, however, be added here that though this notion is of great
importance to Hobbes’s idea of geometry, it is best exemplified in civil philosophy.554 Let
us look at these in turn.
Along with the kinematic conception of geometry Hobbes emphasised the
axiomatic model of discipline. The axiomatic model has, roughly speaking, two parts:
axioms (these can be definitions, postulates, and common notions) and propositions (or,
simply, what follows from axioms). In this account, geometry is intellectual activity,
which naturally uses drawn figures, but these figures play a minor role. It is this model
which Hobbes adopted as a paradigm of his idea(l) of science. Embedded in it is the idea
of generated causality and the model has a number of roles in Hobbes philosophy.
First, generated causality is used to form the basic concepts of science. In
Concerning Body, Hobbes describes it as follows:
Now, seeing none but a true proposition will follow from true, and that the understanding of two
propositions to be true, is the cause of understanding that also to be true which is deduced from
them; the two antecedent propositions are commonly called the causes of the inferred proposition,
or conclusion. And from hence it is that logicians say, the premises are causes of the conclusion;
which may pass, though it be not properly spoken; for though understanding be the cause of
understanding, yet speech is not the cause of speech. But when they say, the cause of the
properties of any thing, is the thing itself, they speak absurdly. For example, if a figure be
553 Leviathan V, 21 (cf. IV, 16 (‘And the act of ...’)).
554 See also Caygill 1989, 23-24.
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propounded which is triangular; seeing every triangle has all its angles together equal to two
right angles, from whence it follows that all the angles of that figure are equal to two right
angles, they say, for this reason, that that figure is the cause of that equality. But seeing the figure
does not itself make its angles, and therefore cannot be said to be the efficient-cause, they call it
the formal-cause; whereas indeed it is no cause at all; nor does the property of any figure follow
the figure, but has its being at the same time with it; only the knowledge of the figure goes before
the knowledge of the properties; and one knowledge is truly the cause of another knowledge,
namely the efficient cause.555
Generated causality then means the relationship between artificial objects, above all
concepts, propositions, and syllogisms. For example, ‘incorporeal substance’ is an absurd
concept, because it follows from the definition of substance that: if a thing is a substance,
it is a body, that is something corporeal. Equally, the proposition ‘man is a stone’ is false,
because the predicate does not contain the subject.556 Lastly, the same pattern of thought
applies to syllogism (reasoning). For example:
‘Socrates is a man’
‘Every man is a gadfly’
So, ‘Socrates is a gadfly’
This is a valid syllogism, because the conclusion follows from the premises. The
fact that it is odd lies in the falsity of the second premise (gadfly does not belong in the
definition of man – even though it might belong to the definition of Socrates), not in the
logical structure of the syllogism.
What is interesting in the long passage quoted is, first, the role figures play in
geometry. The knowledge of figures, like a triangle, do not cause their own properties,
but they do cause our knowledge of the properties. Second, with the help of our
reasoning we are able to give definitions to the objects of geometry, and on the basis of
these we know that this knowledge is certain and universal, because we have produced
the very objects with our thinking. It is these kinds of constructions that play a significant
role in Hobbes’s idea of geometry, civil philosophy, and in his later analysis of causality,
and which best characterise his mature idea of philosophical thinking.
In Concerning Body Hobbes defines philosophy to be:
the knowledge we acquire, by true ratiocination, of appearances, or apparent effects, from the
knowledge we have of some possible production or generation of the same; and of such
production as has been or may be, from the knowledge we have of the effects.557
555 Concerning Body I.3.20, 43-4. Cf. Leviathan VII, 30-31.
556 Concerning Body I.3.7, 35.
557 Concerning Body I.6.1, 65-6. Cf. Concerning Body I.1.2-3, 3-5 and I.I.8, 10.
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It has been claimed that this applies only to natural philosophy.558 It  indeed  says  two
things that seem to defend this interpretation. The first is that philosophy starts from
‘appearances, or apparent effects’, or from the knowledge ‘we have of the effects’. The
second is ‘possible production’, which is in line with Hobbes’s idea that our knowledge
of the natural world is always hypothetical, and therefore the knowledge we have of it is
merely possible, not certain and necessary. The passage also says, however, at least two
things that oppose the idea introduced. The first is that we might have the knowledge of
generation of something, while the second is that we do have the knowledge of how
certain effects have been produced. Both additions point out a significant issue, namely
the change in Hobbes’s account of causality, which is best studied in Hobbes’s idea of
civil philosophy.
Generated causality is present in Hobbes’s civil philosophy in the following
manner:  cause  in  politics  is  constructed  by  the  knowing  subject.  The  difference  is  that
natural philosophers generate only the knowledge of a thing, say, botanists generate
knowledge of plants, but they do not generate the plants, whereas civil philosophers do
both, they generate the commonwealth by generating knowledge concerning it. We know
what something is and especially why it is, because we start the causal process by
generating the necessary knowledge, e.g., ‘That every man, ought to endeavour Peace,
as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek;
and use, all helps, and advantages of warre’.559 One of the main points of our analysis is
to explain that what Hobbes did believe is that the hope mentioned in the first and
fundamental law of nature is rational. Theoretically speaking, to understand rationality
requires the understanding of what causality means in his civil philosophy. That is to say,
if every man endeavours peace, that is, gives his natural right to everything, people’s
mutual hostility and continuous fear of death will cease.
The natural and the artificial are not, however, necessarily in conflict in Hobbes’s
works. They are sometimes two sides of the same thing. This does not remove the
epistemological hierarchy between the two. To Hobbes, geometry and civil philosophy
are more certain because of their stronger notion of causality. The causal process
described in these disciplines is not just something similar, but is exactly as we make it.
What this means in practice Hobbes explains in Concerning Body:
[W]hether such an action be just or unjust; if that unjust be resolved into fact against law, and
that notion law into the command of  him or  them that  have coercive power; and that power be
derived from the wills of men that constitute such power, to the end they may live in peace, they
may at last come to this, that the appetites of men and the passions of their minds are such, that,
unless they be restrained by some power, they will always be making war upon one another;
which may be known to be so by any man's experience, that will but examine his own mind. And,
558 Sorrel (1986, 55-59)
559 Leviathan XIV, 64.
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therefore, from hence he may proceed, by compounding, to the determination of the justice or
injustice of any propounded action.560
This type of ‘conceptual composition and resolution’ are at the heart of Hobbes’s idea of
(civil) philosophy and causality.561 This is also something that every rational creature
should understand.
It  is  somewhat  strange  to  consider  commonwealths  as  nothing  but  matter  in
motion. The issue calls for a clarification. Commonwealths are the result of our
intentions, conscious thinking and our co-operation. Intentions find their exact
formulations in our concepts. Therefore it is better to analyse, say, democracy through
what we mean when we use this word. The twist is, however, that this kind of rational
constructions do have a point of contact with material reality, albeit indirectly. This is not
in any way in contradiction with Hobbes’s materialism, which should be understood as a
metaphysical doctrine. What Hobbes repeatedly says in his works is that all knowledge is
based on appearances, which are expressed in language. The word ‘democracy’ raises a
certain fancy in my mind. This fancy need not be exactly the same every time I recognise
the word ‘democracy’, for occasions in which the term appears might add something
new to my conception of democracy.
Generated causality has two further elements. The first could be called a
definitional causality and the second operational causality. Definitional causality means
that it is because we agree (that is, determine) on something, say, to give up our natural
right  to  everything  except  to  life,  and  keep  the  promise  not  to  kill  each  other,  so  that
peace and commodious living become possible . 562 The operational causality means that
it  is  because  we make  laws  and  find  them binding  that  we  can  be  sure  that  if  someone
breaks the commitments made, he or she will be punished. That is to say, our agreement
has consequences in terms of concrete actions. Contracts, administration, and public
officers  are  all  products  of  this  resolute  and  continuous  will  to  make  life  better,  and  a
working commonwealth is the best example in Hobbes of what the generated causality is.
To conclude, Hobbes’s determinism can be articulated in terms of necessity, and
the unity of necessity is the following: because the world is nothing but the motion of
bodies (metaphysical necessity), because we are physical creatures that are regulated by
the laws of motion (psychological necessity), we should do everything to understand
560 Concerning Body, I.6.7, 74.
561 The analysis that follows owes much to Malcolm (2002, 152-3). See also Kraynak (1990, 69-74 and
especially page 71, where Kraynak proposes that Hobbes’s method should be understood as a procedure).
Jesseph (1996, 99-100 (cf. 93) and 1999, 232-3) makes a similar conclusion, but adds that if we
understand this idea of science as forming concepts in an arbitrarily-conventional manner, the view is
imperfect. It is not flawed, if we accept that there are better and worse scientific definitions. According
to Hobbes good definitions are those, which reveal the real causes of phenomena.
562 Caygill (1989, 30) is illuminating here. Caygill argues that Hobbes’s ‘account of personification
accords with [his] requirement that a philosophical explanation gives an account of the production of its
object’.
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them (epistemological necessity) in order to act in a right way in relation to ourselves
(moral necessity) and towards others (political necessity). This, I believe, is the correct
understanding of Hobbes’s determinism.
KNOWING WHAT AND KNOWING WHY
The difference between natural philosophy and civil philosophy can also be formulated
by using the distinction between knowing what and knowing why. In natural philosophy
in order to know why, we need to know what, but in civil philosophy and in geometry, in
order to know what, we need to know why. According to Hobbes there are two kinds of
knowledge, that of fact and that of consequences of affirmations.563 Knowledge of facts
or absolute knowledge564 is based on sense and memory, whereas the latter form of
knowledge is scientific knowledge properly speaking. Empirical knowledge is particular
and demonstration or explanation related to it is as rational as possible (in modern terms:
it aims at probability), but is never totally certain.565 We know that the universal cause of
natural phenomena is the motion of matter. Genuine scientific knowledge requires that
we know the specific causal mechanism and because there be various causal mechanism
behind a phenomenon, universal propositions on these matters are likely to be false.
Hobbes’s treatment of gravitation and other natural phenomena in Part IV of Concerning
Body are  all  examples  of  this  kind  of  hypothetical  scientific  knowledge.  In  the  case  of
gravitation, he lists some hypotheses:
Some philosophers therefore have been of opinion, that the descent of heavy bodies proceeded
from internal appetite, by which when they were cast upwards, they descended again, as moved
by themselves, to such place as was agreeable to their nature. Others though they were attracted
by the earth. [...] To the latter, who attribute the descent of heavy bodies to the attraction of the
earth, I assent. But by what motion this is done, hath not as yet been explained by any man.566
A further detailed study of the phenomenon of gravitation is not of interest here; what is
important is to understand that plausible theories or hypotheses of gravitation are based
on the motion of matter. This is the level of certainty we are able to reach in natural
philosophy, where the nature of things will always remain unknown.
563 Leviathan IX, 40.
564 This kind of knowledge is absolute in two senses. Firstly, it is absolute in the sense that it states
something that exists (that S) rather than something that does not (that not-S). Secondly, it is absolutely
understood as a contrast to conditional scientific knowledge. That is, absolute knowledge is in the form
of the proposition: S is P, whereas scientific propositions are in the form of the proposition: If S, then P.
565 Seven Philosophical Problems, 11. Cf. Liberty and Necessity, 276.
566 Concerning Body IV.30.2, 509-510.
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The fundamental ‘obscurity’ of the objects of the external world can be defended
by two further arguments. The first says that we do not perceive external objects, but
only impressions of them, and because there are errors in our perception, the causal
processes of the natural world remain unknown to us. The second is what could be called
the simple onto-theological argument and its idea is the following. Hobbes says he thinks
that God is omnipotent and incomprehensible, but we know that he created the natural
world.567 He also believes that God can create things in many ways; this follows from the
omnipotent nature of God. Therefore it is impossible to have sure knowledge of the
natural world.
There is then at least some ground to the claim that Hobbes’s view on the
fundamentally unreliable character of the natural world has a theological element or, at
least, that it is made in a context that could be characterised as theological. When
reading further Hobbes’s theory of knowledge, it turns out, however, that this
theological basis is replaced by another solution.
The distinction between absolute and philosophical knowledge can be clarified by
distinguishing different propositions.568 Even philosophical propositions are always
expressed in the conditional, they are certain, and apply universally. (‘If something is a
crow, it is a bird’), whereas empirical propositions are either absolute and particular
(‘This crow is black’)  or  generalisations  (‘All crows are black).569 The factual
proposition ‘This crow is black’ is true, but in a more limited sense than the proposition
‘All  crows  are  black’.  The  former  is  a  particular  contingent  truth,  while  the  latter  is  a
general contingent truth. Scientific propositions are neither. They are universal necessary
truths.  The  proposition  ‘All  crows  are  birds’  appears  to  be  a  universal  necessary  truth,
because we are accustomed to think that crows are birds. However, it is not a universal
necessary truth, because our perception can alter it.570 The propositions of geometry and
civil philosophy are real universal necessary truths, because they are valid no matter what
our perception is – this does not mean that contingent truths are useless. For example the
proposition: ‘Justice is to give each his due …’ is always a true one. Judges can be
bribed and they may give different sentences for the same crimes, but this does not
change what justice is.
567 Leviathan III, 11; XII, 53; and XXI, 108.
568 On contingent and necessary propositions, see Critique du ‘De Mundo’ XXXV.9. See also Malcolm
(2002, essay 5) whom I follow here.
569 For a clear articulation of hypothetical nature of scientific propositions, see Critique du ‘De Mundo’
XXVI.2.
570 A modern example may help us to understand the matter. Sorting into species is an illustrative way
to show how truths which are related to natural bodies and taken to be universal are not. For instance, it
is generally thought that chimpanzees are pongids. However, recent research has established that the
genes of chimpanzees and some other large apes are so similar to human genes, that we should re-
categorise them as hominids.
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A more customary way of articulating the difference is to use notions of analysis
and synthesis.571 As was earlier explained philosophical inquiry may proceed from causes
to effects or from effects to causes. In general, if it proceeds from effects to causes, this
is called analysis, or the resolutive method, or simply division. Correspondingly, if it
proceeds from causes to effects it is called synthesis, the compositive method, or simply
composition. There are some general guidelines which kind of inquiry is typical to which
area of philosophy. In natural philosophy, the method is analysis; we make hypotheses of
the causes of various phenomena of nature on the basis of their effects on us. And again,
the synthetical method is used in demonstrative sciences. This general distinction is,
however, misleading, for synthesis and analysis have further meanings in Hobbes.
Firstly, all science follows, in a way, synthesis, because all science starts from
definitions. In civil philosophy, for example, we need to define certain basic concepts,
like law and right, and this is also the case in natural philosophy, as Part III of
Concerning Body shows. What needs to be take into account, however, is that though
Hobbes does not explain whether every science has its own philosophia prima, I believe
it is safe to conclude that he rejects the Aristotelian idea that every science has its own
archê.572 Hobbes does think, though, that all science has certain basic concepts, like body
and motion.573
Secondly, the forming of basic concepts, in general and in specific sciences,
consists of both synthesis and analysis. Though the philosophical study of concepts
requires analysis, the consistency of concepts needs to be validated by synthesis, that is,
by studying what follows from their definitions. Here another bifurcation appears: the
validation can, naturally, take various forms. It is logical, for example, that if both P and
not-P  follow  from  a  concept  X,  there  is  something  wrong  with  it.  But  along  with  this
logical validation there is also the empirical validation, which means that what a concept
and the phenomenon is supposed to describe cannot be contrary to our experience. In the
light of this double validation, Hobbes’s rebuttal of some notion, like ‘incorporeal
substance’, makes sense. The procedure of double-validation appears to apply to every
branch of philosophy. Natural philosophy is the most obvious example, but civil
philosophy and geometry also, in their ways, follow the procedure. The case of civil
philosophy was explained earlier when the notion of generated cause was introduced.
Here it can be added, that the materialist undercurrent in Hobbes’s notion of geometry
itself is a sign that he recalls the empirical basis of geometry. The fascinating feature of
geometry is its concrete beauty. Though they are pure artefacts of the mind, the objects
of geometry appear in the world around us and make it more comprehensible.
571 What is said here follows Hobbes discussion in Concerning Body I.VI (‘Of Method’).
572 See Metaphysica 983b11
573 To be a little more precise, philosophia prima studies notions related to the most general qualities of
being, but of course as such it is basis of all philosophy. See Critique du ‘De Mundo’ I.1  and,  for  a
discussion, Zarka 1996.
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The last remark on the protean nature of analysis and synthesis is that the
constitutive  part  of  every  branch  of  philosophy  as  well  as philosophia prima in its
original sense, that is, the study of the most general qualities of being and reality, is a
continual movement from analysis to synthesis. Again and again phantasms are analysed
and their definitions clarified and the consequences of these new definitions tested in the
light  of  what  we  know.  As  Hobbes  concludes:  ‘[i]n  the  study  of  philosophy  [...]
according to this variety of things in question, sometimes the analytical method is to be
used, and sometimes the synthetical’.574 Therefore  it  is  not  simply  the  case  that  the
analytical method deals with logical knowledge and the synthetical with empirical
knowledge, but that the two methods complement to each other. Hobbes distinguishes
exactly how one receives a further elucidation in the analysis of different kinds of
knowledge in his mature theory of philosophical knowledge.575
In Six Lessons to the Professors of Mathematics, Hobbes reformulates his view of
the principal forms of knowledge. The first kind of knowledge (that of fact, or
knowledge simple) is particular and probabilistic, ‘because with the natural bodies we
know not the construction, but seek it from the effects’, while the second (the
knowledge of consequences) is genuine scientific knowledge in which ‘the construction
of the subject […] is in the power of the artist himself, who, in his demonstration, does
no more but deduce the consequences of his own operation’.576 The latter articulates
Hobbes’s idea of definition-based577 and generated knowledge, which is typical of
geometry and civil philosophy.578
The  objects  of  geometry,  such  as  lines  and  planes,  are  generated  in  two  ways,
‘drawn and designed’.579 As concrete objects, they are drawn and in this sense we really
574 Concerning Body I.6.3, 68. I hope that the reasons given in my text this far justify my stretching of
the context (Hobbes is here speaking of the explanation of some natural phenomena like light and
gravity).
575 Even though my claim has been that the new conception of knowledge started to form in the 1650s,
there are possible indications that Hobbes had something similar in mind earlier. See Elements VI.2-3,
40-41 and On the Citizen XVIII.4, 237.
576 Six Lessons ‘The Epistle Dedicatory’, 183-4. Cf. Elements VI.1-4, 40-41; Leviathan IX, 40;
Concerning Body I.6.1, 66; and De Homine X.4,  92-94.  Hobbes  ponders  the  same  idea  in  relation  to
natural philosophy in Seven Philosophical Problems (3-4), but concludes that ‘the doctrine of natural
causes hath not infallible and evident principles’.
577 Scholars have commented on the status of definition in Hobbes’s thought and in particular on his
idea of science. Peters (1967, 56) found Hobbes ‘incredibly naive’, whereas David Johnston (1986, 65),
while rebutting Peters view, does not believe that definitions ‘carry any force of their own’ and sees
them as logical entities. I think that both miss Hobbes’s late development. Reik (1977, 62-63) gives
some analysis of what she calls the method of genetic definition and in this relation she refers to
Cassirrer (1955, 254). For clear discussions of the subject, see Jesseph (1999, especially 141-142) and
Malcolm (2002, 153-154 and 166).
578 Goldsmith (1993, 333-4. Cf. 1966, 10-11) suggests that we should take this claim seriously, that is to
say, civil philosophy is a formal science.
579 Six Lessons, ‘The Epistle Dedicatory’, 184. Cf. De Homine X.5, 93.
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generate them. This is not, however, the point. We could draw a billion triangles and still
not have genuine knowledge of them.580 Therefore geometrical knowledge is genuine
scientific knowledge, because of design, that is, rational construction of them by
definitions and ratiocination. Ratiocination does not refer only to logical or conceptual
analysis, but definitions must correspond with something real. Therefore, the classical
definition of point as ‘that whereof there is no part,’581 or the law of commutation, which
says that x + y = y + x, do not belong to the body of scientific knowledge. First because
it does not fit with Hobbes’s idea that all real entities must have extension, and second,
because it does not pick up any real entities from the world.
This position poses a problem.582 If we take into account that philosophy, scientific
reasoning, is ‘knowledge of the truth of propositions, and how things are called, and is
derived from understanding’,583 Hobbes’s vehement opposing of algebra is strange
because numbers and mathematical symbols appear to be adequate tools for scientific
reasoning. A possible way out is to say that algebra consists of what has been called
fictions, but this solves little, because the immediate objection is: does not the same apply
to many other things which Hobbes takes to be the object of science? For example, law
and right. There are two possible ways to interpret this conclusion. The first is the idea
that Hobbes’s theory is a maker’s knowledge theory, whereas the second explains the
late  theory  of  knowledge  in  more  customary  terms.  But  before  we  consider  these  two
readings, a note on Hobbes and scepticism.
In his versatile and groundbreaking introduction to Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott
wrote on Hobbes’s philosophical motives:
An impulse for philosophy may originate in faith (as with Erigena), or in curiosity (as with
Locke), but with Hobbes the prime mover was doubt. Scepticism was, of course, in the air he
breathed; but in an age of sceptics he was the most radical of them all. His was not the elegiac
scepticism of Montaigne, not the brittle net in which Pascal struggled, not was it the
methodological doubt of Descartes; for him [Hobbes] it was both a method and a conclusion,
purging and creative. It is not the technicalities of scepticism (which we must consider later) that
are so remarkable, but its ferocity.584
580 Losonsky’s (2001, 50-51) discussion of ‘a speechless geometrician’ is illustrative here.
581 Six Lessons, 317. This is the way Euclid’s definition of a point is usually understood. Hobbes claims
that this is a mistaken reading of the definition. The same line of thought applies to the definitions of a
line  and  a  plane.  See Six Lessons, ‘The Epistle Dedicatory’, 184 and, 200-202. Euclid’s original
definitions, see his Elements, Book I, definitions 1, 2 and 5.
582 Hobbes’s concept of mathematics and its relation to his idea(l) of science has been studied by Jesseph
(1999) and Grant (1996). Historically it may be of some importance to point out that Mersenne held a
similar humanistic conception of mathematics. For Mersenne’s view, see Dear (1988).
583 Elements VI.1, 40. Cf. Leviathan XLVI, 367.
584 Oakeshott 1975, 10.
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Oakeshott’s view is rather lyrical, but there is a broader family of arguments that
introduces Hobbes as a kind of sceptic.585 In order to understand Hobbes’s relation to
this school of thought, a small introduction to its history is necessary. The development
of the sceptical movement can be characterised by pointing out what is the focus of
scepticism at each stage. It is possible to distinguish three main phases: epistemological,
psychological and moral scepticism. In what follows, I will narrow my discussion to the
first and second.
A concern of the neo-scepticical movement was to refute the naive theory of
perception, which claims that there is an unproblematic correspondence between what
we perceive and an object of the world, the idea that the perception of a normal observer
in normal conditions is correct.586 The novel idea, which developed among the Mersenne
circle and was put forward above all by Descartes, was to claim that it is not an error in
perception, say, colour-blindness, that blocks our cognitive interaction with reality, for
even a wrong or an erroneous perception is a perception of something, that is, a sense-
impression, and as such the object of our knowledge. No matter how fantastic a sense-
impression is, a subject is unable to deny that imaginations are truly in his mind.587
Therefore the act of perception is non-representational in the sense that it does not
represent reality understood as an objective and constant structure.
It is quite sure that Hobbes knew the ideas and the arguments of classical
scepticism and was aware of its modern advocates like Montaigne, but the sceptical
reading does not appear plausible. As I have tried to explain during the course of this
chapter, Hobbes aimed at certainty. Also natural philosophy aims to the best possible
hypotheses. The general argument in favour of Hobbes’s scepticism fails to see this.
The specific argument where scepticism is seen as an instrument or a point of
reference for Hobbes to develop his ideas is not convincing for the following reason.
Though Hobbes may have used scepticism as he used subjectivism, that is, tactically,
there is a further tactical aim that needs to be taken into account: in his “sceptical”
arguments Hobbes simply criticised naive empiricism. This, however, at its best, tells us
only what the negative aims of his epistemological project were. The content of his more
substantive theory of knowledge arises from rather different origins.
In some studies the role of the so-called maker’s knowledge tradition588 is
suggested to offer a broader framework when trying to understand Hobbes’s conception
585 For an account that sees Hobbes as a part of the development of scepticism in the Early Modern
period, see Popkin (2003, 189-207 and 1982, 133-148). For a well-articulated account of Hobbes and
scepticism, see studies by Tuck (1983, 1988a, 1988b, and 1993). Tuck emphasises epistemological and
psychological aspects, while Popkin studies Hobbes’s alleged scepticism in religion and politics. For a
recent, balanced view, see Harrison (2003, especially 39-42 and 132ff).
586 Originally in De Anima 418 a11-16
587 Descartes 1984, I, 128. Cf. Tuck 1988b, 35.
588 I have not come across a thorough study of the maker’s knowledge tradition, but Pérez-Ramon
(1988, Chapters 5 and 13) offers some systematic and historical guidelines. It is at least of historical
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of knowledge. From this tradition, three major strands can be distinguished: theological,
craftsmanship, and mathematical.589 In order to see which of these corresponds with
Hobbes’s ideas, a short characterisation of each is given.
The theological, or idealistic tradition goes back to, at least, late antiquity and
Neo-platonism.590 In  the  idealistic  doctrine  the  central  idea  is  that  understanding  of  the
true nature of things, that is, forms, is explained as a process in which man’s mind
somehow catches the divine mind and imitates the activity of the divine intellect. In more
Christian terms, God is the paradigm of knowledge in the following way: God knows
things, because He makes them, but in Him knowing and creating happen
simultaneously.
In the craftsmanship account, or experimentalist view of the maker’s knowledge,
which emerges in the Renaissance and was partly influenced by new ideas in painting,591
the core idea is emulation. Because we can create a copy of something, for example of a
rainbow, we make the knowledge in the sense that (re)construction or emulation are
methods of validating knowledge.
The  last  strand,  the  mathematical,  arises  from  the  work  of  Proclus,  who  put
forward the idea that ‘[t]he mathematician knows his truths because he himself has made
them’, and, as was explained earlier, ‘Proclus emphasised the active role of the
understanding in producing and projecting its objects, for mathematicals are
constructions of the mind in a space constituted in the imagination’.592
There have been studies on Hobbes and the maker’s knowledge.593 I have found
the works in the field helpful and share their basic intuition that in Hobbes genuine
knowledge concerns objects that we have made and that this kind of knowledge is
possible only in geometry and civil philosophy. However, there are also some points
where I wish to disagree. In what follows, I will discuss two specific studies, of Child’s
and of Barnouw’s. After this I will move to some more general aspects of the question of
Hobbes and the maker’s knowledge.
curiosity that Galileo, in his Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo, tolemaico e copernico,
introduces both strands of the maker’s knowledge. The advocate of the idealist account of maker’s
knowledge is Salviati, and of the experimentalist account, Sagredo. See, respectively, Galileo 1953, 115
(‘I believe, Simplicius, that your scruple arises ...’) and 116 (‘I have often considered ...’).
589 Pérez-Ramon 1988, 57.
590 This dating is based on Pérez-Ramon, where he argues, that ‘the principle [of verum factum] is
present in pre-Socratic thought’, and, second, that the idea was discussed also by the classical authors,
for instance Plato (see Cratylus 391b and Republic 601e-602a). The problem with the latter is that it is
not clear whether we should call this the maker’s or the user’s knowledge. See Pérez-Ramon, 1988, 50-
55. Cf. Funkenstein 1986, 12. Another source, which Pérez-Ramon does not discuss, is Aristotle’s
notion of nous poetikos (on this, see Kosman 1992).
591 See, however, Pérez-Ramon 1988, 55-56.
592 Pérez-Ramon 1988, 56.
593 More specific studies include Child 1953 and Barnouw 1980. See also Watkins 1989, 46-47;
Funkenstein 1986, 328-338; Pérez-Ramos 1988, 186-189; Jesseph 1999, 220-221; and Malcolm 2002,
511-512.
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Child’s pioneering work is still perhaps the most thorough philosophical study on
the subject, but suffers from certain inaccuracies of which two will be discussed here. He
claims, for example, that ‘the civil philosopher cannot make the first causes of the
commonwealth at all’,594 but it has been shown above that the opposite is true. Child’s
misconception is based on the idea that certain traits of human nature are the first causes
of the commonwealth. To utilise some of the previous conclusions, Child’s reasoning
seems to run as follows. He sees human nature in materialistic and physiological terms,
and therefore considers the matter of the commonwealth as natural bodies. When this is
linked with Hobbes’s argument that the knowledge of natural bodies will always remain
hypothetical, Child’s conclusion (that civil philosophers do not know the first causes of
the commonwealth) appears sound but perhaps trivial. Another misconception is Child’s
intuitions on Hobbes’s notion of the collective agent. It is not the case that ‘the
commonwealth is made by every man who belongs to it, every day in his life, by keeping
of those covenants without whose keeping the commonwealth will perish’.595 Instead, as
some modern studies have shown, a commonwealth is a genuinely collective agent which
is separate from its organic constituents.596 This is the novel layer in Hobbes’s analysis of
politics. The first causes of the commonwealth are not its matter, but the rational
generation of that very object called the commonwealth. In short, Child’s analysis points
in right direction, but he does not fully understand the meaning of making knowledge.
Another noteworthy analysis is Barnouw’s. Though perhaps more a study of Vico
than Hobbes, the deficiency of this reading is that it does not fully take into account the
nature of the generation of causes. Barnouw writes: ‘In the present context we cannot
and need not go into the Hobbesian conception of civil law and sovereignty, according to
which “we ourselves make the principle— that is, the cause of justice (namely laws and
covenants)— whereby it is known what justice and equity are.”’597 This is to bypass an
important point of Hobbes’s later theory of knowledge, which has been discussed in
detail above and has even been claimed to be decisive. Despite this, Barnouw’s analysis
has decisive merits, the emphasis on signs and, in particular, showing what kind of
experience, according to Hobbes, is relevant in science. In Elements, Barnouw points
out, Hobbes writes of two kinds of experience: ‘the former being the experience of the
effects of things that work upon us from without; and the latter the experience men have
594 Child 1953, 280.
595 Child 1953, 280-281.
596 On this, see the recent discussion on Hobbes’s notion of the artificial person and representation.
Major contributions include Pitkin 1958; Gauthier 1969, Chapters III and IV; Baumgold, 1988, Chapter
3; Runciman, 1997, Part I, Chapter 2 and Part III and 2000; and Skinner 2002, Vol. III, Chapter 6.
Child’s reading would also benefit from Oakeshott’s groundbreaking introductory essay to Leviathan,
where this aspect of Hobbes’s political theory is discussed.
597 Barnouw 1980, 613 (the passage he is referring to is from Leviathan (XI, 50).
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of the proper use of names in language’.598 Though the explication is given over ten
years after the distinction was made, it coincides with what has been discussed here.
Lastly, in my view, Barnouw’s version of the maker’s knowledge could be described as a
delicate articulation of Baconian maxim ‘knowledge is power’. That is to say, to have
(certain) knowledge of something gives its holder concrete power to do things, but what
Barnouw’s  analysis  misses  is  that  this  knowledge  gives  its  holder,  above  all,  power  to
create new things.
Returning to the primary question, characterising Hobbes’s theory of knowledge as
a maker’s knowledge theory is as such a rather empty claim. A sensible question is what
kind of account of the maker’s knowledge Hobbes could be taken to support. On the
basis of what has been said above, it may appear evident that of the three major strands,
the mathematical account of the maker’s knowledge could be the best candidate,599 but a
more thorough discussion is needed.
Hobbes’s view of knowledge seems to come close to the idealistic theory of the
maker’s knowledge kind of account, because of his emphasis on the generative aspect of
thinking and reasoning and, in particular, because, of the special features of his mature
theory of knowledge. I do believe, however, that there are at least two obvious reasons
why this line of interpretation is not valid.
The first is Hobbes’s materialism. The idealist theory explains the acquisition of
knowledge as the activity of the immaterial intellect. It is a well-known fact that Hobbes
excludes this kind of explanation. The second objection relates to methodology. Hobbes
rather firmly denies comparisons between man and God.600 For God is fundamentally
incomprehensible, it is of no use to build theories that seek to explain human nature by
the attributes of God – or, what is more common, vice versa.
According to the second principal branch, we make the knowledge, because we are
able to emulate or reproduce a process by experiment, for example, creating a vacuum.
Hobbes’s view that knowledge aims to produce something also seems similar to this
account, but again it is possible to give an argument why this is not the case. The reason
is Hobbes’s attitude towards experimental knowledge.601 Though in many places he
praises the achievements of the study of nature, such as navigation and architecture,
these skills are merely convenient not knowledge.602 His point is well summarised in the
discussion  on  comets  in  Chapter  VIII  of Critique du ‘De Mundo’: even if those who
598 Elements VI.1, 40.
599 Pérez-Ramon (1988, 56 and 186) explicitly links Hobbes with this tradition, though, as I shall argue,
his (ibid. 58) linking of Hobbes with ‘man’s manipulatory capacity as imitator Dei’ is problematic.
600 The Chapter XXX of Critique du ‘De Mundo’ is helpful on this question. See also Leviathan III, 11
and Liberty and Chance, 18
601 See Shapin and Schaffer 1985, especially 99-107, which is, however, instructive to read in the light
of what Malcolm (2002, 187-189) says about the subject.
602 See, for example, Leviathan XIII, 62.
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study nature could agree on the causes of certain natural phenomena, they did not make
the natural bodies, and thereforethey will never have certain knowledge of them.
Moving to a more fundamental question, there also appears to be the general
reason why Hobbes’s idea of knowledge is not well described by the idea of the maker’s
knowledge. What seems to be essential in the theory of the maker’s knowledge and what
both of the meritorious readings correctly point out in Hobbes, is that genuine
knowledge is about things that we have made. Now, though Hobbes seems to agree with
this, for example, by claiming that ‘civil philosophy is demonstrable, because we make
the commonwealth ourselves’,603 it is not so much knowledge or truth, but certainty that
we  make.  This  is  the  core  of  the  more  customary  explanation  of  Hobbes’s  mature
account of knowledge, which I call his epistemic conservatism.
CONCLUSION: HOBBES’S EPISTEMIC CONSERVATISM
This conclusion seeks to explicate two issues: what is meant by epistemic conservatism
and how imagination participates in the acquisition of knowledge.
Aristotle says that all learning ‘come[s] about from already existing knowledge’.604
To him, the world was perfect and the aim of science was to find its real structure. This
is in accordance with the classical conception of knowledge. We have certain beliefs,
which for various reasons we take to be true. The task, then, is to justify and give
reasons  for  our  beliefs.  Aristotle  was  nevertheless  pluralist:  the  world,  already  natural,
consists  of  different  kinds  of  things,  which  should  be  studied  with  their  own  methods,
which, again, had their own ways of reasoning. The plurality of reality did not, however,
prevent Aristotle from developing a more general theory of reasoning and science. The
outlines of this theory are given in Physica:
When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes, or elements, it is
through acquaintance with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. For we do not
think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles, and
have carried our analysis as far as its elements. Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature too our
first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.
The natural way of doing this is to start from things which are more knowable and clear to us and
proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are
not knowable relatively to us and knowable without qualification. So we must follow this method
and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear
and mora knowable by nature.605
603 Six Lessons, ‘The Epistle Dedicatory’, 184
604 Aristotle Analytica Posteriora 71a1-2.
605 Physica 184a10-21.
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Philosophy, like such sciences as biology and history, is about finding first principles.
These are, then, used that explain other things, whereas knowledge (epistêmê)  is  to
understand how they explain something. It is, however, especially the task of philosophy
to study first principles and Hobbes has a similar idea of philosophy and knowledge.
Hobbes’s theory of knowledge is conservative in the sense that there are a mass of facts
that we know to be true about the world, human nature, and so on, which become
scientific knowledge only after we know why they are true.606
It is possible to recapitulate some of the key ideas in the previous discussions by
defining how Hobbes understood knowledge properly speaking. Genuine scientific
knowledge is a combination of three elements. The basis of knowledge is experience, but
this  basis  is  not  solid  because  the  causes  of  things  (i.e.,  bodies)  that  are  the  causes  of
phantasms remain uncertain. Therefore what we have are phantasms. Additionally, the
correspondence with the external world should be understood more broadly than merely
the correspondence with the material constitution of reality. Though ultimately
everything real is just matter in motion, Hobbes’s idea of correspondence is better
characterised by saying that it is correspondence with the state of affairs.
The second element is the generation of knowledge by definitions. This is the
construction of the truth of propositions, which is based on the coherence theory of truth
and which is a kind of clarification of the state of affairs in question. However, and this is
the salient point, aside from the coherence and correspondence components, there is the
operational component, which means that we bring something totally new, say, a
commonwealth, into the world on the basis of (theoretical) knowledge. The mature
conception of knowledge, I think, is best manifest in Hobbes’s civil philosophy.
As in geometry, in civil philosophy the objects of the discipline are created by the
knowing subject who generates not only scientific knowledge, but the objects of
knowledge.607 We know what something is and especially its causes, because we start the
process by generating the knowledge by definitions, which are linguistic manifestations
of our conceptions, that is, imaginations. No matter that reality is nothing but matter in
motion we are able to surpass the limits of experience by the use of imagination.
Lastly, two more questions need to be clarified. The first is the question of
constructionism and constructivism. The reading of Hobbes’s theory of knowledge
articulated here, as well as some of the interpretations introduced, may give an
impression that Hobbes’s theory of knowledge has a constructionist flavour, that is, that
our knowledge of the world is ultimately only a construction of the mind or a conceptual
framework that appears to give an order to the phenomena of reality. I hope that the
rephrasing of Hobbes’s view of genuine scientific knowledge given above has explained
why this is not the case. Though Hobbes may use language that alludes to something like
606 Hobbes seems to hold this kind of quasi-Socratic attitude. See, especially, Elements (I.2, 21). See also
Malcolm 2002, 153.
607 See also Zarka 2001, 437.
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this, for example, expressions like ‘to construct’ or ‘to generate’, he still always
maintains that these constructions correspond to what I have called the state of affairs,
that is, states of the world. In brief, though he does not always reduce all the phenomena
to the materialist-mechanistic level, it does not follow that Hobbes is a constructionist.
The second point of clarification relates to the role of curiosity. In Leviathan,
Hobbes defines it as follows:
Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but Man: so that Man
is distinguished, not onely by his reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in
whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of
knowing causes.608
The passage suggests that this peculiar ‘Lust of the mind’ is constitutive to the
acquisition of knowledge. Without the passion to know the causes of things, human
beings would remain in the state of dullness. The ongoing analysis of Hobbes’s theory of
knowledge does not seek to nullify the relevance of curiosity, but has concentrated on
other aspects of the acquisition of knowledge. Curiosity is the major motivation in the
acquisition of knowledge, but equally important is the cognitive role of imagination.
Imagination gives concrete suggestions about what could be the causes and effects of
various phenomena,609 but because it is not restricted to past experience in the sense that
memory is, or in the sense that the classical paradigm of knowledge was, it can create
something that has not existed before. In sum, if curiosity prompts the lust for
knowledge, imagination helps us to create knowledge and new objects, which are
consolidated by the use of reason and empirical validation. In the next chapter, we turn
to an aspect of this interplay, that is, to Hobbes’s accounts of art and style.
608 Leviathan VI, 26. Cf. III, 9.
609 For a similar claim, see Nauta and Pätzold, 2004.
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VI ART AND STYLE
Wit and art, the two notions this chapter discusses, have not been central in Hobbes
scholarship. It is only recently that the rationalistic picture of Hobbes has opened up to a
more versatile analysis. Wit and art are the two sides of the same coin and this chapter of
the thesis seeks to articulate the nature of their interrelation, which can be summarised by
saying that wit is the psychological description of what many arts consist of. One way to
open the discussion is to point out a peculiar occurrence of the word ‘wit’.610
In 1573, Ralph Lever (died 1584) published a book entitled The Arte of Reason,
rightly termed, Witcraft. Following the Aristotelian fashion, Lever’s book is a compact
presentation of the essentials of logic, but its peculiarity lies in a somewhat homespun
tendency to produce a vernacular lexicon of logic. Lever’s description of the central term
‘witcraft’ is a clear symptom of this tendency:
Witcrafte ... If those names be alwayes accompted the best, which doe moste playnly teache the
hearer the meayning of the thyng, that they are appoynted to expresse: doubtlesse neyther
Logicke, nor Dialect can be thought so fit an Englishce worde to expresse and se foorth the Arte
of reson by, as With craft is, seeing that Wit in oure mother tongue is oft taken for reason: and
crafte is the aunciente Englishe woorde, whereby wée haue vsed to expresse an Arte; which two
wordes knit together in Witcrafte,, doe signifie the Arte that teacheth witte and reason.611
Firstly, it is clear that for Lever, wit is a rational capacity, something that deals with, if
not formally plausible, at least decent rational thinking. Secondly, it is a talent or a skill;
something that can be learned only by practising the skill. Hobbes’s understanding of wit
shares the latter criterion, but not the former. Wit has an epistemic status, but it is closer
to prudentia than scientia.
Art is another of Hobbes’s notions which is rich in nuances. Sometimes he uses it
in a general sense, when the term refers to the mastery of something. The opening of
Leviathan is an example of this general use of the term: ‘Nature (the Art whereby God
hath made and governes the world) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in
this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal.’612 Sometimes Hobbes uses the
term in a clearly pejorative sense as something lower than philosophy and science, which
610 The  word  has  a  long and interesting  history  going back to Beowulf.  For  a  short  account,  see OED
Online (http://dictionary.oed.com), which lists seven entries of ‘wit’. See especially the entry for ‘wit’ as
a noun. On the Continental equivalents and the origins of the conception of wit, as well as its use in
17th-century British criticism and in Hobbes, see Spingarn 1957, xxix-xxxi.
611 Lever 1573, A note to understand the meaning of new defined terms, term ‘Witcraft’. For a
discussion, see Howell 1952, 57-63.
612 Leviathan, ‘Introduction’, 1.
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are based on reason. The third major meaning Hobbes gives to the notion of art is
inherited from classical and Renaissance ideas of arts where it referred to the acquisition
of the subject matter and techniques of certain specific disciplines. In brief, the art of
governing and of geometry is not the same thing as the art of rhetoric, which all differ
from the art of sophistry.
The previous chapters have studied traditional areas of philosophy: human nature,
language, and knowledge. These form the basis of the following chapter on method and
argumentation. But a full understanding of this subject requires another inquiry: how
Hobbes did understood style?
Style can be taken here to refer to both, style in philosophy and style in the arts,
above all, poetry. The former will be the subject of the next chapter, but because
Hobbes’s philosophical style is often coupled with his ideas of literary style, this issue
needs to be examined in some detail also here.613 Secondly, literary style should be
understood rather widely. It does not cover only works of fiction, but also other kinds of
written works. This is another reason why a closer look at Hobbes’s conception of arts is
required. Through this, the analysis will also cover the distinction between the arts and
philosophy, but before moving to the theoretical topics, a biographical note.
Throughout his life, Hobbes was interested in literature.614 When leaving his school
in Malmesbury Hobbes presented to his teacher Robert Latimer his translation of
Euripides’s Medea.615 We also have some evidence of his literary commitments during
the years in Oxford and during his first decades in the service of the Cavendish family.616
Hobbes also wrote some poetry, his De mirabilibus pecci praising the hilly district near
the Cavendish residence in Derbyshire. Though De mirabilibus pecci did not remain
Hobbes’s  only  actual  contribution  to  poetry,  his  merits  here  do  not  lie  so  much  in  the
practice, but in the theory of literature,617 or in the words of a scholar: ‘While the Peak
613 For some views about Hobbes’s own style, see Nauta 2001, 35-36 and Rogow 1988, 65. For more
general accounts, see Manley 1999 and Patey 1997.
614 On Hobbes’s literary career, see Watson 1955, 558; Brett 1971, 45-46; and Skinner 1996, 230-235.
On his literary contacts, see Malcolm 2002, 243-244. On Hobbes’s literary theory and different genres,
see Thorpe 1940, Chapter V; Reik 1977, Chapter VI; Cantalupo 1991, 70-72; Prokhovnik 1991, Chapter
3. On Hobbes’s influence on literary criticism, see Thorpe 1940, Chapters VI-X and Spingarn 1957,
xxxvi. Thorpe’s central argument is plausible, but his reading of Hobbes is one sided. When
emphasising the modern aspects of Hobbes’s aesthetic ideas, he does not put much emphasis on the fact
that some of them, for example, metrical requirements, are classical.
615 Brief Lives, 232.
616 The Verse Life, 246.
617 This appears to stem from the general tendency of the 17th century, where the theory and practice of
poetry started to go separate ways. On this, see Prokhovnik 1991, 101. The translator of the poem seems
to disagree with my conclusion. In an advertisement in the beginning of the 1683 translation of De
Mirabilibus Pecci, the anonymous translator writes: ‘This Latine Poem, writ by the famous Mr Thomas
Hobs of Malmesbury, hath got such reputation, that many English Readers had a great desire to be
acquainted with it, for whose sakes it is now translatd into English. Reader farewell, but do not forget to
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[De Mirabilibus Pecci] has little if any value as poetry and reveals nothing of Hobbes’s
maturing thought, the poem is not without interest’.618 Therefore, if Hobbes’s literal
practice remains a curiosity, the study of his views on literature theory contribute to our
understanding of his philosophy.
In addition to some passages in his major works,619 much of Hobbes’s ideas about
literature  can  be  found  in  two  writings  on  the  theory  of  poetry: The Answer of Mr
Hobbes to Sir William Davenant’s Preface before ‘Gondibert’620 and the introductory
essay to Hobbes’s translation of Ilias and Odyssey entitled ‘Concerning the virtues of a
heroic poem’. Though in principle about poetry, the ideas put forward in these writings
can be applied not only to different genres and forms of literature (such as epic, drama,
sonnet, or epigram), but also to other arts such as history and oratory.
A note on the word poetry is needed. In what follows, poetry will be used in two
major senses: as a general term referring to any kind of written work with some literary
quality, and as a specific term referring to poetry as it is understood also today. Though
it  is  sometimes  hard  to  say  how  Hobbes  uses  the  term,  his  vagueness  reflects  the  17th
century understanding of poetry and literature. Prokhovnik offers a clarification.621 First,
though there were many debates on the nature of both, criticism and philosophy, they
were strictly distinguished from each other in the 17th century. Second, the term
‘literature’ had three major meanings: it could refer to trivium (grammar, logic, and
rhetoric), that is, to the study of language; to philosophical commentaries; and to fictive
writing (literature as it is understood nowadays). Third, poetry was a general term and
poetry an appropriate subject in the study of language.
The standard view of Hobbes’s role in the development of literary theory was put
forward  by  Spingarn,  who  suggested  that  Hobbes  is  significant  for  the  criticism  of  the
time, but in his thought there is no place for imagination or creativity; that Hobbes did
not note the force of imagination to mould things.622 Another, and not totally separate,
characterisation says that Hobbes ‘is a passionate neo-classical’, who ‘deliberately
peruse thath excellent Translation of Hoe by Mr Hobs; The most exact and best translation that e’er I
readout of Greek to English.
There is lately printed in two Volums in Octavo, Mr. Hobes his life at large by Doctor
Blackborn, and eight Tracts more of Mr. Hobes. Both Volums sold for twelve shillings’ (De Mirabilibus
Pecci, 3).
618 Rogow 1988, 68.
619 Elements X.4; Leviathan VIII and Concerning Body IV.XXV.8. There are also some remarks in a
letter to Edward Howard (Correspondence Letter 184, 704-705).
620 Gondibert was a long heroic poem, which Sir William Davenant (1606-1668) composed in 1640s
and which Hobbes commented in the mentioned work. Of Davenant’s life and works, see Mary Edmond,
‘Davenant , Sir William (1606–1668)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University
Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/7197, accessed 10 May 2006] and sources there.
621 Prokhovnik 1991, 57-59.
622 Spingarn 1957, xxviii. Cf. Reik 1977, 133-5. See also Selden 1974 and Woodfield 1980.
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attacks the old style of English verse’.623 Instead of analysing Hobbes’s neo-classicism
(or explaining what the doctrine meant during the time of Hobbes) the author moves on
to explain the causes of Hobbes’s conversion ‘to classicism and his rejection of the
poetic conceit [which] can be traced back to his first full-time preoccupation with
philosophy in Paris’.624 In Paris, Watson explains, Hobbes dedicated himself to the
development of his philosophical ideas in ‘the intensely empirical atmosphere of the
Cartesians grouped around the Abbé Mersenne.’625 After this, rather disconnected
summary, Watson proceeds on the path that has become conventional wisdom and
emphasises that something happened during the writing of Leviathan. The core idea of
Watson’s interpretation is expressed as follows: ‘There is nothing unlikely in the
proposition that a reading by Dryden of Hobbes’s philosophic works in the late 1650's
and 1660's was one decisive cause of his revolution of poetic diction’. The outcome then
is the same as Spingarn’s: Hobbes had an indirect impact on the development of literary
theory in mid-seventeenth century England. A more precise view that reaches roughly
the same conclusion, is provided by Brett, who writes:
There is nothing in this [that is, Hobbes’s theory of literature] contrary to the traditional theory of
the period. On the first of these points Hobbes is echoing Sidney, who wrote of the poet in his
Apologie for Poetrie: “whatsoever the Philosopher sayth should be doone, hee [i.e., the poet]
giveth  a  perfect  picture  of  it  in  some  one,  by  whom  hee  presupposeth  it  was  doone.  So  as  hee
coupleth the generall notion with the particular example.” The second point reaffirms Bacon’s
definition of “the office of Rhetoric” in the Advancement of Learning, which is” ... to apply and
recommend the dictates of reason to imagination in order to excite the appetite and will.626
Brett, then,gives a simple answer to the question to what Hobbes’s contribution to
literary criticism is based on, namely on his ‘empiricist psychology [... ] brought into use
to explain the literary imagination’.627 The ideas introduced above find a careful
treatment Thorpe’s pioneering study of Hobbes’s aesthetics, where both neo-classicism
and the modern psychological views are discussed. Thorpe writes:
In The Answer to Davenant and in The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, though he does not attack any
writer or any system, Hobbes quietly ignores set codes, building his critiques on the psychological
principles he has now advanced. It is true that some of these principles run a broad parallel to
seventeenth-century neoclassic theory. He evolves again theories of unity of action,
verisimilitude, and decorum. He is in accord with the current dictum that poetry is for the delight
623 Watson 1955, 559. Prokhovnik (1991, 88-100), who also labels Hobbes a neo-classicist, points out
that he strongly emphasised didactic function of poetry.
624 Watson 1955, 559.
625 Watson 1955, 559. For a critical note on Watson, see Gang 1956.
626 Brett 1971, 46.
627 Brett 1971, 47.
- 156 -
and instruction of mankind; in spite of his strong tendency toward realism, he admits a species of
ideal imitation.628
Thorpe’s summary is in accordance with the original text. Hobbes’s theory of art and
style could be described by two epithets: imitation and naturalism. This is summarised,
for instance, in The Answer to Davenant: ‘For in him that professes the imitation of
nature, as all poets do, what greater fault can there be, than to betray an ignorance of
nature in his poem’629 and again in The Virtues of an Heroic Poem:  ‘For  a  Poet  is  a
painter,  and  should  paint  actions  to  the  understanding  with  the  most  decent  words,  as
painters do persons and bodies with the choicest colours, to the eye’.630 However, both
imitation and naturalism should be understood in a specific way, which has some points
of contact with Hobbes’s psychology.
A sober mind should not to go beyond experience, this is clear, but, as I have tried
to explain in earlier chapters in relation to Hobbes’s psychology and epistemology, this
tenet should not be taken literally. Imitation does not mean that a poet is only allowed to
describe things as they are. Instead, ‘[b]eyond the actual works of nature a poet may
now [that is, in the time of Hobbes] go; but beyond the conceived possibility of nature,
never’.631 This is a peculiar kind of imitation (Thorpe’s ‘species of ideal imitation’),
which is bound to the sphere of the natural world, but not in a narrow empiristic manner.
The  second  major  quality  of  art  and  style,  naturalism,  refers  not  so  much  to  the
idea that, as human inventions, art and style could not transcend sensation, but to the
way in which reality should be described. The expression of the poet, Hobbes writes, ‘is
nothing but experience and knowledge of nature, and specially human nature; and is the
true and natural colour’.632 In particular, naturalism refers to ‘novelty of expression’, by
which Hobbes means that a poet should economically use ordinary words in a way that
unveils something unexpected.633
In what follows, the focus will be on Thorpe’s intuition that the originality of
Hobbes’s aesthetics is in ‘psychological principles he has now [that is, the 1650s]
advanced’.  This  seems  to  fit  in  well  with  the  general  picture  of  Hobbes,  but  again  the
original text may surprise us by its complexity.
628 Thorpe 1940, 156.
629 The Answer to Davenant, 453.
630 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vi.
631 The Answer to Davenant, 452.
632 The Answer to Davenant, 452.
633 The Answer to Davenant, 453-454.
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WIT AND ART
Hobbes’s theory of human nature says that all thinking is the succession of phantasms
and that a wise person is the one who notes the similarities and the differences between
phantasms. This ability to observe similarities and dissimilarities between things generate
coherent thoughts and is made better by the acquisition of certain pre-linguistic forms of
reasoning, but above all by language and reasoning. Hobbes’s notion of wit tries to
describe this emergence of coherence from a particular point of view.
It is not an accident that when Hobbes starts to discuss some developed forms of
human thinking, he directly adopts the idea of succession and comparison.634 It would,
however, be a simplification to understand this only in pre-linguistic terms. Succesion
and comparisons are also about how to express thoughts with a certain type of language.
Witty thinking, it appears, is something above a clear series of memories or even political
plotting, but below rational philosophical arguments.
In Hobbes, wit is used to describe two things: types of human abilities and these
abilities in particular.635 In Chapter VIII of Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes between
natural and acquired wit. The former is central in the arts, whereas reason, the only
acquired wit man may possess,636 is typical of philosophy. The distinction between
natural and acquired wit is, however, misleading in one respect.
Wit, according to Hobbes’s redefinition, is an intellectual virtue. This means that
wit  ‘is  valued  for  eminence’,  that  is  to  say,  a  virtue  is  some kind  of  an  excellence  that
‘men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves’, and because it is an intellectual
virtue, it is some kind of excellence of mind,637 not, say, the ability to kill a buffalo with
one’s bare hands. What is, however, salient in the coupling of wit and virtue is the more
familiar aspect of virtue, namely that virtues are in some degree socially determined. This
raises the theoretical point according to which virtue is a relational concept: we do want
to be like others. If A and B behave in a certain way that is taken to be something worth
attending to; for example, if A and B speak French, C sees this activity as virtuous, even
though C may think that Russian is a more elegant language.638 Virtues reflect social
valuations in a more or less direct and relevant way. The next issue the notion of virtue
introduces is the status of intellectual virtues among Hobbes’s epistemic forms. Lastly,
and this will be discussed in the latter section of the chapter, there is a contrast that arises
634 Hobbes uses same kinds of wordings: ‘observe their differences, and dissimilitudes […] are said to
have a good Judgement.’ (Leviathan VIII, 33. Cf. Elements X.4, 61-2). For a discussion, see Reik 1977,
144-5.
635 For discussion of Hobbes’s conception of wit, see Spingarn 1957, xxviii-xxxi.
636 Leviathan VIII, 35.
637 Leviathan, VIII, 32.
638 The example derives from the works of Dostoyevski in which the fashion of the 19th-century Russian
nobility to speak French instead of their native tongue is often satirised. See especially The Possessed.
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when Hobbes’s idea of intellectual virtues is contrasted with relation to his naturalistic
conception of style. If Hobbes claims that a writer should avoid scrupulous, foreign
expressions, and should aim at a simple but innovative – and it can be added, vernacular
– style, purified of vain snobbery and immediately clear for the reader, his emphasis on
social factors is, if not contradictory, at least problematic.
NATURAL WIT AND VIRTUE
Natural wit is based on experience and ‘consisteth principally in two things; Celerity of
Imagining (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and steddy direction to
some approved end’; in brief, it ‘consisteth in comparison’, which involves two
operations: fancy (or combining) and judgement (or distinguishing).639
The second quality of natural wit (‘a steddy direction to approved end’) is
interesting. Hobbes’s general idea here is that:
necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End;
that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily
fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onley by illustration of his discourse and adorning it
with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity of their invention.640
What is clear is that all thinking must be regulated and, additionally, that the regulation is
done by an appropriate language. What is not clear is what kind of appropriate languages
there can be, and, especially, what is an approved end. These questions must however be
postponed until fancy and judgement are defined in the context of wit and arts.
Thus  far  the  thesis  has  discussed  three  different  kinds  of  fancy  that  appear  in
Hobbes’s  philosophy.  The  first  is  fancy  as  a  part  of  imagination  and  the  second  is  the
fancy  we find  in  the  working  of  memory.  The  third  is  fancy  as  a  part  of  generation  of
genuine scientific knowledge. There is one more conception of fancy in Hobbes: fancy as
a prime mover of poetry and, more general, in good literary style.641
Poetic fancy can be considered a form of conceivability, though different from
those discussed earlier. To define it broadly, a poetic fancy is the ability to express one’s
ideas in a smooth language that is in harmony with, first, the rules of genre, and, second,
with  the  subject  a  text  speaks  of.  It  is  related  to  style  and  finds  a  number  of  different
639 Leviathan VIII,  32.  It  is  likely  that  Hobbes’s  notion  of  wit  was  influenced by such literary  men as
Ben  Jonson,  see  Reik  1977,  15.  However  Reik’s  claim  (ibid.) that Hobbes belongs ‘to the end of the
Renaissance period rather than to the Restoration or the beginning of the Enlightenment in England’ is
an odd statement – especially in the light of what she writes a few pages later: ‘It is true that Hobbes was
no Renaissance man, no poet-courtier-prophet-statesmen-lover’ (Reik 1977, 19). A simpler answer could
be that Hobbes’s ideas on literature and art were more traditional (or, classical) than his ideas on
philosophy.
640 Leviathan VIII, 33.
641 For a summative discussion, see Hinnant 1976.
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forms, depending on what kind of literature we are dealing with. In relation to arts, fancy
could be characterised as the similarity of surprise, because Hobbes emphasises that a
writer should aim at novelty of expression. This does not mean, as Hobbes underlines,
adopting foreign words and idioms. Instead a writer should use language familiar to his
readers and show how ordinary words find new meanings. This ‘copious imagery
discreetly ordered’ is the basis of poetic similarities.642 It is not similarity in the semantic
sense, but the similarity of emotions and the excitation of mind between a performer and
a receiver. Fancy focuses on this and it seeks by language to raise a certain mood in the
reader’s mind. Fancy, then, consists of certain technical skills that can be acquired by
practising writing, but especially by reading masters like Homer and Virgil. Regardless of
Hobbes’s swift characterisations, by itself fancy is not of much use, but needs regulation
of judgement.
Judgement is in a number of ways a more complicated operation in Hobbes’s
theory of wit. In its basic form it is a capacity to make distinctions. Aside from this
formal definition, judgement is in a sense prior to fancy, because ‘Fancy, without the help
of Judgement, is not commended as a virtue, but the later which is Judgement and
Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy’.643 Judgement is also
important when trying to understand the second part of Hobbes’s general definition of
wit. Judgement regulates fancy in two ways. First, by evaluating the formulations of
fancy on the basis of the criteria of a discourse, say, comedy. Second, judgement
evaluates the contents of fancy and their appropriateness to serve human flourishing.
What this means in practice will be explained below when discussing poetic virtues, here
it is sufficient to add that the regulative function of judgement is discourse-dependant,
that is, what may pass in rhetoric may not be appropriate to poetry.
With these remarks it is possible to give an account of the epistemic status of wit.
Natural wit (fancy and judgement) is based on experience only, not reason. This Hobbes
confirms in the The Answer to Davenant:
Time and education beget experience; experience begets memory; memory begets judgment and
fancy; judgment begets the strength and structure, and fancy begets the ornaments of a poem. The
ancients therefore fabled not absurdly, in making Memory the mother of the Muses. For memory
is the world, though not really, yet so as in a looking-glass, in which the judgment, the severer
sister, busieth herself in a grave and rigid examination of all the parts of nature, and in
registering by letters their order, causes, uses, differences, and resemblances; whereby the fancy,
when any work of art is to be performed, finds her materials at hand and prepared for use, and
needs no more than a swift motion over them, that what she wants, and is there to be had, may
not lie too long unespied.644
642 The Answer to Davenant, 449.
643 Leviathan VIII, 33.
644 The Answer to Davenant, 449.
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Hobbes’s  theory  of  natural  wit,  then,  explains  the  psychology  of  the  creative  process.
The other aspects of wit, coupling it with intellectuality and social behaviour, are
however also important, because they reveal certain valuations and ideals, which Hobbes
holds, and, again, which wit as an intellectual virtue is supposed to reflect.
The  answer  to  the  question  posed  in  the  introductory  part  of  this  section  is
relatively simple. Wit belongs to the class of knowledge of facts, but in a special way.
Whereas, for example, truths in physics are, at their best, empirical generalisations, the
expressions of wit, like those in poetry, are felicitous descriptions of human nature. Their
reliability is poor, but they give some idea what human nature is, say, that men are
vainglorious. Wit, as a capacity, however, is valued. Hobbes’s reflections seem to
suggest that people who are able to express themselves in a clear and elegant way have a
some kind of gift or human excellence, which should not be taken as insignificant.
However, in a letter Hobbes seems to contradict to what he has written in The
Answer to Davenant. He writes: ‘For what authority there is in wit? A jester may have it;
a man in drink may have it; be fluent over night, and wise and dry in the morning. What
is it? Or who can tell whether it be better to have it or be without it, especially if it be a
pointed wit?’645 Hobbes’s  note  is  apt  folk-psychology.  Persons  happy  in  the  haze  of  a
drunken hour are sometimes swift, but naturally this is not to be compared with proper
and  serious  poetry.  Authentic  authority  of  wit  and  of  poetry  is  of  certain  sort.  Here  a
summative note on what constitutes this authority is sufficient. The mastery of wit,
consists of a right balance between fancy and judgement and on presenting certain moral
ends and in this way both, the entertaining and the pedagogical function of wit is fulfilled.
Wit, it can be rephrased, constitutes art, but a consequent question arises: what is
art? Some general remarks were given, but in what follows I will try to explain not only
the background of Hobbes’s reflection of art, but also what arts consist of and what the
status of the arts is in Hobbes’s thought.
HOBBES’S CONCEPTION OF THE ARTS
It is a general view that the classical curriculum of trivium and quadrivium slowly eroded
when we reach the 17th century.646 Whether or not this is really so, Hobbes’s conception
of art had its predecessors. In the opening of pages of Part II of his monumental Reason
and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes,  Skinner  reflects  on  the  question  of
intellectual origins of Hobbes’s thinking:
Although this view of Hobbes as ‘formed’ by the scientific revolution is widely shared, it is part
of my purpose to suggest that there is something misleading about it. [...] If we re-examine
645 Correspondence Letter 184, 704-705. For Howard, see ‘Biographical register’, in Correspondence
839-840.
646 For a balanced view of the development, see Serjeantson 1999.
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Hobbes’s life and studies during his earlier years of obscurity, and if we reflect on the range of
works  he  published  prior  to  the  appearance  of De Cive, we find that his intellectual formation
was overwhelmingly indebted not to the culture of science but rather to the humanist literary
culture.647
My aim here is not to contribute to this question, but to study how Hobbes understood
the arts, which were important in the humanist curriculum Skinner speaks of.648 In  his
essay on humanism in a textbook, Kristeller offers a compact treatment of the subject:
The word ‘humanity’ and its derivatives were associated with ‘liberal’ education by several
Roman writers, especially Cicero and Gellius. The term was revived by Petrarch, Salutati and
others in the fourteenth century, and by the middle of the fifteenth century it came to stand for a
well-defined cycle of studies, called studia humanitatis, which included grammatica, rhetorica,
poetica, historia and philosophia moralis, as these terms were then understood. Unlike the liberal
arts of the earlier Middle ages, the humanities did not include logic or the quadrivium
(arithmetica, geometria, astronomia and musica), and unlike the fine arts of the eighteenth
century they did not include the visual arts, music, dancing or gardening. The humanities also
failed to include the disciplines that were the chief subjects of instruction at the universities
during the later Middle Ages and throughout the Renaissance, such as theology, jurisprudence
and medicine, and the philosophical disciplines other than ethics, such as logic, natural
philosophy and metaphysics.649
This should not however mislead us. Firstly, as Kristeller points out, the Renaissance was
just one of many intellectual currents of the time. Scholastic philosophy in its many forms
still stayed in the arena and developed. Secondly, as Kristeller points out in his article, a
separate disciplinary evolution (especially in philosophy) took place, though this was
influenced by humanism. Thirdly, and this Kristeller does not mention, though logic, in
its narrow, terministic sense, was looked down on in humanist education, this does not
mean that its questions and problems were not discussed. Grammar and more broadly
philological inquiry touched on many of the questions of logic. These general remarks
should be kept in mind when analysing Hobbes’s conception of the arts.
Hobbes actually has two classifications of art:650 a taxonomical and psychological
one based on the balance between fancy and judgement. These two classifications, of
course, come together, but there is reason to analyse them separately because this reveals
certain background ideas of Hobbes’s theory of the arts.
647 Skinner 1996, 216-217.
648 The notion of art can, of course, be traced back to Aristotle and his notion of technê, which can be
translated as art, skill, or technique. See Ethica Nicomachea 1105a22-1105b2; 1140a1-24 and 1197a4-
11.
649 Kristeller 1988, 113-114. Kristeller refers to Cicero’s Pro Archia I.I-II.4 and Aulus Gellius’s Noctes
Atticae, XIII.17.1. For how the humanistic disciplines were understood, see Kristeller 1988, 118-127.
650 See Leviathan VIII, 33-34. Cf. Critique du ‘De Mundo’, I.3, 107.
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The taxonomic classification says that the arts include history, poetry, music, and
rhetoric, or at least that is what we find when we combine the table of sciences in
Leviathan and the preceding Medieval and Renaissance taxonomies.651 Elsewhere
however, Hobbes adds logic and geometry to the arts.652 These characterisations raise at
least two questions: why does Hobbes speak of logic and geometry as arts, and what is
the basis of his classification? The short answer is that both refer to the traditional
understanding of disciplines as a part of the liberal arts, and, in particular, logic refers
here to the broad sense of the term as it was understood in the Medieval and Renaissance
curriculums.653 Furthermore, Hobbes’s characterisation of geometry as an art needs to be
taken to refer to the first meaning of art, mentioned in the introductory section, that is,
art  as  a  general  mastery  and  not  to  geometry  as  a  part  of  the quadrivium. What is
perhaps already clear is that Hobbes’s treatment of the arts corresponds only loosely
with the strict educational sense of the Medieval and Renaissance conceptions, and is
instead a distant heir of the Renaissance idea of art as mastery.
The two arts Hobbes discusses more broadly are history and poetry. He mentions
other arts, but the discussion is not as systematic as in the case of history and poetry.
Additionally, when Hobbes writes on rhetoric (or oratory, or eloquence), instead of
analysing the art itself, he concentrates on criticising eloquence. In the case of music and,
perhaps, astronomy, the problem is that Hobbes’s treatment is scarce.654 In the table of
science, music stands side by side with optics.655 Both belong to the branch of natural
philosophy that studies ‘consequences from the qualities of animals in general’, and
whereas optics studies ‘consequences from Vision’, music studies ‘consequences from
Sounds’.656 Taking into account the fact that Hobbes wrote two treatises on optics, that
he quite often speaks of it in a positive fashion, a reader finds his taciturnity about music
strange, but perhaps he is here following the intellectual fashion of the age. Concerning
astronomy, it is safe to conclude that Hobbes considered it a part of natural philosophy,
651 Howell (1956) offers a viewpoint worth mentioning. In the introduction of his work, he points out
that in the 16th and the 17th century, poetry, rhetoric, and logic were understood as the principal forms of
communication. Of these poetry was the figural way, rhetoric and logic the literal ways to communicate.
Only later were the three separated. There is, to my mind, traces of this kind of thinking in Hobbes’s
discussion of these three arts.
652 Critique du ‘De Mundo’ I.
653 A useful introduction to the notion of art is Gilbert 1960 (especially Chapter two). Arts as a part of
the medieval curriculum originates in the handbook and commentary tradition of Rome in the early
centuries AD and in particular Martianus Capellas’s De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae written in the
early fifth century (see Reynolds and Wilson 1991, 32-33).
654 There is some evidence that Hobbes was interested in music both as a listener and a practitioner.
Aubrey writes that ‘Mr T.H. was much addicted to music, and practised on the bass viol’ (Brief Lives,
234).
655 The idea of music as a part of natural philosophy is also found in an earlier work of Hobbes. In
Critique du ‘De Mundo’ (I.1, 106), he says that music belongs to the mathematical part of philosophy.
656 Leviathan IX, 40.
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and his conception of astronomy appears to bear only an ostensive resemblance to the
older conceptions of astronomy.
If we move to the second major classification, the psychological one, a summary is
provided in a paragraph of Chapter VIII of Leviathan, which tells the following. In good
poetry a writer should always look for a combination of fancy and judgement, so that the
former  dominates,  whereas  in  good  history  fancy  is  an  instrument  of  style  and  the
judgement must dominate.657 In orations, whether aimed to praise or condemn, the fancy
is again predominant, but judgement must be used to decide ‘what circumstances make
an action laudable, or culpable’, when in exhorting or pleading it depends on the
particular situation which one is to be used.658
To conclude, though Hobbes’s discussion of the arts may appear confusing, it is
safe to say that his conception of the arts is a hybrid of the classical, Medieval, and
Renaissance ideas on the arts. Secondly, Hobbes’s discussion concentrates on two arts,
history and poetry.
HISTORY AND POETICS
Hobbes defines history as ‘the Register of Knowledge of Fact’.659 It  is  not listed in the
table of sciences, but Hobbes speaks of it briefly in Chapter IX of Leviathan.660 Firstly,
history can be of two kinds, natural and civil. Natural history ‘is the History of such
Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependence on Mans Will’ and civil history ‘is
the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths’.661 This division is
generally correct, but misses some forms of history we are able to find from the works of
Hobbes. Hobbes’s own historical works include the translation of Thucydides’ History of
the Peloponnesian War with an introductory essay, Behemoth, and Historia
Ecclesiastica.662 To these can be added numerous fragments in other works, say,
Hobbes’s histories of Western philosophy that appear in Chapter XLVI of Leviathan and
657 See also Thycudides, xx.
658 Leviathan VIII, 33.
659 Leviathan IX, 40. On Hobbes and history see the collection of the essays edited by Rogers and Sorell
(2000), especially Schuhmann’s (2000) essay. On the sources of Hobbes’s conception of history and his
idea of history writing, see also Skinner 1996, 235-236.
660 Rogow (1988, Chapter IV) gives a detailed discussion of the translation process of Thucydides. Some
scholars have emphasised similarities between Hobbes’s and Bacon’s view of history. See Rogow 1988,
67 and Bunce 2003, 100. The latter also emphasises the role of Diodorus Siculus and John Dee. Both
works, Siculus’s history and Dee’s 1570 translation of Euclid which included a short of history of
mathematics, are in the Chatsworth Catalogue, see (respectively), II, 41 and 99.
661 Leviathan VIII, 40.
662 Vaughan (2002) has proposed that Behemoth is a concrete example of Hobbes’s educational
programme and in his work Vaughan sees history as a form of education.
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in Behemoth663 and  a  legal  history  contained  in  the Dialogue.  These  are  all  sources  on
how he understood history. The second point is that the distinction in Chapter IX of
Leviathan omits ecclesiastical history, which is an important part of Hobbes’s
philosophical project. Thus though history is not a science in the strong sense of the
word, it has many roles in Hobbes’s philosophy.
Whether it is ecclesiastical or a history of animals, Hobbes took history to have
certain general features. First, history deals with belief and faith. Hobbes writes:
To have faith in, or trust to, or beleeve a man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the
veracity of the man: But to beleeve what is said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the
saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase I beleeve in, as also the Latine, Credo in; and the
Greek ??????? ??? are  never  used  but  in  the  writings  of  Divines.  In  stead  of  them,  in  other
writings are put: I beleeve him; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him: and in Latin,
Credo illi, fido illi: and in Greek, ????????????:664
History is a discourse based on witnessing and testimony. The use of the Christian faith
as a paradigm of this kind of discourse would be puzzling, but Hobbes’s critical attitude
towards the study of the Bible is helpful here. The Bible is written by man and therefore
we should be cautious about what is said in the book, not everything is the word of God,
but many parts of the Bible, for instance the Pentateuch, are words concerning God.665 It
is not then a surprise when Hobbes a few lines later concludes that:
And so it is also with all other History [than the history in Scriptures]. For if I should not believe
all that is written by Historians of the glorious acts of Alexander or Caesar,  I  do  not  think  the
Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar,  had  any  just  cause  to  be  offended;  or  anybody  else,  but  the
Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not
God therein, but Livy.666
This gives a fairly clear idea of the incompleteness of historical inquiry, and what Hobbes
simply suggests is criticism.667 The article on the subject matter of philosophy in
Concerning Body summarises the point: ‘history, as well natural as political [is excluded
663 Behemoth 277-281.
664 Leviathan VII, 31.
665 The distinction appears in Leviathan XXXVI, 222.
666 Leviathan VII, 32. Curley (Hobbes 1994, 37, note 4), following Tricaud (Hobbes 1971, 63), has
commented the passage. Curley argues that Livy does not say anywhere exactly what Hobbes claims he
says, which is incorrect. Livy (1929, II, 35) writes how cows speak. Secondly, Curley argues that the
example is not ‘well chosen’ in the sense that it is historically incorrect. Perhaps so, but it can be
considered well chosen from another point of view: it is really an effective illustration of how uncritical
men, even educated ones, can be. Thirdly, Curley’s further remark, namely that ‘different difficulty’
would emerge, if only Hobbes had chosen to use ‘the analogous story of Balaam and the ass’ (for the
story see Numbers 22:28-30) remains obscure.
667 Particularly instructive is his discussion of the translation history of Thucydides’ History of the
Peloponnesian War. See EW VIII, viii-ix.
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from philosophy, because], though most useful (nay necessary) to philosophy’.668 From
this it does not follow that there is not a good history or even less that historians should
not follow certain principles in their work. Before dealing with the three specific forms of
history Hobbes distinguishes, a remark on the other principal art he discusses.
As already noted, throughout his life Hobbes showed an interest in literature. But
what this precisely means is unclear. Some earlier studies have emphasised the role of the
art of rhetoric in Hobbes,669 although  his  attitude  towards  rhetoric  is  often  considered
controversial. One, rather typical, characterisation is given by Rogow, who writes that
Hobbes considered rhetoric as ‘the impassioned and emotional appeals of demagogues
(such as those of Cleon in the History)’.670 In the second sub-section below, this view is
not so much questioned as complemented by introducing an analysis of Hobbes’s theory
of poetry.
NATURAL, CIVIL, AND ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY
In Leviathan, Hobbes articulates a special place among the arts for history in the
following fashion: ‘[i]n a good History the Judgement must be eminent; because the
goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions that
are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the stile’.671
History, though based on believing to someone’s word, should be governed by
judgement, which can itself be an intellectual virtue and as such is then a sovereign part
of a rational inquiry. Even so, Hobbes appears to think that even good history can at its
best give examples that illustrate philosophical ideas. For instance, in Leviathan he writes
that:
[T]he Latines did alwayes distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia; ascribing the former to
Experience, the latter to Science. But to make their difference appeare more clearly, let us
suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling armes; and
another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science of where he can offend, or be
offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would
be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull, but the latter infallible. But
they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that
trusting to the false rules of a master of Fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that
either kills, or disgraces him.672
668 Concerning Body I.1.8, 10.
669 Johnston 1986, Prokhovnik 1991, and Skinner 1996.
670 Rogow 1988, 79. The history is, almost needless to add, Thucydides’s history of Peloponnesian wars.
671 Leviathan VIII, 33.
672 Leviathan V, 22. For somewhat more concrete reflections, see the famous passage that civil
philosophy is no older than Hobbes’s De Cive (Concerning Body, ‘Epistle Dedicatory’, ix) and the
critique of imitation (Leviathan XXIX, 170). Another well-known, if a less straightforward, critique is
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As a rule of thumb, to establish political philosophy in history is a chimera, because
‘[s]ignes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember
all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible’.673
In a similar vein, natural history can hardly be anything more than illustrations.
There is, however, a function that natural history can fulfil and which Hobbes brings out,
for example, while discussing the study of comets in Critique du ‘De Mundo’. He notes
that one of the errors of scientists who studied comets was that they did not give
appropriate  attention  to  the  history  of  the  study  of  comets.  If  they  had  done  this,  they
would have understood the possible causes of some features of comets better.674 In brief,
aside being illustrative history can also give basis for empirical generalisations.
A representative treatment of the method of history is Hobbes’s introductory essay
to his translation of Thucydides in whom ‘the faculty of writing history is at the
highest’.675 Thucydides is the culmination of another maxim of Hobbes’s historiography,
namely that the historian can take sides, but in order to avoid becoming fixed in one
position  he  must  remain  an  outsider.  This  is  what  Hobbes  praises  in  Thucydides  when
introducing his analysis of democracy.
History is above all then educational: ‘the principal and proper work of [civil]
history’ is ‘to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past, to bear
themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future’. More
specifically, a historian, such as Thucydides, can make the ‘auditor a spectator’, that is,
to describe the past in such a way and in such an order that a reader can feel that he lives
in the throes of the actions. However, this is not mere entertainment, which Hobbes
despises: ‘for the greatest part, men came to the reading of history with an affection
much like that of the people in Rome: who came to the spectacle of the gladiators with
more delight to behold their blood, than their skill in fencing’.676
Let  us  move  from the  person  of  the  historian  to  his  narration.  The  virtues  of  the
historian are truth and elocution, which are the soul and body of history; ‘The latter
without the former, is but a picture of history; and the former without the latter unapt to
instruct’.677 Truth, Hobbes continues, is present especially in Thucydides’s frankness and
ability to speak against the times. Instead of writing to ‘win present applause, as was the
Hobbes’s discussion of political philosophy in On the Citizen (‘Preface to Readers, 7-8). The assignment
of fencing to sovereign conduct also appears in On the Citizen XIII.8, 145, where Hobbes refers to
Demosthenes’s Phillipici (I.40-1) as a source of the idea. Raylor (2000) offers some historical and
theoretical insights how the last sentence of the quotation could be understood.
673 Leviathan V, 22.
674 Critique du ‘De Mundo’, VIII.2, 153.
675 Thucydides, viii.
676 All quotations are from Thucydides, vii-ix.
677 Thucydides, xx.
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use of that age’, he wrote ‘to instruct the ages to come’.678 Later in the essay Hobbes
defends Thucydides against Herodotus, and depicts the former as a modest historian who
does not go beyond what he has himself been able to confirm. ‘Herodotus’, Hobbes
writes, ‘undertook to write of those things, of which it was impossible for him to know
the truth; and which delight more the ear with fabulous narrations, than satisfy the mind
with truth: but Thucydides writeth one war; which, how it was carried from the
beginning to the end, he was able certainly to inform himself’.679 Hobbes is dramatically
surprised why some have considered this kind of history less significant, for the
Peloponnesian war ‘was a great war and worthy to be known; and not be concealed from
posterity, for the calamities that then fell upon the Greacians’ are a lesson to all
mankind.680
The second virtue of Thucydides, which Hobbes now calls the ‘disposition or
method’ is the way in which Thucydides arranges the course of events. Depicted events
are  preceded  by  tools  for  readers  to  understand  the  ‘grounds  and  motives  of  every
action’681 and followed by the judgement of the author. His detailed style, which was, if
we believe Hobbes, acknowledged by many ancient authors, is characterised by
perspicuity or by grave and august language. Cicero puts it as follows: ‘he is so full of
matter, that the number of his sentences doth almost reach the number of his words; and
in his words he is so apt and so close, that it is hard to say whether his words do more
illustrate his sentence, or his sentences his words’.682
Though the introductory essay to the translation of Thucydides is mainly about his
excellence as a historian, it includes an interesting and significant sub-theme: the critique
of a certain kind of history. Hobbes chooses Dionysius Halicarnassus as his target.683
Hobbes uses rather familiar words when describing this type of history: ‘I think there was
never  written  so  much  absurdity  in  so  few  lines’.684 Hobbes is clearly indignant at
Halicarnassus’s way of promoting history as entertainment, which consists of the
following ‘virtues of a historiographer’ such as ‘affection to his country; study to please
the hearer; to write more than his argument leads him to; and to conceal all actions that
were not to the honour of his country’.685 Aside from these ‘[m]ost manifest vices’,
678 Thucydides, xxi.
679 Thucydides, xxiv.
680 Thucydides, xxiv.
681 Thucydides, xxi.
682 Cited in Thucydides, xxiii. The reference is to De Oratore II.xiii.56, 239.
683 This is, of course, not random. Dionysius was, as Hobbes’s discussion highlights, a critic of
Thucydides.
684 Thucydides, xxvi. Compare this to his judgement of Aristotle’s politics in Leviathan XLVI, 370.
685 Thucydides, xxvi.
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Halicarnassus was ‘a rhetorician’.686 In brief, Halicarnassus represents all the possible
vices of a historiographer and his critique of Thucydides is not a valid one.
Hobbes’s tune changes, in many ways, when we turn to ecclesiastical history. This
seems to be an insignificant part of human learning, for what could be further from
science than the history of theological matters; history is merely a matter of prudence and
theology a specious science which studies things that are beyond human comprehension
and philosophy. But to make this conclusion is to ignore, among other things, Hobbes’s
practice, which shows that it is here where his critical philosophical attitude is at work. A
careful and sober conceptual analysis of the Scripture and a critical knowledge of the
history of Christianity are perfect tools to ‘detect all your [that is, the clergy] cheates
from Aaron to yourselves’.687
Biblical criticism plays a significant part in Leviathan and especially the 1668 Latin
edition of the work to which is added two extrachapters, one on the Nicene Creed and
one on heresy. The critical humanist ethos is also demonstrated in a separate short piece
entitled An Historical Narration Concerning Heresy, And the Punishment thereof,
which is a careful philological and historical study of the conception of heresy.688 Strictly
taken, these works are not ecclesiastical history for they concentrate on the analysis of a
doctrine or a concept, but there are many similarities between them and Hobbes’s single
work on sacred history, Historia Ecclesiastica.
The first thing in Historia Ecclesiastica that may strike a reader is that it is written
in verse. If we believe the editor of the 1722 English translation of the work, this was not
however uncommon.689 In the preface of the translation it reads:
Our Author chose to cloath his Sentiments in Verse, because the Oracles of Apollo were utter’d
in Heroicks; and Pythagoras, that great Master of Wisdom would suffer none of his Precepts to
Appear, without the Sanction of the Muses.
Ovid wrote his Books in a flowing Stile, and other have compos’d their Histories in a Vein much
swelling and exalted ; but why may it not be proper (having Horace for a Guide Guide) to
proceed in a Familiar way? And with the same Success, expose heinous Crimes, in a jocose
manner.690
Aside from being in prestigious company, Hobbes, according to the editor, has mainly
pedagogical reasons for choosing this genre doing it ‘only for the Help of Memory’.691 If
686 Ibid.
687 This is Hobbes’s comment to a priest that came to his sickbed in Paris at the end of the 1640s . See
Brief Lives (Clarke), 357-358.
688 The work was composed at sometimes in the 1660s or 1670s and published in 1680.
689 Lessay (2000, 148) correctly considers the 1722 translation unreliable, but I have decided to use the
translation for it is in line with Hobbes’s mental world. The translation would deserve a study of its own.
690 ‘PREFACE by the EDITOR’ (in Hobbes 1722, 1-2). Preface does not have pagination, so the
pagination refers to the pages from the beginning of the preface.
691 ‘PREFACE by the EDITOR’, 2.
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we believe the editor, education is the main concern of the whole piece. Hobbes’s aim is
to  tell  ‘how greedily do these spiritual Oedipus’s every where delight to pursue their
sacred Riddles, sweating in a new field of Mysteries, and, being blinded with an
unwonted Light’.692
Though this ethos bears a resemblance to the natural history of religion expounded
in  Chapter  XII  of Leviathan, Hobbes’s history starts with some remarks on the
relationship between church and the state, which, however, quickly give way to the
discussion of pre-Christian religions, substantial space being dedicated to the ancient
custom of worshipping the moon, Phoebus.693 Hobbes’s analysis here appears to touch
on pagan religions, the theme is a familiar one and culminates in the following
judgement:
The Greeks [before they ‘invented philosophy’] were Jugglers, noted far and wide,
Whou sought to cozen all the World beside ;
These grand Impostors would no Prophets chuse
But train’d, and moulded to their proper Use :
Old Logick-choppers, in each corner lay,
Who bawl’d for Pence, and led the Mob astray
Their public Calling, did to Discord tend,
And Wrong and Right, promiscuously to bend.694
Historia Ecclesiastica is not only peculiar in its form, but also in style. The latter is
described by Primus, Hobbes’s alter ego, as follows: ’Your chiefest Pleasure lies the
Point to strain, And shew your Sharpness in Satirick Vein’.695 This  is  manifest,  for
instance, in the discussion of indulgence:
The fourth, all Crimes will, for your Alms relieve;
But ceases purging, when cease to give ;
There, by the Silver Streams, that daily flow,
Black Charcoal Sins are wash’d as white as Snow:
[...]
Each weary Soul, with Superstition blind,
Left both his Money, and his Sins behind ;696
692 ‘PREFACE by the EDITOR’, 5-6.
693 Of the overall structure of the work, see Lessay 2000, 149.
694 A True Ecclesiastical History, 23 (358). When evaluated appropriate, I have indicated in brackets
the corresponding place in the original Latin text as it appears in OL, V, but since the 1722 translation
is rather free, the references are not always one-to-one. Names, for instance, may not appear.
695 A True Ecclesiastical History, 33.
696 A True Ecclesiastical History, 166 and 182.
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The contents, too, are somewhat unorthodox, for Hobbes does speak at length on the
fate of Socrates and the development of philosophy. This is not random for a central
theme in Historia Ecclesiastica (and the one that connects it to Leviathan and the just
mentioned shorter studies of aspects of Christianity) is Hobbes’s critique of the
philosophical abuse of religion. In Historia Ecclesiastica this is phrased as follows:
The highest Honours always were conferr’d
On those, whom Logick, not Religion rear’d;
Their grand Ambition, and their darling Pride,
Was, that the Learn’d might o’er the Flock preside ;697
However, the clergy who deliberately seek to use philosophy to justify its unjust rule
were not only immoral, but often stupid and vain; ‘Their Brains are empty, but their
Beards profound’.698
When turning to the history of early Christianity, this is to Hobbes pretty much the
history of the development of sectarianism and of the gradual forgetting of the teachings
of Christ. The Word was perverted by vain speculations of synods, people were led
astray, and the justified power of earthly rulers was taken away from them. This situation
can lead to only one result: ‘But now the Pope his End compleatly gains, And leads the
People, and their Prince, in Chains’.699
In its cruelty, plotting, and degradation of the teachings of Christ, the church
overcomes the great satanic beasts the Leviathan and the Behemoth:
Such monsters Africk never could produce,
None such could flow from Circe’s pois’nous Juice ;
So strangely haggard seem’d her antique Face,
Her very Footsteps you could hardly trace :
Under a Mask their Priests the Lands deceive,
They scatter Treasons, which the Rout receive ;700
All this, predictably, changes when we come to the Reformation. Hobbes summarises the
core idea of the Reformation: ‘Since ev’ry Subject has a thinking Soul, Which less, than
Papal Pow’r, can ne’er controul’ and asks ‘But now, since Miracles are plainly ceas’d,
How stands the Credit of the lying Priest?’.701 Also important is the change from Latin to
the vernacular:
697 A True Ecclesiastical History, 63 (370).
698 A True Ecclesiastical History, 63 (370).
699 A True Ecclesiastical History, 97 (381).
700 A True Ecclesiastical History, 102 (382-383). On Leviathan and Behemoth, see page 98 (381).
701 A True Ecclesiastical History, 102 (383) and 105 (383-384).
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For, by this Time, the Latin Language ceas’d,
Which for some Ages had this Clime possess’d,
And many barb’rous Pedantries conduce,
To patch the Language, now in vulgar Use :
So the same People, who were blind before,
By Popish Mists, that Spread their Sense o’er,
Stand now amaz’d at such a shocking Theme ;
For all the Pray’rs in use were Arabick to them :
The Priests alone the Scriptures understand,
Who read the ancient Language of the Land,
But the deaf Audience know but How, and When,
With hollow Tone, to tout a long A M E N ;702
Hobbes’s affinity with the Reformation though culminates to the following lines:
But LUTHER once from German Coasts will come,
To blast the Honours, and the Pomp of Rome ;
He’ll set their pious Fraud to publick Show,
And, with his Saxon Thunder, strike them low.703
Historia Ecclesiastica combines  two  features  that  I  take  to  be  central  in  Hobbes’s
philosophical thinking: a critical stance and a candid way of expressing one’s ideas.
Compared to natural and civil history, sacred history plays a different role in Hobbes’s
philosophy. Whereas the first two serve certain instrumental pedagogic functions, e.g.,
provide examples and illustrations, sacred history can be considered a part of Hobbes’s
linguistically oriented critical philosophy. As such, history differs quite significantly from
the other principal art Hobbes discusses of, poetry.
HOBBES’S THEORY OF POETRY
The original forms of poetry were sacred style, the style of oracles, judicial style, and the
style of public speeches. The verse was adopted because of certain mnemonic advantages
it had and because it pleased the audience.704 Hobbes’s classification of different genres
of literature is based on a model taken from philosophy. ‘As philosophers’, he writes,
‘have divided the universe, their subject, into three regions, celestial, aerial, and
terrestial; so the poets [...] have lodged themselves in the three regions of mankind,
court, city and country’. This produces three kinds of poetry: ‘heroic, scommatic, and
pastoral’, which are again divided according to the way things are represented: in a
702 A True Ecclesiastical History, 125 (390).
703 A True Ecclesiastical History, 130-131 (392).
704 The Answer to Davenant, 445.
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narrative or in a dramatic manner.705 By  these  two distinctions,  Hobbes  is  then  able  to
give an extensive list of six different genres:
For the heroic poem narrative, such as yours [that is, Davenant’s Gondibert],  is  called  an epic
poem; the heroic poem dramatic, is tragedy. The scommatic narrative is satire; dramatic is
comedy. The pastoral narrative, is called simply pastoral, anciently bucolic; the same dramatic,
pastoral comedy.706
What is  worth further investigation is what Hobbes excludes from poetry.  He says that
not all that ‘writ in verse’ is poetry. Examples of this kind of writing include ‘sonnets,
epigrams, eclogues, and the like pieces, which are but essays’.707 Equally, the writings of
natural philosophy, moral precepts, or histories, though may be composed in verse form
are not poetry. Hobbes’s explanation why this is so gives a central criterion for poetry.
The mentioned forms of writing are not poetry, because their subject is not the same as
in poetry. Whereas natural philosophy studies the consequences of accidents from natural
bodies and histories are registers of facts, the subject matter of poetry, is ‘ the manners
of men, not natural causes; and manners feigned, as the name of poetry imports, not
found in men’.708 Poetry then describes man in his artificial setting.
A similar rigidity in the requirements of good poetry follows Hobbes’s discussion.
He emphasises the use of the correct form (that is, the hexameter)709 and in general, it
can be concluded that the technical nature of poetry is central in his reflections on the
subject.710 Good poetry follows certain rules and is a matter of hard work. Another sign
of this is the strict division of what is possible in different genres: ‘The delight of an epic
poem consisteth not in mirth, but admiration. Mirth and laughter are proper to comedy
and satire’.711 The next topic is the exact nature of these rules.
In  general,  Hobbes  understood  style  to  be  a  question  of  taste  and  delicacy.  Style
and along with it poetic imagination represent a creative aspect of literary expression,
while judgement is the rational, logical aspect of the same. This view can be found, in
more  detailed  form,  in  both  Hobbes’s  writings  on  poetry.  In The Answer to Davenant
Hobbes writes:
That which giveth a poem the true and natural colour, consisteth in two things; which are, to
know well, that is, to have images of nature in the memory distinct and clear; and to know much.
705The Answer to Davenant, 443-444.
706The Answer to Davenant, 444.
707 Ibid.
708 The Answer to Davenant, 445. Spingarn (1957, xxxii) suggests that this‘Horatian rather than
Aristotelian’ conception of the subject-matter of poetry.
709 The Answer to Davenant, 446.
710 For Hobbes’s comments on rhyming, see The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, iv-v.
711 The Answer to Davenant, 454.
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A sign of the first is perspicuity, propriety, and decency; which delight all sorts of men, either by
instructing the ignorant, or soothing the learned in their knowledge. A sign of the latter is novelty
of expression, and pleaseth by excitation of the mind; for novelty causeth admiration, and
admiration curiosity, which is a delightful appetite of knowledge.712
Accordingly, The Virtues of an Heroic Poem characterises a good heroic poem as being
based on discretion, which may become manifest in various ways, such as the choice of
words and the justice and impartiality of the poet.713 What exactly this knowing well and
knowing much is, and how a poet is able to ‘please for the Extravagancy [… but] not to
displease by Indiscretion’714 his or her audience, will be the next subject, but before that
Aristole’s De Rhetorica, a source of Hobbes’s ideas of style, needs to be shortly
discussed.715
A major obstacle to further analysis appears to be the scarcity of Hobbes’s
translation of De Rhetorica.  For  example,  whereas  Aristotle’s  text  reads:  ‘We  may
describe friendly feeling towards anyone as wishing for him what you believe to be good
things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring
these things about’, in Hobbes’s hands this changes to the following phrase ‘To Love is
to will well to another, for that others, not for ones owne sake’.716 The fact that Hobbes
does not translate the whole text but only summarises the art  of rhetoric may partly be
for pedagogical reasons: the treatise was translated, at least to some extent, to be used in
his private teaching.717 Secondly, brevity could be understood as an advantage when
interpreting the text; and Hobbes must have considered the translated passages the most
relevant ones.718 Therefore the brevity of the translation of De Rhetorica is  not
necessarily an obstacle, though, it needs to be admitted that this conclusion rests on the
bona fide assumption that the passages that appear in the translation are really the most
significant from Hobbes’s perspective. In addition to this, the translation of De Rhetorica
finds another explanation.
The  notion  of  art  (technê) on which the translation of De Rhetorica is based
comes from the Stoics, who understood art as a set of rules that help to attain a certain
end necessary in life. Though the conception differs from the classical notions originally
formulated by Plato and Aristotle, if we believe Gilbert, it began to prevail in late
712 The Answer to Davenant, 453.
713 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, iii-iv.
714 Leviathan VIII, 33.
715 On this see Strauss 1952, Chapter III and especially Harwood 1986.
716 De Rhetorica 1380b36-1381a1 and Rhetorique, 72.
717 Cf. Harwood 1986, x and 1.-3
718 Or at least, as Harwood (1986, 2) points out, this is what the subtitle of the first edition (1637)
suggests. The subtitle reads: ‘containing in substance all that ARISTOTLE hath written in his Three
Bookes of that subject [rhetoric], Except onely, what is not applicable to the English tongue’. See also
Harwood’s (1986, 13-23) analysis of Hobbes’s translation as an interpretation of Aristotle.
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Renaissance thought, where introductory presentations of various arts, say that of
grammar  and  that  of  oratory,  were  often  referred  to  as  the  ‘brief  way’.  In  the  light  of
this, Hobbes’s translation of Aristotle’s De Rhetorica is  a  continuation  of  the  late
Renaissance handbook tradition.719 ‘Briefe’ in the title of the translation is meant to be
taken quite literally as referring to the most important parts of the art of rhetoric offered
to a novice in the art so that he or she is able to learn the art effectively.
The contents of the ‘brief way’ are however important, especially Chapter II of
Book III of De Rhetorica, entitled: ‘Of the choise of Words and Epithets’.720 Hobbes’s
text mentions two cardinal virtues of a word: perspicuity and decency.721 By  this  he
means  that  the  words  used  to  describe  a  thing  are  ‘neither above, nor below the thing
signified’. To do this, the writer should use words in a natural but novel manner. This
excludes for example, the use of foreign and self-styled words. Here the terminology is
somewhat unclear, for Hobbes on the one hand opposes poets with ‘Sophisters’ and then
speaks of orators, who, if using ‘Proper words, and Received, and good Metaphors,
shall both make his Oration beautifull, and not seeme to intend it; and shall speake
perspicuosly’. I take this to refer to the writing in general, that is, in all kinds of writing
the use of metaphors is  allowed ‘[f]or in a Metaphor alone there is perspicuity, Novity,
and Sweetnesse’. The use should, however, follow three rules: first, a metaphor needs to
change the original meaning, say, making a crime an error; second, a metaphor needs to
be clear, not ‘far-fetched’; thirdly, a metaphor ‘ought to be drawn from the noblest
things’,  for  instance,  it  is  more  appropriate  to  use  ‘Rosy-finger’d’  than  ‘Red-finger’d
Aurora’.722
The impact of the translation of De Rhetorica remains ambiguous. On one hand,
as we shall see, Hobbes seems to adopt some of the ideas of Aristotle, but on the other
hand, it would be absurd to take the translation as a definitive statement of Hobbes’s
ideas of style. In what follows, some aspects of this question will be introduced, but the
major aim is to give a more comprehensive view of Hobbes’s theory of style.
Hobbes summarises his idea of style in the following way: ‘virtues required in an
heroic poem, and indeed all writings published, are comprehended all in this one word—
719 My argument here is based on Gilbert 1960 (see especially 11-13 and 65-66). Though the same line
of thought applies to the two works in volume four of EW, The Art of Rhetoric and Art of Sophistry are
not the works of Hobbes but were wrongly attributed to him in the 1681 publication of Rhetorique. The
works are a reprint of Dudley Fenner’s English adaptation of Omer Talon's Rhetorica of 1584. See Ong
1951.
720 Rhetorique, 108-110 (the quotations, if not stated otherwise, are from this chapter). For the original
see De Rhetorica 1404b1-1405b33.
721 Harwood (1986, 6) takes the first quality to be the most important and refers to Hobbes’s use of it in
Leviathan V, 22.
722 The metaphor was widely held already in Antiquity. It refers to dusk as the work of Aurora, the
goddess of dawn, scattering rose petals. Aristotle’s original text mentions the third possibility: ‘crimson-
fingered’ (De Rhetorica 1405b20-21).
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discretion.’723 Discretion refers to an appropriate balance between fancy and judgement
and the corresponding literal expression. This balance depends on many factors, such as
which kind of art is in question, or what kind of social situation is one in, but generally it
is about knowing well and knowing much. Of these the latter is more central.
By knowing well, Hobbes means that expression in poetry must be right, but
what this exactly means depends on various things, for example, what kind of poetry is in
question. Hobbes however starts his discussion from the Aristotelian tenet of avoiding
foreign words. In The Answer to Davenant, he complains that there are ‘so many words
in use at this day in the English tongue that, though of magnific sound, yet like the windy
blisters of troubled waters, have no sense at all, and so many others that lose their
meaning by being ill coupled; that it is a hard matter to avoid them.’724 Hobbes’s
complaining can not be taken simply as the talk of a conservative linguistic purist,
because Hobbes defends, again in the footsteps of Aristotle, elaborate vernacular
language. The complaint can be taken as a statement on behalf of language that is simple,
clear, and plain, but at the same time innovative and rich in expression.
We also need to consider Hobbes’s own descriptions. What justifies his own
rather colourful language? He describes, for instance, contemporary language as
‘palpable darkness’.725 One  answer  could  go  as  follows.  The  idea  here  is  more  familiar
from his critique of philosophical language. Just as scholastic philosophy has produced
such absurdities as the ‘eternal now’ or ‘incorporeal substance’, bad poetry produces
cock-eyed, clumsy verses. It is worth noting that Hobbes uses similar language when
describing bad poets. Their literary imagery consists of ‘expressions [which] are indeed
no better than riddles and not only to the reader, but also after a little time to the writer
himself, dark and troublesome’.726 Bad philosophers and unskilful poets are just two
names for the same thing, deceptive and inept use of language.727
Aside from this general lack of verbal dexterity, Hobbes mentions the vices of
expressing ‘more than is perfectly conceived; or perfect conception in fewer words than
it  requires’.  To  avoid  these,  a  poet  must  have  a  clear  view of  the  relationship  between
persons and subjects in a poem. Again, there are many traps, which Hobbes characterises
723 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, iii.
724 The Answer to Davenant, 453.
725 The Answer to Davenant, 453.
726 The Answer to Davenant, 454.
727 Howell (1956, 384-385) sees Hobbes as a part of a more general movement in Early Modern
England, which aimed towards a clear and simple ars rhetorica. As the culmination of this
development, he mentions Joseph Glanvill’s textbook (s) on preaching published for the first time in
1678. In Glanvill’s (1703, 12 and 19) own words: ’Plainness is a Character of great latitude and stands
in opposition, First to hard words. Secondly, to deep and mysterious notions. Thirdly, [t]o affected
Rhetorications, and Fourthly, to Phantastical Phrases’ and preachers ‘should not trouble [their] Pulpits
with Hypotheses of Philosophy of the heights of speculative Theology’. Spingarn (1957, xxxviii-xl) also
discusses this movement against metaphysical conceits.
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as ‘indecencies’, of which the gravest are those which ‘show disproportion either
between the persons and their actions, or between the manners of the poet and the
poem’728. An example of the first is ‘uncomeliness of representing’ some vices, like
cruelty or drunkenness in great persons, and, of the second, the use of inappropriate
dialect and the use of ‘metaphors and comparisons as cannot come into men’s thoughts’.
Against this, Hobbes’s gives his analysis of knowing much, or ‘novelty of expression’,
which causes ‘a delightful appetite of knowledge’.729 The analysis, found in The Virtues
of an Heroic Poem, not  only  lists  some  of  the  poetic  virtues,  but  also  gives  concrete
examples of classical authors.
The essay opens with a discussion of discretion. Discretion refers to harmony,
which however now means delicate composition in writing, and, aims toward a certain
end, which is profit and delight. Of profit Hobbes mentions that ‘[b]y profit, I intend not
here any accession of wealth, either to the poet or to the reader; but accession of
prudence, justice, and fortitude’.730 This articulates the moral aspect connected with
Hobbes’s conception of style. Literal works, which are not philosophy, aim to elevate the
mind of a reader and by this to give him or her a sublime illustration of what moral life is.
In such a way literal works exemplify the two aspects of virtue already present in the
notions of wit and art, namely skilfulness and education.
Of great interest is the analysis of how literal harmony is created. There are,
Hobbes continues, seven virtues by which harmony is achieved: by ‘the choice of words’,
‘the construction’, ‘the justice and impartiality of the poet’, ‘the contrivance of the story
or fiction’, ‘the elevation of fancy’, ‘the clearness of descriptions’, and, ‘the amplitude of
the subject’.731 In general, Hobbes strategy here resembles the one he uses in Chapter V
of Leviathan when speaking of the causes of absurdity. As in philosophical discourse, so
too in poetical discourse an author should avoid category mistakes in order to create
harmonious texts. If, for example, a poem chooses to describe love by speaking of pots
and pans, this is probably an attempt which is doomed to fail and a sign of indiscretion.
The first virtue concerns the right choice of words. This does not refer only to the
avoidance of too complicated expressions or words not know for a reader, but also to
the idea that words should correspond with character. Hobbes’s own example is telling:
‘Nor does Homer in any part of his poem attribute any praise to Achilles, or any blame to
Alexander, for that they had both learnt to play upon the guitar.’732
728 Hobbes clarifies this by writing that ‘the disproportion is between the poet and the persons of his
poem’, for example the disproportion between ‘the dialect of the inferior sort of people, which is always
different from the language of the court.’ (The Answer to Davenant, 455)
729 All quotations are from The Answer to Davenant, 453-455.
730 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, iii.
731 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, iv.
732 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, iv.
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The  second  virtue,  ‘the  perspicuity  and  the  facility  of  construction’,  is  what
Hobbes calls, in the technical sense of the word, ‘good style’.733 This  virtue  has  to  do
with the overall composition of the work as well as its parts and details. An author
should  set  down  the  words  of  a  piece  so  that  they  follow  ‘a  natural  contexture  of  the
words’;734 so  that  a  reader  does  not  have  go  back  and  forth  in  the  text.  This  also  is  a
question of rhythm. Hobbes mentions that ‘the laws of verse [that is, classical verse ...]
put great constraint upon the natural course of language’, but immediately adds that it is
the skill of a poet to find words that fulfil these classical rhythmic standards.735 This can
be exemplified by two basic rhetorical figures, asyndeton and polysyndeton. A simple
example is the saying of Caesar, ‘veni, vidi, vici’, which follows the figure of asyndeton,
but as a polysyndeton it reads: ‘veni et vidi et vici’. Compared to the punchy original, the
dragging tempo of the latter is an evident sign of clumsiness.
The  mastery  of  the  first  and  the  second  virtue  depends  in  some  degree  on  the
language  used,  but  instead  of  raising  Homer  or  Virgil  or  Lucan  above  the  other  two,
Hobbes outlines some general principles that guide these virtues. Latin is perhaps ‘apter
[than Greek] to dispose itself into an hexameter verse, as having both fewer
monosyllables and fewer polysyllables’.736 This linguistic factor gives Latin a certain
majesty and an impression of gravity. Rhythm is not of much use, however, if the words
are incorrect, and therefore both the author and the translator are advised to avoid
‘unknown words’ and to deviate from strict rules only when necessary. Literal
translation, Hobbes adds, has a tendency to fail.737
The third virtue, contrivance, is a kind of poetic liberty to break the linearity of
events.  In  history,  it  is  mandatory  to  follow  the  course  of  events,  but  this  is  not  a
requirement of poetry, where an author should present events in an order that is best for
the narrative.  Here Hobbes – though it  is  a little bit  difficult  to see why – firmly places
Homer on the highest throne. Not only did he bring together ‘the whole learning of his
time (which the Greeks call cyclopædia)’, but ‘furnished both the Greek and Latin stages
with all the plots and arguments of their tragedies’.738 Perhaps the idea is that Homer is
the master of this virtue because he melded into his works all the basic narratives and
gave them a form that has been copied ever since.
The fourth virtue, the elevation of fancy, is perhaps the most relevant. By this
Hobbes means the capacity of a poet to affect readers, to show his or her ‘poetical
733 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, iv. Cf. De Rhetorica 1408b21-1409a23.
734 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, iv.
735 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, v.
736 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vii.
737 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vii.
738 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vii.
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fury’.739 This should not lead to rage, although Hobbes is not actually clear why this
should be so. He mentions that ‘men more generally affect and admire fancy than they do
either judgement, or reason, or memory, or any other intellectual virtue’.740 This is so
because men are hedonistic even in their more cultivated desires. A story of a great hero
killing men and beasts and saving princesses pleases a great majority than a story of a
modest clerk who helps a beggar-wife. Poetry, then, seems to be somewhat more
developed entertainment and should remain so. This is not, however, the full story, for
Hobbes keeps repeating his idea that literal works should have a genuine pedagogic
function. Therefore, the descriptive language should not be excessive. It is indicative that
in the essay, when Hobbes gives the examples of mastery of every particular virtue
among the classical writers he has chosen, he mentions Lucan rather Homer as a master
of this virtue and adds that ‘though it [the elevation of fancy] be a mark of great wit, yet
it is fitter for a rhetorician than a poet’741 The concrete example Hobbes gives from
Lucan is line 118 from Pharsalia:
Victrix cause Diis placuit, sed victa Catoni
Which is translated:
The side that won the Gods approved most,
But Cato better lik’d the side that lost.742
This absolute line between man and gods is according to Hobbes pure at least in
aesthetic terms. This is so because the verse so clearly represents the difference between
gods and man. There is however, a further aspect of Lucan’s genius. Hobbes seems to
prefer Lucan to the other two ancient masters because Lucan is on man’s side: ‘Homer
indeed maketh some Gods for the Greeks, and some for the Trojans’, kept Jupiter
impartial,  and  ‘never  prefers  the  judgement  of  a  man  before  that  of  Jupiter,  much  less
before the judgement of all the Gods together’.743
The fifth virtue of a poet is justice and impartiality, ‘[f]or both the poet and the
historian writeth only, or should so do, matter of fact.’744 If a subject of a poem lived a
disgraceful life, a poet may tell the truth, but he should keep only to the description, not
take the role of ‘an absolute master of any man’s good name’. Hobbes concludes that ‘it
739 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, v.
740 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, v.
741 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vii.
742 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, viii.
743 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, viii.
744 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vi.
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is a very great fault in a poet to speak evil of any man in their writings of historical’.745
Here, Lucan, the master of the fourth virtue, is the lowest of the three. Lucan, ‘openly in
the Pompeian faction’ and ‘inveighing against Caesar throughout his poem’ is just like
Cicero and therefore ‘justly reckoned by Quintilian as a rhetorician rather than a poet.’746
The judgement should be read more as the requirement of impartiality than, say, evidence
of Hobbes’s possible royalist tendencies.
A salient point is that Lucan, who was the master of contrast and thereby of the
elevation of fancy, is not a proper poet, because, contrary to ‘Homer and Virgil,
especially Homer, do everywhere what they can to preserve the reputation of their
heroes’.747 Lucan tries to sell the reader his point of view, which, we must conclude, is
against Hobbes’s view of the task of a poet. This requirement of impartiality is of some
relevance in the further discussions of the relationships between poetry, civil philosophy,
and education.
The sixth virtue should be seen in relation to the fourth. If the elevation of fancy
was mainly about the overall smoothness of the text, ‘the perfection and curiosity of
descriptions’ is about choosing the right individual words. Hobbes refers to the ancient
way of speaking of these as icons (that is, images), which are always ‘a part, or rather a
ground for the poetical comparison’.748 In  general,  the  rule  here  is  that  a  poet  ‘should
paint actions to the understanding with the most decent words, as painters do persons
and bodies with the choicest colours, to the eye’.749 In practice, this means economical,
even ascetic expression, which captures something with just a few words. Hobbes’s
example is the line ‘So fell Troy’ from Virgil. To this is combined a description where
men together cut a tree and the kinds of things that are related to this. The description is
the image, but the concluding line,  ‘So fell  Troy’,  condenses all  this.  When it  comes to
the specific question, who among the three is the greatest, Hobbes’s answer is again
equivocal. He says that Virgil did not have many original ideas, but borrowed much from
Homer,  but  then  goes  on  to  explain  that  it  is  not  only  the  image  used  (the  falling  of  a
great tree), but to what effect it is used. Homer used the image to illustrate the fall of a
particular, albeit great man, whereas Virgil used it to illustrate the fall of a kingdom, and
it is impossible to compare them.750
The last virtue is about making the text lively and interesting to read. This
requirement of variety distinguishes a poem from an epigram. If in an epigram, one good
verse is enough, in a poem, all the verses should not only be compatible with the others,
745 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vi.
746 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, viii.
747 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, viii.
748 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vi.
749 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, vi.
750 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, ix-x.
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but be individually elegant. Here the master is Homer, and not so much because of a
‘superfluity of words’, but because he has ‘plenty of heroic matter, and multitude of
descriptions and comparisons’.751
When pondering the nature of simile (or, in the 17th vocabulary, similitude) both
in general and in poetry Hobbes draws a distinction that is important. On the one hand he
speaks of the importance of using just the right kind of a simile, and on the other hand,
he warns of the fraudulent nature of metaphors.752 In general, simile is always anchored
to our natural understanding of reality, whereas a metaphor can surpass it. Hobbes’s
practice seems to support this colloquial account, but his theoretical distinction between
the two is not clear. His translation of Aristotle’s De Rhetorica gives a definition of both:
A Similitude differs from a Metaphor onely  by  such Particles of Comparison as these; As  ;
Even as ; So; Even so, &c.
A Similitude therefore is a Metaphor dilated ; and a Metaphor is a Similitude contracted into
one Word.
A Similitude does well in an Oration, so it be not too frequent; for ‘tis Poeticall.
An example of the Similitude, is this of Pericles, that said in his oration, that the Bæotians were
like so many Oaeks in a Wood, that did nothing but beate one another.753
Hobbes seems to agree with these recapitulations of Aristotle. For instance, he defines
metaphor as ‘a comparison contracted to a word’.754 Nevertheless, when we move to the
broader terrain of similes, things become more complicated. It is not only the case that a
simile is a metaphor with more words, but also that similitudes have different functions in
poetic and philosophical discourse.
As already mentioned, the use of similes is not limited to poetry, but can be used
elsewhere. Hobbes’s use of simile is an interesting part of his discussion of imagination in
Chapters II and III of Leviathan.  Hobbes  starts  the  discussion  of  imagination  in  a
naturalistic fashion by referring to the general laws of motion. During the discussion he
uses a number of similes to explain the different aspects of imagination. The first simile
seeks to explain the nature of imagination. Hobbes writes:
751 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, x.
752 Bunce (2003, xvii), following Samuel Sorbiere, has suggested that Hobbes’s use of allegories is a
direct loan from Bacon.
753 Rhetorique, 110-111. Aristotle’s original text contains, as Harwood (editors note 13 on page111)
points out, a total of ten examples.
754 The Virtues of an Heroic Poem, v. Watson (1955, 559) suggests that Hobbes’s conception of
metaphor is a loan from Aristotle.
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And as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long
time after, so also happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man,
when he Sees, Dreams, &c.755
This is a clear, natural comparison that is in accordance with the law of inertia. The
simile that characterises the decaying character of imagination is comparable:
The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an
obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which
starrs do no less exercise their virtue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night.756
Again the illustration is sober but at the same time full of meaning. The first thing
Hobbes seeks to show here is that imagination and memories do not vanish. Like stars in
the sky, they stay in the mind, though not forever, still long enough. Secondly, he directs
the reader’s attention to the fluctuation of phantasms, which again have a certain general
regularity; just as day and night follow each other with a certain necessity, so do different
phantasms. Finally, almost needless to add, the sun is a star, but because it is closer to us
it shines brighter than other stars in the universe. In a similar manner, sensation is the
most vehement and actual phantasm of the mind.
The third simile appears in Chapter III of Leviathan and describes the general
coherence  of  our  thinking  from  another  point  of  view.  Mental  discourse,  or  the
succession of one phantasm by another, has ‘coherence of the matter moved, in such
manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by
the finger.’757 This simile is both natural and rich. It is clear what Hobbes has in mind:
our thinking can be guided in the same way as the finger guides water on the table.
The above examples give some idea how Hobbes sees the similes and metaphors
in poetry and elsewhere, but they need to be complemented by a discussion of the
general aims of poetry. Poetry aims at truthlikeness and is not in this sense as restricted
as  philosophy  or  history.  There  is  nevertheless  a  clear  limit  to  the  liberty  of  poets  and
poetic language. Hobbes disagrees with those who ‘think that the beauty of a poem
consisteth in the exorbitancy of the fiction’.758 Therefore, also the poetic imagination has
its limits.
755 Leviathan II.4-5. Cf. Elements III.1, 27.
756 Leviathan II, 5.
757 Leviathan III, 8. Cf. Elements III.4, 28.
758 The Answer to Davenant, 451
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CONCLUSION: HARMONY AND EXPEDIENCY OF LITERARY
STYLE
In The Answer to Davenant Hobbes writes:
But  so  far  forth  as  the  fancy  of  man  has  traced  the  ways  of  true  philosophy,  so  far  it  hath
produced very marvellous effects to the benefit of mankind. All that is beautiful or defensible
[...] is the workmanship of fancy, but guided by the precepts of true philosophy. But where these
precepts fail, as they have hitherto failed in the doctrine of moral virtue, there the architect
Fancy must take the philosopher's part upon herself. He, therefore, who undertakes an heroic
poem, which is to exhibit a venerable and amiable image of heroic virtue, must not only be the
poet, to place and connect, but also the philosopher, to furnish and square his matter; that is, to
make both body and soul, colour and shadow of his poem out of his own store; which, how well
you have performed I am now considering.759
This suggests that Hobbes held a view that poetry and philosophy, and especially moral
philosophy, can sometimes coincide. My understanding of this relationship is as follows.
The two central features of poetry were imitation and naturalness. These two are
summarised by Hobbes when he defines the aim of poetry to be truthlikeness. Poetry,
then, imitates philosophy, which, almost needless to say, aims at truth. Philosophy should
remain a ‘rigorous search of Truth’760 and should leave ornamentation aside.
Consequently,  a  poet  should  have  some  philosopher  in  him  in  order  to  educate  the
public. This reading, it may be added, is more in line with Davenant’s own preface,
which discusses at great length the precise role of poetry in civil education.761 It  is  not
then the case that Hobbes is adopting a conception of philosophy in which philosophy
was understood to bear a close resemblance to arts and in contact with philological
analysis and hermeneutics. Or that a philosopher is a craftsman who gives a form to
matter by his tekhn?.762 Though Hobbes clearly appreciates the philological aspect of
Renaissance thought, the emphasis is on the latter part (logos)  of  the  word,  that  is,
philology as a scientific study of language. This aspect of his thinking is most clearly
present in his Biblical criticism, not in his ideas on political philosophy and its method.
My second critical remark deals with the educational or civilising function of
poetry.  Because  poetry  is,  on  the  one  hand,  about  the  virtuosity  of  a  poet  and,  on  the
759 The Answer to Davenant, 449.
760 Leviathan III, 34.
761 See Davenant, 1971[1650 and 1651], 3-44. Note that Davenant (op.cit. page 13) was not in favour of
a general educational project, but one for the elite (natural or acquired).
762 On the Renaissance conception of philosophy, see Vasoli 1988, 59-65.
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other, about educating the public, discretion is also a social question.763 As such, it can
be divided into two discussions: firstly this analysis is about to what extent a writer or a
speaker should follow social norms and manners in order to give a genuine moral lesson,
not just entertainment or ‘Small morals’. But secondly, it is about limits of literary
expression which discretion determines and which represent the approved moral ends of
society. The discussions may look separate but in the end the aim is the same: the
expression of excellent and harmonious humanity.
In The Answer to Davenant, Hobbes gives a rather different example of what he
means by harmony. While discussing the difference between the great classical (heathen)
poets and their indirect heirs, ‘unskilful divines’, he writes:
in the use of the spiritual calling of divines, there is danger sometimes to be feared, from want
of skill, such as is reported of unskilful conjurers, that mistaking the rites and ceremonious
points of their art, call up such spirits, as they cannot at their pleasure allay again; by whom
storms are raised, that overthrow buildings, and are the case of miserable wreck at sea.764
A magical tone to a passage is of course secondary, for the greatest danger of these
poets lies in that ‘instead of truth, they raise discord, instead of wisdom, fraud: instead of
reformation, tumult; and controversy, instead of religion.’765 In his work, a poet should
contribute to social harmony, not promote political instability, to be in Puttenham’s
words ‘not phantastici but euphantasiote.’766
The second question is a little more complicated. It seems hard to couple
Hobbes’s  idea  of  certain  social  manners  as  valuable  and  important  with  his  analysis  of
vainglory,  on  the  one  hand,  and  his  requirement  of  plain  and  clear  style,  on  the  other.
The term ‘discretion’ already indicates that Hobbes emphasises a certain social delicacy
in his discussion of wit. As a part of politeness, discretion is used in ‘conversation and
business, wherein times, places, and persons are to be discerned’.767
There is, however, an obvious answer to the problem posed. Poetry should
contribute to certain ends and give such moral examples that promote the public peace
and the self-preservation of a commonwealth. It then has a similar agenda and similar
restrictions as philosophy. A consequence of this seems to be censorship, because the
ultimate power to decide what is suitable for the public mind is decided by the sovereign
and this applies equally to both as poems and philosophical treatises.
763 This was, as for example Westgate (1977, 281) writes , ‘conventional Renaissance Horatian
doctrine’.
764 The Answer to Davenant, 448.
765 Ibid.
766 Puttenham 1970, 19.
767 Leviathan VIII, 33.
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The adaptation of the idea of indecency is indicative as such for it alludes to the
fact that poetry has a certain function. The exemplary poetry does not only aim at
harmonious expression, but at educating through this, at cultivating people and making
their moral and intellectual character polite and genteel. Understood like this poetry is a
means  to  civil  and  moral  education  and  therefore  contributes  to  collective  aims,  or,  in
Hobbes’s words, ‘approved ends’. Hobbes is not very precise what these ends are, but it
is safe to assume that poetry that aims to teach secure and commodious living and
virtues according to self-preservation qualifies.
With these clarifications, it is possible to recapitulate certain ideas. In short,
illustrations of philosophy should follow Hobbes’s basic principle that, if we adhere to
rational discourse, our imagination should be restricted to finite things, but this is meant
to be interpreted more freely so that the use of common knowledge and literature is
included. With these extensions, the use of comparisons in philosophy can be taken to
follow Hobbes’s finitism. However, the illustrations in the arts – history excluded,
perhaps – resemble the use of the name ‘God’, which refers not to a conceivable object,
but is used only to honour God’s omnipotence.768 They should not be understood as
telling us something real in the sense that we are able to know that such things as these
really exist. They are, however, real in the sense that we really use words that do not
correspond with objects in the external world, or, more broadly, the elementary structure
of reality. But this is what names are in general. They are signs of our thoughts, not
things.769
It is misleading to conclude that poetry (understood here in the broad sense
covering all kinds of literary works) and philosophy come together in Hobbes’s
philosophy and especially in Leviathan. First, the distinction between fancy and
judgement is not a complementary, but separating one. As Hobbes writes, they ‘may
have a place in the same man, but in turnes, as the end which aimeth at requireth’.770 A
similar conclusion cannot however be made about the relationship between reason and
eloquence, which Hobbes describes as follows: ‘wheresoever there is place for adorning
and preferring of Errour, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of
Truth’.771 And this means that in civil philosophy truth prevails, no matter how effective
eloquence might be. As Oakeshot once described the issue: ‘civil philosophy, whatever
else it is, is philosophy’.772 To  say  this  is  not  to  violate  the  diversity  of  Hobbes’s
argumentation, but to point out that the core idea remains: all good philosophy is based
on definitions, which is followed by an analysis of what follows from this. Secondly,
768 Leviathan III, 11. Cf. On the Citizen, XV.14, 178-179.
769 Concerning Body I.I.5, 17. Cf. Elements V.2, 35 and Correspondence Letter 57.
770 Leviathan ‘A Review and Conclusion’, 389.
771 Leviathan ‘A Review and Conclusion’, 390.
772 Oakeshott 1975, 26.
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though the figurative use of language has a role in the argumentation of Leviathan and
more generally in Hobbes, this is not the same kind of figurative use that we find in
poetry or rhetoric. It is not a ‘combining [of] the pictorial vividness of the epic with
relentless precision of logic’.773 Instead it is the use typical to many philosophers,
perhaps exemplified best in Plato. As with Plato, Hobbes’s philosophy was the art of
thinking. Perhaps the following example helps to pinpoint the difference:
I can allow a geographer to make in the sea, a fish or a ship, which by the scale of his map
would be two or three hundred miles long, and think it done for ornament, because it is done
without the precincts of his undertaking; but when he paints an elephant so, I presently
apprehend it as ignorance, and a plain confession of terra incognita.774
The relevance of the preceding discussion on poetry can be rephrased as follows. Poetry
aims  not  at  truth,  but  truthlikeness.  Rhetoric  is  at  times  even  worse,  for  it  aims,  at  its
best, at the adornment of truth, and, at its worst, at pure persuasion. It is then mistaken
to blur the line between reason and eloquence and judgement and fancy, not only
because there is no clear evidence to be derived from Hobbes’s text, but also because it
would change the meaning of the text itself.
To sum up, Hobbes does use vivid language and opulent comparisons when
illustrating his ideas, but they do not transcend in any way his general realistic way of
doing philosophy. I would also argue that there is not a direct relationship between
Hobbes’s ideas on literature and his later civil philosophy. Hobbes’s theory of literature
is a relatively independent part of his thought and should be treated as such. From this
conclusion, it follows that philosophy is a sober, but not dry discourse. Further aspects
of this are the subject of the next chapter.
773 Wolin 1970, 24.
774 The Answer to Davenant, 452. See also Thorpe (1940, 135) on Hobbes’s account of metaphors in
science and Skinner (1996, 364-365) on Hobbes’s understanding of ornatus.
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VII METHOD AND ARGUMENTATION
Hobbes aimed to write with clarity and certainty (perspicué et valide).775 In the light of
this, two things are distracting: the nature of his own writings on method and the amount
of  secondary  literature  discussing  his  method.  Both  turn  out  to  be  more  like  obstacles
than guides when trying to understand Hobbes’s ideas of philosophical reasoning. In the
chapter at hand, the much vexed question of what was Hobbes’s method will be
analysed.
In one of his two surviving letters to Hobbes, Leibniz wrote: ‘digna TE, qvi
primus illam accuratam disputandi ac demonstrandi rationem, veteribus velut per
transennam inspectam, in civil scientiae clara luce posuisti.’776 This  statement  has  in  a
condensed form a number of problems related to the question of method and
argumentation in Hobbes. The first, and the most general, could be phrased: by what
name (method or argument) should we call Hobbes’s way of doing philosophy? The
second question asks whether the case is as Leibniz claims: that Hobbes’s
methodological genius lies in political philosophy. It is not axiomatic that political
philosophy  is  the  apex  of  Hobbes’s  philosophy.  Especially  in  the  light  of  the  post-
Leviathan works, a more traditional answer appears plausible, namely that mathematics,
or more precisely geometry, is the key an understanding of Hobbes’s way of
philosophising.
There are a number of ways to approach the question of method in Hobbes. The
first is studying the historical background of Hobbes’s philosophy and the question here
is: what are the constituents of Hobbes’s idea of philosophy and, consequently, his civil
philosophy. The second, the internal approach, seeks to trace the development of method
in  Hobbes’s  own  work.  The  two  are  some  times  coupled,  and  what  is  taken  to  be  the
source or the sources of Hobbes’s idea of science influences what is taken to be his idea
of science.
Hobbes himself claimed to be without predecessors.777 Why, then, should we
think otherwise? Perhaps we should not, but we do. In recent scholarship on Hobbes
there are three principal interpretations about the origin or background of Hobbes’s
775 Critique du ‘De Mundo’ I.4, 107 (in Anti-White, 26) Jones translates valide as ‘firmness’. The literal
meanings are ‘strong’, ‘powerful’, ‘valid’). Cf. OL, V, 154.
776 Correspondence Letter 189, 731 (Malcolm’s translation reads: ‘you were the first person to place the
correct method of argument and demonstration (which had been looked at by the Ancients as if through
a lattice window) in the clear light of political philosophy.’ (733)).
777 See Concerning Body, ‘Epistle Dedicatory’, ix and EW, VII, 471 (this text is an excerpt from
English Optical MS (Harleian 3360), also known as ‘A Minute or first draught of the Optiques’
composed 1646 in Paris).
- 187 -
scientific method. The first emphasises the role of Aristotelianism and modern science.778
The second sees the humanistic tradition and, in particular, classical oratory as significant
when trying to explain Hobbes’s idea of civil philosophy.779 Third, and perhaps the most
widely accepted, emphasises the role of mathematics in Hobbes’s scientific
development.780 In what follows I will concentrate on the second and the third
interpretations. When it comes to the first interpretation, which was long held the
standard one, my position on it is the following.
I find it plausible to think that the Aristotelian philosophy of science helps us to
understand some of Hobbes terminological solutions and distinctions, for example,
throughout his work he uses the Aristotleian distinction between apodeixis tou dioti and
apodeixis tou hoti. I do not, however, believe that the more specific arguments are
convincing. For instance, the argument concerning the influence of the Padovan method
on Hobbes is shown to be superficial.781 Instead of blindly following Galileo or Harvey,
Hobbes was impressed by their concrete achievements in the sciences. The basic
assumption that Hobbes was impressed by the power of geometry and its method
appears, however, more correct here. This is true especially in the light of the fact that
Euclidean and Aristotelian methods were largely taken as incompatible in 16th-century
discussions of the scientific method.
The historical studies on origins of Hobbes’s method are plausible, but only, I
believe, if they are taken to reveal an aspect of the complicated network of ideas that
constitute and surround Hobbes’s thinking. For example, modernistic-Aristotelian
interpretations tell us something, not necessarily about Hobbes’s idea of science, but
about the general development of scientific method just before the time of Hobbes. My
historical interests here are twofold. First, I seek to offer a historical narrative of the
conception of method and how it relates to the notion of art, and to Hobbes. Secondly, I
wish to give some clarifying remark on Hobbes’s relationship with the history of
mathematics.
My initial argument goes as follows. Hobbes from the beginning of his intellectual
career wrote a great deal on method, but his mature philosophy does not seem to
demonstrate a rigid adoption of methodological principles. Clarity and certainty do not
778 This line of interpretation was emphasised by Watkins (1989[1965], Chapter III) who relies on
Randall 1961. The broader historical argument, however, is based on Cassirer’s (1906-7) interpretation
of the relationship between Medieval and Early Modern science. See also Laird 1934, 43; MacPherson
1964, 25-6; Goldsmith 1966, 1-2; Raphael 1977, 22; and Martinich, 1997, 100. For a recent, more
convincing suggestion that Hobbes’s ideas of method are influenced by some 16th-century Italian
Aristotelians, see Leijenhorst 2002. For critical notes, see Sorell 1988, 74; Tuck 1989, 105-6; Prins
1990; Jesseph 1999, 95-6 and 238; Malcolm 2002, 153.
779 Above all Skinner 1996.
780 Hobbes himself emphasised the role of geometry. See, for example, his The Verse Life 256, 261, and
263. Cf. the Latin original in OL, I, xiv and xxvi. For a rather odd view of Hobbes’s mathematics as ‘a
purely mental construct’, see Funkenstein 1986, 316.
781 See Prins 1990.
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refer to this. Leviathan, which is the apex of Hobbes’s thinking in many ways, is versatile
and rich not only in details and ideas, but also in its arguments, and I find it misleading to
reduce them to a set of principles, whether found from his predecessors and
contemporaries, or construed by modern commentators. From this it does not follow that
the views of predecessors and contemporaries or modern scholarship are not of great
importance, merely that it is doubtful whether or not it is possible to give a monolithic
reading of Hobbes’s method and its historical grounding.
A heuristic approach to the discussion in hand is the view offered in the beginning
of Critique du ‘De Mundo’, where Hobbes writes that: ‘Philosophia, id est scientia
omnis’.782 Jones in his English translation gives three possible interpretations of this:
‘philosophy, i.e. every science’, ‘philosophy includes all other disciplines’, or ‘every
study must be treated philosophically whether or not it is a part of philosophy’.783 Of
these, the last is closest to Hobbes’s original meaning, which leaves the familiar
conception of philosophy as a general inquiry related to the foundations of every science
and which is also in line with the general theme of the opening of the Critique du ‘De
Mundo’ where Hobbes argues that the essence of philosophy is a logical and conceptual
clarification of basic concepts like body and motion. This formulation forms the core of
the discussion below.
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Any reflection on Hobbes’s idea of science benefits from taking into account the fact that
though he started relatively late, Hobbes stayed in philosophy for over fifty years and
wrote on various subjects with different styles making an oeuvre of approximately 40
works, including treatises on metaphysics, psychology, optics, politics, poetry as well as
translations and commentaries. It should not, then, be surprising if Hobbes’s idea of
science is not easy – if indeed possible – to summarise.
As the discussions concerning Hobbes’s method are sometimes related to how his
intellectual development is seen, a short look at this development is appropriate.784
Hobbes received a basic humanist education in a school in Westport. After this he
studied at Oxford and went through the curriculum that was shaped by humanism and
Aristotelianism. In 1608 he started his career as a tutor and secretary for the Cavendish
family. Hobbes entered the world of science, and in some extent also of politics, in 1627
when he published his first academic work, a translation of Thucydides’s History of the
782 Critique du ‘De Mundo’ I.3, 107. As the editors point out there is a parallel view in Leviathan XLVI,
367.
783 Anti-White, 26.
784 For example Strauss (1952) and Skinner (1996). The story that has been told many times and in
many ways, need not be repeated here in detail. Useful biographies of Hobbes include Tuck 1989; and
Martinich 1999; Malcolm, 2002, Chapter 1; and Skinner 2002, Vol. III, Chapter 1.
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Peloponnesian Wars.785 Depending on one’s interpretation he maintained a humanistic
position from 1620 to the beginning of the 1630’s, or from the publication of Thucydides
to the composition of Elements of Law.786 After Elements and during his early years in
exile in France, Hobbes is considered to have adopted a more scientific approach to
philosophical problems. After this ‘rupture’ Hobbes returned to a more humanistic style
of philosophy, but one that perhaps does not have direct predecessors in the tradition.787
The product of this pondering of civil philosophy and its nature is Leviathan. The rest of
Hobbes’s career is taken to be overshadowed, in practice and in theory, by this work.
In general, I share the sketch presented, but interpret it a little differently.
Leviathan (that is the English version of 1651) is a turning point in Hobbes’s work in
many respects,  but we need to be more optimistic.  That is  to say,  in Leviathan Hobbes
becomes aware of and starts to develop a new theory of philosophical knowledge, which
receives a further clarification in the post-Leviathan works.  My  disagreement  with  the
standard reading then is that Hobbes’s works from the 1650s onwards are significant.
The other point where my reading is different from the humanist and modernistic-
Aristotelian readings is the way in which the historical background of Hobbes is
approached; the development of mathematics is of primary importance here.
A reader of Hobbes cannot avoid the impression that geometry is the highest
science.788 This impression is roughly correct and in what follows I seek to establish it. It
has become a piece of common faith that Euclid is the figure through which we are able
to shed light on Hobbes’s idea(l) of science.789 However, if we look at mathematical
785 This is a rather tentative proposal. Naturally Hobbes was involved in politics as a servant of the
Cavendish household and had some other activities, like those in the Virginia company. See Malcolm
2002, Chapters 1 and 3.
786 The dating is based on the following presuppositions. The first dating (1620 to 1630s) arises from
the idea of some scholars who think that a collection of essays published anonymously in 1620 and titled
Horae Subsecivae contain three essays by Hobbes (1997). The authorship is however doubtful. See
Malcolm 2002, 7 and 78-9. The latter end of this periodisation refers to the time when Hobbes’s interest
in science is convincingly documented to have started. The second dating (1627-1640) is based on
Skinner (1996, Chapter 6) according to whom Elements completed Hobbes’s series of humanist works
that included a work in poetry (De Mirabilibus Pecci), history (the translation of Thucydides), rhetoric
(the translation of the parts of Aristotle’s De Rhetorica) and civil philosophy (Elements).
787 Skinner 2002, Vol. III, 65.
788 This is not unequivocally true, for in Leviathan (XXX, 184) Hobbes writes: ‘Good Counsell comes
not  by  Lot,  nor  by  Inheritance;  and therefore  there  is  no  more  reason to  expect  good Advice  from the
rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall
think  there  needs  no  method  in  the  study  of  Politiques,  (as  there  does  in  the  study  of  Geometry,)  but
onely to be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two’. From this it
does not, however, follow that political philosophy is the higher or highest study, only that it is harder
than geometry. Secondly, one should be careful about Hobbes’s statements on his own ideas, especially
those to do with mathematics. As Jesseph (1999, 4) has noted, Hobbes was not up-to-date with
contemporary mathematics or even the important problems of mathematics in general. For Hobbes’s
own listing of his mathematical achievements see OL, I, xix.
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sources that influenced thinkers in the early seventeenth century, it was not Euclid or
Archimedes, but Pappus of Alexandria and his Synagoge.790
Another sketch is also needed, namely on secondary literature. The discussions
on the unity or disunity of sciences in Hobbes are based partly on the various taxonomies
of science in his works. A common interpretation says that Hobbes worked on a unified
science of body, man, and citizen. This is also suggested by himself. In On the Citizen, he
explains that the first section of his system of philosophy ‘would discuss body and its
general properties; the second, Man and his particular faculties and passions; the third,
the Commonwealth and the duties of citizens.’791 But then again, Leviathan and
Concerning Body suggest something different.792 For instance, in the latter Hobbes
makes an explicit distinction between natural and civil philosophy:
The principal parts of philosophy are two. For two chief kinds of bodies, and very different from
one another, offer themselves to such as search after their generation and properties; one
whereof being the work of nature, is called a natural body, the other is called a commonwealth,
and  is  made  by  the  wills  and  agreement  of  men.  And  from  these  spring  the  two  parts  of
philosophy, called natural and civil.793
The two introduced views constitute two major readings of Hobbes’s method, the
hypothesis of single method794 or the dependence thesis795 and the hypothesis of a variety
of methods or the independence thesis.796 To say that there is only one method in Hobbes
is to put forward a claim that Hobbes seeks to build up a system of science that starts
from first philosophy and proceeds to geometry and natural philosophy, goes on to moral
philosophy, that is, the theory of the human mind and behaviour, and lastly, to civil
789 Hobbes often refers to Euclid, but naturally mentions other mathematicians, like Archimedes. For a
extensive list, see Concerning Body III.XX.6, 313-4 (cf. EW, VII, 188). Secondly, Hobbes repeatedly
criticises Euclid and his definition of elementary notions, such as point and line (see EW, VII, 67, 200-3
and 211, OL, IV, 391-392. See also Jesseph 1996, 87-88 and 1999, 224-230.) Most, if not all, studies on
Hobbes mention Euclid. See, for example, Peters 1967, 63-64; Watkins 1989, 24 and 28-29; Martinich
1999, 84-5; and Malcolm 2002, 6. Sommerville (1992, 14-15) has proposed that Gassendi influenced
Hobbes’s view of Euclid.
790 See Malcolm 2002, Chapter 4. Chatsworth Catalogue (III, 160) reports the following work of
Pappus: Mathematicæ Collectiones, a Federico Commandino Urbinate in latinum conversæ et
commentariis illustratæ, Pisa 1588.
791 On the Citizen ‘Preface to the Readers’, 13.
792 See the table of sciences in Leviathan (IX) and Concerning Body I.1.9, 11-12. Cf. Martinich (1999,
276-8), who points out that taxonomies of science differ in Leviathan and Concerning Body. In
Leviathan human nature and moral philosophy are part of natural philosophy, but in Concerning Body
they are part of civil philosophy.
793 Concerning Body I.1.9, 11.
794 Schneewind (1998, 10) claims this to be a ‘meta-assumption’ of modern (moral) philosophy.
795 Dependence is here referring to the idea that various branches of philosophy depend on each other.
796 For versions of this, see McNeilly 1968, 71-72; 76-77 and 86.
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philosophy. To say that Hobbes had methods is to put forward the claim that he had at
least two different methods: one for natural philosophy and one for civil philosophy.
Such is then, generally, the terrain of the discussion on Hobbes’s method of science. In
what follows, I will analyse these claims, first from a historical point of view, and then,
from a more systematic point of view.
METHOD BEFORE HOBBES: EXCERPTS
The term method derives from the Greek words meta (‘to follow’) and hodos (‘a way’,
‘system’) and was first used in the technical and philosophical sense by Plato in Phaedrus
in which the nature of dialectics is discussed.797 This discussion is not only historically
relevant and influential, but of particular help because it shows the original close
relationship between method (methodos)  and  art  (technê). In Plato, philosophical
reasoning or dialectics consists of a combination of methods, which the later tradition has
divided into four major types: the analytical, definitive, divisive, and apodeictic method.
Plato’s use of the term differs from those who followed him, but roughly speaking, the
singular use of a method corresponds with art, and the plural use with dialectics, with the
additional criterion that dialectics is argumentative, demonstrative , and rational. Further
on in Phaedrus it is argued that methods create method, that is, dialectics constitute the
art of philosophy. Here a familiar idea reappears. In the dialogue, Plato uses the term
‘art’ in the way Hobbes explained the use of the term, that is, as a general term when it is
equivalent to the mastery of something and as a specific term referring to the idea of
learning a specific skill, say, medicine or oratory. This is not to claim that Hobbes
adopted the use from Plato, merely to say that there is ambiguity in the use of the term
from the beginning of its history.
Aristotle, who inherits many of Plato’s positions, tries to systematise the
discussion on technê and methodos. The problem, however, is his general idea of
science, which is based on the tenet that all the sciences have their own foundational
principles (archai). Though Aristotle discusses the general conditions of scientific
demonstration in Analytica Priora and Posteriora, he does not give a general account of
method. The closest to this, it has been claimed, comes Topica where Aristotle speaks of
dialectics. What remains sure is the platitude that Aristotle’s ideas had a significant
impact on Medieval and Renaissance discussions of method.798
To Aristotle, methodos is not a generic expression, but refers to a specific, that is,
reasoned way of doing scientific research, which can be understood in two ways. Firstly,
a more abstract reading says that different kinds of studies are committed to a single
797 The salient passage is from 265d-277c. My discussion here ownes a great to deal to Gilbert 1960,
Chapters 1 and 2.
798 Gilbert 1960, 11-12.
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method. It is perhaps best not to take this too literally to mean that there is a specific
single scientific method, say, eliminative induction, but rather to understand it to refer to
the idea that all scientific research requires certain common tools (logic) and general
concepts (first philosophy).The second reading of the ‘reasoned way’ is closer to the
common understanding of the term, namely as research that is done by following a
certain method, say, the apodeictic.
Aside from Plato and Aristotle, method was discussed, to mention some
prominent influences, by Stoics, the Greek mathematicians, the Commentators, and
Galen. Of these the Stoic notion has already been mentioned in the previous chapter
when explaining Hobbes’s translation of Aristotle’s De Rhetorica, whereas the influence
of Galen on Hobbes is at its best indirect, that is, it came through the late Renaissance
discussion of method. The same line of thought applies to the Commentators. Their
influence on Hobbes must have been indirect and general. As transmitters of the ideas of
Plato and Aristotle, they surely had an impact to their Medieval followers, and further on
to Renaissance scholarship (where new editions and translations of their works were
composed), and, perhaps, to Early Modern thinking, but this path falls outside the scope
of my study. Additionally, though the influence of the classical mathematics and
especially of geometry on Hobbes is significant, and though the Ancient commentators
played a role in this, the classical mathematics is discussed here in the context of the
revival of mathematics at the turn of the 17th century.
It is not completely clear why the original connection between art and method
was forgotten for centuries, but one factor was that in Latin philosophy not only a
certain terminology but also a certain conception of method was adopted and transmitted
to the following generations. In the Latin lexicon of philosophy, the term methodus
makes it first appearance in the texts of medicine and geometry where it does not ‘have
the broad and abstract meaning that Renaissance students (and we, following them) give
to the term’.799 The more common term that was used to refer to method was Cicero’s
via et ratio, which Quintilian, for instance, follows, and Cicero’s conception of method
was in essence a Stoical. Though it is not beyond dispute whether the expression was a
direct equivalent of the Greek methodos,  the  early  Latin  writers,  with  the  exception  of
Boethius, either hardly ever used the term methodus, or when they spoke of method they
maintained the Ciceronian expression via et ratio.
In the Medieval world, though Moerbeke’s translations use methodus for the
Greek methodos, the majority of thinkers used other terms. Aquinas, for instance, uses
the more customary expressions via, modus, ratio, and ars, whereas the original
passages use methodos. Another influence came from Arab commentators, above all
Averroes (Ibn Rushd), who established a metaphorical way of understanding method as
‘a way’. Through the Latin translations of Averroes the expression via doctrinae
799 Gilbert 1960, 48-49.
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established itself in the medieval lexicon of method. The idea of a brief way or method as
a set of rules manifested itself not only in the writings of Medieval thinkers like Peter of
Spain’s Summulae Logicales, but also in certain learned practices such as disputatio,
which exemplifies how the original idea of dialectics was reduced to a formalised and
institutionalised debate.800
In the Renaissance, the tendency to avoid the term methodus survived because
here, as elsewhere, Cicero was the example. Gilbert refers to the oddities that Ciceronian
purism led to. For example, in his translation of Aristotle’s Politica Leonardo Bruni
(1369-1444) uses ‘no less than six different circumlocutions in six passages where
William of Moerbeke consistently used one word: methodus’.801
The term methodos reappears in Renaissance philology. The pioneering
etymological study of Guillaume Budé (1468-1540) reintroduced the various specific
meanings that the “barbarous” methodus have had in Greek thought.802 Methodus, then,
found its way into translations and into the general discussion slowly and in the Stoic
sense, as a set of rules and a brief ‘way’. Such pioneers of humanist education as
Rudolph Agricola (1442-1485) and Phillip Melanchthon (1497-1560) are taken to have
held this view.803
It has been claimed that seventeenth-century thinkers inherited two or three ideas
of method.804 First  was  humanistic,  where  the  aim  was  to  give  instructions  on  how  to
arrange different areas of knowledge, for example, meteorology, which deals with the
‘Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies, Transient, such as sometimes appear,
sometimes vanish’.805 The other was the method of synthesis and analysis.806 The
humanistic method is usually linked to Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) and Ramism, whereas
the central articulation of synthesis and analysis is thought to be given by Jacopo
Zabarella (1533-1589).807
800 Other forms naturally existed, perhaps the most prominent being treatises on ‘obligations’,
axiomaticed logical argumentation schemes. Of these, see Stump 1982 and Spade 1982.
801 Circumlocutions include doctrina, disciplina, and materia. See Gilbert 1960, 61-63.
802 The study was a commentary on the Pandects published in Paris in the 1530s. Budé’s list became a
standard and was included in Henri Estienne’s (1528?-1598) influential Thesaurus Graecae linguae
(1572).
803 Gilbert 1960, 69-71.
804 Dear (1988, 147-177), whom I follow here suggests that there are two models, whereas Jardine
(1974) talks of three models, which are rhetorical, demonstrative, and axiomatic. See also Howell’s
pioneering work (1956, Chapter 6).
805 Leviathan IX, 40 (table).
806 Dear 1998, 148.
807 For Ramus’s logic, see Ramus 1964. On Hobbes and Ramism, see Harwood 1986 and Ong 2004.
Zabarella’s key ideas on method can be found in his Opera Logica (1607). On Zabarella’s method, see
Mikkeli 1992. See also Jardine 1988, 689-93.
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 A terminological clarification may explain why there has been much ado about
nothing. In Late Medieval and Renaissance discussions on science, the term ‘method’
referred to the organisation of knowledge according to different subjects, where the
expression ordo, or the logical technique of discovering knowledge, was, literally
speaking, method (methodus). Rudolph Goclenius’s (1547-1628) Problemata logica, for
example, describes these terms in the following fashion:
Ordo & Methodus interdum distinguuntur: ut ordo sit dispositio legitima praeceptorum
disciplinae alicujus: Methodus vero sit processus declarandi & probandi praecepta illa: seu via,
qua disciplinae partes ignotiores obscurioresque per manifestiora & notiora explicantur &
demonstrantur.808
Secondly, method can be considered in two principal ways: as a way to teach and as a
way to make scientific discoveries and demonstrate them. The Stoic conception of
method emphasised the pedagogical aspect of method. The Medieval curriculum had
already emphasised what Gilbert baptises as the artistic method, which ‘was concerned
with teaching of the arts and with communication in general’ and originated with
Socrates. This Gilbert opposes to what he calls the scientific method, which aims ‘to
develop explicit criteria of demonstrative procedure’ and is normally attributed to
Aristotle.809
It was in the ethos of the Renaissance to emphasise that method was about
teaching. Many Renaissance thinkers criticised the Medieval lecture (a reading of and
commenting on a text in classroom) and disputation (a formal debate), and their written
equivalents commentaries and quaestiones. During the Renaissance, these were
increasingly replaced by manuals and handbooks in the lesser and higher arts, starting
from grammars and ending with textbooks in law and theology. Whatever the subject,
the two central ideas in textbooks were that the subject matter should be easily digested
and quickly internalised. This was complemented by exercises which practised the rules,
that  is,  by  reading  the  classical  authors  and  imitating  them.  This  sort  of  procedure
became widely accepted in Renaissance education. The Christian humanist Johannes
Sturm (1507–1589), for instance, promoted it in his commentaries,810 but the
pedagogical aspect of art found its most systematic expression in Ratio Studiorum, the
educational system of the Jesuit order completed in 1586.811
808 Goclenius, Problemata Logica, V, 3.
809 Gilbert 1960, xxiv-xxv.
810 For these, see Sturm 1586. Sturm’s influence was significant. Ramus was his student in Paris and
Roger Ascham (1514/15-1568) corresponded with Sturm. Ascham’s The Scholemaster, though
published posthumously in 1570, had huge impact on late 16th century education in England. See O’Day
(2004) and Skinner 1996, 20-21.
811 The programme was ratified in 1595. The documents with revisions were edited by Pachtler 1887-
1894.
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Gradually the humanist conception of education invaded most areas of learning.
A significant sidetrack of this development being the quadrivium or mathematical arts.812
Though the ad fontes started already at the end of 15th century it was the rediscovery of
Pappus that is taken to have prompted the further development. Two issues in particular
were discussed: was it possible to reduce mathematics to Aristotelian syllogistic and
what was the difference between mathematical and non-mathematical analysis? Though
some tried to carry out the first, many agreed with the Jesuit mathematician Clavius
(1537-1612) that there was no point in trying to transform ‘linear proofs’ of mathematics
into the language of syllogistics.813 This line of thought has a background that starts from
one of Aristotle concerns.
Aristotle thought that to use the methods of one science, say, those of geometry,
in another, say, in physics, is a “category mistake” (metabasis).814 Aristotle believed that
sciences have their own specific principles (archê) and, consequently, contra Plato, that
there is no universal science that could cover all possible areas of human knowledge,
even arithmetic and geometry had their own principles.815 However, some sciences fall
under the other, like ‘optics to geometry […] and star-gazing to astronomy’.816 What
particularly worried Aristotle was mixing mathematics and physics. Exactly why is not
clear, but a possible answer could be something like this.817 It  has  been  proposed  that
Aristotle understood mathematics as a language.818 This allowed him to reject the idea
that mathematical objects have their independent realm and could maintain the idea that
also mathematics is also about sensible objects. He writes in Physica:
812 On this, see Gilbert (1960, 81-92) and Kline (1990, Vol. 1, 220-223), which should be read however
in the light of Grant (1996, 44-47).
813 Conrad Dasypodius and Christianus Herlinus (1566), teachers in mathematics at the university of
Strasbourg founded by Sturm, ‘attempted to cast the proofs of Euclid (or rather, as he thought, those
appended to Euclid’s theorems by Theon) into syllogistic form’ (Gilbert 1960, 89).
814 Analytica Posteriora 75a38-75b9. For a discussion, see Funkenstein 1986, 36-37 and 303-307.
Logically speaking, in this sort of syllogism the middle term is not of the same kind. The syllogism: A Ì
B, B Ì C ®A Ì C, is false, because B stands for different things in relation to A and in relation to C.
Cf. Analytica Posteriora 79a34-b23.
815 The  general  claim can be  found in Analytica Priora, 46a17-27 and Analytica Posteriora 76a31-36
and 78b35-79a15, the particular in Analytica Posteriora, 75b10-20 (see also 74a18-20). Note that
Aristotle mentions that there are some special cases when the border between geometry and arithmetic
can be crossed. Elsewhere (see, for instance, Metaphysica 1026a23 and 1077a9-10) he also speaks of
universal mathematics. From this it has been concluded that to apply cross-disciplinary methods is an
invention of the seventeenth-century. See Funkenstein 1986, 6, 15 and Chapter V, esp. 307-317. On
Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics, see Lear 1982.
816 Analytica Posteriora 78b38-39.
817 I do not share Funkenstein’s (1986, 304) conjectural claim that the basis of this is irrational or
theologically motivated fear.
818 Funkenstein 1986, 305. Aristotle discusses the ideas introduced here in Physica II.2 and
Metaphysica XIII.3. Funkenstein’s reading seems to be based on the way Aristotle speaks of
mathematics especially in Metaphysica, for instance, 1077a9-10 and 1077b18.
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[M]athematician, though he too treats these things [that is, natural bodies], nevertheless does
not treat them as the limits of a natural body; nor does he consider the attributes indicated as
the attributes of such a bodies. [...] Similar evidence is supplied by the more natural of the
branches of mathematics, such as optics, harmonics, and astronomy. These are in a way the
converse of geometry. While geometry investigates natural lines, but not qua natural, optics
investigates mathematical lines, but qua natural, not qua mathematical.819
In more technical words, though Aristotle allowed the idea that numbers represent lines,
even that they represent time, this was only by analogy. It is this last idea that
differentiates Aristotle from classical mathematics. The Greek mathematicians, like
Euclid or Archimedes, did not have such restrictions.820
A reason for mathematics being in a somewhat dormant state up to the end of the
16th century was the influence of Aristotle’s ideas on science and demonstration, which
included the ideas of discipline-specified archê and  of metabasis.821 These
presuppositions and the strong emphasis on logic made mathematics a kind of ancillary
and applied discipline and it was not until the 16th century that mathematics as a
discipline in its own right became the subject of specific consideration.822
As indicated, when the interest in mathematics grew, the work of Pappus became
central. The specific relevance here is that his work contains a formulation of the method
of synthesis and analysis that is close to that of Hobbes.823 Pappus understands synthesis
and analysis in a way that bears a resemblance to Aristotle, but in a compact form and
with certain additions. As with Aristotle, synthesis is a method of demonstration, while
analysis is the method of discovering. Usually analysis precedes synthesis, and, under
certain conditions, analytical reasoning can be transformed into synthetic reasoning.824 In
the seventh book of Synagoge, Pappus summarises what is meant by synthesis and
analysis in geometry:
Now, analysis is the path from what one is seeking, as if it were established by way of its
consequences, to something that is established by synthesis. That is to say, in analysis we
assume what is sought as if it has been achieved, and look for the thing from which it follows,
and again what comes before that, until by regressing in this way we come upon some one of
the things already known, or that occupy the rank of a first principle. We call this kind of
method ‘analysis’, as if to say anapalin lysis (reduction backward). In synthesis, by reversal, we
819 Physica 193b31-33 and 194a7-11.
820 See Book 10 of Elementa and the supplement in The Works of Archimedes 7, 13-14.
821 This claim relies on Funkenstein’s study, which, though it bears some truth in it, should be read in
the light of more detailed and balanced discussions of mathematics in the Middle Ages. For these, see
Kline (1990, Vol. I, Chapter 10) and, in particular, Grant 1996 (44-47, 148-152, and Chapter 8).
822 For a differing view according to which in the 17th century philosophical reflection about the nature
of mathematics did not influence the actual development of mathematics, see Mahoney 1998, 742.
823 For a history of analysis in geometry, see the classical study by Hintikka and Remes (1974).
824 Cf. Jesseph 1999, 226-227
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assume what was obtained in the last analysis to have been achieved already, and setting now in
natural order, as precedents, what before were following, and fitting them to each other, we
attain the end of the construction of what was sought. That is what we call ‘synthesis’.825
After this Pappus distinguishes between the two kinds of geometrical analysis: theoretical
and problematical. In the theoretical analysis something is assumed to be true and then
the consequences of the assumption will be studied until something is either found to be
true, when the assumption studied is true, or if not, the assumption is false. This sort of
analysis was also described as the demonstrative analysis. Problematical analysis
addresses a different need, namely that of solving problems and constructing
(geometrical) objects. Again analysis starts from an assumption that something is true
and proceeds until we find this to be or not. However, the criterion of truth is of a
certain kind. If something is possible, it is true (what mathematicians call ‘given’).
The revived interest in mathematics culminated in the debate commonly referred
to as Quaestio de Certitudine Mathematicarum. The debate was about two issues. The
first considered whether or not mathematics in any way suited the Aristotelian
conception of science; or to put it more generally: What are mathematical
demonstrations? The second, consequent question was: If the certainty of mathematics is
not in its logical structure, then what other basis could there be? Both questions received
numerous answers, but instead of repeating them, I shall concentrate on issues that are
relevant to Hobbes.
The first idea was the answer to the latter question by Alessandro Piccolomini
(1508 - 1579) in his Commentarium de Certitudine Mathmeaticarium Disciplinarum
(1547). After defining rather strong requirements for these kinds of demonstrations,
Piccolomini proposed that mathematical demonstrations are not potissima.826 However
they are certain because the objects of mathematics are the clearest and surest creations
of the human mind.827 The second issue concentrated on the question whether or not
mathematical demonstrations are causal. The typical negative answer said that the
essentia of a mathematical object did not give knowledge of what will follow from it, and
therefore it was not a genuine apodeixis tou dioti.828 Some, however, thought that
mathematics could be defined in a way that fulfils the condition of Aristotelian science.
825 Pappus 1986 [ca. 340]), 82. Cf. Concerning Body III.XX.6, 311. On the relevance of Pappus in the
seventeenth-century, see Molland 1993, 107-8.
826 Potissima was the third type of demonstration Aristotle mentions in his works (others were apodeixis
tou dioti and apodeixis tou hoti). This, the highest sort of demonstration was emphasised by Averröes in
his commentary on Aristole’s Physics and, for example, Aquinas gives it a systematic treatment in his
commentary on Analytica Posteriora.
827 Piccolomini, Commentarium de Certitudine Mathmaticarium Disciplinarum, Chapter 11. Cf.
Mancosu 1996, 11-12.
828 Among the many Aristotelians who resisted the mathematising of physics Mancosu (1996, 14-15)
mentions a Jesuit Benito Pereyra (1535?-1610), who gives this argument in his De Commonibus omnium
rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus 1576 [1562], 24.
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Giuseppe Biancani (1566-1624), for example, in his De Mathematicarum Natura (1615)
put forward an argument that mathematical objects are abstractions of sensible matter
that are located in the divine or human mind, and, in particular, that the mistake is in not
understanding that mathematical objects, those of geometry as well arithmetic, are
limited quantities.829 Aside from these ideas there was an mediating view, represented for
example, by the Jesuit Clavius, according to which mathematics was important even if it
was not a causal science.830
Renaissance humanism also applied to mathematics and this tendency lasted well
beyond the 16th century. As Gilbert duly writes: ‘not even the haughty Descartes
discarded the books of Euclid, Pappus, or Diophantus.’831 This humanistic movement,
which, perhaps somewhat naively, aimed at the reconstruction of Classical mathematics,
was  alive  and  well  even  during  the  time  of  Hobbes.  In  relation  to  this  it  may  be
instructive to give a brief note.
 Hobbes learned mathematics from a number of his friends and colleagues in
England and France who included, among others, Robert Payne, Gilles Personne du
Roberval, and Marin Mersenne.832 The relationship between all three and Hobbes has
been studied, but the last not so much in the field of mathematics.833
Both Mersenne and Hobbes received an education that can be described as
humanistic and Aristotelian. Mersenne went to the Jesuit College at La Flèche and
studied a rather conventional curriculum.834 In the beginning of his academic life,
Mersenne shared the idea of humanist mathematicians that the advancement of
mathematics lies in the restoration of ancient knowledge, not in new innovations, which
was the view put forward above all by Descartes.835 As  Dear  points  out,  ‘the  new
developments in algebra seem to have quite left Mersenne behind: he never addressed
them in his own writings’.836
To summarise, Hobbes’s ideas of scientific method have their origin in ancient
discussions,  but  combined  two  elements:  as  a  humanist  Hobbes  could  show  interest  in
829 See Mancosu 1996, Chapter I.
830 See Mancosu 1996, Chapter I.
831 Gilbert 1960, xvi.
832 On Hobbes and Payne, see Malcolm 2002, Chapter 4 (especially 96). On Roberval and Hobbes, see
Malcolm 2002, Chapter 6. On Mersenne and Hobbes, see Malcolm 2002, 12 and 16-7 and Jesseph 1999,
91. In general, Hobbes’s mathematical career is discussed by Jesseph (1999), where an extensive list of
contacts, influences and ideas can be found. For a list of persons who influenced Hobbes’s mathematical
ideas, the biographical register in Correspondence is also useful.
833 I follow here rather directly Dear 1988.
834 Dear 1988, 13.
835 Dear 1988, 12. For Descartes’s own view, see his Geometry (AT VI: 306).
836 Dear 1988, 12 note 18.
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ancient mathematics and as a person interested in the latest currents in science he would
have been aware of the contemporary debate on the scientific basis of mathematics.837
THE QUESTION OF RHETORIC
A different but connected view opens when the question of method is reflected from the
point of view of literary humanism. This humanistic reading of Hobbes’s method has
been the second major reading in the recent decade or so, and the most elegant and
detailed argument is provided by Skinner. With minor violence it is possible to divide
Skinner’s  account  into  two  parts:  a  view  of  what  classical  oratory  was,  and  a  view  of
how Hobbes is taken to treat this tradition. Before proceeding to these, the relationship
between classical oratory and Tudor rhetoric needs to be discussed.
At the end of the 16th century the British educational system considered rhetoric
in a Ramist manner. In the Ramist programme rhetoric, classically understood, needed to
be replaced by logic, or dialectic, understood broadly as a general art of reasoning.838
From this it does not follow that only the Ramist conception of rhetoric was taught and
that the rest of the humanist curriculum, including rhetoric, neglected. Quite the
opposite, many of the classical ideas became relevant at the turn of the 16th and 17th
centuries. In what follows, some general features of classical rhetoric will be briefly
discussed. This will by followed by an analysis of the relevance of the ars rhetorica to
Hobbes.839
A  striking  feature  of  classical  oratory  is  its  uniformness,  which  is  based  on
Aristotle’s typology presented in De Rhetorica Book I, Chapter III. Aristotle writes that
‘[r]hetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to
speeches’ and, accordingly, there are three kinds of orations: ‘deliberative, forensic, and
epideictic’.840 Of the three, the first, genus deliberativum,  as  it  was  referred  to  in  the
Roman world, was of particular interest.
 Following Aristotle, the Roman orators explained that deliberative oration is
used for ‘exhortation and dehortation’, and its proper end is to show a person or a thing
as profitable or unprofitable. Here we have a slight disagreement with the Philosopher
and  his  followers.  Cicero,  for  example,  casts  doubt  on  whether  the  end  of  this  kind  of
oration is really profit or unprofit. Instead of mere utilitas, the author of De Inventione
837 Compare how Howell (1956, 375) summarises the constituents of Bacon’s idea of method: ‘Thus
Bacon stands as a composite of scholasticism, of Ramism, and of something that looks to the future’.
838 On Ramus and English Ramism, see Howell 1956, Chapter 4; Ong 1958; and Gilbert 1960, Chapter
9. For some of the central Tudor works, see Skinner 1996, 61-62.
839 Much of what I say here draws on Skinner’s (1996) work, to which I am indebted.
840 De Rhetorica 1358a36-1358b7. For a discussion, see Skinner 1996, 41-45. The division was
determined by the public life of the Greek polis.
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proposes that the end of deliberative oration is honestas et utilitas.841 Both, Aristotle and
his Roman followers, however, thought that the arena of deliberative oration is politics,
though the Roman authors limited it especially to the Senate.842 These kinds of speeches
are, Skinner concludes, ‘the central and inescapable idiom of scientia civilis’.843
The second major area of rhetorical education deals with the abilities of the
orator. Rhetorica Ad Herenniam, the central document in Roman oratory, introduces the
required five skills: inventio was  ‘the  capacity  to  find  out  the  considerations,  true  or
plausible, that may serve to make our cause appear probable’; dispositio referred to the
capacity ‘to order and distribute things we have found out in such a way as to indicate
how they can best be placed’; elocutio meant ‘the application of appropriate thought and
words to describe the things we have found out’; memoria consisted of ‘the capacity to
hold  firmly  in  the  mind  the  things  we  have  found  out,  the  words  in  which  we  wish  to
express them, and the order which we wish to present our argument’, and pronuntiatio
was ‘the regulation of voice, countenance and gesture in a temperate and elegant
style’.844
Of these the first, inventio, is considered to be the most important and difficult.
Some authors associate inventio and dispositio, but Cicero defends the latter’s
independent  role.  Another  matter  of  dispute  was  the  parts  of dispositio. Those like
Hobbes,  who  follow  Aristotle,  suggest  that  there  are  four  major  parts: proeme,
proposition / narration, proofs and epilogue. Proofs are divided into sub-parts called:
confirmation, confutation, amplification, and diminution. In contrast, Quintilian gives a
six-part structure to oration: exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, confutatio and
conclusio.
Elocutio, that is, the speech itself, was considered to have two distinct features.
First is the ability to speak purely and clearly, and here an important point arises.
Contrary to their later reputation, many Roman rhetoricians emphasise plainness as an
essential feature of true eloquence. The second feature of elocutio is  good  style  or
ornatus. The orator must give special attention to his words and the rhythm of speech.
Again this does not refer, as it is so often misunderstood, to ornamentation or decorative
speech. Rather it refers to the original use of the term, meaning proper weapons and
other equipment of battle. This aspect of battle, a war of words, is central when trying to
understand the classical rhetoric tradition.
Verbal battles used two methods. One was to challenge a present state of affairs
or conceptions and then attack or defend it. The other was to use concrete strategies, the
841 De Inventione, 325.
842 Skinner uses here Hobbes’s translation, which, as Harwood duly notes (see note 7 on page 42 of
Rhetoriques), ‘omits 1.4-4.6, a passage where Aristotle describes the complex relations between the art
of rhetoric and such sciences as political science’.
843 Skinner 1996, 44.
844 Cited in Skinner 1996, 45-46. For the originals, see Rhetorica Ad Herenniam I.II.3.
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tropes and so on that were used in speech. What both are essentially concerned with are
techniques of redescription and it is this element of the ars rhetorica that  proves to be
most interesting.
The first strategy of redescription is to question an existing description. A typical
example is to a claim that one was not committing a murder, but merely killing.845 The
typical remedy is a procedure which consists of a proper analysis of (key) terms, say,
murder or theft, and an illustration of what it means in practice.846 Later, in Rhetorica Ad
Herennium,  the  manipulation  of  definitions  was  clearly  understood  as  an  aspect  of
ornatus. In the work, the level of terms is also more significant, it considers such central
issues as justice and courage. Here the clearly moral spirit becomes evident. To
manipulate the meaning of words is to alter one's moral status. However, manipulation is
a clumsy strategy, and therefore, classical rhetoricians turned to the next strategy. This is
the restaging of actions. Here the error in evaluating a situation is not in the terms, but in
how we understand its character.
There is a difference between the two strategies of redefinition. Whereas in the
first  people  really  argue  about  how  something  is  defined,  in  the  latter  they  agree  on  a
certain description, but disagree whether or not an action falls under it. The skilful orator
concentrates  on  the  latter  with  the  help  of  the  former,  and  holds  that  there  is  ‘no
categorical distinction [...] between descriptive and evaluative terms’.847 The standard
name for this strategy was paradiastole.
Paradiastole is based on a peculiar moral philosophy, that is, Aristotle’s doctrine
of mean and the rhetorical manipulation of words accordingly. Other central articulations
exist, Thucydides pointed out that in an age of political disorder language itself starts to
become similarly disordered and Plato and Isocrates can be taken to adopt the same idea
in their works. In a similar fashion, many Roman moralists and historians like Cicero and
Sallustius (86-36) base their work on this idea, but, according to Skinner, especially
Tacitus (ca. 55-117) emphasises the paradiastole as ‘a means of excusing vice’.848 The
tradition continues in Renaissance thinking and, in particular, in late 16th- century English
humanism. The opening of the 17th century changed the debate; in England especially
poets and moralists began to demand that paradiastole should be neutralised and
outlawed from moral and political debates, but how precisely this was exactly to be done
remained open.
The deeper philosophical problem behind the debate on paradiastole concerns
the possibility to use evaluative terms without ambiguity. If rhetoric is just a clever way
of defending any kind of moral values, it is dangerous and false. Here we have an old
845 See, for example, De Rhetorica 1374a1-15.
846 De Inventione I.VIII.II
847 Skinner 1996, 145.
848 Skinner 1996, 163.
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debate that can be traced back to Euripides and Medea, which was among the first works
that was accused of spreading moral relativism.849 It also here where Hobbes comes into
the picture.
If I have understood correctly, the argument that Hobbes’s (civil) philosophy and
his method here are based on the tradition of ars rhetorica goes as follows.850 The role
of rhetoric in the grammar schools and of political argument in the Tudor age was
significant. The heritage of classical rhetoric was adopted, but also reflected and this
caused some changes. From the beginning of the 17th century rhetoric starts to lose its
prominent place in education and politics and assimilates a new kind of discourse. This
can be seen in language; for example, sarcasmus becomes sarcasm. The objection to this
was that there was no need anymore to know what the exact contents of the classical ars
rhetorica are, one can just use it as a tool for mockery and ridicule.
It is clear that Hobbes’s examination of literature and style establishes a division
of labour between the arts and philosophy. In Leviathan he writes:
In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigorous search of Truth, Judgement does all; except
sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is
so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they
openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Counsell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.851
To this is related a more general argument that to Hobbes there was no grave distinction
between the arts and philosophy.852 In ‘A Review and Conclusion’ of Leviathan Hobbes
even appears to oppose views in which ‘the celerity of fancy and the severity of
judgement’ cannot coincide in politics:
[T]hese are indeed great difficulties, but not Impossibilities: for by Education, and Discipline,
they may bee, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment, and Fancy may have place in the same
man; but by turnes; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt, were
sometimes fastened to their labour of making Bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to
gather Straw: so also may the Judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain Consideration,
and the Fancy at another time wandring about the world. So also Reason, and Eloquence,
(though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet in the moral) may stand very well together. For
wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of Errour, there is much more place for
adorning and preferring of Truth, if they have it to adorn.853
849 For this and further developments, see Skinner 1996, 175-180.
850 This is a paraphrase of Skinner 1996, 211.
851 Leviathan VIII, 34.
852 Many writers have emphasised the relevance of the text to Hobbes. See, for example, Thorpe 1940,
80-82; Wolin 1970, 30; Cantalupo 1991,72; Prokhovnik 1991, 56 and 87; and Skinner 1996, 333 and
363-370.
853 Leviathan ‘A Review and Conclusion’, 389-390.
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Whether there really is in Hobbes a union of philosophy and oratory or as it has been so
aptly called, reason and rhetoric, requires some further reflection.
Traditionally philosophy and rhetoric are seen as opposites.854 The simple
argument against rhetoric and on behalf of philosophy appeals to the idea that the aim of
philosophy is truth, whereas the aim of rhetoric is victory. In rhetoric, the intention of a
speaker is morally dubious, while in philosophy it is morally laudable. The view
characterised here could also be taken to be Hobbes’s, especially in Elements and in De
Cive (both contain statements about the dangers of seditious speech, ornamentation,
analogy, and all the rest of the misleading verbal techniques).855 The idea should,
however, be read as a statement against the abuse of language. In the previous chapter I
tried to establish that this general principle prevails in Hobbes’s account of style where it
is manifest in two ways. First, as in philosophy, so in other literary forms, a writer needs
to follow certain rules of discourse, the rules that are expedient from the internal point of
view of the discourse in question. What is forbidden in epic, may be allowed in satire.
Second, in all literary activity the writer should express him- or herself in an
understandable manner. Poetry and other forms of literature have their own instances of
nunc-stans, that is, expressions that are absolutely excluded because of their obvious
absurdity. Therefore, what Hobbes says about judgement and fancy in the passage just
quoted may refer to the internal rules and, consequently, that the balance between fancy
and judgement is different in arts than it is in philosophy.
Secondly, on the basis of the major evidence, it is tempting to make eloquence
and philosophy bedfellows.856 Hobbes’s use of the plural form in the central passage
quoted above implies that moral sciences could also include civil philosophy857 and the
opposition between natural and moral sciences implies that the latter are something
different.  My  claim,  however,  is  that  eloquence  is  not  a  part  of  civil  philosophy,  but  a
854 Typically the confrontation is traced back to Plato (see for example Phaedros 266a-268a). For a
critical and extensive discussion, see Chapter 2 in Vickers 1988. Some authors, for example Chaïm
Perelman, have proposed that the division is older and comes from Parmenides (fragment 8 appear to
defend this claim). See also Chapter 1 in Perelman 1977. Note that Vickers and Perelman use different
classifications. The former proposes that Plato was against rhetoric, but not dialectics, whereas the latter
operates with the division between analytic and dialectical reasoning that he adopts from Aristotle (See
Analytica Priora 24a-b15, Topica 100a-101a20, De Rhetorica 1354a1). Therefore in the light of
Vickers, Perelman does not discern all the aspects of Plato’s argumentation. But, again, from
Perelman’s point of view, Vickers (1988, 161) simply reiterates the standard view on Aristotle. For a
mediating and insightful view on Plato’s position, see Williams 1993, 156.
855 See On the Citizen X.11, 123. Cf. Elements XXVII.14. However, an important distinction between
the proper, lucid eloquence and the false eloquence is made in On the Citizen XII.12, 139. Cf. Elements
loc.cit.
856 See Condren 1991.
857 Hobbes does not always make a distinction between moral and civil philosophy. See, for example,
Leviathan XV, 80. But then again, ethics and ‘Politiques’ are clearly something different. See above all
Leviathan IX. For an attempt to clarify this relationship, see Concerning Body I.I.9, 11-12.
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part of politics, or ‘civil’ life. There are a number of things that can be pointed out in
support of this.
In the period Hobbes composed his political treatises, the public debate was
rather vehement as the Declaration of the Army, dated 1st of August 1650, shows:
[A] second testimony [that is, the Second Civil War] given from heaven to justify the
proceedings of his poor servants against that bloody Antichristian brood, though with the loss
of many precious Saints – we were powerfully convinced that the Lord’s purpose was to deal
with the late King as a man of blood. And being persuaded in our conscience that he and his
monarchy was one of the ten horns of the Beast (spoken of, Revelations 17.12-15), and being
witnesses to so much of the innocent blood of the Saints that he had shed in supporting the
Beast, and considering the loud cries of the souls of the Saints under the altar, we were
extraordinarily carried forth to desire justice upon the King, that man of Blood.858
Whether or not it is a good argument for justifying regicide, the style of the passage
reflects what was the bread and butter of politics in Hobbes’s times. However, instead of
adopting one of the extremes (to deny its existence or to approve eloquence) Hobbes
recognised the power of eloquence and tried to understand what it was about.
The text should be read in its context, which I believe to be that of politics
understood as everyday political life. What Hobbes speaks about in the opening of the
‘Review’ are ‘Civill duty’ and ‘Civill Amity’, that is, how men should behave in public
life,  whether  in  office  or  as  an  ordinary  subject,  not  how  civil  philosophy  is  to  be
conducted.859 Education and discipline, discussed in the opening refer to this public
behaviour. Here the role of poetry is illuminating. Good poetry aims at education and
discipline, and may contribute to harmonious and expedient civil life and human
flourishing, but this is a sort of additional good and should be separated from civil
philosophy. The same line of thought applies to rhetoric though one should be more
cautious in the case of this art. Lastly, the example Hobbes gives seems to support the
argument. When speaking of the contrast between human nature and civil duties, Hobbes
refers to Sir Sidney Godolphin (1610-1643) in whom these two elements have come
together in a perfect balance. Aside from being, say, a gesture of personal gratitude, or
an attempt to strike an even balance in an inflammable political situation,860 the closing of
this paragraph tells us that the opening of the ‘Review’ is a kind of introduction to the
more theoretical summary of the book, not Hobbes’s statement of what civil philosophy
should be.
858 For a discussion, see Crawford, 1977. Cf. Skinner 425. I am grateful for Dr. Clive Holmes (Lady
Margaret Hall, Oxford) for this piece of information.
859 Leviathan ‘A Review and Conclusion’, 389-390.
860 Leviathan is dedicated to Mr. Francis Godolphin, the brother of Sir Sidney Godolphin who left some
money to Hobbes. Though both Godolphins were royalists, this was a more cautious dedication than to
dedicate the book openly to Charles II.
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It is now possible to see the thematic link between the prevailing pictures of
Hobbes as a humanist or as a scientist and the various traditions of method discussed.
What has been argued here is that both readings are in a way misleading. The humanist
reading because it makes Hobbes’s philosophical thinking only a delicate adaptation of
rhetoric, the scientific reading because it misses the rhetorical dimension in Hobbes’s
thought, but also because it misconstrues the origins of Hobbes’s idea of philosophy as a
mixture of 16th century Aristotelianism and pioneering modern science.
It is likely that Hobbes was unable to fully overcome the above characterised
mixed (ordo and methodus) use of the term ‘method’ and that he used the terminology of
method in the established manner, for instance, that method consists of synthesis and
analysis. Especially, Aristotle’s classifications seem to be deeply rooted. A comparison
with the architects of the Organon of new philosophy, Arnauld and Nicole, may help to
see Hobbes’s position:
The art of arranging a series of thoughts properly, either for discovering the truth when we do
not know it, or for proving to others what we already know, can generally be called method.
Hence there are two kinds of method, one for discovering the truth, which is known as analysis,
or the method of resolution, and which can also be called the method of discovery. The other is
for making the truth understood by others once it is found. This is known as synthesis,  or the
method of composition, and can also be called the method of instruction.861
It is surprising how similar to Aristotle and scholastic terminology the wording of Nicole
and Arnauld is. The same line of thought applies to Hobbes.
 Hobbes’s relationship to Aristotle and to Aristotelianism and the Scholastics has
been widely discussed. In general, the relationship is twofold. It is clear that his
philosophical works partly operate in a framework that is based on the writings of
Aristotle, but it is also clear that he writes of Aristotle, Aristotelianism, and especially
Scholastics in a way that does not seem to leave place for conjecture.862 For example, in
Leviathan Hobbes writes:
And I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than that
which now is called Aristotles Metaphysiques; nor more repugnant to Government, than much
of that hee hath said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques.863
A closer and more extensive look at Hobbes’s however work, however, shows that the
case is more complicated. First, when Hobbes writes more specifically on false
861Arnauld and Nicole 1996, 233.
862 As such the claim that Hobbes opposed scholastics is rather empty, because scholastics as well as
Aristotelianism were not homogenous theories, but quite the opposite. I will try to explicate the exact
goal of Hobbes’s criticism below.
863 Leviathan XLVI, 370.
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metaphysics, it is not Aristotle only or even mainly who is the source of erroneous views:
‘Now to descend to the particular Tenets of Vain Philosophy, derived to the Universities,
and thence into Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from Blindnesse of
understanding’.864 Secondly, from time to time Hobbes criticises the schoolmen, who
only take from Aristotle what is in agreement with their opinion865 or  read  his  texts
without understanding them. Hobbes then seems to defend Aristotle against the ignorant
and unlearned.866
Furthermore, there are similarities between Hobbes and Aristotle.867 Often the
idea is that Hobbes adopts certain features of Aristotelianism.868 My claim is different.
Naturally there are significant differences between Hobbes and Aristotle especially in
metaphysics and politics,869 but it is not as far-fetched as it may appear to claim that it is
the ignorant interpretations of Aristotle that Hobbes is criticising, not Aristotle’s thinking
per se. For instance, Chapter IV of Leviathan seems to offer an example where Hobbes
seem to defend Aristotle against dogmatists:
By this [dogmatic adoption of ideas] it appears how necessary it is for many that aspires to true
Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to correct them, where
they are negligently set down; or to make them himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply
themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last
they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning: in which lyes the
foundation of their errours.870
Hobbes does not suggest that earlier ideas are useless; only that we should understand
them and if they are false, correct them. Hobbes’s materialism can be seen as this kind of
attempt to correct false theories (like idealism and dualism) on the nature of reality.871 It
is not then the case that everything written by Aristotle is by definition without value.
Taking into account the fact that in Leviathan Hobbes quite consistently attacks ‘the
Schools’, it can be concluded that the primary target of his critique is the combination of
864 Leviathan XLVI, 371.
865 See Behemoth, 216
866 Perhaps the best example of Hobbes’s defence of Aristotle against the schoolmen is Critique du ‘De
Mundo’, see especially VII and IX.16.
867 This is not a new idea. After all Hobbes translated Aristotle’s De Rhetorica and considered it ‘rare’.
There are a number of works that have studied the similarities between Aristotle, Aristotelianism, and
Hobbes, for example, in theory of emotions (see James 1997, 132-3) and philosophia prima (see Sorell
1999, 372), which also compares Hobbes and Aristotle more generally.
868 For example Leijenhorst, 2002, ‘Conclusion’.
869 See Leviathan XLVI, 371-380.
870 Leviathan IV, 15. As is well known, Aristotle often begins his discussions by going through what
predecessors have said.
871 For another example, see Critique du ‘De Mundo’ XXVII.3, 316.
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(Catholic) religion and scholastic or Aristotelian philosophy.872 The  aim  of  this  short
discussion is to give room for a tolerant view of the relationship between Hobbes and the
tradition of philosophy.
This conclusion seeks to explain why it may be rather difficult to decide what the
origins of Hobbes’s idea of method were. What remains sure is that Hobbes’s conception
of method is a part of a complex history and, what has here been implicit, that it is the
interest in mathematics and its conception of method that is central when trying to give a
substantial account of his way of doing philosophy. The argument, then, is not that
Hobbes invented a new method. A more precise way to express his novelty is to say it
was the application of some theoretical reflections that brought Hobbes his lasting fame
in the pantheon of modern thought.
The novelty of Hobbes’s method is not a straightforward adaptation of the
deductive-axiomatic model of geometry, the Padovan conception of composition and
resolution, or of humanist critical dialectics. Instead, Hobbes uses the general
terminology of synthesis and analysis, largely based on a rereading of classical geometry,
and applies it to different phenomena.873
HOBBES ON METHOD AND ARGUMENTATION
Moving into the internal development of Hobbes’s method does not make things clearer.
Partly the problem lies in Hobbes’s own writings, partly in interpretations. Hobbes’s own
works appear to contradict each other, but above all they become an increasingly
unreliable guide to his actual practice.874 This holds true especially in the case of
Leviathan.  The  significance  of  the  work  is  often  taken  to  be  in  its  content,  that  is,  the
political ideas Hobbes develops in the book. Though it is hard to disagree with the
claim,875 here I shall investigate whether the book could also help us to understand the
nature and development of Hobbes’s idea(l) of philosophy and science.
‘[T]the obvious paradox that Hobbes seems to categorically argue against
figurative language in philosophy, while at the same time expressing his own
philosophical argument in at times distinctively figurative language’876 has not led
872 For Hobbes’s own formulations, see Leviathan XLVI, 371 and Behemoth, 184-185.
873 For an apt example that discusses the corruption of political power, see Leviathan XLVII, 384-385
(‘But as the Inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out; the way is the same, but the
order is inverted. The web begins at the first Elements of Power [...] but also scandals, apt to make men
stumble one time or other upon the suppression of their Authority.’)
874 Cf. Malcolm 2002, Chapter 5.
875 See however Strauss 1952, 170.
876 Prokhovnik 1991, 105.
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modern scholars877 to the same conclusion as Taylor, who thought Leviathan ‘a
rhetorical and, in many ways, a popular Streitschrift’.878 And so we are left with a legion
of interpretations. Some of them hold that Hobbes developed a uniform or core idea of
science, which after the 1630s he maintained through out his career, while others
propose that he had one method for natural philosophy and one for civil, and from some
works we learn that he changed his idea of civil philosophy. Again, many of these works
offer insights that are valuable and various readings have more or less convincing internal
evidence (i.e., from Hobbes’s own works). Here it is, however, presumed that attempts
to provide a system of science or sciences in Hobbes always appears somehow
constructed.879 From this a more radical conclusion is made, that Hobbes did not have a
method at all in the sense that it is assumed in various modern interpretations.880 Before
moving to a more detailed analysis, three more questions need to be considered: the
audience and the structure of Leviathan as well as the status of the book among the
works of Hobbes.
Hobbes gave three articulations of his political theory, all of which we can
assume he intended to make public. Though they all seem to address the same problem,
preventing political disorder, all three have special nuances shaped by the situation in
which they were written: The Elements of Law was  written  before  the  Civil  War, De
Cive was a sober reflection of an exile, and Leviathan a  more vehement articulation of
the two earlier works. All three raise the question of audience.
With Leviathan, it is my belief that it is addressed to a wide audience, not only to
rulers. The obvious evidence is that the work is written in English. The time of the
composition and publication and the style of the work also support this view.881 The
audience of Leviathan is, however, restricted in a number of ways. Firstly, even it does
not belong to the mirror-for-prince genre,882 it is addressed to those who are involved in
politics and in the mid-17th century this group was restricted. Secondly, Hobbes’s
vernacular and colourful language indicates that the work is primarily written for a
British audience and that it has clear political aims.883 In the light of this, Leviathan then
877 There are naturally exceptions. See, for instance, McNeilly (1968, 83), who gives some examples of
Hobbes’s inaccuracies.
878 Taylor 1965, 35.
879 For a sober view of Hobbes as a system builder, see Malcolm 1994, xxix.
880 Compare to McNeilly (1968, 83-84), who proposes that we are not allowed to assume that there is a
uniform system of doctrines in Hobbes or that mathematics remained the ideal science. Instead we
should start from the fact that there are problems related to this ideal science.
881 For a discussion that also comments on other contributions to the subject, see Burgess 1990.
882 Hobbes’s hope expressed at the end of Part II of Leviathan (XXXI, 193) is better characterised as
nugatory or even satirical.
883 The genesis of the two earlier political treatises seems to defend this. Elements was  written  under
similar conditions and also in the vernacular, but On the Citizen was originally written in Latin and only
translated afterwards.
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is not necessarily meant to be a definitive articulation of Hobbes’s political ideas. This is,
of course, problematic because the theoretical ideas (re-)formulated in the book are
subversive and mirror meditations on the elementary structures of politics. Nevertheless,
purely in terms of audience, Leviathan is fundamentally a political and not a
philosophical work, and though it has received a deserved place in the curriculum of
Western political thought, this was not likely to be among the primary aims of its author.
It  is  possible  to  compare  the  content  of  Hobbes’s  political  works  and  although
they appear quite similar, in actual fact they are not. Aside from some subversive ideas
on political philosophy, such as the idea of double-impersonality and Hobbes’s theory of
representation, the material on religion has given Leviathan an exceptional status.
Whereas Hobbes’s two earlier treatises contain a fairly small amount of religious and
especially scriptural material, in Leviathan Hobbes discusses these extensively. This leads
to another problematic issue: the structure of Leviathan.
Scholars have addressed the significance of the different parts of the book and
their interrelationships in a number of ways. A common view is summarised by Pocock,
who says that Leviathan is actually two books: a philosophical one (Parts I and II) and a
not-so-philosophical one (Parts III and IV).884 Some Hobbes scholars seem to share this
idea. Johnston, for instance, emphasises the fact that there are two worlds in Leviathan,
scientific and magical. Skinner has suggested that the religious content of Hobbes’s
philosophy are ironical. Another, rather subtle, exegesis was suggested by Krook, who
comments Parts III and IV in the following way:
But the integral place of Parts III and IV in the argument of Leviathan is, I believe, best
understood if one understands two closely connected aspects of Hobbes’s ‘Christian’ thought.
These are the peculiar character of his Erastianism, and his thoroughly nominalistic,
thoroughly sceptical view of ‘interpretation’ in general and therefore of Scriptural
interpretation in particular.885
What Krook also considers essential in this respect is that we should carefully distinguish
what is said of religion in Chapter XIII in Part I and what is said in Part III. She goes on
to claim that to Hobbes there ‘is the Christian Church, not the Christian religion’ and
summarises her view thus: ‘the problem of the relation of State and Church becomes
reduced to the single question, Who shall be the interpreter of the Scriptures?’886 This
also seems to speak on behalf of a two-kingdom model of Leviathan. On the one hand,
there is natural and immanent reality which can be understood by the use of the senses
and reason, and, on the other hand, there is a religious, transcendent world, which is
incomprehensible, even magical.
884 Pocock 1971.
885 Krook 1953, 221.
886 Ibid.
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A sound alternative to the two-kingdom model is given by Oakeshott,887 who has
proposed that Parts I , III and IV are there to support, in a strictly logical sense (that is,
to prove or to demonstrate), the doctrine of the commonwealth in Part II. To this can be
added that if Leviathan demonstrates anything, it is how science is used for political
purposes. By this I mean not only Hobbes’s overt statements that his work is an attempt
to give the true and right principles of governing, but also the undercurrent that runs
through the book, namely, the analysis of the misuses of science for political purposes, of
which the critique of Scholasticism is the clearest example. Furthermore, Part III is
relevant not only to the argument, but also to the argumentation of Leviathan.888
Criticism and interpretation are not oddities of scriptural interpretation, but reflect an
aspect of Hobbes’s argumentation.
THE UNITY AND THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE
An element of Hobbes’s philosophy seems sometimes to be neglected, namely that it is
negative in at least two sense. First Hobbes tries to make a demarcation between things
that we can know and those we cannot. This is the starting point of all philosophy; to be
wise is to know that one does not know.889 More concretely, this means that there are a
set of issues that we are never able to answer, like, the nature of God or has the world
always existed.890 Consequently, some disciplines like theology are excluded from
philosophy. The second negative aspect relates more specifically to civil philosophy.
When other parts of philosophy show their usefulness in the results, like navigation,
architecture and so on, ‘the utility of moral and civil philosophy is to be estimated, not so
much by the commodities we have by knowing these sciences, as by the calamities we
receive from not knowing them’.891 Wars,  in  particular  civil  wars,  are  the  result  of  the
ignorance of people about the real causes of war. Civil philosophy then has a restrictive
and instructive function, but not necessarily a action-guiding and normative role in
Hobbes. Though the nature of civil philosophy appears distinctive in the framework
introduced, it does not automatically follow that the independence thesis is correct and
that the dependence thesis incorrect. Both need to be studied before a further conclusion
is given. I shall start from the argument that Hobbes considered science a uniform
system.
887 Oakeshott, ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, in Oakeshot 1975.
888 In this respect Sorell’s reading (1990b) comes close to my view.
889 Here Hobbes’s note on White’s internal conflict is useful. See Critique du ‘De Mundo’ XIV.7, 204-
205.
890 Trying to prove some things about God is both unphilosophical and untheological. See Critique du
‘De Mundo’ XXVI. As already pointed out, trying to characterise God is, at best, to honour him. See
Leviathan III, 11 and IV, 17; and Critique du ‘De Mundo’ XXXVI.15.
891 Concerning Body I.1.7, 8.
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The idea of the unity of science in Hobbes is based on the tenet that science
studies  the  body,  which  can  be  of  two  kinds:  natural  and  artificial.  The  distinction
between the two arises from the way they are generated and what consequences they
have.892 The  world  of  natural  bodies  is  created  by  God  (or  at  any  case,  not  by  human
beings), whereas the world of artificial bodies is man-made. A more specific argument is
the following: because human beings are a corporeal being, their actions are determined
by the same laws of motion as the rest of nature. So-called mental activities are matter in
motion and even though we do not completely know the regularities, these motions
direct our action causally. Consequently, civil philosophy is also based on mechanistic
physics and Hobbes deduces his civil philosophy from his natural philosophy. A short
way to articulate this proto-positivism is to characterise Hobbes as a naturalist.893
The dependence thesis can be divided into two separate claims: that natural and
civil philosophies are the two chief parts of philosophy, and that there is a parallel
between them. Secondly, the argument has a strong and a weak version. According to
the strong version the mentioned parallel is based on the assumption that both are an
investigation of the body. More specifically, the body politic, that is, an artificial body,
and its study is a special case of natural body and its study.894 The weaker version
emphasises the methodological unity of sciences. That is to say, all philosophy follows a
uniform method.
In the ‘Preface to the Reader’ of On the Citizen, Hobbes explains his method by
an analogy:
As far as my Method is concerned, I decided that the conventional structure of a rhetorical
discourse, though clear, would not be suffice by itself. Rather I should begin with a matter of
which a commonwealth is made and go on to how it comes into being and the form it takes, and
to the first origin of justice. For a thing is best known from its constituents. As in an automatic
clock or other fairly complex device, one cannot get to know the function of each part and
wheel unless one takes it apart, and examines separately the material, shape and motion of the
parts, so in investigating the right of a commonwealth and the duties of its citizens, there is a
need, not indeed to take the commonwealth apart, but to view it as taken apart, i.e. to
understand correctly what human nature is like, and in what features it is suitable and in what
unsuitable to construct a commonwealth, and how men who want to grow together must be
connected. Following such a Method I put in first place, as a Principle well known to all men by
experience and which everyone admits, that men’s natural Disposition is such that if they are
892 Concerning Body I.I.9, 11In (see also IV.25.1, 385-386).
893 This can mean two things. First, that the constitution and operations of the human mind can be
explained only by using sensible, natural qualities or, second, it can refer to what has been called
Hobbes’s ethical naturalism. A clear presentation of Hobbes’s naturalism is given by Zarka (1996, 75-
77). On ethical naturalism, see Hampton 1992.
894 See for example Watkins (1965) Chapters 3 and 4. See also Carter (1999, 86-7) who claims that
Hobbes’s method of civil philosophy is the amalgamation of Euclid (synthesis) and the School of Padua
(analysis).
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not restrained by fear of a common power, they will distrust and fear each other, and each man
rightly may, and necessarily will look out for himself from his own resources.895
This passage has led to a number of interpretations. Some of them believe that both, a
watch and a commonwealth, are studied by resolving them into their constituent parts
and then (re)composing. Others, most cogently Sorell, point out, firstly, that the
comparison is about a watch and rights and duties, which are different entities and,
secondly, that decomposing is not relevant in civil philosophy. Another way to defend
the dependence thesis is refer to a passage in Concerning Body, where Hobbes explains
that in political philosophy one may proceed by synthesis or analysis.896
The first issue is about the comparison. Is it a comparison between a watch and a
commonwealth or between a watch and rights and duties? The argument that supports
the latter is based on the idea that the constituents of a commonwealth are the rights of
the sovereign and the duties of the citizen.897 Yet another argument, based on the text of
De Cive, points out that if we follow the original Latin text, the comparison is between a
watch and a commonwealth (civitas).898 Though  it  is  easy  to  agree  with  the  latter
suggestion, the two views are not mutually exclusive, for both human beings and rights
and duties can be considered as the constituents of a commonwealth.
The essential thing to note is that, in general, the comparison operates on the
level of science. If the purpose of any science is to study the constitutive causes of an
entity, then indeed studying a watch and studying a commonwealth are similar
enterprises. The difference is, however, the one explained earlier, that is, if the analysis of
causality given in the Chapter V is correct, the constitutive causes in civil philosophy are
different from the constitutive causes in natural philosophy (where the philosophical
study of watches can be located).899 In civil philosophy to understand a constitutive
cause  is  ‘to  understand  the  intentions  of  the  person  who  makes  it  or  uses  it’.900 And
though the similar line of thought applies to a watchmaker, the intentions of his artefact
differ radically from the intentions of the artefact called the commonwealth. In sum, the
comparison between a watch and a commonwealth is an analogy that is based on the
notion of constitutive cause and on the idea that a whole is understood through its parts.
The analogy works up to a point, but when it comes to the difference between the
895 On the Citizen, ‘Preface to the Readers’, 10. On historical origins and the use of the watch analogy,
see Funkenstein 1986, 317, 323-4. For a discussion how we should understand the relationship between
a watch and the commonwealth, see Sorell 1986, 18-21 and Malcolm 2002, 148-151.
896 Concerning Body I.6.7, 73-74. McNeilly (1968, 71-72;76-77; and 86), for instance, takes this as
given.
897 Sorell 1986, 18.
898 Malcolm 2002, 149.
899 It can be – though Hobbes does not say this explicitly – located into the ‘Science of ENGINEERS’
(Leviathan IX, table).
900 Malcolm 2002, 149.
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intentions of the constituents in two artefacts, the analogy breaks down. For though the
watchmaker may fail to put together a working watch, the failure is in the maker, not in
the artefact, whereas a sovereign does not have same sort of absolute power over the
constituents of a commonwealth.
Sorell has claimed that it is a shared interpretative mistake that Hobbes deduced
his political and moral philosophy from the truths of physics, and that, instead, he only
regards natural philosophy as the first part of his general philosophy and geometry as the
first part of natural philosophy.901 If we believe Sorell, what Hobbes says is that the
truths of mechanics are to be deduced after, not from, those of geometry. And,
furthermore, even if Hobbes considered moral philosophy or ethics902 to  be  a  theory
dealing with the motions of the mind, it is not true that he claimed moral philosophy was
deducible from physics. The last step, from moral to civil philosophy, is also superficial.
Though civil philosophy can be based on experience, it is not necessarily connected to
physics and psychology.903 Understood in this way, the dependence thesis, in both its
versions, is not plausible. Hobbes partly bases his civil philosophy on non-natural or
acquired human capacities, and these are more important than the natural capacities
when we try to understand the nature of politics, the state, political obligation and so on.
It then remains that Hobbes’s idea of science is based on the distinction between
natural and artificial bodies, which he maintained in an early work on optics:
The natural sciences differ greatly from the other sciences. In the latter, nothing is needed or
admitted as a foundation or primary principle of demonstration other than the definition of
terms, by which ambiguity is excluded. They are first truths; every definition is a true and
primary proposition because we make it true ourselves by defining it, that is, by agreeing about
the meaning of the words. […] But in the explanation of natural phenomena, another kind of
procedure must be followed, which is termed Hypothesis or supposition.904
This  suggests  that  the  independence  thesis  is  the  correct  reading  of  Hobbes’s  method.
The thesis claims that Hobbes’s civil philosophy is independent of his natural philosophy.
A variant of the thesis could be something like the following. The behaviour of man and
especially a citizen is not be explained by natural desire, but by the ability to use language
and make agreements. This does not, however, necessarily mean that civil philosophy
belongs to humanities, nor that Hobbes anticipated a Comtean idea of social physics. The
main reason is,  almost needless to say, that  in the 17th century the division between the
humanities and the sciences did not exist. The obvious solution then seems to be that
901 Sorell 1986, 5-7.
902 The term Sorell prefers, because moral philosophy is concerned with the laws of nature
903 This Hobbes proposes above all in Concerning Body, I.6.7, 73-74.
904 In The Latin Optical MS. Quoted in Tuck 1988a, 253. Tuck claims that Hobbes maintained a similar
position in 1636 in a letter to Newcastle. For the letter, see Correspondence Letter 19, 33-34.
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Hobbes had two methods, one for nature, one for society and that these sometimes
overlap.905 In  what  follows,  the  reading  is  reevaluated  on  the  basis  of  the  notion  of
philosophy that arises from Leviathan and is developed in the later works of Hobbes.
Though perhaps the fullest expression of his political doctrine, in terms of his idea
of what science is Leviathan is confusing. There are two central formulations about
science in the work. In Chapter V Hobbes gives the following definition:
[A] knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand [is what]
men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are but Knowledge of Fact, which is a
thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one
fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else
when we will, or the like, another time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon
what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to
make it produce the like effects.906
And in Chapter VII he writes:
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of
Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into generall Affirmations, and of these again
into Syllogismes; the End or last summe is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind
by it signified, is that conditionall Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words,
which is commonly called SCIENCE.907
These passages outline two conceptions of philosophy and in them two analyses of
causality are embedded that were discussed in the chapter on knowledge. Both
characterisations of science appear to say the same thing, namely that science is the
defining and proper understanding of the conceptions we use. This is true. The cause of
obscurity is, however, the first definition, which says that science is also the knowledge
of consequences, and the dependence of one fact, that is, the state of the world, not the
mind as in the latter definition, upon another. This ontological realism could be
understood as an echo of Hobbes’s supposed earlier scientific ideal, namely that science
is  about  the  efficient  causes  of  things,  in  which  there  is  ultimately  only  one:  matter  in
motion. In Leviathan, Hobbes does not adopt this strictly materialistic theory of science
in the same sense as he did earlier. Instead, there seem to be two, if not rivalling, at least
differing idea(l)s of science: science as a doctrine of causes and science as a doctrine of
definitions. The first doctrine is articulated as follows:
905 See Malcolm 2002, 436 and Chapter 5.
906 Leviathan V, 21.
907 Leviathan VII, 48.
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By PHILOSOPHY, is understood the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of the
Generation of any thing, to the Properties; or from the Properties, to some possible Way of
Generation of the same; to the end to bee able to produce, as far as matter, and humane force
permit, such Effects as humane life requireth.908
And in Concerning Body we find the following definition: ‘Philosophy is the knowledge
we acquire, by true ratiocination, of appearances, or apparent effects, from the
knowledge we have of some possible production or generation of the same; and of such
production, as has been or may be, from the knowledge we have of the effects’.909 These
are articulations of science as a doctrine of causes.
According to some of his writings, to Hobbes, philosophy is concerned with
giving proper definitions.910 This activity has two aspects: natural and artificial. The
background idea is that scientific reasoning and explanations should be in accordance
with our natural way of understanding things. By this Hobbes means three things: we
comprehend things gradually, we relate concepts by comparison (‘adding and
subtracting’), and, finally, we shape or even create an order to the world by doing this.
For  example,  if  we  try  to  understand  what  man  is,  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that
accidents,  living body and rational define what we take to be man. From this arises the
formula: man =def rational, living body, or rational animal. Correspondingly, we can study
the notion we already hold. For example, crow = bird and black, and, bird = living,
flying, body. This understanding of synthesis and analysis is more in accordance with
what Hobbes says about truth, reason and science in Leviathan:
Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that
seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stand for; and to place it
accordingly; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more
he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it
hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the signification of
their words; which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the
beginning of their reckoning.911
In all its simplicity, Hobbes’s idea of scientific reasoning is that we agree upon names
that stand for our appearances of things, and proceed by investigating their consequences
(synthesis) and causes (analysis).912 Secondly, synthesis and analysis are applied to the
908 Leviathan XLVI, 367. Sorell (1986, 55-59) claims that this applies only to natural philosophy.
909 Concerning Body I.6.1. Cf. I.1.2, 3 and 8.
910 For instance, Raphael (1977, 19-20) emphasises science as a defining activity.
911 Leviathan IV, 15.
912 For  some  examples  how  this  happens  in  practice,  see Critique du ‘De Mundo’ XXVII.1-12
(definition) and XXVII.13-17 (synthesis and analysis). For the three conceptions of analysis in Hobbes,
see Jesseph’s (1999, 231) lists and Johnston’s (1986, 142) discussion.
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first definitions, which are the basis of all philosophical thinking. The proper aim of
synthesis and analysis is to create universal definitions, that is, concepts that describe and
explain reality in an extensive, clear and comprehensible way. In short, philosophy is
conceptual analysis.913
A comprehensive articulation and application of how Hobbes understood
scientific reasoning can be found in Concerning Body
Analysis is continual reasoning from the definitions of the terms of a proposition we suppose
true, and again from the definitions of the terms of those definitions, and so on, till we come to
some things known, the composition whereof is the demonstration of the truth or falsity of the
first supposition; and this composition or demonstration is that we call Synthesis. Analytica,
therefore, is that art, by which our reason proceeds from something supposed, to principles, that
is, to prime propositions, or to such as are known by these, till we have so many known
propositions as are sufficient for the demonstration of the truth or falsity of the thing supposed.
Synthetica is the art itself of demonstration. Synthesis, therefore, and analysis, differ in
nothing, but in proceeding forwards or backwards; and Logistica comprehends both.914
Though Hobbes speaks here especially of synthesis and analysis in geometry, his ideas
apply to civil philosophy. In the practice of civil philosophy, analysis and synthesis mean
the following:
[W]hether such an action be just or unjust; if that unjust be resolved into fact against law, and
that notion law into the command of him or them that have coercive power; and that power be
derived from the wills of men that constitute such power, to the end they may live in peace, they
may at last come to this, that the appetites of men and the passions of their minds are such,
that, unless they be restrained by some power, they will always be making war upon one
another; which may be known to be so by any man's experience, that will but examine his own
mind. And, therefore, from hence he may proceed, by compounding, to the determination of the
justice or injustice of any propounded action.915
This type of ‘conceptual composition and resolution’ is at the heart of Hobbes’s idea of
science. However, definitions in civil philosophy form a case apart. They are not only
descriptions, but also evaluations.
Civil philosophy is mainly about defining, but with a component that contains the
idea of a struggle over meanings – and as such it is part of public life. To speak in more
concrete terms, laws are the basic device to exercise political power and they are
supposed to be Hobbes’s answer to the threat of competing vocabularies of just and
913 For some good examples of conceptual analysis, see Critique du ‘De Mundo’ II.2. The work is also
useful in another respect, for here Hobbes continuously criticises White’s use of concepts, see for
example Chapter VI, article 6.
914 Concerning Body III.20.6, 309-310.
915 Concerning Body I.6.7, 74.
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unjust; sovereign power uses the laws of nature and the civil laws that correspond with
them and provide the unequivocal language of what is just and unjust. Additionally,
science should be the guardian of the public use of language in a commonwealth. It has
this privilege for its aim is not private and science does not seek victory but truth. This is
the ideal of science in Hobbes, but it is a matter of further reflection to determine to what
degree or in what manner he follows this ideal.
The systematic analysis has led us to the same conclusion as the historical
analysis, namely that Hobbes’s idea of scientific reasoning is manifold and it is doubtful
whether there is any point in calling it a method at all – the only justification being,
however, that Hobbes himself uses the term. Because both analyses point in the same
direction, I will suggest that Hobbes’s idea of philosophy is better understood as
argumentation than method. The rest of the chapter tries explicates this intuition.
LOGIC AND THE ART OF ARGUMENTATION
There is nothing revolutionary or transgressive in Hobbes’s writings on method. When
put into their proper context, they arise from various intellectual currents. Secondly, his
basic idea is rather simple. In his critique of Thomas White’s De Mundo, this idea is
articulated as follows:
Quid ergo, dicet forte aliquis, non permittetur philosopho inquirere de causâ motus? aut si hoc
non est, quid demum est quod philosophiae tanquam opus suum assignabimus? Respondeo 1°
ratione naturali concludi neque verum neque falsum quicquam posse, nisi ex supposito, quod
nomina & appellationes eo modò accipiantur quatenus à nobis intelliguntur: procedit enim
omnis ratiocinatio a constitutis nominum significationibus.916
As explained and as the quotation confirms, the basic mode of argument in Hobbes is the
rational investigation of concepts, though it should also be pointed out that Hobbes also
uses analogues, metaphors and other literary “special effects”. These are usually taken to
be illustrations of abstract arguments. I propose that they are more, that is, they are
important parts of the argumentation. In order to show that my claim is valid, a study of
Hobbes’s  ideas  of  argumentation  is  needed.  These  ideas  can  be  analysed  from  two
viewpoints, theoretical and practical.
916 Critique du ‘De Mundo’ XXVI.7, 310. Jones’s English translation is as follows: ‘Perhaps someone
will ask: ‘What then, will the philosopher not be allowed to investigate the cause of motion?’ Or, if this
is not the case, ‘What is it, then, that we shall assign to philosophy as her proper function?’ First, I reply
that nothing may be fixed as true or false by natural reason, except on supposition, because terms and
names are acceptable only inasfar as we understand them: every reasoning process advances when the
meanings of the terms have been [already] settled.’ (Anti-White, 307).
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Hobbes wrote something on formal argumentation and emphasised the role of
logic in philosophical thinking.917 The most coherent and extensive account – but far
from perfect – can be found from Part I of Concerning Body, which Hobbes describes in
the following words: ‘In the first part of this section, which is entitled Logic, I set up the
light of reason.’918 Part  I  has  six  chapters  which  are  entitled: ‘Of  Philosophy’,  ‘Of
Names’, ‘Of Proposition’, ‘Of Syllogism’, ‘Of Erring and Falsity, and Captions’, and ‘Of
Method’. Chapters II, III, and IV form the core of Hobbes’s logic (understood here as
the doctrine of formally valid reasoning), the fifth studies shortcomings in the formal
argumentation, and the first and the last are more general in nature.
The sequence of chapters two to five is worth noticing in at least two respects.
The first is that the sequence shows that Part I of Concerning Body has a structure of a
logical textbook, and that it bears some resemblance to the scholastic textbooks, and
even inherits some details from the Late Medieval developments in logic.919 In this sense,
Hobbes is rather traditional. Secondly, the order of the chapters tells us what Hobbes had
already articulated in Leviathan, namely that science consists of ‘a good and orderly
Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by
Conncexion of one of them to another; and so to Syllogismes’.920 The  first  part  of
Concerning Body may be understood as a detailed presentation of the above sketch,
which has three principal parts: names, propositions, and syllogisms.
Names, discussed in detail in Chapter II, constitute speech, which can be of
different kinds. What is of particular interest here is the form of scientific speech, which
expresses truth or falsity, and whose basic form is the proposition. A proposition is the
combination of two names that can take, according to Hobbes, two equivalent forms:
1) S = P, for example, ‘Socrates is a man’ or
2) S Ì P, for example, ‘Man is a living creature’.921
917 See, for instance, On the Citizen XII.12, 139-140.
918 Concerning Body ‘The Author’s Epistle to the Reader’, xiii.
919 Of the structure of the logical treatises in 17th century and the Ramist influence in De Corpore see
(respectively) Nuchelmans 1998, 103-105 and 107. Of the scholastic textbooks in logic see Ebbesen
1982, especially 107-108. Note, however, that Hobbes was familiar with more recent text books, like
Herbert Cherbury’s De Veritate. See Serjeantson 2001, 220 note 27.
920 Leviathan V, 21.
921 The latter reads: ‘Man belongs to the class of living creatures’. In the formulas, S stands for a
subject, which Hobbes also calls an antecedent or a contained name, and P for a predicate, a consequent
or a containing name. See Concerning Body I.3.2-3, 30-3. The identity between S and P in the former is
not clear. As I explicate right below, a proposition that S = P refers to a view that, if an S has all the
necessary criteria of P, gathered from sensations of all the “Ps”, then it is a part of P, but this is an quite
obscure view.
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Propositions, like names, can be classified in a number of ways922 of which two
will be discussed here. Perhaps the most significant distinction is that between true and
false propositions. A true proposition is ‘that, whose predicate contains, or comprehends
its subject, or whose predicate is the name of every thing, of which the subject is the
name’.923 If a predicate does not contain a subject, a proposition is false. For example,
‘the image of a man in a glass, or a ghost, is therefore denied to be a very man, because
this proposition, a ghost is a man, is not true; for it cannot be denied but that a ghost is a
very ghost’.924
According to Hobbes, there is a group of propositions that are the principles of
demonstrations, that is, something that cannot be proved. These include definitions or
the parts of definition (primary propositions), like ‘Man is body, animated, rational’,
axioms, and common notions .925 The last two are not principles properly speaking for
common notions can be false and petitions, like those in geometry, are ‘the principles of
art or construction, but not of science and demonstration’.926
After the classification of propositions, Hobbes analyses the logical structure of
proposition.927 To Hobbes the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of
an argument (or a syllogism) is a relationship that explains how from the knowledge in
the premises follows the knowledge in the conclusion. The fourth chapter on syllogisms
is a clarification of this relationship.928 The  author  himself  seems  to  admit  that  the
chapter – on logic in its traditional syllogistic form – is of little use:
And thus much seems sufficient for the nature of syllogisms; (for the doctrine of moods and
figures is clearly delivered by others that have written largely and profitably of the same). Nor
922 A proposition can be positive, such as ‘Man is a living creature’, or negative, like ‘Lassie is not a
man’. Secondly, there are four basic types of propositions: universal (‘Every man is a living creature’),
particular (‘Some men are learned’), indefinite (‘Man is a living creature’), and singular (‘Socrates is a
man’). See Concerning Body I.3.4-5, 33-35. Later, Hobbes classifies necessary ( ‘Man is a living
creature’), contingent (‘Every man is a liar’), categorical (‘Every man is a living creature’), hypothetical
(‘If a thing being a man, the same is also a living creature’) and equipollent propositions (for example,
the propositions ‘Every man is a living creature’ and ‘Every thing that is not a living creature is not a
man’ are equipollent). See Concerning Body I.3.10-16, 37-41. The third group analyses propositions
that are of the same or different quality or quantity. These include subaltern (from ‘Every man is a living
creature’ it follows that ‘Some man is a living creature’), contrary (e.g. propositions ‘Every man is
happy’ and ‘No man is happy’), subcontrary (‘Some man is learned’, ‘Some man is not learned’), and
contradictory (‘Every man is a living creature’, ‘Some man is not a living-creature’). See Concerning
Body I.3.12, 39-40.
923 Concerning Body I.3.7, 35.
924 Concerning Body I.3.7, 35.
925 Some evidence can be provided by a letter from Sorbiere, where he writes to Hobbes that
philosophers like him and Hobbes should return to ordinary facts. (Correspondence Letter 141)
926 Concerning Body I.3.9, 37.
927 Concerning Body I.3.20, 43-4.
928 First Hobbes makes some technical clarifications and then he goes on to introduce different types of
syllogisms.
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are precepts so necessary as practice for the attaining of true ratiocination; and they that study
the demonstrations of mathematicians, will sooner learn true logic, than they that spend time in
reading the rules of syllogizing which logicians have made; no otherwise than little children
learn to go, not by precepts, but by exercising their feet.929
Although the fifth chapter discusses error in sensation (a mistake not only in ‘in affirming
and denying, but also in perception, and in silent cogitation’) and ratiocination (a mistake
in affirming and denying , that is, ‘the falsity of propositions’),930 it is safe to conclude
that Hobbes articulated an Organon, with all its traditional elements, but which he
considered  only  ‘the  first  pace  in  the  way  to  Philosophy.931 It  is  a  further  question  to
what extent or in what way he followed the rules of formal reasoning.
There seems to be some evidence that Hobbes maintained a syllogistic way of
thinking, if not the syllogistic way of presenting arguments.932 There are traces of formal
argumentation in his texts. In On the Citizen, for example, he writes: ‘Socrates is a man,
and therefore a living creature, is a right reasoning’ and is evident.933 We can take this to
mean two things. Firstly, to clarify the reasoning could be taken as correct because it is a
valid syllogism, which can be formulated as follows:
Premise 1: Socrates is a man
Premise 2: Every man is a living creature
Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is a living creature.
However, this is not the reason why Hobbes takes the reasoning to be correct. He
continues:
[The reasoning is correct and evident] since all that one needs, to recognise the truth of the
conclusion, is to understand the word man, because animal is in the definition of man; and
everyone supplies the missing proposition, man is an animal.934
929 Concerning Body I.4.13, 54-5.
930 Concerning Body I.5.1, 55 and 57.
931 Concerning Body I.4.13, 54-5.
932 This naturally depends what we mean by ‘syllogism’ and related terms like syllogize. If we use the
term to refer to reasoning in general and drawing conclusion for certain premises, Hobbes surely
maintained a syllogistic way of thinking, but then who would not. If we, however, use the term in a more
specific way of studying and teaching the logic as this was done in the Medieval curriculum, Hobbes
himself seems to contract of – perhaps most vehemently in Verse Life (255), where he satirizes the
syllogistic way logic was taught in Oxford when he studied there.
933 On the Citizen IX.1, 107-108.
934 On the Citizen IX.1, 107.
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It, simply, follows from the definition of man that he is a living creature. Similarly it also
follows from the definition of man that he is, for example, rational. This, of course, does
not apply to all definitions. The quoted passage goes on:
Sophroniscus is the father of Socrates, therefore also his Master [Dominus] is also perhaps a
valid inference, but not totally evident, because Master is not in the definition of father. To
make it evident, one needs to explicate the relation between father and Master.935
The relationship between the names ‘father’ and ‘master’ is accidental, and therefore
does not fulfil the two central criteria of Hobbes’s concept of definition, namely that
scientific definitions are universal, real definitions. As Hobbes explains in the appendix of
the Latin Leviathan: ‘The essence of concrete being, say of a white being, is the name of
the  white  itself,  but  considered  insofar  as  it  is  white’.936 In the light of the above,
Hobbes’s argumentation is not so much about giving formally valid syllogisms, but of
formulating definitions and testing them against our knowledge of the world. How his
philosophical practice seems to support this intuition, is the next topic.
The second way to clarify Hobbes’s idea of valid philosophical reasoning is to
study the texts themselves. The majority of arguments in Hobbes’s writing start with a
definition  of  a  certain  phenomenon  and  then  go  on  to  analyse  what  follows  from  this
definition. Understood like this what we have is conceptual analysis, which includes logic
and the study of our linguistic practice as it is at present, not merely in the philosophy
books, but also in common parlance.
A rather  typical  example  of  Hobbes’s  argumentation  is  Chapter  X of Leviathan
(‘Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness’). The chapter begins with a short
definition of power: ‘The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means,
to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall or Instrumentall.’ This
basic definition is followed by a number of qualifications. First we learn that original
power means the natural powers of men, like strength, prudence, and eloquence. By
instrumental power Hobbes understands power that is acquired with natural powers, like
‘Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call Good
Luck’. The nature of power is like ‘Fame, increasing as it proceeds’, or ‘like the motion
of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste’. Lastly, Hobbes
emphasises that the greatest power is that of a commonwealth, that is, one in ‘which is
compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural, or
civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will’.937 In short, power is to
935 On the Citizen, IX.1, 107. Cf. De Cive IX.1, 164.
936 Appendix to Leviathan, 515. The English translation is a little bit turgid, but I interpret it to mean
that the essence of a thing is signified by its name, but only in so far as this name corresponds with our
perception of the thing. See also the original Latin text in EW, vol. III, 532.
937 All quotations from Leviathan X, 41.
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Hobbes a mean or a device to attain a certain kind of end (‘some future apparent Good’),
which, as Hobbes explains earlier in chapter six, is a consequence where there seems to
be more (subjective) good than evil.938 The definition of power is followed by Hobbes’s
study of what kinds of things can be thought of as power, that is, what follows from his
definition of power. For example, popularity and nobility are power, whereas (pure)
sciences are only small power.
We may now ask: Is this an argument? The answer being yes and no. It is not in
the sense that though there is a definition, the explanatory part of the argument seems to
be a recommendation of how we should understand a certain word and what falls under
its extension. But, again, it is an argument in the sense that it gives all the adequate
knowledge concerning the phenomenon of power, namely the knowledge of fact (a
definition) and the knowledge of consequences (what follows from the definition).
Secondly, though things Hobbes says about power do make sense and sound
plausible, what seems to be lacking is an explanation of the causes of power. Hobbes
only seems to answer the question, ‘what is power?’, not the question. ‘Why is power as
he describes it to be?’ This is not, however, quite correct. To be precise, Hobbes names
two causes of power. The first is our natural capacity (physical and mental powers), like
strength, and the second is the power acquired by pact (social or political power).
Power is not the only subject of Chapter X of Leviathan. It also discusses
conceptions  which  in  one  way  or  another  are  close  to  power,  such  as  worth  (the
comparative value of a man to society), dignity (or public worth), honour, and
worthiness (the fitness or aptitude of a man for an office). All receive their exact
definitions and a list of what kinds of things or acts fall under them. However, Hobbes
devotes most space to an analysis of honour.
The analysis of natural honour follows the basic procedure described above, but
when Hobbes moves to the analysis of honour in civil society there is a departure. Thus,
the discussion on honour extends to the history of ‘[s]cutchions, and Coats of Armes
haereditary [and] Titles of Honour,  such  as  are  Duke,  Count,  Marquis,  and  Baron’.939
From this miniature history Hobbes turns to the actual theme of the chapter, which is the
doctrine  of  private  and  public  evaluation  so  important  to  his  theory  of  the  state  as  a
neutral agent. If we leave natural equality aside (that is, mutual respect for each other as
natural equals), Hobbes in this chapter seems to suggest that we should not value each
other on the basis of superficial qualities, like honorary titles, but only on the basis of
what a person is able to do. Here he qualifies something claimed earlier in the chapter.
The known formula that ‘[t]he Value,  or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his
Price’940 introduces an instrumental view of man, but worthiness (understood as fitness,
938 Leviathan VI, 29.
939 Leviathan X, 45 and 46.
940 Leviathan X, 42.
- 223 -
that is, a suitability for a specific task), Hobbes underlines, should be distinguished from
worth. The further explication that merit may override worthiness seems to support this
more balanced reading of Hobbes’s doctrine of mutual respect based on the fact that we
are naturally equal.
Lastly, the way Hobbes structures his argument chapter exemplifies detours or
side-tracks that are not uncommon in Leviathan. Some of them, like the characterisation
of  a  man’s  life  as  ‘solitary,  poore,  nasty,  brutish,  and  short’941 are amplifications, but
some of them, I propose, are more than that.
CONCLUSION: EXPLANATION AND HOBBES’S
ARGUMENTATIVE PLURALISM
In Hobbes’s philosophy there is a difference between the merely stylistic and more
substantive textual strategies. Some of Hobbes’s extra-rational argumentation is verbal
acrobatics but some not. For example, when he says that ‘words are wise men’s counters
[…] but […] the money of fools’,942 this does not add anything decisive to his idea that
truth consists of right definitions of names, whereas the argument about the natural
origins  of  religion  would  not  be  as  effective  without  the  illustration  of  what  –  the
crocodile, the leak, and fever, to name but a few men have worshipped throughout the
ages.943 To distinguish between the two is not always easy, but hopefully the analysis
below will be of some use.
There are a number of literary strategies in Hobbes’s texts. The core idea here is
to show that Hobbes’ way of doing philosophy is itself an example of imagination. By
this, it should be added, it is referred to the more general meaning of term. That is say,
Hobbes’s philosophy is inventive and he uses various ways to exemplify his arguments.
The strategies are distinction, persuasion, referring to authority, genealogical
argumentation, and, most typically, illustration.944
An example of distinction is Chapter VI in Leviathan, which concerns passions.
The chapter begins by distinguishing between vital motion, like breathing and the
circulation of blood, and voluntary motion, which are ‘first fancied in our minds’, say,
drinking a glass of sherry, and introducing the concept of endeavour, or ‘small
beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking,
striking, and other visible actions’.945 After this Hobbes gives a rather extensive
941 Leviathan XIII, 62.
942 Leviathan IV, 15. ‘But’ is here conjunctive not disjunctive.
943 For a full list and the detailed argument, see Leviathan XII, 53-57.
944 It needs to be emphasised that the list introduced here is a reconstruction and I do not claim that
these are the only strategies Hobbes uses.
945 Leviathan VI, 23.
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classification of different passions. Starting from two basic motions, appetite and
aversion,  Hobbes  goes  on  to  add  a  number  of  organising  criteria,  like  does  the  motion
direct  one  towards  or  away  from  an  object,  and  to  introduce  the  basic  passions  of
appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief on which are based the rest of the
motions of the mind, like hope, diffidence, pusillanimity, curiosity, panic, and many
more. Finally, Hobbes analyses different ways of expressing the passions, for example
praise is the appropriate form to express the goodness of a thing.946
 Another way of using distinction is by referring to the classical terminology of
philosophy.  An  example  of  this  is  Hobbes’s  analysis  of  good  and  evil.  There  are  three
kinds of good and evil: good and evil in promise, good and evil in effect (or substantive
good), and good and evil as a means (or instrumental good). Unfortunately the English
of his age did not have the required delicacy to distinguish clearly between these, and
therefore Hobbes turns to Latin where the listed goods and evils are called (respectively):
pulchrum and turpe, jucundum and molestum, and utile and inutile. In short, the classical
terms are not there only to indicate Hobbes’s linguistic profiency, but are an integral part
of the explanation or explication of his ideas.
The second explanation that Hobbes uses is persuasion. Now and then Hobbes
uses analogies, metaphors, and tropes to strengthen his claims, but in a way that if a
persuasion is dropped, the argument will lose some of its force. It is an ongoing
discussion whether or not persuasion should be understood as something more than
rhetoric, but it cannot be denied that some of the force and finesse of Leviathan rests on
persuasive argumentation. Naturally the most brilliant analogy of Hobbes is that of
Leviathan947, but many others exists.
A stimulating example of persuasion is the argument against papacy, which uses
the analogy to kingdom of fairies.948 The analogy is located into the last chapter of
Leviathan in which Hobbes seeks to show how the ecclesiastics had benefited by their
manipulation of religion. He lists over ten different ways by which the clergy have
acquired, maintained, and raised their power over people and their lawful rulers. For
example, ‘the teaching that Matrimony is a Sacrament, giveth to the Clergy the Judging
of the lawfulnesse of Marriages; and thereby, of what Children are Legitimate; and
consequently, of the Right of Succession to hereditary Kingdoms.’949 This historico-
946 Leviathan VI, p. 46.
947 The analogy was discussed in the introduction. The textual analogy can be found in Leviathan,
‘Introduction’ and has been cited so many times that I won’t repeat it here. For an interesting, but
somewhat conjectural, analysis of Hobbes’s decision concerning the title of his magnum opus, see
Stillman 1995.
948 See Leviathan XLVII, 386-387. The kingdom of fairies appears shortly also in the Chapters XII and
XXIX of Leviathan.
949 Leviathan XLVII , 383.
- 225 -
critical analysis is followed by the analogy where it is pointed out, among other things,
that like fairies ecclesiastics sneak about in the dark and speak the language of death.
The third explanation is based on authority.950 Sometimes Hobbes appears to be
one of the dogmatists, whom he generally despises.951 This  is  a  qualified  claim  for
occasionally Hobbes seems to use authorities for strategic support. This is, for example,
the case at the end of Part II of Leviathan, where he compares his task to that of
Plato.952 The case is slightly different with proponents of the new science like Galileo and
Harvey. Hobbes shows them the appropriate formal admiration,953 but there are also
passages that paraphrase, critique, and develop their ideas. The second chapter of
Leviathan, for example, begins by summarising some of the key ideas of Galileo:
That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stir it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that
no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless
somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,)
is not so easily assented to. […And that ]
When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally; and
whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it.954
Hobbes is not here only criticising Aristotelian physics or showing that he is aware of the
latest discoveries of science, but is primarily introducing a basic idea of his psychology
(that mental functions obey the laws of motion), which he seeks to justify by an allusion
to Galileo and his authority.
The fourth kind of explanation is genealogy. Basically this means the analysis of a
conception and the meaning of words with certain special techniques.955 There are at
least two types of genealogies, etymologies and genealogies of the terms of Bible, which
both share the idea of restoring a forgotten original meaning of a word or a conception.
Here Hobbes’s debt to the critical linguistic analysis revived in the Renaissance is
evident.
950 This kind of argumentation is clearly evident in Thucydides,  where  some  parts  of  the  discussion
simply list what others have said.
951 Leviathan XLVI, 367-368. For the distinction between mathematici and dogmatici, see Elements
I.13.4, 75.
952 Leviathan XXXI, 193. A similar identification with Galileo can be found from Considerations upon
the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners and Religion of Thomas Hobbes, (in EW, IV, 432). For a recent
discussion of Galileo’s influence on Hobbes, see Jesseph (2004), who claims that the Galilean influence
appeared after a period of delay, that is to say, though Hobbes became familiar with the ideas of Galileo
already in the 1630s, the actual influence came in the next decade in Paris.
953 For example, Concerning Body, ‘The Author’s Epistle Dedicatory’, viii. In particular Hobbes seems
to lean on the authority of Galileo. He uses such expressions as ‘is well proved by Galileo’ (Elements
VIII.2, 47), ‘as hath been demonstrated by Galileo’ (Seven Philosophical Problems,  9 and Decameron
Physiologicum, 148) without explaining the ideas.
954 Leviathan II, 4.
955 On this, see also Skinner 1996, 310-311
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Etymologies are quite common in Hobbes’s works,956 but we need to distinguish
between their merely referential use and their substantive use. An example of the first
kind of etymology is in Chapter II of Leviathan, where Hobbes explains what he means
by imagination. He refers to the Greek and Latin predecessors of the concept.957 A more
substantive  way  of  using  etymology  is  the  way  in  which  Hobbes  uses  the  term
‘conscience’. In Leviathan,  he  writes:  ‘When two,  or  more  men,  know of  one  and  the
same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to
know it together.’958 A  border  case  can  be  found  in Concerning Body, where Hobbes
explains that by ratiocination he does not simply mean reckoning (and even less,
reckoning by numbers), but something closer to the original Greek idea as it is present in
the pair of terms logizomai/syllogizomai, which refers to reasoning understood as
bringing all the relevant facts together and presenting them in a comprehensible form.959
The second genealogical explanation is the meaning of scriptural terms.960
Hobbes Biblical criticism serves two functions: political and theological. The political
function attempts to show that the fundamental tenets of Christian faith are in
accordance with his political theory, whereas the theological function seeks to show that
there is no relationship between the nature of God and the nature of the world.
Explanation  as  a  technique  is  found  above  all  in  chapters  XXXIV  to  XXXIX  of
Leviathan, where Hobbes analyses such key Biblical concepts as ‘spirit’, ‘hell’, ‘holy’,
and ‘church’. This kind of explanation bears a resemblance to etymological analysis, for
in both there is a basic Renaissance tendency to restore the original meanings of concepts
that were corrupted (due to the works of the scholastics). The basic procedure in this
kind of explanation is to pick a term and then find passages in the Bible where it is
discussed and give a philological and sober analysis of these terms. For example,
‘church’ (Lat. Ecclesia,  though  the  English  word  comes  from  the  Greek Kyriake) has
three principal meanings in the scriptures. The first is the place where men gather to
worship God, a temple. The second is a particular assembly of citizens, or congregation.
Hobbes only takes the third to be the proper meaning. This is when the church refers to
the community of all Christians, no matter where they lived, who take Christ to be the
head of this universal congregation. The church is then:
A company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Soveraign; at
whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to
assemble. And because in all Common-wealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant from
957 To  be  precise,  Hobbes  does  not  use  the  Greek  word  here,  but  the  English  equivalent,  fancy.  The
Greek term is, however, mentioned in the corresponding discussion in Concerning Body IV.25.7, 396.
958 Leviathan VII, 31.
959 Concerning Body I.I.3, 5.
960 For an extensive discussion of Hobbes’s Biblical criticism, see Malcolm 2002, Chapter 12.
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the Civil Soveraign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in any Common-wealth,
that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawful Assembly.961
Hobbes’s aim is not an ecumenical one. For as no global sovereign exists, every Christian
should  obey  his  own sovereign.  The  conclusion  is  the  same as  it  is  in  Parts  I  and  II  of
Leviathan: men must obey they sovereigns, but the style of argumentation is different.
To conclude, Hobbes adopted different stylistic solutions in Leviathan and also in
some of his post-Leviathan works (like the use of Renaissance dialogue), which are
already a sign of change, but these solutions do not necessarily relate to his changing
conception of argumentation. Nevertheless, it appears plausible to say that it is not
possible to harness philosophy to a single method. Philosophy has always used various
techniques to illustrate arguments. In particular, civil philosophy, which is the hardest of
all the arts to master.962
961 Leviathan XXXIX, 248.
962 It is even more difficult than geometry. See Leviathan XXX, 184.
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VIII EPILOGUE
This epilogue offers two sorts of conclusions, systematic and historical, or internal and
external – though I shall follow the order that has become customary during the course
of the thesis, that is, I shall start with the historical and then proceed to the systematic
conclusions. Both kinds of conclusions try to demonstrate that Hobbes’s philosophy,
both when it comes to its contents and form, is more diverse than the standard readings
claim. Internal conclusions deal with the claim that Hobbes’s philosophy is best
understood through his conception of imagination. In order to show this, a summary
view of different conceptions or aspects of imagination in Hobbes will be given.
External conclusions can be reflected in relation to Kant’s though.963 As said in
the historical introduction, Kant is sometimes taken to be the turning point in the history
of imagination. His architectonic philosophy included an analysis of imagination that
established a strain in aesthetics and criticism, and which expanded in the treatment of
Romantic thinkers into a full philosophical programme. From a philosophical point of
view, the modern history of imagination has received relatively little attention. Though
some studies exist, a comprehensive and critical one is still missing. The work in hand is
unable to fulfil such a massive task, but it will provide some remarks based on the case of
Hobbes and imagination.
A standard reading says that Kant systematised the tripartite distinction of
imagination into the reproductive, productive, and creative imagination, but that this
division had its historical roots in 17th-century and 18th-century thinkers.964 Secondly, the
standard reading emphasises that the creative imagination, a term used already the 1730s,
matured ‘[w]ith a few exceptions, mostly in German philosophical writing’.965 The third
central claim is that the idea of the creative imagination developed out of pondering on
the nature of taste and, more broadly, art and literature. My first remark relates to this
last claim.
963 The relationship between Hobbes and Kant has interested scholars at least since the1930s, when
Taylor introduced his reading of Hobbes’s moral philosophy. This idea was developed further by Howard
Warrender and goes in the secondary literature under the name of Taylor Warrender -thesis. The
discussion is extensively documented in Brown 1965. For a recent study on the relationship between
Hobbes and Kant, see Williams 2003.
Kant himself comments on Hobbes in a number of places. In Critique of Pure Reason (A 752 /
B 780) Kant utilises some of Hobbes’s key notions, above all, state of nature, but more well known is the
attack in the essay ‘On the common saying “This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in
Practice”’, subtitled ‘Against Hobbes’. (See also Reiss 1991 and, especially, Airaksinen and Siitonen
2004, 326-327).
964 Here I follow by and large the excellent pioneering work of James Engel (1981).
965 Engel 1981, vii.
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In the chapter on art and style one of the ideas was to demonstrate how Hobbes’s
theory of literature was based on reproductive and productive imagination. Arts, like
poetry and history, could at their best give general insights formulated in a delicate way,
but never compete with genuine philosophical knowledge. Such knowledge, I argued, is
based on creative imagination understood as a capacity that brings something completely
new into the world and which is best exemplified in Hobbes’s political ideas, and has, at
least, a loose point of contact with the tradition of the maker’s knowledge and especially
the mathematical branch of this tradition. The standard reading of the modern history of
imagination, while concentrating on poetic imagination, then fails to appreciate the
epistemic imagination and its creative function.
The second, more systematical remark I wish to make relates to the development
of creative imagination after Kant. Here the claim is that Romantics, such as Coleridge
and Wordsworth, developed further the Kantian idea of creative imagination and gave it
a special inspirational and practical flavour. Imagination represents the poetical God-
given genius, but was equally ‘viewed as a cosmic power, responsible for bringing forth
and organising the unity of all creation and for implanting the divine in man’.966 In the
hands of the Romantics, it has been claimed, humankind moved from the age of reason
‘into an age of what Wordsworth defines as the age of imagination, that is, “reason in her
most exalted mood”’.967 In the Romantic conception of imagination, the psychological,
the epistemological, the aesthetic, and the mantic imagination combine together and form
an all-pervading force of the human mind.
My aim here is not so much to deny the plausibility of the standard reading as in
complementing it. It may well be that the origins of the Enlightenment and the Romantic
conceptions of imagination are in the discussions on the nature of art and taste in the
latter half of the 18th century, especially as the idea of the creative power of the aesthetic
imagination as creative does not appear before the Romantics. But to this genealogy
should be added the fact that the 17th century ideas on human nature, knowledge, and art
may well contribute to an understanding of the modern history of imagination.968 What
has been the historical claim here is that Hobbes’s theory of imagination in general and
his theory of knowledge in particular may be significant steps in this development, and
that the modern history of imagination, instead of being understood as a triumph of
aesthetic genius,  is  a more complicated story of the ways in which the mind, the word,
and the world interact. The thesis ends with a Hobbesian version of this.969
In Hobbes’s philosophy imagination is perhaps best understood as a theoretical
concept, which brings together different mental states and capacities of the mind. As
966 Engel 1981, viii.
967 Engel 1981, ix.
968 For an attempt to understand the relationship between the Early Modern period and Enlightenment
in less traditional terms, see Losonsky 2001.
969 Hobbes summarises some of his basic ideas of imagination in Leviathan XLV, 358-359.
- 230 -
such it may appear vague, but I hope that the preceding analyses have brought some
clarity and distinctiveness to this admittedly broad theme in Hobbes’s philosophy. It is
true that Hobbes’s terminology is not always consistent. It is easy to distinguish between,
say, dream and memory, but not between imagination and fancy, or phantasm. However,
if two criteria are kept in mind, imagination as a general term makes sense. The first is
that imagination is an appearance, and the second that for a conception of the mind to
qualify as imagination its object must not be directly present to a subject.970
The second conception is imagination as a specific psychological capacity. The
idea is that imagination is the natural capacity that picks up from the mind different
conceptions, which it can combine in a way that transcends past and present. It is not so
much the analysis of imagination, but the analysis of a train of imaginations that counts
here. From this analysis arises the pre- and semi-scientific thinking based on experience,
fancy, and judgement.
The third conception could be labelled aesthetic. I have argued that the aesthetic
or poetic imagination should be kept apart from Hobbes’s philosophical argumentation
and in particular from his civil philosophy. Though in both language plays a central role,
there are two things that separate them. The first is that poetry and other arts work on
particular facts and the second is the different role of language in the arts (poetry,
history, and rhetoric) and in philosophy. In the arts, the role of language is the
excitement of passions, while in the latter it is the clarification of our conceptions.
The next concept of imagination has to do with knowledge and it has some
resemblance to the second meaning of imagination. It is here where my reading of the
significance of imagination to Hobbes differs from what could be called the humanist
reading. I agree that in Leviathan Hobbes tries to bring together the methods of science
and the techniques of Renaissance humanism, and this manner of writing philosophy is
one of his enduring legacies. However, I disagree that the statement ‘how can fancy hope
to collaborate with reason to create a persuasive civil science’ is the essence of Hobbes’s
late (civil) philosophy of Hobbes or that in Leviathan’s ‘theory of imagination. Hobbes
returns in a wide circle to the humanist allegiances of his youth’.971
To Hobbes, philosophy and science is to have (and sometimes also to generate)
the correct (real) definitions. Here understanding (a form of imagination) and,
consequently, signs and language are important. Secondly, the analysis of regulated train
of thought and the generated causality point to the form of thinking which is not
determined by the previous sensation but genuinely creative. Further on, my argument is
not merely that thinking of any possible consequence refers to curiosity so typical to
970 The latter criterion needs an explication. An object is present only when it is actually there and has a
direct effect on our senses. Therefore, the reflection of the sun on the water or an echo are imaginations.
For a clear formulation of this, see Leviathan XLV, 358.
971 Where I am in agreement, see Skinner 1996, 437, and where I disagree, see 367 and 372 .
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human beings, but to a more specific technique of making hypothesis.972 The role
curiosity in Hobbes’s account of invention has been noted by scholars, and indeed
Hobbes himself speaks of curiosity in this context. I naturally do not seek to deny the
role of curiosity, but develop the argument by emphasising that the other element in this
sort of regulated discourse of the mind, design, is of at least equal importance as desire.
Curiosity is the motivational component of knowledge, whereas imagination is its
cognitive component. As Hobbes writes in Elements:
The contrary [of dulness] hereunto, is that quick ranging of mind described chap. IV sect. 3,
which is joined with curiosity of comparing things that come into his mind one with another. In
which comparison, a man delighted himself either finding unexpected similitude in things,
otherwise much unlike, in which men place the excellency of FANCY: and from thence proceed
those grateful similes, metaphors, and other tropes, by which orators have it in their power to
make things please or displease, and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else
discerning suddenly dissimilitude in things that otherwise appear the same. And this virtue of
the mind is that by which men attain to exact and perfect knowledge.973
Hobbes’s reference to poetry and oratory should not mislead us, and when he in
Leviathan rearticulates the above idea and defines the second type of regulated train of
thoughts as ‘imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can
by it be produced’,974 this is to be taken quite literally as the elementary idea of scientific
discovery. That is to say, we make various hypotheses about a phenomenon and then try
to verify them . The most successful hypothesis is the one that best explains the
phenomenon. The difference between natural philosophy and demonstrative sciences
(geometry and civil philosophy) is in the degree of certainty that they are able to provide.
Because the objects of geometry and civil philosophy are of our making, our knowledge
of them is also more certain and perfect than that concerning natural bodies, though it
does not follow from this that natural philosophy is a mere collection of facts; it is a
collection of more or less reliable generalisations.
Understood in this way imagination creates something completely new in terms
of knowledge. And as explained it was in the later writings of Hobbes (including perhaps
Leviathan at the level of practice, though it does not contain a clear theoretical
formulation of this new notion of knowledge) where this idea of the artificial production
of knowledge finds the best articulation. It needs to be emphasised, however, that this
theory of knowledge forms only a part of what can be taken to be revolutionary in
Hobbes’s political philosophy. The application of the ideas of classical mathematics to
civil philosophy and the theory of knowledge that grows out of this reflection are his
972 See Leviathan III, 10. Readings that emphasise curiosity include Bunce 2003 and Losonsky 2001.
Also James (1997) has emphasised the role of curiosity in seventeenth-century philosophy.
973 Elements X.4, 61.
974 Leviathan III, 9.
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contribution to the rational study of politics. But equally important is the role of
imagination in his analysis of the irrational dimension of politics, which leads to the
conception of mantic imagination. When evaluating this, we need to articulate what
problem Leviathan answers.
This was the problem that politics poses to philosophy and which is present
above all in language. The linguistic genius of Hobbes, as found in Leviathan, is a lively
example of how one might try to handle the language of politics. But the problem of
politics is not merely the abuse or misuse of language but the nature of language itself.975
To put the claim strongly, rhetoric and its alleged dangerous nature are the tip of the
iceberg. Rhetoric is an art that can be learned and utilised, even against the art itself.
Leviathan is an example, but Hobbes’s verbal genius and his conception of language are
more than a learned exercise of ars rhetorica and Leviathan something  more  than  ‘a
belated but magnificent contribution to the Renaissance art of eloquence’.976
Additionally, as I have argued, the analysis of eloquence should be seen as related to the
actual practice of politics. The use of figurative language is an integral part of politics
and this is a matter that needs to be taking into account in the philosophical study of
politics.
In a philosophical climate which is still very much influenced by (the late)
Wittgenstein, it is not a novelty to adopt a view that Hobbes’s philosophical project is
one that tries to understand what language is. My aim has been narrower and, perhaps,
more traditional, for I have investigated various mechanisms of language that are present
in  Hobbes’s  philosophy.  Therefore,  I  do  not  offer  a  theory  of  language  as  such,  but  a
view of language as it may be understood through Hobbes’s writings. And in this
respect, if there is a point of reference, it is Thucydides rather than Wittgenstein.
From the beginning of the 1980s there has been emphasis on the linguistic and
rhetorical dimension of Hobbes’s thought. Secondary literature concentrating on this line
of reading deals with an important dimension of Hobbes’s thinking. To characterise
recent Hobbes scholarship, we may adopt two ideas, namely those of the linguistic and
the rhetorical turn.977 The first notion refers, here, to the idea that Hobbes’s
philosophical project is an endeavour to understand the nature of language and,
furthermore, its role in philosophical thinking and political life. The latter expression
emphasises the rhetorical elements in Hobbes, indicating that his work can be analysed,
as the general tendency could be characterised, from the rhetorical point of view, or, as
975 As indicated earlier, the view is not novel. Thucydides, Hobbes’s early interest, proposed that there is
a nexus between the collapse or mess of public vocabulary and political order. (See The History of the
Peloponnesian War, Book 3, paragraphs 82-84.) A contemporary of Thucydides, Isocrates (436–338),
gave a similar argument (For sympathetic view of Isocrates, see Vickers 1988, 158).
976 Skinner 1996, 4.
977 Hobbes’s linguistic genius and his enigmatic style has been always recognised. Among the recent
studies, I have found the following works helpful: Whelan 1981; Ball 1985; Johnston 1986; and Skinner
1996. For expressions the linguistic turn and the rhetorical turn, see Rortry 1967 and Simons 1990, vii.
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the more qualified argument goes, that his thinking should be set into the context and
tradition of ars rhetorica.978 My work can be seen as both: in part following these lines
of interpretation, but also acting as a critical commentary upon them.
We may adopt the Greek word pharmakon to characterise Hobbes’s idea of the
functioning of language.979 Pharmakon can mean both cure and poison. Whether it  is  a
poison or a cure depends on the use. Too much botulin will kill, but the proper amount
can be useful. In the same manner, language can be a cure or make one ill; it constitutes
reasoning, even thinking, but always contains the possibility of misleading. For instance
in On the Citizen, Hobbes writes:
[H]owever well the animals may be able to use their voices to indicate their feelings to each
other, they still do not have the art of words that is needed to arouse the passions, notably, to
make the Good appear Better, and Bad Worse than they really are. But man’s tongue is a
trumpet to war and sedition.980
It is then plausible to repeat the platitudes that language is what makes man human and
that at the same time it is a dangerous ability. Hobbes’s philosophical project is an
attempt to try to understand this aspect of human life. Hobbes’s solution, however, has
its foundation in his naturalistic analysis of the human mind and the world; ‘[t]here is no
other acts of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally planted to him, so, as to need no
other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five
Senses’.981 As its concrete counter part, the great Leviathan, the great Leviathan is
indeed the ‘deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected.’982 It  is  not
definitions but real definitions that matter to Hobbes.
The connection between psychological and political theory is not neglected in
other works by Hobbes, but the link between the philosophical and the political is
clearest in Leviathan.983 In terms of imagination, the basic idea is as follows. A form of
imagination, vision is not only the description of a perversity of mind, but serves also as
978 For more general views, see Johnston 1986, Prokhovnik 1991, and Condren 1991; for a specific
view, see Skinner 1996.
979 The idea is present in his division into the uses and abuses of language and in man’s privilege to be
absurd (see Leviathan V, 20). For a discussion, see Prokhovnik 1991, 122-127.
980 On the Citizen V.5, 71.Cf. Leviathan XVII, 86-87.
981 Leviathan III, 11. Cf. Leviathan I.II, 8.
982 Elements II.10, 26.
983 In Elements discussion is scattered and not as extensive as it is in Leviathan. For example, vision is
used mainly to refer to visual perception. See Elements III.5, 29; I.X.9, 63; XI. De Corpore, De Homine,
and De Cive should  be  read  together,  but  even  so,  in De Corpore the discussion is limited mainly to
dreams, though Hobbes mentions men who, even when awake, have dreams of ghosts and incorporeal
substances, i.e. visions. See De Corpore IV.25.9. In De Homine and De Cive the practical implications
of psychology are largely neglected and the questions of religion and faith are discussed from the
institutional point of view.
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aetiology of (religious) fanaticism. Related to visions are the doctrine of private
judgement, pretence of inspiration, prophecy (true and false) and the word of God. In
other words, certain imaginations, especially, religiously motivated, which amplify
private judgement and prophecy, are clearly politically dangerous, for they provoke
fanaticism and sectarianism.984
Hobbes’s analysis of language is tied to the relationship between normative
language and political order. The 16th century had showed to Europe that probably the
greatest danger to political stability was religious enthusiasm. When moving to the 17 th
century, the sphere of good and evil was still to a large extent determined by religion.
Perhaps the clearest articulation of this can be found from the 1668 Latin edition of
Leviathan, where Hobbes writes: ‘these [disorders and civil wars] are most often
generated by differences of doctrine and intellectual wrangling, there must be some
restraint,  in  the  form  of  punishment,  on  those  who  teach,  in  books  or  sermons,  things
whose teaching the laws of the prince or republic prohibit’.985
Hobbes rephrases what was commonly known, but behind this is another line of
thought, namely that people are normatively thirsty, eager to condemn others and praise
themselves. This is the basis of the irrational aspect of politics and also Hobbes’s
modernity for his work can be taken to be among the first attempts to analyse ideology, a
very familiar phenomenon in modern politics.986
The language of religion and of morals is passionate and often overrides the
language of reason, toleration, and temper. The problem of politics, re-articulated in
more psychological terms, is that men are prone to make judgements about each other in
normative terms and because we are vainglorious creatures that seek nothing but ‘power,
honour, and riches’ the result is the perpetual fight over pride and dignity.987 We crave
for good and bad, and when the idea of the right to maintain subjective, private moral
principles is combined with this, social harmony is threatened.
But yet another question arises: Why is the language of religion a threat to the
public order? An initial  answer could be that because religion is – or at  least  was – the
only area of human life that goes beyond this life. Even Hobbes seems to admit this, or
how else can it be explained that he reserves so much space and effort to the analysis of
religion in his major work. It is true that he holds that there is no other government in
this world but the temporal and there is no power greater than the earthly
governments,988 but though as fully rational creatures we ought to think as Hobbes does,
984 A helpful analysis of the mantic aspect of imagination can be found in Chapter XLV of Leviathan,
entitled ‘Of DAEMONOLOGY, and other Reliques of the Religion of the Gentiles’.
985 Appendix to Leviathan, 526.
986 For a detailed and delicate discussion, see Kraynak 1990.
987 Articulated in terse terms in Leviathan VIII, 35. See also Thomas 1965 and especially Williams
2000.
988 Leviathan XXXIX, 248.
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the majority of people believed that God is the supreme power in every respect. This is
something that Hobbes also takes into account. To put the issue from another point of
view, the only imaginable power that can defeat the sovereign is God. Only He is able to
offer greater rewards and more horrible punishments. Eternal life is more important than
paying taxes, going to prison, or even to dying. The problem of politics culminates in this
conflict between private conviction and public conformity, which Hobbes analyses in the
case of Naaman, briefly noted in Chapter XLIII of Leviathan.989
When discussing the conflict between internal faith and external religion, Hobbes
refers to the Biblical story of Naaman, a Syrian army leader who converted to
Christianity but was forced to continue worshipping Baal. The lesson of Hobbes’s
interpretation of the story is that Naaman’s inner faith to God is more important than his
outward ritual worship of Baal. This can be taken to determine the de facto extension of
political freedom that subjects have in a commonwealth and, consequently, the range of
individual freedom to follow one’s own moral principles openly. Another, more general
reply to the challenge that mantic imagination poses, is his minimalistic theology.990
According to Sommerville, Hobbes’s political theory does not depend in any
significant way on his notion of God.991 Perhaps  this  is  so,  but  from  this  it  does  not
follow that theological issues do not have role in Hobbes’s political thinking. A balanced
perspective on the issue is provided by Thomas:
Of course, religion ultimately outlived its magical competitors. […] When the Devil was
banished to Hell, God himself was confined to working through natural cause. 'Special
providences' and private revelations gave way to the notion of a Providence which itself obeyed
natural laws accessible to human study.992
Here the relationship between religious belief and scientific thinking is not displayed in
antagonistic terms. Instead, Thomas continues, ‘magic and science had originally
advanced side by side. The magical desire for power had created an intellectual
environment favourable to experiment and induction’.993 It  is  then  perhaps  a
simplification to represent Hobbes’s thinking as purified from all religious issues. This
was discussed in the introductory chapter of the thesis when touching the question of
Hobbes’s atheism. To repeat, the mental world around Hobbes was essentially religious
and it is reasonable to think that this had an influence also to his philosophy. One way to
see how this was done is to reflect on Hobbes’s theological ideas.
989 See Leviathan XLIII, 330.
990 On Hobbes’s concrete ideas of education, see Correspondence, Letter 58.
991 Sommerville 1992, 138.
992 Thomas 1991, 765.
993 Thomas 1991, 770.
- 236 -
The outcome of Hobbes’s pondering on the nature of God is a minimalistic
theology. In purely doctrinal terms, this theology can be summarised by two tenets which
are in accordance with his idea of political obligation and obedience, which, again, if we
believe Hobbes, are in accordance with what Christ taught. These are the belief that
Jesus is Christ and obedience to laws. Another way to clarify the issue is the idea that
Hobbes aimed at a synthesis of natural and Biblical theology.994 Hobbes’s discusses
natural theology in Chapter XXXI of Leviathan, which is at the same time a summary of
Parts I and II and an introduction to Parts III and IV. The chapter tries to describe God’s
natural kingdom, which is characterised by two features. On the one hand, it is manifest
in the principles of natural law, which describe the rationality of nature, but, on the other
hand, we have the notion of cruel, omnipotent, and mystical God. Nevertheless, Hobbes
emphasises omnipotency, not the severe God of the Old Testament. Partly this might be
because he wants to put the natural reasons for religion in their right place, that is,
ignorance and the fear of the supernatural are not religious reasons for religion, because,
properly speaking, religion only exists in civil society, where there is a uniform
interpretation of the word of God by sovereign.
Hobbes then has a clear idea that all people should be educated to understand
why they are members of a commonwealth. An obstacle to this was the deeply religious
atmosphere of the time. For this purpose Hobbes developed his minimalistic theology,
which reduced Christian faith to a form that was simple and resistant as possible to
doctrinal politics.
In this work, the aim has not been to state the final word on Hobbes, merely to
make his philosophy more comprehensible. In Prologue I put forward a view that some
of the most familiar epithets attached to Hobbes and his philosophy were more like
background principles than fixed doctrines of a complete philosophical system. What
remains true is, however, that the ideas that the mentioned doctrines represent are an
integral part of Hobbes’s philosophy. My point is again simple: all the central labels that
have been attached to Hobbes’s thinking are important, but they are parts of his rational
world view. As Robertson once described Hobbes’s philosophy:
Nobody is more urgent than Hobbes in pointing the distinction between Science and
Experience[...] and the opposition runs through all his thought. Here [in his idea of science] it
is reasoning against experience; in his psychology it is reason against sense, or wisdom against
prudence; in his politics it is reason against custom; in his theology (when he diverges into
theology) it is reason against faith, save at an innermost core. Everywhere the aim of Hobbes is
to rationalise.995
994 Milner, 1988. The analysis in the preceding paragraphs is largely based on this work.
995 Robertson 1993, 82.
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The phrasing reflects my reading of Hobbes in which I have emphasised the role of
imagination, on one hand, and diversity of his thinking, on the other hand. The first issue
I wish to summarise as follows. Imagination is a capacity that assembles, motivates, and
explicates the mind and its functions in order, first, to produce and to create knowledge,
and, second, to create harmonious style. When it comes to the second topic, my view is
the following. Instead of dogmatically following some fixed doctrines, Hobbes realised
that there is not necessarily only one way to make a philosophical argument. For him the
objectivity  of  the  world  and  our  knowledge  of  its  objects  were  self-evident,  the  harder
part was to give a convincing argument that we really do have good grounds for
believing this. This gives his philosophy a certain flavour that can be characterised by
saying that problems and questions are more important than theories and principles. The
outcome of this is an enlightened, rational person, who is able to understand the diversity
of nature, man, and society.
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